Cadenhead v. Director, TDCJ-CID

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
BRADLEY CHANCE CADENHEAD ,
Petitioner,
v. 	No. 4:25-cv-0184-P
E RIC GUERRERO , DIRECTOR ,
T EXAS D EPARTMENT O F
CRIMINAL J USTICE-C ORRECTIONAL
I NSTITUTIONS D IVISION ,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the petition of Bradley Chance Cadenhead under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus. Having considered the
petition, the response, the record, and applicable authorities, the Court
concludes that the petition must be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is serving terms of imprisonment of twenty years each on
counts one, two, and three to run consecutively, and four through eight
to run concurrently after service of the sentences on the first three
counts, and ten years probated on count nine to run consecutively after
his release on the other counts for possession with intent to promote
child pornography under case No. 22CRDC-00016 in the 266th District
Court, Erath County, Texas. ECF No. 18-21 at 7–10. On November 2,
2023, he voluntarily dismissed his appeal. Cadenhead v. State, No. 11-
23-00119-CR, 2023 WL 7198519 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 2, 2023).
On November 7, 2024, Petitioner filed his state habeas application.
ECF No. 18-21 at 48. On February 5, 2025, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas (“CCA”) denied the application on the findings of the
trial court and on its own independent review. ECF No. 18-23.
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On February 26, 2025, Petitioner filed his federal petition, ECF No.
1, and supporting memorandum, ECF No. 2.
GROUND OF THE PETITION
Petitioner urges one ground in support of his petition, alleging that
he 	received 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	because 	his 	attorney
advised him to plead guilty and then conducted the sentencing hearing
without 	investigating 	expert 	assistance 	in 	forensic 	psychology 	for
mitigation purposes at sentencing. ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 2 at 11.
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Section 2254
A writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody under a state
court judgment shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated 	on 	the 	merits 	in 	state 	court 	proceedings 	unless 	the
petitioner shows that the prior adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2) 	resulted 	in 	a 	decision 	that 	was 	based 	on 	an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal
law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by
the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state
court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of
materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
405–06 (2000); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir.
2000). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes
federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664
(2004)).
A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed
to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The presumption of correctness
applies to both express and implied factual findings. Young v. Dretke,
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356 F.3d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 2004); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948
n.11 (5th Cir. 2001). Absent express findings, a federal court may infer
fact findings consistent with the state court’s disposition. Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983). Thus, when the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas denies relief without written order, such ruling is an
adjudication on the merits that is entitled to this presumption. Ex parte
Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The petitioner has
the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Hill, 210 F.3d at 486.
In making its review, the Court is limited to the record that was
before the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
B. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To 	prevail 	on 	a 	claim 	of 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel, 	the
petitioner must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “[A] court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Id., 466
U.S. at 697; see also United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d 750, 751 (5th Cir.
2000) 	(per 	curiam). 	“The 	likelihood 	of 	a 	different 	result 	must 	be
substantial, not just conceivable,” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112, and a
petitioner must prove that counsel’s errors “so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 189 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Judicial scrutiny of this type of claim must
be 	highly 	deferential 	and 	the 	petitioner 	must 	overcome 	a 	strong
presumption that his counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
Where the state court adjudicated the ineffective assistance claims
on the merits, this Court must review a petitioner’s claims under the
“doubly deferential” standards of both Strickland and § 2254(d). Woods
v. Etherton, 578 U.S. 113, 117 (2016); Cullen, 563 U.S. at 190. In such
cases, the “pivotal question” for the Court is not “whether defense
counsel’s performance fell below Strickland’s standard”; it is “whether
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the 	state 	court’s 	application 	of 	the 	Strickland 	standard 	was
unreasonable.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. In other words, the Court
must afford “both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of
the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013) (quoting Cullen, 563
U.S. 	at 	190); 	Knowles 	v. 	Mirzayance, 	556 	U.S. 	111, 	123 	(2009).
“Unreasonable” is a substantially higher threshold than “incorrect.”
Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 2010).
Simply making conclusory allegations of deficient performance and
prejudice is not sufficient to meet the Strickland test. Miller v. Johnson,
200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000).
ANALYSIS
The petition in this case is essentially a rehash of the state habeas
application. The CCA denied relief based on the trial court’s conclusion
that the application was without legal or factual merit and on its own
independent review. ECF No. 18-23. For all of the reasons set forth in
the answer, ECF No. 19, which the Court need not discuss here,
Petitioner has not overcome the doubly deferential standard of review
applicable. In sum, Petitioner and his attorney discussed bringing
experts to testify on his behalf and decided to use his current counselor,
who could and did testify as an expert that based on her experience with
Petitioner, he was not a danger to himself or others. ECF No. 18-21 at
120, 122–33. Petitioner chose not to testify on his own behalf. Id. at 120.
Counsel 	may 	well 	have 	determined 	that 	retaining 	a 	forensic
psychologist would not have been to Petitioner’s benefit based on the
psychological examination that had already been performed. See ECF
No. 22 at 177–86. Petitioner has not shown, and can only speculate, that
every fairminded jurist would agree that every reasonable lawyer would
have made a different decision and retained a forensic psychologist. See
Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 739–40 (2021). Moreover, he has not
shown that he was prejudiced as a result of the failure to present such
an expert.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, all relief sought by Petitioner is
DENIED.
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Further, for the reasons discussed herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2553(c), a certificate of appealability is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 17th day of February 2026.
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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