Gordon v. Cowtown Express Logistics LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
NICCOL GORDON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
COWTOWN EXPRESS LOGISTICS LLC,
CARRIER411 SERVICES INC., WILL
RUDDICK, and COWTOWN EXPRESS,
INC.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-547-P
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE REGARDING DEFENDANT CARRIER 411’S MOTIONS TO
DISMISS
Pending before the Court is Defendant Carrier411 Services, Inc. (“Carrier411”)’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint [doc. 87] under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6), filed on November 3, 2024. This case was
referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States
Code, Section 636(b). Having reviewed the motion, response, reply, and relevant law, the Court
RECOMMENDS that Carrier411’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction be
GRANTED for the reasons stated herein.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Pro se Plaintiff Niccol Gordon (“Plaintiff”) “is a citizen of New York, residing in West
Hempstead, NY, and the sole owner and operator of RNN Global Transportation[.]” (Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (“Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl.”) at 1.) 	RNN is “a registered freight
dispatching company in New York[.]” (Pl’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 1.) 	RNN, and by extension
Plaintiff, “regularly conducts trucking and freight brokerage business in both New York and
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Texas.” 	(Sec. Am. Compl. at 1.) 	In early November 2023, Plaintiff had an interaction with
Defendants Cowtown 	Express Logistics LLC, Cowtown Express Inc., and Will 	Ruddick
(collectively “Cowtown Defendants”) that culminated in Cowtown Defendants posting an
allegedly defamatory “FreightGuard Report” (“Report”) on Carrier411’s website. (See Pl.’s Sec.
Am. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff is asserting claims against Carrier411 for (1) Antitrust Violations, (2)
RICO Violations, (3) Defamation, (4) Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations,
and (5) Motor Carrier Act Violations. (See Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 3-4.) These claims arise from
the allegedly defamatory Report posted on Carrier411’s website by the Cowtown Defendants. (See
Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.)
In her Second Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Carrier411 Services
Inc. is a Florida corporation with substantial business operations affecting Texas, including broker
and carrier rating, grading, and reputational reporting platform.” 	(Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2.)
Carrier411 admits that it is “incorporated in the State of Florida with its principal place of business
in” Florida. (See Carrier411’s Motion to Dismiss (“Carrier411’s Mot. to Dismiss”) at Exhibit 6,
Declaration of Darren M. Brewer (“Brewer Decl.”) at 2.) Carrier411, however, contests that it has
substantial business operations in Texas that would subject it to the personal jurisdiction of this
Court. (See Brewer Decl. at 2.)1 In fact, in a sworn declaration, the CEO of Carrier 411 claims
the following: 	(1) Carrier411 operates exclusively from Florida; (2) Carrier411’s books and
records are maintained in Florida; (3) Carrier411 has never conducted any events in Texas; (4)
Carrier411 does not undertake any activities specifically directed to Texas or its residents; and (5)
Carrier411 does not advertise its services to Texans or otherwise. (See Brewer Decl. at 2.)
1 This declaration remains unrebutted by Plaintiff; as such, the sworn testimony within controls because a
Court need only accept allegations not controverted by evidence in ruling on a motion to dismiss for personal
jurisdiction. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) allows for the dismissal of an action in which the
court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant. As an initial matter, it is proper for a Court
recommending dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) to do so without addressing the merits of the asserted
claims. See Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 231–32 (5th Cir.
2012) (affirming district court’s decision to dismiss case for lack of personal jurisdiction, without
separately ruling on the defendant’s pending Rule 12(b)(6) arguments). 	When a defendant
challenges personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of “mak[ing] a
prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction is proper.” E.S. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 510 F. Supp.
3d 420, 425 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 431 (5th
Cir. 2014)). “In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction a district court
may consider ‘affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the
recognized methods of discovery.’” Revell, 317 F.3d at 469 (quoting Alpine View Co. Ltd. v. Atlas
Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th Cir.2000)). 	The Court “must 	accept the plaintiff's
uncontroverted allegations, and resolve in [his] favor all conflicts between the facts contained in
the parties’ affidavits and other documentation.” Id. (alterations in original). The Court, need not
“credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted.” 	Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 2001). Moreover, when “unsubstantiated allegations
are controverted by affidavit or declaration, the affidavit or declaration trumps the allegation.” In
re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liab. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 845, 847 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citing
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir.1986), modified, 836 F.2d
850 (1988)).
As to the scope of personal jurisdiction in federal court, “[a]bsent a federal statute that
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provides for more expansive personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of a federal district
court is coterminous with that of a court of general jurisdiction of the state in which the district
court sits.” Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)). Because the Texas long-arm statute “reaches to the limits of
due process,” the Court need only analyze whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
violate due process. Purcel v. Advanced Bionics Holding Corp., No. 3:07-CV-1777-M, 2008 WL
4790998, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2008). 	Due process requirements are satisfied if the non-
resident defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co.
v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal
quotations omitted).
Two types of minimum contacts support jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) contacts that
give rise to general personal jurisdiction and (2) contacts supporting specific personal jurisdiction.
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). A court may
exercise general jurisdiction over a defendant entity only if the entity’s “affiliations with the State
in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [the defendant] at home in the
forum State.’” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 122 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); see also New World Int’l, Inc. v. Ford Glob. Techs.,
LLC, No. 3:15-CV-01121-M, 2016 WL 1069675, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2016). To satisfy this
standard, an entity must be incorporated in the state, headquartered in the state, or have some other
equivalent presence in the state. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 403 (2017).
For specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant purposefully directed
his activities at residents in the forum; (2) the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise from
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or relate to the defendant’s activities in the forum; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction will comport
with “fair play or substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)
(citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). A defendant’s isolated or occasional activities in the forum
are insufficient to establish jurisdiction if the “nature and quality and the circumstances” of those
activities establish only an attenuated affiliation with the forum. 	Id. at 475–76 n.18. 	Once the
plaintiff has established minimum contacts, however, a defendant “must present a compelling case
that the presence of some considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” 	Id. at 477.
Accordingly, “[o]nly in rare cases . . . will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play
and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposely established minimum
contacts with the forum state.” Enviro Petroleum, Inc. v. Kondur Petroleum, 79 F. Supp. 2d. 720,
725 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (quoting Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays,
P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex. 1991)).
In its Motion to Dismiss, Carrier411 argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff’s claims against
Carrier411 should be dismissed because the Second Amended Complaint fails to establish that this
Court has personal jurisdiction over Carrier411. (Carrier411’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) To establish
personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that this Court has either general or
specific jurisdiction over the Defendants.2 See, e.g., Hall, 466 U.S. at 418.
In this case, Plaintiff has not established that this Court has general jurisdiction over
Carrier 411. 	As set forth above, for this Court to have general jurisdiction over Carrier411,
Carrier411 must either be incorporated in Texas, headquartered in Texas, or have some other
2 As noted in Carrier411’s Motion, 15 U.S.C. § 22 provides for wider personal jurisdiction for causes of action
under the Antitrust laws, and 18 U.S.C. § 1965 provides for wider personal jurisdiction when RICO Claims are
asserted. However, Plaintiff does not respond in any meaningful way as to why these provisions apply; as such, the
Court finds that for the reasons outlined in Carrier411’s Motion to Dismiss, that personal jurisdiction over Carrier411
is not proper under either of these statutes. (See Carrier411’s Mot. to Dismiss at 6-9.)
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equivalent presence in Texas. 	See BNSF Ry. Co, 581 U.S. at 403. 	However, Carrier411 is not
incorporated or headquartered in Texas. 	(Pl.’s Sec. Am. Compl. at 2 (“Defendant Carrier411
Services Inc. is a Florida corporation”); (Brewer Decl. at 2 (stating that Carrier411 is headquartered
in Florida).) Moreover, Plaintiff does not plead sufficient facts that show that Carrier411 has some
equivalent presence in Texas. (See Brewer Decl. at 2. (stating that Carrier411 operates exclusively
in Florida, its books and records are maintained in Florida, it has never conducted any events in
Texas).) 	As such, because the Court is not required to credit bare allegations and Plaintiff has
failed to dispute Carrier411’s assertions, the Court FINDS AND CONCLUDES that it lacks
general jurisdiction over Carrier411.
As to specific jurisdiction, even construing the Second Amended Complaint liberally,
Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled that this Court has specific jurisdiction over Carrier411. As set
forth above, for specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff first must show that Carrier411 purposefully directed
its activities at residents in Texas.3 	See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476. 	Carrier411 has
presented unrebutted sworn testimony that it does not conduct business in Texas, operates
exclusively in Florida, does not undertake any activities specifically directed at Texas or its
residents, and does not advertise its services to Texans or otherwise. (See Brewer Decl. at 2.) The
only remaining unrebutted contact, beyond bare allegations that the Court need not credit, is that
Carrier411 has a website that is interactive and accessible in Texas. (See Plaintiff’s Response to
Carrier411’s Motion to Dismiss at 3-4.) However, Carrier411 “‘merely operat[ing] a website, even
a “highly interactive” website, that is accessible from, but does not target,” Texas, does not allow
Carrier 411 to “be hauled into court in [Texas] without offending the Constitution.’” Admar Int'l,
3 When a plaintiff fails at step one, of the specific personal jurisdiction analysis, a Court need not address the
other two steps. See Admar Int'l, Inc. v. Eastrock, L.L.C., 18 F.4th 783, 786 (5th Cir. 2021).
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Inc., 18 F.4th at 787 (quoting be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2011)). 	“To hold
otherwise would be too much. 	If [Carrier411] has minimum contacts with [Texas], then it has
minimum contacts with all 50 states, for no other reason than that it put up a website” that a
company in a state posted on. Admar Int'l, Inc., 18 F.4th at 788. “No other circuit has endorsed
such a sweeping view.” 	See id. 	As such, because Plaintiff has failed to adequately dispute
Carrier411’s assertions, the Court FINDS AND CONCLUDES that it lacks specific jurisdiction
over Carrier411.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant Carrier411
Services, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) [doc. 87]
be GRANTED and that all claims against Carrier411 be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Carrier411.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific
written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after the party has
been served with a copy of this document. The United States District Judge need only make a de
novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations to which specific objection is timely made. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). 	Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed
factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest
injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual findings and legal conclusions
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accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Services Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until January
22, 2026, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge’s proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed
and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days
of the filing date of the objections.
SIGNED January 8, 2026.
____________________________________
JEFFREY L. CURETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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