Ramirez Najera v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
V ICTOR M ANUEL RAMIREZ
N AJERA,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-00443-P
E XPERIAN I NFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, I NC.,
Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s
(“Experian”) 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	and 	Plaintiff 	Victor
Manuel Ramirez Najera’s (“Ramirez”) Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment. ECF Nos. 109, 114. Having considered the briefing and
evidence of record, the Court will DENY Ramirez’s Partial Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 114), and GRANT Experian’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 109).
BACKGROUND
Experian is a credit reporting agency (“CRA”) under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(f). ECF No. 110 at 3. It does not originate or create credit
information. 	ECF No. 110 at 3. 	Instead, Experian receives 	credit
information from various creditors and lenders, known as “furnishers.”
ECF No. 110 at 14. This information is subject to industry standards,
ensuring the information 	provided is 	sufficient to 	correctly 	match
consumers’ accounts. ECF No. 135 at 7. Experian requires at least three
out of four pieces of information to be reported by furnishers. ECF No.
142 at 1.
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Experian uses a database to compare, analyze, and match the
identification 	information 	in 	a 	credit 	report 	with 	the 	information
supplied by furnishers. ECF No. 135 at 5. Its database sorts through
millions of credit items. Experian considers first name, middle name,
first last name, second last name, generation code, address, date of birth,
and social security number. ECF No. 135 at 1. Experian also uses other
identification information, reported about consumers, over time, such as
prior nicknames, names, or variations. ECF No. 111 at 4. An algorithm
(the “matching algorithm”) reviews this information for similarities and
conflicts. ECF No. 135 at 6. After the matching process, Experian’s
database assembles a credit report. ECF No. 135 at 6. The process is
subject to both automated and manual quality controls to detect possible
errors or inaccuracies. ECF No. 135 at 6.
Its policies and procedures must be able to “accommodate and allow
changes and variations in items of information” over a consumer’s
lifetime. ECF No. 110 at 5. These include name changes after marriage
or 	address 	changes 	after 	moving. 	ECF 	No. 	110 	at 	5. 	Experian’s
procedures must be flexible enough to match accounts when there are
typos or a consumer’s identifying information is inaccurately entered by
a data furnisher. ECF No. 110 at 5. Without this flexibility, Experian’s
ability to assemble complete credit reports in its database would be
hindered. “Millions of consumers would be likely to have incomplete or
fragmented files.” ECF No. 110 at 5.
At times, the matching algorithm results in a “mixed file.” ECF No.
111 at 4. A mixed file occurs when credit information from two different
consumers appears in one credit file. ECF No. 115 at 12. When this issue
arises, consumers can submit different types of disputes. ECF No. 115
at 12–14.
Ramirez applied to an apartment complex, Hartford House, in or
around May 2023. ECF No. 1 at 25. A Tenant Screening Report was
prepared and provided to the complex. ECF No. 1 at 25. The report
contained 	Ramirez’s 	correct 	date 	of 	birth 	and 	credit 	information
obtained from Experian. ECF No. 1 at 26. The report listed a mortgage
account (“Rushmore Mortgage”) from Rushmore Loan Management
Services, which was transferred from PennyMac. ECF No. 1 at 26. But
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Ramirez had no prior mortgage. ECF No. 1 at 26. The account was
opened on January 27, 2009, when Ramirez was 13 years old, and it
showed a late payment history. ECF No. 1 at 26. Also on the credit report
were three other negative accounts that belong to Ramirez. ECF No. 135
at 21. One was a collection account, one had a past due balance, and a
third account that was “charged off.”1 ECF No. 135 at 21. The report also
shows that the PennyMac account was never delinquent. ECF No. 135
at 21.
The Rushmore Mortgage account belonged to Ramirez’s father. ECF
No. 110 at 1. Ramirez often dropped his second last name, Najera, when
applying for credit, and he did not use a generational identifier, “Jr.,”
either. ECF No. 110 at 5. As a result, both Ramirez and his father often
use identical names, first, middle, and last, when applying for credit.
ECF No. 110 at 1. They also both used the same address. ECF No. 110
at 1. Ramirez’s father does not have, and has never had, a Social
Security number. ECF No. 110 at 1.
After 	discovering 	the 	mortgage 	on 	the 	credit 	report, 	Ramirez
disputed the report (“First Dispute”) around March 2024. ECF No. 1 at
27; ECF No. 115 at 2. He called Experian and stated that two accounts
did not belong to him: the Rushmore Account and a PennyMac Account.
ECF No. 110 at 6–8. No further information was provided. ECF No. 135
at 9. Experian sent automated consumer dispute verifications (“ACDV”)
to the furnishers, Rushmore and PennyMac, with information that
Ramirez disputed that the accounts were his. ECF No. 135 at 10. Both
furnishers verified the account. ECF No. 135 at 9. Rushmore verified the
account with information identical to Ramirez’s. ECF No. 135 at 10. So,
Experian continued to report the Rushmore account. ECF No. 135 at 10.
However, because PennyMac provided information that did not match
Ramirez’s, Experian removed that account from Ramirez’s file. ECF No.
135 at 10.
1To “charge off” is to treat an account “as a loss or expense because payment
is unlikely.” Charge Off, BLACK ’S L AW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A charged-
off account, in other words, is “bad debt.” Id.
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Ramirez again disputed the report (“Second Dispute”) around July
2024, stating that he had never taken out a mortgage and that the report
was inaccurate. ECF No. 1 at 27. Ramirez provided his birth certificate
and his school records to show he was a minor at the time the mortgage
was opened. ECF No. 1 at 27. Ramirez also provided information that
the account in question belonged to his father. ECF No. 135 at 11.
Experian 	responded 	to 	the 	dispute 	and 	again 	sent 	an 	ACDV 	to
Rushmore. ECF No. 135 at 11. Rushmore once again verified the
information. ECF No. 135 at 11. The account continued to be reported.
ECF No. 135 at 11.
Experian received a third dispute on May 28, 2025. ECF No. 110 at
9. Experian responded on June 11, 2025, deleting the disputed account.
ECF No. 110 at 9. However, when the Rushmore Mortgage was removed
from his credit report, Ramirez’s score dropped by five points. ECF No.
110 at 10.
In his suit, Ramirez asserts that he has suffered damages due to the
credit reports. ECF No. 1 at 30. First, he testifies to “harm to his overall
creditworthiness” 	due 	to 	Experian’s 	continued 	reporting 	of 	the
Rushmore Mortgage. ECF No. 115 at 44. Ramirez also claims that the
reporting caused him mental pain and anxiety. ECF No. 115 at 44. He
had headaches, which resulted in an emergency room visit. ECF No. 115
at 44.
Ramirez 	sued 	Experian 	for 	mixing 	his 	files 	under 	15 	U.S.C.
§ 1681e(b) and 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, initiating this action on April 22, 2025.
ECF No. 1 at 30, 32. His § 1681e(b) claim alleges that Experian did not
follow reasonable reporting procedures. Meanwhile, Ramirez’s § 1681i
claim alleges that Experian failed to reasonably investigate his disputes.
Ramirez also testified to feelings of embarrassment; feeling sick to
his stomach, tired, and “[unable] to function at one hundred percent”;
his life was put on pause; and he suffered through sleepless nights. ECF
No. 115 at 44. He also maintains that he was denied credit applications.
ECF No. 115 at 44. In addition to the rental application, Ramirez was
denied a J.P. Morgan Chase Card twice. ECF No. 135 at 43. First, in
April 2024, and then later in January 2025. ECF No. 135 at 43. He also
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alleges that he was denied credit from Greensky Installment in June
2025. ECF No. 135 at 44. Ramirez has no letter or other evidence to show
these denials. ECF No. 135 at 43–44. Further, any denial of the
Greensky account was after the PennyMac and Rushmore Accounts had
been removed.
After discovery, Experian moved for Summary Judgment on all
claims on December 21, 2025. ECF No. 109. Ramirez moved for Partial
Summary Judgment on December 22, 2025. ECF No. 114. The Court
now considers those motions.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence
presented would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of
the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43
(1986). A fact is “material” if it would affect a case’s outcome. Id. at 248.
Generally, the “substantive law will identify which facts are material,”
and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
counted.” Id.
In assessing whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court
views 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the 	nonmovant.
Cunningham v. Circle 8 Crane Servs., LLC, 64 F.4th 597, 600 (5th Cir.
2023). The Court may rely on any evidence of record but need only
consider those materials cited by the parties. FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)–(3);
see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (noting
summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law”). The Court
need not mine the record for evidence supporting the nonmovant; the
burden falls on the moving party to simply show a lack of evidence
supporting the nonmovant’s case. See Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393,
404–05 (5th Cir. 2003).
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ANALYSIS
Experian seeks summary judgment on Ramirez’s claims that it
negligently and willfully violated provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (“FCRA”). Meanwhile, Ramirez seeks summary
judgment on the claims that Experian willfully violated § 1681e(b) and
§ 1681i; that Ramirez sustained actual damages; and that Experian’s
violations of the FRCA caused Ramirez’s actual damages. ECT No. 114
at 1.
A. 	Reporting Inaccuracy
The threshold inquiry for both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i claims is
whether there was an inaccurate entry on a credit report. See Reyes v.
Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 140 F.4th 279, 286 (5th Cir. 2025) (“We join
the 	other 	circuits 	in 	concluding 	that 	inaccuracy 	is 	a 	threshold
requirement for § 1681i claims.”); Warner v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC,
No. 3:23-CV1286-E, 2025 WL 714243, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2025)
(“To prevail on a claim under either Section 1681e(b) or Section 1681i,
[a plaintiff] must prove that [his] consumer reports included inaccurate
information.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Generally, an item of information is “inaccurate” within the meaning
of the FCRA “either because it is patently incorrect, or because it is
misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected
to adversely affect credit decisions.” Reyes, 140 F.4th at 285 (citing
Sepulvado v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., 158 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 1998)).
Here, it is not disputed that inaccurate information was included on
Ramirez’s credit report. His father’s mortgage was reported on his credit
report, satisfying the first elements for both § 1681e(b) and § 1681i. So,
the case turns on other elements of Ramierz’s claims.
B. 	Section 1681e(b)
Section 1681e(b) 	requires 	credit 	reporting 	agencies 	to 	“follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information concerning the individual about whom the report relates”
when preparing a credit report. § 1681e(b). However, this provision
“does not hold a CRA strictly liable for all inaccuracies.” Hammer v.
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Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 974 F.3d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 2020), aff'g sub
nom. Hammer v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 3:18-CV-1502-C, 2019
WL 7602463, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2019). To prevail under a
§ 1681e(b) 	claim, 	a 	plaintiff 	“must 	establish 	that 	(1) 	inaccurate
information was included in his credit report; (2) the inaccuracy was due
to 	[defendant’s] 	failure 	to 	follow 	reasonable 	procedures 	to 	assure
maximum possible accuracy; (3) [plaintiff] suffered injury; and (4) his
injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry.” Hammer,
2019 WL 7602463, at *2.
1. Willful Violation
Both Ramirez and Experian seek summary judgment on the issue of
whether Experian willfully violated § 1681e(b). To prove that Experian’s
violation 	of 	§ 1681e(b) 	was 	negligent, 	Plaintiff 	must 	prove 	actual
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. On the other hand, to prove a willful
violation, Plaintiff must prove that the consumer reporting agency
“willfully fail[ed] to comply with any requirement imposed” by the
FCRA. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a).
In interpreting “willful,” the Supreme Court has held that “reckless
disregard of a requirement of FCRA would qualify as a willful violation.”
Safeco Inc. Com. Of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 71 (2007). This standard
requires a showing that “the action is not only a violation under a
reasonable reading of the statute’s terms, but shows that the company
ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk
associated with a reading that was merely careless.” Id. at 69–70. Under
Fifth Circuit law, damages for willfulness are appropriate only on
evidence of “willful misrepresentations or concealments” beyond mere
negligence. Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993);
Cousin v. Trans Union Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 374 (5th Cir. 2001).
Ramirez makes two arguments that Experian acted willfully. Both
miss the mark. First, Experian acted willfully because of the system it
uses. The use of a matching system based on name and address only,
without requiring a Social Security number or date of birth to match
credit 	information, 	constitutes 	a 	“willful 	misrepresentation[] 	or
concealment[].” Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293. Ramirez does not present
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any 	other 	evidence 	to 	show 	that 	Experian 	made 	willful
misrepresentations or concealments regarding his credit history, such
as purposely excluding or ignoring his Social Security number to match
the accounts. The Fifth Circuit has not held that failing to require a
Social Security number as identifying information to match credit
accounts amounts to be a willful violation. This Court is not inclined to
make such a ruling on this record.
Second, Ramirez argues that because Experian received notice of the
danger of these procedures “more than 30 years ago,” any subsequent
violations qualify as “knowing violations.” Ramirez relies on a 1991
Consent Order and a 1993 case, both involving Experian’s predecessor,
to show that Experian was aware that its procedures were “loose” and
“harmful.” F.T.C. v. TRW Inc., 784 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Tex. 1991); see
Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293. This argument assumes that Experian’s
procedures 	are 	the 	same 	today 	as 	they 	were 	in 	1991, 	with 	no
modifications. However, Experian has presented evidence that these
procedures were updated in 2008 and 2018. Thus, the argument that
Experian was on notice that its procedures were unreasonable has no
footing and cannot be used to prove willful conduct.
Because Ramirez fails to point the Court to any evidence that
establishes a willful violation of § 1681e(b), there is no genuine dispute
as to a material fact as to whether Experian willfully violated § 1681e(b).
2. Reasonableness
Experian seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether it
followed reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy.
It argues that Ramirez presented no evidence raising an issue of
material fact as to the reasonableness of the procedures. The Court
agrees.
The adequacy of the consumer reporting agency’s procedures is
judged according to what a reasonably prudent person would do under
the circumstances. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass’n,
682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982). “[T]he Fair Credit Reporting Act does
not impose strict liability for inaccurate entries.” Sepulvado, 158 F.3d at
896. In other words, because § 1681e(b) is not a strict liability statute,
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evidence of the inaccuracy in Ramirez’s consumer report, alone, is
insufficient evidence that Experian’s procedures were not reasonable.
See id.; see also Garrett v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 3d
1077, 	1082 (N.D. 	Fla. 	2025) (“[I]f 	simply 	showing 	a 	mix-up 	were
sufficient to 	prove unreasonableness, 	the statute 	would 	effectively
provide for strict liability.”). Ramirez must show something more than
just the inaccuracy to prove the violation.
While reasonableness is normally a question for the jury, the Fifth
Circuit has not precluded district courts from determining whether
procedures in the credit reporting context are reasonable. Cousin, 246
F.3d at 368; see also Matise v. Trans Union Corp., No. 3:96-CV-3353-D,
1998 WL 872511 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 1998) (conducting an inquiry into
whether a CRA used reasonable procedures); Morris v. Trans Union
LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 733 (S.D. Tex. 2006), aff'd, 224 F. App'x 415 (5th
Cir. 2007) (same). Additionally, other circuits have held that a credit
reporting agency is not liable under the FCRA if it followed reasonable
procedures 	to 	assure 	maximum 	possible 	accuracy 	but 	reported
inaccurate 	information 	in 	the 	consumer’s 	credit 	report. 	Sarver 	v.
Experian Info. Sols., 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004); Rydholm v.
Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 44 F.4th 1105, 1107 (8th Cir. 2022).
In Sarver, the court looked at the defendant’s recounting of their
procedures. Sarver, 390 F.3d at 972. Given the massive amounts of
information, 	the 	complex 	system 	they 	used, 	and 	the 	information
required to link consumer credit reported, the court found that “even
with 	safeguards 	in 	place, 	mistakes 	can 	happen. 	But 	given 	the
complexity of the system and the volume of information involved, a
mistake does not render the procedures unreasonable.” Id.
The same reasoning applies here. In its briefing, Experian recounts
its procedures for matching consumer and credit information. Experian
sorts through millions of credit items. When determining what items
should be displayed on a credit report, Experian’s computer system
compares, 	analyzes, 	and 	matches 	the 	identification 	information
provided in the credit inquiry with the identification information that
was reported with and linked to the millions of credit items in its
database. After this matching process, Experian’s database assembles a
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credit report. The process is subject to both automated and manual
quality controls to detect possible errors or inaccuracies.
Kimberly 	Cave, 	Experian’s 	Director 	of 	Litigation 	Support, 	also
testified to the need to have room for flexibility. Its policies and
procedures must be able to “accommodate and allow changes and
variations in items of information” over a consumer’s lifetime, such as a
name change after marriage or a new address after moving. ECF No.
110 at 5. Further, these procedures must be flexible enough to match
accounts when a consumer’s identifying information is inaccurately
entered by a data furnisher. ECF No. 110 at 5. Without this flexibility,
Experian’s ability to assemble complete credit reports in its database
would be hindered. “Millions of consumers would be likely to have
incomplete or fragmented files.” ECF No. 110 at 5.
Ramirez 	posits 	that 	Experian’s 	procedures 	were 	unreasonable
because Ramirez was matched to an account belonging to his father
based on name and address, without a Social Security number. While
Ramirez’s 	father 	had 	no 	Social 	Security 	number 	to 	report, 	the
identifying information they both used on their credit applications was
the same. Their first, middle, and last names were the same. Their
addresses 	were 	also 	the 	same. 	Considering 	the 	vast 	amount 	of
information the database sorts through and the flexibility required to
match accounts to consumers, even some consumers without Social
Security numbers, these procedures are not rendered unreasonable due
to matching accounts without considering Social Security numbers
when other identifying information matches. See Garrett, 785 F. Supp.
3d at 1082 (considering identifying information in a credit file mix-up
“remarkably similar”); Dunmore v. Experian Info. Sols. Inc., No. 2:24-
CV-225-PPS-JEM, 2025 WL 2331036, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 13, 2025)
(comparing identifying information in mixed files). Thus, there is no
genuine 	dispute 	regarding 	whether 	Experian 	followed 	reasonable
procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy.
3. Damages and Causation
Even 	assuming 	arguendo 	that 	Experian’s 	procedures 	were
unreasonable, Ramirez’s claims fail because he has not shown that the
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inaccurate reporting caused his damages. Section 1681o authorizes a
consumer to recover actual damages sustained from the consumer
reporting agency’s negligent violation of a requirement under FCRA.
Actual damages include humiliation or mental distress, even if the
consumer has suffered no out-of-pocket losses. Fischl v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 1983). These damages
must be warranted by the evidence. Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258,
1265 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022 (1987).
Ramirez asserts two types of damages caused by Experian’s credit
reporting: (1) economic damages in the form of credit and apartment
denials, and (2) emotional distress.
a. Economic Damages
“A plaintiff asserting an FCRA claim has the burden of proving that
his damages were caused by the defendant’s violations of the FCRA.”
Matise, 1998 WL 872511, at *7; see Bacharach v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc.,
827 F.3d 432, 435 (5th Cir. 2016). In the case of a credit denial, “[t]o
meet 	this 	burden,” 	the 	plaintiff 	must 	show 	that 	the 	inaccurate
information contained in a [credit] report, rather than other lines in the
[credit] report or a report from a different CRA, caused his injury.”
Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 435 (emphasis added). Further, to prevail on
this claim, the plaintiff “must present evidence sufficient to raise a
material fact question on the issue of whether the denial of [credit] was
proximately caused by [the] alleged misreporting . . . .” Wagner v.
BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., 520 Fed. App’x 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2013); see
also Cameron v. Greater New Orleans Fed. Credit Union, 713 F. App’x
238, 240 (5th Cir. 2018); Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662,
664 (7th Cir. 2001); Matise, 1998 WL 872511, at *7 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
i. 	Housing Applications
Ramirez 	asserts 	that 	he 	was 	denied 	an 	apartment 	while 	the
PennyMac or Rushmore Accounts were included on his consumer report.
Specifically, he claims that when he applied to live in the Hartford
House Apartments in Nashville, Tennessee, he was denied because of
Experian’s reporting. Ramirez does not have the denial letter, but only
the credit report generated with the application. Yet he points to “no
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evidence that the denial” was actually caused by Experian. Bacharach,
827 F.3d at 435. The credit report reveals three other negative accounts
that belong to Plaintiff, one of which was a collection account, one of
which had a past due balance, and a third that was charged off. Further
review of the report shows that the PennyMac account was never
delinquent.
Ramirez has presented no evidence that any apartment denial was
caused by Experian’s reporting of his father’s mortgage accounts on his
consumer 	report, 	rather 	than 	these 	other 	negative 	accounts 	that
belonged to him or some other reason, such as his employment history
or reported income. Thus, Ramirez has not shown that Experian was the
proximate cause of his apartment denial.
ii. 	Credit Lines
Ramirez also posits that he was denied multiple credit applications
because of Experian’s reporting. First, Ramirez alleges that he was
denied a J.P. Morgan Chase Card in April 2024 and later in January
2025. Just as with the rental application, Ramirez has no evidence of
the denial. Further, Ramirez fails to present any evidence that the
PennyMac and Rushmore Accounts caused his denials, rather than the
negative accounts that belonged to him.
Second, Ramirez alleges that he was denied credit with Greensky
Installment because 	of 	Experian’s 	reporting 	in 	June 	2025. 	Again,
Ramirez has no proof of the denial. In addition, Ramirez’s consumer
report from June 11, 2025, 	when Experian 	stopped 	reporting 	the
PennyMac and Rushmore Accounts, reflects no inquiries relating to
Greensky. Any denial by the Greensky account was after the PennyMac
and Rushmore Accounts had been removed and thus could not have
caused the denial. Therefore, Ramirez has not shown that Experian was
the proximate cause of his credit denials.
Because 	Ramirez 	“must 	show 	that 	the 	inaccurate 	information
contained in a [credit] report, rather than other lines in the [credit]
report . . . caused his injury,” Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 435, and he has
failed to meet that burden, causation of any alleged economic damages
has not been established.
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b. Emotional Distress
A plaintiff seeking emotional distress damages is required to present
“evidence of a genuine injury.” Wagner, 520 Fed. Appx. at 298. Such
evidence must demonstrate a “degree of specificity, which may include
corroborating testimony or medical or psychological evidence in support
of the damage award.” Id.; Cousin, 246 F.3d at 371. In other words, the
plaintiff must present more than their “own conclusory assertions about
emotional distress.” Wagner, 520 Fed. Appx. at 298.
After reviewing the record, Ramirez presented evidence that he
suffered from (1) mental pain and anxiety associated with the loss of
control; (2) physical manifestations of anxiety, resulting in headaches
occurring 	multiple 	times 	per 	week; 	(3) 	feelings 	that 	Experian’s
inaccurate 	reporting 	was 	the 	“most 	embarrassing 	thing 	that’s
happened” to him; (4) feeling sick to his stomach, tired, “mind boggy,”
racing heart, sweaty palms, and inability to function at one hundred
percent; (5) the stress of feeling in limbo like his life had been put “on
pause”; and (6) sleepless nights multiple times per week. Ramirez has
also presented affidavits and corroborating testimony.
Despite the evidence above, this testimony cannot support a damages
award to the extent “no reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (holding that “where a version of events is so
utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have
believed him,” it cannot prevent summary judgment). Here, Ramirez
claims that Experian’s reporting is the “most embarrassing thing that’s
happened” to him and it paused his life for a year because he could not
get 	an 	apartment. 	However, 	as 	discussed 	below 	under
“Creditworthiness,” the summary judgment evidence demonstrates that
removing the mortgage from the credit report decreased Ramirez’s credit
score. In other words, the falsely reported mortgage, albeit incorrect,
actually helped Ramirez’s credit score. Therefore, no reasonably jury
could believe that an incorrect item on a credit report that helped the
individual’s credit score caused emotional distress.
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c. 	Creditworthiness
Ramirez 	asserts 	that 	he 	suffered 	harm 	to 	his 	overall
creditworthiness because of the inaccurate reporting of the Rushmore
account. But harm to credit eligibility by itself is not a cognizable injury
under the law. Smith v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 703 F.3d 316,
317–18 	(5th 	Cir. 	2012) 	(noting 	that 	“[t]he 	real 	damage 	from 	an
erroneously 	reduced 	credit 	rating, 	which 	causes 	lower 	available
borrowing limits, occurs if the consumer’s cost of actual borrowing
increases or he is refused credit altogether”).
Contrary to Ramirez’s argument, the evidence demonstrates that
Ramirez’s creditworthiness improved from Experian’s reporting. When
the PennyMac Account was included on Ramirez’s report, it reflected no
negative reporting. Similarly, reporting Rushmore Mortgage improved
the plaintiff’s credit score. On June 3, 2025, before the Rushmore
Account was removed, Plaintiff had a FICO score of 645. A week later,
on 	June 	11, 	2025, 	after 	the 	Rushmore 	Account 	was 	removed 	as
requested by Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s FICO score dropped to 640.
Thus, the evidence shows that, if anything, Plaintiff was helped by
Experian’s reporting the PennyMac account and Rushmore Mortgage in
his credit file.
Accordingly, Ramirez fails to raise a dispute of material fact as to
Experian’s failure to follow reasonable procedures or as to a causal
connection between his injury and Experian’s inaccurate reporting. And
having failed to raise a genuine issue as to a material fact on numerous
elements, Ramirez’s § 1681e(b) claim fails.
C. 	Section 1681i
1. Reasonable Investigation
Experian moves for summary judgment regarding its handling of
Ramirez’s first dispute, arguing that it complied with the requirements
of § 1681i. The Court agrees.
To assert a claim under § 1681i, Ramirez must establish that (1) he
disputed the accuracy of an item of information contained in his
Experian consumer file and notified Experian directly of that dispute;
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(2) Experian did not reinvestigate free of charge and either record the
current status of the disputed information or delete the item from the
file in the manner prescribed by § 1681i(a)(5) within 30 days of notice of
the dispute; (3) Experian’s noncompliance was negligent or willful; (4)
Ramirez suffered injury; and (5) that injury was caused by Experian’s
failure to reinvestigate and record the current status of the disputed
information or delete the item from the file. Hammer, 2019 WL 7602463,
at *2; see also Reyes, 140 F.4th at 285. The Fifth Circuit has held that
the 	use 	of 	automated 	consumer 	dispute 	verifications 	(“ACDV”) 	to
reinvestigate 	consumer 	disputes 	is 	a 	reasonable 	method 	of
investigation. Barron v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 802 F. App’x 161,
162 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[A] reporting agency’s reliance on the ACDV system
is generally acceptable.”).
a. First Dispute
Ramirez fails to demonstrate that Experian did not reinvestigate the
First 	Dispute 	or 	committed 	any 	willful 	or 	reckless 	conduct 	in
investigating the First Dispute. Ramirez called Experian and informed
it that the Rushmore Account did not belong to him. He provided no
other information. This satisfies the first requirement under § 1681i,
requiring the consumer to submit a dispute.
After receiving this dispute, Experian sent ACDVs to both Rushmore
and PennyMac, each containing information that Ramirez disputed. The
PennyMac ACDV contained a different Social Security number and date
of birth than Ramirez’s. Thus, upon receipt of the PennyMac account
ACDV, Experian stopped reporting the account.2
However, 	when 	Rushmore 	returned 	its 	ACDV 	with 	identical
identifying information to Ramirez’s, Experian continued to report the
Rushmore Mortgage. The Fifth Circuit has noted that when the plaintiff
2Ramirez argues that Experian merely “parroted” the information that
Experian received from its furnishers. However, the Court disagrees. When
Experian received the PennyMac ACDV response, which “verified” that the
account 	was 	Ramirez’s, 	Experian 	deleted 	the 	account 	because 	of
inconsistencies with Ramirez’s identifying information. In other words, where
Experian had reason to question the reliability of PennyMac’s verification, it
deleted the PennyMac Account.
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gives no reason to show that CRA should have been on notice of a need
to go beyond the ACDV system as to this dispute, failure to do so was
not unreasonable. Barron, 802 F. App’x at 162 (“We agree with the
district court that Barron has offered no reasonable factual basis for
finding the defendants should have been on notice of a need to go beyond
the ACDV system as to this dispute.”). The same is true here. In the
First Dispute, Ramirez gave no information to put Experian on notice
that an investigation beyond an ACDV was necessary.
Therefore, 	Experian 	adequately 	reinvestigated 	Ramirez’s 	First
Dispute.
b. Second Dispute
The same cannot be said for the Second Dispute. In his Second
Dispute, Ramirez called Experian and informed it that the Rushmore
Account did not belong to him. This time, he provided additional
information. He sent Experian his birth certificate and his school
records to show he was a minor at the time the mortgage was opened.
This information should have notified Experian that it needed to go
beyond the ACDV system. Id. However, Experian sent an ACDV to
Rushmore, who verified the information. The account continued to be
reported. Experian concedes that this should not have been the case.
Ramirez 	thus 	satisfies 	the 	second 	requirement 	for 	failure 	to
reinvestigate. So, Ramirez’s claims once again turn on his damages and
whether Experian’s failure to reinvestigate caused those damages.
While Experian failed to reinvestigate the Second Dispute, Ramirez’s
§ 1681i claim fails because he again fails to demonstrate that the
inaccurate reporting caused his damages. As aforementioned, § 1681o
authorizes a consumer to recover actual damages sustained from the
consumer reporting agency’s negligent violation of a requirement under
FCRA. Actual damages include humiliation or mental distress, even if
the consumer has suffered no out-of-pocket losses. Fischl, 708 F.2d at
151; Pinner, 805 F.2d at 1265. Ramirez asserts two types of damages
caused by Experian’s credit reporting: (1) economic damages in the form
of credit and apartment denials, and (2) emotional distress.
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A plaintiff asserting an FCRA claim must prove that his economic
damages were caused by the defendant’s violations of the FCRA. To do
this, a plaintiff must show that the inaccurate information contained in
a [credit] report, rather than other lines in the [credit] report or a report
from a different CRA, caused his injury. Bacharach, 827 F.3d at 435.
For the same reasons as the § 1681e(b) claim, Ramirez’s showing of
his economic damages and emotional distress damages fails. He has not
established that Experian was the proximate cause of his apartment or
credit 	denials. 	While 	Ramirez 	presented 	specific 	evidence 	and
corroborating testimony of his emotional distress, it cannot support a
damages award to the extent “no reasonable jury could believe it.” Scott,
550 U.S. at 380. No reasonable jury would believe that this was the
“most embarrassing thing” or that it paused his life for a year because
he could not get an apartment, when the evidence shows the reporting
helped his creditworthiness.
Ramirez’s 	claims 	that his creditworthiness 	suffered due 	to 	the
inaccurate reporting also fail because the evidence demonstrates that
Ramirez’s creditworthiness improved from Experian’s reporting.
While Ramirez has shown that Experian failed to reinvestigate his
Second Dispute, he has not raised a causal connection between his
injury and Experian’s inaccurate reporting. Thus, Ramirez cannot show
that Experian’s failure to reinvestigate caused his claimed damages, and
his § 1681i claim fails on the second dispute.
2. Willful Violation
Ramirez seeks summary judgment on the issue of whether Experian
willfully violated § 1681i. Just as with his § 1681e(b) claim, to prove that
Experian’s violation of § 1681i was willful, Ramirez must prove that the
consumer 	reporting 	agency 	“willfully 	fail[ed] 	to 	comply 	with 	any
requirement imposed” by the FCRA. § 1681n(a).
Under Fifth Circuit law, damages for willfulness are appropriate
only on evidence of “willful misrepresentations or concealments” beyond
mere negligence. Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 293; Cousin, 246 F.3d at 374. A
defendant acts willfully by “knowingly and intentionally commit[ting]
an 	act in 	conscious 	disregard 	for the 	rights 	of 	others,” “typically
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misrepresent[ing] or conceal[ing] . . . a credit report from a consumer.”
Cousin, 246 F.3d at 372.
“A failure to adequately investigate and swiftly correct inaccurate
information generally does not constitute a willful violation” of § 1681i.
Cameron, 713 F. App’x at 240 (holding that “no evidence” that allegedly
“insufficient procedures that facilitated the reporting of inaccurate
information and delayed the process of correcting that information . . .
were done knowingly and intentionally”).
Here, Ramirez has presented no evidence that Experian acted with
“willful misrepresentations or concealments.” Stevenson, 987 F.2d at
293. He argues that Experian received notice of the danger of these
procedures “more than 30 years ago” when the Stevenson District Court
found willful noncompliance. 987 F.2d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 1993). But the
Fifth Circuit overturned the finding of willful violations, 987 F.2d at 293
(“The district court's decision [finding a willful violation] was clearly
erroneous.”). It found there was “no evidence” of willful noncompliance.
Thus, it cannot be said Experian was on notice, and thus any subsequent
violation is willful.
Ramirez also asserts that an agent’s mistake amounts to a knowing
and intentional disregard. This is at most negligent conduct. Ramirez
“never 	points 	to 	which 	of 	Experian's 	actions 	constituted 	willful
noncompliance” in the reinvestigation of his disputes, nor does he
analyze how Experian “knowingly and intentionally committed these
actions.” Cameron, 713 F. App’x at 240. So, as with the above claims,
because Ramirez fails to point the Court to any evidence that establishes
a willful violation of § 1681i, there is no genuine dispute as to a material
fact as to whether Experian willfully violated § 1681i.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Experian’s Motion
for Summary Judgment should be and hereby is GRANTED, and
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Ramirez’s 	Partial 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	is 	DENIED.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.3
SO ORDERED on this 26th day of March 2026.
3With this ruling, all other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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