Gordon v. Cowtown Express Logistics LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
NICCOL GORDON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
COWTOWN EXPRESS LOGISTICS LLC,
CARRIER411 SERVICES INC., WILL
RUDDICK, and COWTOWN EXPRESS,
INC.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-547-P
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE REGARDING COWTOWN DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS
Pending before the Court is Defendants Cowtown Express Logistics LLC, Cowtown
Express Inc., and Will Ruddick’s Motion to Dismiss [doc. 88], filed November 3, 2025. Having
carefully considered the motion, response, and applicable law, the Court RECOMMENDS that
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
I. 	RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Niccol Gordon (“Plaintiff”) “is a citizen of New York, residing in West
Hempstead, NY, and the sole owner and operator of RNN Global Transportation[.]” (Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl.”) at 1.) 	RNN is “a registered freight
dispatching company in New York[.]” (Pl’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 1.) 	In early November 2023,
Plaintiff had an interaction with Defendants Cowtown Express Logistics LLC, Cowtown Express
Inc., and Will Ruddick (collectively “Cowtown Defendants”) that culminated in Cowtown
Defendants posting an allegedly defamatory “FreightGuard Report” (“Report”) on Carrier411’s
website. (See Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.) The Report stated:
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CANCELLED AFTER ACCEPTING LOAD - BOOKED LOAD WITH NICCOL,
FOR A PICKUP IN FORT WORTH - TRUCK 3 HOURS AWAY - I STATED I
DON’T NORMALLY BOOK A TRUCK THIS FAR AWAY BUT WILL GIVE
THEM A SHOT - SHE ASSURED NO ISSUES - CARRIER NEVER FILLED
OUT OUR PACKAGE AND DIDN’T ANSWER ANY CALLS OR TEXT - HAD
TO RECOVER LOAD FOR A HIGHER RATE - TRED LIGHTLY AS THEY
GHOSTED AFTER BOOKING
(Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2-3; 19 (emphasis in original).) 	Based on this Report, Plaintiff is
asserting claims against Cowtown Defendants for (1) Antitrust Violations, (2) RICO Violations,
(3) Defamation, (4) Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations, and (5) Motor
Carrier Act Violations. (See Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 3-4.) The Court will address each count in
turn.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12 (b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint
that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This Rule
must be interpreted in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which sets forth the
requirements for pleading a claim for relief in federal court. Rule 8(a) calls for “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see
also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (holding that Rule 8(a)’s simplified
pleading standard applies to most civil actions). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded,
non-conclusory allegations in the complaint and liberally construe the complaint in favor of the
plaintiff. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045,
1050 (5th Cir. 1982).
The plaintiff must, however, plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid
dismissal. 	Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir.1992). 	Indeed, the plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations omitted). The Court need not credit bare conclusory
allegations or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. Rather, “[a] claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Further, when a plaintiff alleges claims sounding in fraud, they must
be pleaded with particularity in accordance with Rule 9(b). 	Nix v. Major League Baseball, 62
F.4th 920, 931 (5th Cir. 2023). 	In other words, a plaintiff must provide the “who, what, when,
where, and how” of the alleged fraud. Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 179 (5th Cir.
1997) (citation omitted).
“Generally, a court ruling on a motion to dismiss may rely on only the complaint and its
proper attachments. 	A court is permitted, however, to rely on documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Dorsey v. Portfolio
Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“A written document that is attached to a complaint as an exhibit is considered part of the
complaint and may be considered in a 12(b)(6) dismissal proceeding.” Ferrer v. Chevron Corp.,
484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007). In addition, a “court may consider documents attached to a
motion to dismiss that ‘are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s
claim.’” Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scanlan v. Tex.
A & M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)). If a court determines that dismissal of a claim
is appropriate, it should be with prejudice if amending the claim would be futile or “the plaintiff
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has alleged his best case.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1999); see Schiller v.
Physicians Res. Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir.2003).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Count I: Antitrust Violations1
In Cowtown Defendants’ Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim
for violations of the Antitrust laws. (Cowtown Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Cowtown Defs.’
Mot. to Dismiss”) at 10.) 	Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act makes unlawful “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. 	“To establish a
[s]ection 1 violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) engaged in a conspiracy (2) that
restrained trade (3) in a particular market.” 	BRFHH Shreveport, LLC v. Willis-Knighton Med.
Ctr., 49 F.4th 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). To satisfy the conspiracy element, a plaintiff
must show “that the defendants engaged in concerted action, defined as having ‘a conscious
commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’” Marucci Sports,
L.L.C. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 373-74 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Golden
Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2008)). At the motion to dismiss
stage, a plaintiff must allege “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement
was made.” 	Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 544. 	Finally, “parallel conduct does not suggest
1 As an initial matter, it is not clear from Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint under which Antitrust law
she is proceeding. Plaintiff refers to the Clayton Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act in the header in her Second
Amended Complaint but does not indicate if she is proceeding under section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act and does not plead any facts that could be associated with the Cayton Act. The fact that this Court cannot with
certainty ascertain what statute or section Plaintiff is bringing her claim under is sufficient grounds alone to find that
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim; however, because the language contained within the complaint generally tracks
that of section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Court construes that Count I is being brought under section I of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
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conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply
facts adequate to show illegality.” Id. at 557.
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following regarding her Antitrust
claim:
Cowtown Defendants and Carrier411 conspired in a group boycott and concerted
refusal to deal by using Carrier411’s grading platform to exclude Plaintiff from the
multi-state freight market, constituting per se and rule-of-reason violations.
Carrier411’s platform was not neutral but an active participant in market exclusion
and restraint of trade, harming competition.
Plaintiff suffered both competitive and personal injury.
(Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 3-4.) 	Simply put, these allegations do not come close to alleging
“enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.” Bell Atl. Corp.,
550 U.S. at 556. For example, Plaintiff does not allege “when, where, or how the conspiracy was
supposedly formed.” Elite Sub-Zero Repair v. Great Plains Appliance Parts, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-
118-DAE, 2023 WL 11916709, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2023). 	Thus, the Court FINDS and
CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible Antitrust claim. 	Consequently, the
Court RECOMMENDS that Cowtown Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s Antitrust claim and that such claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
B. 	Count II: Violations of the RICO Act (18 U.S.C §1962)
Next, Cowtown Defendants argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the RICO
Act. (Cowtown Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12.) The RICO Act provides a civil cause of action to
“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 	18
U.S.C. § 1964(c). 	“Broadly stated, a civil RICO claimant must prove (1) a violation of the
substantive RICO statute . . . and (2) an injury to the plaintiff’s business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962.” 	Stacker v. Givens-Davis, No. 3:23-cv-00833-D (BT), 2024 WL
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4427818, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2024) (quoting HCB Fin. Corp. v. McPherson, 8 F.4th 335,
338 (5th Cir. 2021)), rep. and rec. adopted, 2024 WL 4428988 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2024). Further,
“[a]n injured party must show that the violation was the but-for and proximate cause of the injury.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 802 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 654 (2008)). “To state a civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, a
plaintiff must allege three common elements: ‘(1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of
racketeering activity, (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an
enterprise.’” Peel v. Cpaperless, LLC, No. 4:23-CV-02417, 2024 WL 5058609, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 8, 2024) (quoting North Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781
F.3d 182, 201 (5th Cir. 2015)), rep. and rec. adopted, 2024 WL 5063667 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2024).
While these elements may seem “deceptively simple, . . . each concept is a term of art which carries
its own inherent requirements of particularity.” Elliot v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1989).
Additionally, “[a] RICO plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, which
establish the enterprise, and plaintiff must plead the specified facts as to each defendant.” Holliday
v. Goodell, No. 25-264, 2025 WL 721307, at *4 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2025).
1. 	A Pattern of Racketeering Activity
“Racketeering activity” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961, which encompasses certain state
and federal crimes. 	The individual acts or crimes of “‘racketeering activity’ are known as
‘predicate offenses.’” World of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 122
(5th Cir. 1996). In the Fifth Circuit, to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, two elements
must be met: “1) predicate acts—the requisite racketeering activity and 2) a pattern of such acts.”
In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 742 (5th Cir. 1993); Boroja v. Roux, No, 1-22-CV-01299-RP, 2023
WL 4054689, at *4 (W.D. Tex. June 15, 2023). The “pattern of acts” element requires a showing
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of “two or more predicate acts and a demonstration that the racketeering predicates are related and
amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Williamson,
224 F.3d 425, 441 (5th Cir. 2000); See St. Germain v. Howard, 556 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009).
While “[r]elatedness is established if the acts have the same or similar purposes, results,
participants, victims, or methods of commission[,]”2 continuity is established by a plaintiff
demonstrating: “(1) a ‘closed period of repeated conduct;’ or (2) an open-ended period of conduct
that ‘by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.’” Malvino v. Delluniversita,
840 F.3d 223, 231 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting J.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
241 (1989)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that the following predicate offenses establish a pattern of
racketeering activity: “mail/wire fraud, extortion, and racketeering.”3 (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at
4.) 	To establish a predicate act of wire fraud, Plaintiff must first meet the heightened pleading
standard of Federal Rule 9(b).4 See Arroyo v. Oprona, Inc., H-16-852, 2017 WL 7792617, at *3
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2017) (“Arroyo I”). Rule 9(b)’s “particularity” standard requires a party to, at
a minimum, set forth “allegations of the particulars of time, place, and contents of the false
representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what he
obtained thereby.” Crosswell v. Rodriquez, 120 F.4th 177, 184 (5th Cir. 2024); see Arroyo I, 2017
2 World of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church, 90 F.3d at 122.
3 The Court notes that Plaintiff, in her Second Amended Complaint, does not allege a single mailing caused
to be sent by Defendants; as such, mail fraud clearly cannot support her RICO claim. See Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008) (mail fraud requires a mailing). As to extortion as a predicate, Plaintiff pleads
no facts that would allow the Court to infer extortion has occurred. Further, it appears Plaintiff concedes this point
as, in her Response, she only argues that Defendants committed wire fraud. (See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendant Carrier411’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s Resp. to Carrier411”)
at 6 (only arguing that the Defendants committed three acts of wire fraud).) As such, the Court will only address
Plaintiff’s allegations of wire fraud and considers her claims relating to extortion abandoned.
4 In alleging fraud, a party shall state with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud; however,
malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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WL 7792617, at *3 (“Rule 9(b) requires that a plaintiff must specify the fraudulent statement,
identify the speaker, state when the statement was made, and explain why the statement was
fraudulent.”) (citations omitted). 	However, Rule 9(b) permits a party to plead generally
“[a]llegations about conditions of the mind, such as a defendant’s knowledge of the truth and intent
to deceive.” Crosswell, 120 F.4th at 184.
To commit “wire fraud, a defendant must (1) ‘devis[e]’ or ‘inten[d] to devise’ a scheme (2)
to ‘obtai[n] money or property’ (3) ‘by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.’” Kousisis v. United States, 605 U.S. 114, 123 (2025) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343). As
a result, a defendant only commits wire fraud “if he both engaged in deception and had money or
property as an object of his fraud.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, even liberally construing the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s wire fraud
allegations lack the specificity that Rule 9(b) demands. Regarding her RICO claim, Plaintiff only
sets forth the following three sentences in her Second Amended Complaint:
Defendants formed an enterprise, committing repeated acts of mail/wire fraud,
extortion, and racketeering by publishing false reputation scores and enforcing
commercial exclusion.
Carrier411 systematically aggregated and monetized reputational and economic
exclusion, in concert with Cowtown Defendant.
Plaintiff suffered injury to her reputation, business and property.
(Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 4.) 	Plaintiff apparently recognizes that the allegations in her Second
Amended Complaint are deficient as she attempts to supplement her complaint in one of her
responses. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Carrier411 at 6.) In her Second Amended Complaint, there is only
one act that could reasonably be construed as the wire supporting wire fraud, the allegedly
defamatory Report being published on Carrier411’s website. (See Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2, 4.)
In her Response she construes what was originally alleged as a single act, the publishing of the
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allegedly defamatory Report, into three distinct acts. Specifically, she now argues that there are
three separate acts of wire fraud, which are the submission of the Report by Cowtown Defendants,
the publication of the Report by Carrier 411, and the use of a database to disseminate the Report.
(Pl.’s Resp. to Carrier411 at 6.) However, whether the Court considers the Report a single wire,
as in the Second Amended Complaint, or as three separate wires, as in her Response, Plaintiff still
fails to state facts allowing this Court to infer Cowtown Defendants committed wire fraud.
Specifically, Plaintiff has plead no facts that the publication of the allegedly defamatory Report in
any way was designed or intended by Defendants “to ‘obtai[n] money or property’” of another.
See Kousisis, 605 U.S. 114 (2025) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1343). 	Further, Plaintiff fails to plead
what Cowtown Defendants obtained as a result of the alleged fraud. See Crosswell, 120 F.4th at
184. Consequently, because Plaintiff fails to plead at least two predicate acts supporting her RICO
claim, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible RICO
claim. 	Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s RICO claim be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
C. 	Count III: Defamation
Cowtown Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s defamation claim
because Plaintiff has abandoned it by not substantively responding to Cowtown Defendants’
arguments that the Report is an expression of opinion, not defamatory, and that Plaintiff has not
plead sufficient factual allegations to support a defamation claim. (Cowtown Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss
at 16; see also Cowtown Defendants’ Reply (“Cowtown Reply”) at 2.) 	“Failure of a party to
respond to arguments raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver or abandonment of that
issue.” MCR Oil Tools, LLC v. DMG Mori USA, Inc., No. 4:20-CV-00560-O, 2020 WL 13133311,
at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2020) (O’ Connor, J.) (citing Black v. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584,
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588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006)); see also Wheeler v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., No. 3:24-CV-2058-S-
BK, 2025 WL 936664, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2025) (“Indeed, Plaintiff's failure to meaningfully
respond to any of Defendants' arguments constitutes abandonment of all his claims.”), rep. and
rec. adopted, No. 3:24-CV-2058-S-BK, 2025 WL 936657 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2025). When
abandonment or waiver occurs in this way, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper. See MCR Oil
Tools, LLC, 2020 WL 13133311, at *9 (dismissing fraud claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because a
plaintiff did not respond to a defendant’s economic loss argument).
The entirety of Plaintiff’s response to Cowtown Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding
her defamation claim is as follows:
Defendants published false, defamatory information targeting Plaintiff by
name, damaging her reputation and livelihood.
. . . .
Defendants Cowtown, through their agent Will Ruddick, falsely accused
Plaintiff of “stealing freight in which he had to recover” and unethical practices.
Publication via Carrier411’s platform graded then disseminated these
defamatory statements industry-wide.
Plaintiff suffered substantial reputational and economic injury, consistent
with Texas defamation law.
(Plaintiff’s Response to Cowtown Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp. Cowtown Mot. Dis.”) at 2-3.)
Plaintiff, in her response, chose not to respond substantively to Cowtown Defendants’ arguments
that the Report is an expression of opinion, not defamatory, and that Plaintiff has not plead
sufficient factual allegations to support a defamation claim. (Cowtown Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at
16.) Thus, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that dismissal of Plaintiff’s defamation claim is
proper. 	See MCR Oil Tools, LLC, 2020 WL 13133311, at *9. 	Consequently, the Court
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RECOMMENDS that Cowtown Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
claim for defamation and that such claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
D. Count IV: Tortious Interference with a Prospective Business Relationship
Cowtown Defendants next argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for tortious
interference with prospective business relations (“tortious interference”). (Cowtown Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss at 16.) To state a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, a
plaintiff must allege that “(1) there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have
entered into a business relationship with a third party; (2) the defendant either acted with a
conscious desire to prevent the relationship from occurring or knew the interference was certain
or substantially certain to occur as a result of the conduct; (3) the defendant’s conduct was
independently tortious or unlawful; (4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff injury;
and (5) the plaintiff suffered actual damage or loss as a result.” Nix, 62 F.4th at 934. To plead the
first element, a plaintiff must allege the specific business relationship interfered with and the
specific individuals this relationship would have been with. See I Love Omni, LLC v. Omnitrition
Int'l, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-2410-G, 2017 WL 3086035, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2017) (dismissing
a tortious interference claim when a plaintiff plead only “unspecified individuals” and “some
unspecified business relationship”).
Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to her claim for tortious interferences are that “Defendants
intentionally and knowingly prevented Plaintiff from contracting, securing business, or performing
her profession in Texas and beyond” and that “[a]ctual refusals and losses ensued directly from
Defendants’ unlawful actions.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 4.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff
has failed to allege “there was a reasonable probability that the plaintiff would have entered into a
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business relationship with a third party”5 because she has not stated the specific business
relationship interfered with and the specific individuals this relationship would have been with.
See I Love Omni, LLC, 2017 WL 3086035, at *3. 	At best, she alleges an undisclosed broker
refused to contract with her based on the Report. (See Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 15.) Thus, the
Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for tortious interference.
Consequently, the Court RECOMMENDS that Cowtown Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss be
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations and
that such claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
E. Count V: Violation of the Motor Carrier Act
Finally, Cowtown Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims under the Motor Carrier Act
must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as her allegations are entirely
conclusory. (Cowtown Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12.) Plaintiff’s allegations relating to the Motor
Carrier Act are confined to a single sentence: “Carrier411 and/or Cowtown Defendants violated
federal and state standards for fair business conduct, reporting, and competitive practices, erecting
unlawful barriers for licensed carriers and brokers.” (Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 4-5.)
Courts must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally. Andrade v. Gonzales, 459
F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006). 	“However, ‘such a liberal construction does not require that the
Court or a defendant create causes of action where there are none.’” Gonzalez v. Int'l Med. Devices,
Inc., 787 F. Supp. 3d 776, 784 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2013
WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013)). Regardless “of whether the plaintiff is proceeding
pro se or is represented by counsel, ‘conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.’” Taylor v. Books A Million,
5 Nix, 62 F.4th at 934.
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Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme
Court of State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001)). Plaintiff’s allegations are the definition
of vague and conclusory. 	(See Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 4-5.) 	In addition, the Court cannot
ascertain which section of the Motor Carrier Act Plaintiff is proceeding under to begin the analysis
of whether she stated a claim. Thus, the Court FINDS and CONCLUDES that Plaintiff has failed
to 	state 	a 	claim 	for 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	Motor 	Carrier 	Act. 	Consequently, 	the 	Court
RECOMMENDS that Cowtown Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss be GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
claim for violations of the Motor Carrier Act and that such claim be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants Cowtown
Express Logistics LLC, Cowtown Express Inc., And Will Ruddick’s Motion to Dismiss [doc. 88]
be 	GRANTED 	and 	that 	all 	claims 	against 	such 	Defendants 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITH
PREJUDICE.6
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
6 As set forth above, a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when amending a complaint would be futile,
Schiller, 342 F.3d at 566, or “if the court determines the plaintiff has alleged his best case.” Jones, 188 F.3d at 327.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has plead her best case because this is Plaintiff’s third complaint, and the Court has
already given Plaintiff a final opportunity to amend her complaint to plead her best case prior to considering
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (See Order Requiring Plaintiff to File an Amended Complaint at 1.)
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novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to
which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate
Judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation where the disputed determination is found.
Failure to file, by the date stated above, a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding
or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from
attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the
United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29
(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending
the time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until January
22, 2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to
the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions and recommendation, be and hereby
is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.
SIGNED January 8, 2026.
____________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 4:25-cv-00547-P Document 94 Filed 01/08/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID <pageID>