Ziegenfuss et al v. Martin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
CHARLES ZIEGENFUSS, ET AL .,
Plaintiffs,
v. 	No. 4:24-cv-01049-P
F REEMAN M ARTIN ,
Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are two motions. The first is a Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by Plaintiffs. ECF No. 25. The Second is a Cross Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by the State of Texas. ECF No. 29. Having
considered the Motions, briefs, and applicable law, the Court finds the
statutory provisions at issue in the Motions constitutional. Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS Texas’s Motion and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion.
BACKGROUND
Texas law makes it a crime to carry firearms in a number of public
spaces. Texas law prohibits “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
possess[ing] or go[ing] with a firearm, location-restricted knife, club, or
prohibited weapon” on the “premises” of three types of spaces. TEX.
PENAL CODE § 46.03. First, this provision applies to “racetracks.” Id. §
46.03(a)(4). Second, this provision applies to “premises” “of a business
that has a permit or license issued under [the Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Code], if the business derives 51 percent or more of its income from the
sale or service of alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption.” Id.
§ 46.03(a)(7). Third, the prohibition applies to “premises” “where a high
school, collegiate, or professional sporting event or interscholastic event
is taking place.” Id. § 46.03(a)(8). Texas has enjoyed the protection of
these laws passed by their elected representatives for decades. Section
46.03 dates 	back to 	1973 	and 	codified prior longstanding firearm
prohibitions. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 46.02, 46.04 (1974). One of the
latest pertinent amendments to these provisions was passed as far back
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as 1995, when Texas banned citizens possessing a concealed-carry
license from carrying handguns on the premises of businesses primarily
profiting from alcohol, at interscholastic events, and at sporting events
of nearly all levels. See An Act Relating to the Issuance of a License to
Carry a Concealed Handgun, 74th R.S., ch. 229, § 4, 1995 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1998, Tex. Penal Code § 46.035 (1995). And some of the other
relevant provisions were enacted even earlier than that amendment,
which was passed 31 years ago.
Here, Plaintiffs sue Defendant Freeman Martin, director of the
Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) (the successor of previous
Defendant, Steven C. McGraw) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking a
declaratory injunction, permanent injunction, and reasonable attorneys’
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. ECF No. 1 at 13. Plaintiffs include Charles
Ziegenfuss, David Montgomery, Brian Robinson, and Firearms Policy
Coalition, Inc. (“FPC”). FPC is an organization based out of Sacramento,
California, not Texas. The claims rest on a facial challenge asserting
that the Firearms Prohibitions violate the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiffs assert that the Second Amendment grants them
the right to “carry[] loaded, operable handguns in case of confrontation
for immediate self-defense in public places.” Compl. at 8.
Texas initially argued in its Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
for the case to be dismissed on justiciability grounds and chose to “not
contest the underlying merits.” ECF No. 29 at 1. Because the Attorney
General of Texas declined to defend the merits of the Legislature’s duly-
enacted laws, the Court needed to look elsewhere for a defense of the
relevant statutory provisions. See generally Duties and Responsibilities
of 	the 	Office 	of 	the 	Attorney 	General, 	TEX. 	ATT ’Y 	GEN.,
https://tinyurl.com/yf95ptet (duties include “defend[ing] the laws and
the Constitution of the State of Texas”); accord Speaker Sam Rayburn,
quoted in D.B. H ARDEMAN & D ONALD C. BACON , RAYBURN : A BIOGRAPHY
429 (1987) (“A man who is not willing to get out and defend what he has
done will ultimately find himself in poor shape politically.”). As a result,
the Court appointed attorneys Professor Eric Ruben and Judge Gregg
Costa as amici curiae to defend the underlying merits. ECF No. 34.
Amici accordingly filed its brief. ECF No. 57.
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The Motion and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment are now ripe
for review. ECF Nos. 25, 29.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and “is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV . P. 56(a). A dispute is
“genuine” if the evidence presented would allow a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 (1986). And a fact is “material” when it might
affect the outcome of a case. Hobby Distillers Ass’n v. Alcohol and
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, 740 F. Supp. 3d 509, 517 (N.D. Tex.
2024). When determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,
the 	Court 	views 	the 	evidence 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
nonmovant. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 709 F.3d 1170,
1173 (5th Cir. 2013). In conducting its evaluation, the Court may rely on
any admissible evidence of record but need only consider materials cited
by the parties. FED. R. CIV . P. 56(c)(1)–(3).
Considering that there are no factual issues, the determinative
inquiry is which Party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Because Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge to the Firearms Prohibitions,1
they must “‘establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the [challenged law] would be valid.’” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S.
680, 693 (2024) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987)). The Parties’ motions are a vehicle for presenting to the Court a
question of law: Are the Texas Firearms Prohibitions constitutional?
ANALYSIS
To successfully challenge a firearms regulation under the Second
Amendment, Plaintiffs must satisfy a two-step test. First, a Plaintiff
1 Plaintiffs 	also 	seek 	a 	universal 	permanent 	injunction 	“enjoining
enforcement of [Texas’s sensitive-places laws] with respect to places open to
the public.” Compl. at 13; but see Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 656, 145 S. Ct.
2530, 2554 (2025) (noting that “[b]ecause the universal injunction lacks a
historical pedigree, it falls outside the bounds of a federal court’s equitable
authority”).
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must show that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the
proscribed conduct. If the Second Amendment covers the conduct, it
follows that “the Constitution presumptively protects [it].” N.Y. State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 (2022). In that case, the
burden shifts to the government, and the inquiry continues to step two.
To defend the challenged regulation at the second step, the government
must show that the regulation “is consistent with the Nation’s historical
tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
To make that showing, the government must provide evidence of
analogous regulations from around the Founding era, when the Second
Amendment was ratified. The Founding era example need not be a “dead
ringer” for, or a “historical twin” of, the challenged regulation, but it
must be “relevantly similar” using “commonplace” analogical legal
reasoning. Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, “[T]he appropriate analysis involves
considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692. “Historical
regulations reveal a principle, not a mold.” Id. at 740 (Barrett, J.,
concurring). 	Modern 	regulations 	need 	not 	“precisely 	match 	[their]
historical precursors.” Id. at 692. Whether a similarity is relevant
depends on the answers to two questions—why the regulation was
enacted and how the regulation operates. The first question asks what
social ills the government seeks to lessen by placing a burden on the
natural right to armed self-defense. Id. And the second considers
whether the law burdens the Second Amendment right “to an extent
beyond what was done at the Founding” and how similar those burdens
are. Id.
Here, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	Firearms 	Prohibitions 	regulate
conduct that falls within the plain text of the Second Amendment.
Further, Amici have demonstrated that Texas’s law is sufficiently
analogous to historical laws prohibiting the carry of firearms in sensitive
places to justify Texas’s Firearms Prohibitions.
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A. Standing 	and 	Sovereign 	Immunity 	Pose 	No 	Barriers 	to
Plaintiffs’ Lawsuit.
Plaintiffs have standing to litigate their claim that the Firearms
Prohibition violate the Second Amendment.2 To demonstrate standing,
a Plaintiff must show: (1) an actual or imminent “injury-in-fact”; (2) that
is 	caused 	by 	and fairly 	traceable to 	the challenged action 	of the
Defendant; and (3) that is likely redressable by a favorable judicial
decision. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 	U.S. 	167, 	180–81 	(2000). 	Plaintiff, 	FPC, 	enjoys 	associational
standing as representative of the three named Plaintiffs, who are
members of FPC. 	An “association” has standing to sue on behalf of its
members’ 	interests 	when 	“(a) 	its 	members 	would 	otherwise 	have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect
are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v.
2 Although Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this case is easy to determine, this
is not always true under current precedent. Indeed, standing jurisprudence
has been aptly described as a “morass of imprecision.” N.H. Rt. to Life Pol.
Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1996). Recent decisions from
the Supreme Court on this issue are notoriously difficult to reconcile. See, e.g.,
Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 277 (2023) (holding that a state lacks
standing to challenge federal law preempting state laws on foster child
placement, despite the fact that “Congress’s Article I powers rarely touch state
family law”); contra Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (holding
that a state had standing to challenge the EPA’s decision not to regulate
emissions of greenhouse gases because that power was preempted and
greenhouse gases affected “the earth and air within [their] domain”); contra
United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 671 (2023) (holding that states near an
international border lacked standing to challenge the federal government’s
immigration enforcement policies because the state’s financial injury was not
“legally cognizable”); but see Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2358 (2023)
(holding that Missouri established standing by showing that it “suffered . . . a
concrete injury to a legally protected interest, like property or money”); contra
Dept. of Ed. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551, 568 (2023) (holding that individual loan
borrowers lacked standing to allege the federal government unlawfully
excluded them from a one-time direct benefit program purportedly designed to
address harm caused by an indiscriminate global pandemic).
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Tex. Med. Bd., 627 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Hunt v. Wash.
St. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
Here, at issue is whether a favorable court decision would redress
the alleged injuries suffered by the named Plaintiffs and thus confer
associational standing on FPC. Texas claims that redressability is an
issue. It argues DPS is not primarily responsible for enforcing these laws
and 	that 	local 	law 	enforcement 	performs 	most 	of 	the 	relevant
enforcement actions. Texas’s reasoning is misguided.
For starters, the redressability prong need not be met with a perfect
remedy; a “partial remedy” suffices. Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992); Sanchez v. R.G.L., 761 F.3d 495,
506 (5th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (holding that when “establishing
redressability, [a plaintiff] need only show that a favorable ruling could
potentially lessen its injury; it need not definitely demonstrate that a
victory would completely remedy the harm”). So, all that is needed for
standing here is that DPS at least partially enforces the Firearms
Prohibitions; the fact that local law enforcement may not be subject to
an injunction does not undermine that analysis. Indeed, the State even
concedes “DPS has authority to enforce every portion of the State’s
criminal 	law,” 	and 	implies 	at 	minimum 	that 	they 	have 	some
responsibility 	for 	enforcing 	these 	laws, 	even 	if 	not 	the 	“primary
responsibility.” Def.’s Br. at 1, 3. Because all that is needed is a “scintilla
of enforcement by the relevant state official,” Plaintiffs have standing
against DPS. Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 90 F.4th 770,
786 (5th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
As for the sovereign immunity argument, Texas’s assertion fails on
that front as well. Texas contends that Director Martin of DPS is not
subject to the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. It argues
that he is too far afield from enforcement of the Firearms Prohibitions
to be properly subject to Ex parte Young. See 209 U.S. 123 (1908). “Ex
parte Young permits plaintiffs to sue a state officer in his official
capacity for an injunction to stop ongoing violations of federal law,”
Texas Alliance for Retired Americans v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 671 (5th Cir.
2022), as long as the officer has “some connection with the enforcement
of the [challenged] act.” Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. For the reasons
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mentioned in the standing analysis, Director Martin, as head of DPS, is
adequately connected to enforcement of these laws. Indeed, Director
Martin’s job description even says that he himself “leads the agency of
over 11,000 commissioned and non-commissioned personnel charged
with ensuring the safety and security of Texas.” Texas Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, Press Release, Freeman F. Martin Assumes Command of DPS
(Dec. 2, 2024). And those include the Texas Rangers and Texas Highway
Patrol 	troopers. 	Texas 	Dept’ 	of 	Pub. 	Safety, 	Organization 	Chart,
https://perma.cc/JNC4-TYTR. Those officers have jurisdiction to make
arrests for violations of these laws throughout all of Texas. Texas Gov’t
Code §§ 411.022, .032. Director Martin is, therefore, lawfully within the
scope of the Ex parte Young exception to be subject to a suit for
prospective injunctive relief.
B. The 	Second 	Amendment’s 	Plain 	Text 	Covers 	Conduct
Restricted by the Firearms Prohibitions, Even in Sensitive
Places.
The first step requires an analysis of the latter portion of the Second
Amendment text: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST . amend. II. The first clause of the
Amendment is prefatory: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State . . . .” Id. The prefatory clause does not
expand or diminish the scope of the right protected by the second clause:
“ . . . the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” Id.; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 US. 570, 578 (2008).
Instead, it announces the purpose for codifying the right to bear arms in
the following part of the sentence. Id. at 599. Therefore, the Court looks
to the main clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.” That clause determines whether the conduct forbidden
by the challenged laws is “presumptively protect[ed].” Bruen, 597 U.S.
at 24; see Elite Precision Customs LLC v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, 805 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Tex 2025) (Pittman,
J.) (finding that conditions requiring firearms purchased out of state to
be first transported to federally licensed dealers fell outside the ambit of
the Second Amendment).
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First, 	the 	Court 	has 	no 	trouble 	finding 	that 	the 	Firearms
Prohibitions apply to “the people,” cf. Firearms Pol’y Coal., Inc. v.
McCraw, 623 F. Supp. 3d 740 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (Pittman, J.), even in
“sensitive places.” See United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458, 466 (5th Cir.
2024). Amici incorrectly argue that sensitive place restrictions fall
outside the ambit of the Second Amendment’s coverage at step one of
the Bruen text. It is clear that laws restricting the carry of firearms in
“sensitive places” are presumptively constitutional. Heller, 554 U.S. at
626–27 n.26; Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 735 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). As
the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear, its precedents should
not be taken to “cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions . . . forbidding
the 	carrying 	of 	firearms 	in 	sensitive 	places 	such 	as 	schools 	and
government buildings.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
But, there is no carve out for sensitive places from the Bruen test.
“[C]ourts can use analogies to those historical regulations of ‘sensitive
places’ to determine that modern regulations prohibiting the carry of
firearms in new and analogous sensitive places are constitutionally
permissible.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 30; McRorey v. Garland, 99. F.4th 831,
838 (5th Cir. 2024) (“[S]ensitive-place laws are likely captured by the
plain text of the Second Amendment—they directly impact the right to
bear arms. Therefore, they are likely subject to Bruen’s historical
analysis.”). Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit had said “how [sensitive
places] mesh[] with Bruen’s framework is an open question.” United
States v. Allam, 140 F.4th 289, 295, n.7 (5th Cir. 2025).
C. The Bruen Test Centers on Founding Era Evidence with
Guidance from Reconstruction Era Evidence.
Here, as in other constitutional contexts, the Second Amendment
ought to be interpreted based mainly on how the Founders understood
the scope of the right in 1791, rather than its interpretation around
1868. Evidence from the 19th century can then help guide the analysis.
The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to opine on whether 1791 or
1868 should be the focal point of a historical analysis of the Second
Amendment as applied to the States. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 (“We need
not address this issue today.”). And “there is an ongoing scholarly debate
on 	whether 	courts 	should 	primarily 	rely 	on 	the 	prevailing
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understanding of an individual right when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified in 1868 when defining its scope.” Id. at 37. While guidance
from the Supreme Court would be helpful, this Court must use the tools
it has and confront the issue on its own. This inquiry is critical because
“when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created
equal.” Id. at 34.
Bruen “gave a strong hint” that 1791 is the correct timeframe. Lara
v. Comm’r Pa. State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 439 (3d. Cir. 2025). So the
burden is on Amici to demonstrate that 1868 would be the dispositive
timeframe. Id. at 439–40 (putting the burden on the Government to
“establish that the Second Amendment—whether applied against a
state or federal regulation—is best construed according to its public
meaning at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification as
opposed to the public meaning of the right when the Second Amendment
was ratified”). Indeed, in Bruen, the Supreme Court said “we have
generally assumed that the scope of the protection applicable to the
Federal Government and States is pegged to the public understanding
of the right when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791.” Bruen, 597
U.S. at 37. And as Bruen mentioned, this has been the approach in the
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment contexts.
Id. Plus, the Supreme Court has at minimum indicated that 1791 has
some bearing on the scope of the right as against the states. Id. at 41.
To be sure, some circuits have put a greater or equal emphasis on
Reconstruction era evidence. See Antonyuk v. James, 120 F.4th 941,
973–74 (2d Cir. 2024) (“We therefore agree with the decisions of our
sister circuits—emphasizing the understanding that prevailed when the
States adopted with the Fourteenth Amendment—is, along with the
understanding of that right held by the founders in 1791, a relevant
consideration.”) (cleaned up); Wolford v. Lopez, 116 F.4th 959, 980 (9th
Cir. 2024) (“[W]e look to the understanding of the right to bear arms
both at the time of the ratification of the Second Amendment in 1791
and at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868.”) (emphasis in original); Kipke v. Moore, 165 F.4th 194, 207 (4th
Cir. 2026) (“[W]e look beyond the Founding Era to determine whether
our national tradition of firearm regulation supports a government’s
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restriction today.”). Yet other circuits see otherwise. See United States
v. Daniels, 77 F.4th 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2023) (saying “[a] tradition cannot
inform the original meaning of the Bill of Rights if it emerges one
hundred years later” when analyzing a federal statute), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, No. 23-376, 144 S. Ct. 2707 (2024); Lara, 125 F.4th
at 441 (3d Cir. 2025) (“[T]he constitutional right to keep and bear arms
should be understood according to its public meaning in 1791.”); Worth
v. Jacobsen, 108 F.4th 677, 692 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Bruen strongly suggests
that we should prioritize Founding-era history.”). The Court agrees with
the latter circuits.
But, with that said, 1791 is not the exclusive point of historical
analysis because the period closer to 1868 still plays an important role
in the analysis. Reconstruction era evidence can help to liquidate a
meaning and settle indeterminacies. See Chiafalo v. Washington, 591
U.S. 578, 593 (2020) (quoting Letter to S. Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8
Writings of James Madison 450 (G. Hunt ed. 1908)) (“As James Madison
wrote, ‘a regular course of practice’ can ‘liquidate & settle the meaning
of’ disputed indeterminate ‘terms & phrases.”). So a proper Second
Amendment analysis 	involves “pre-ratification 	and post-ratification
history.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 714 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). How the
Second 	Amendment 	was 	understood 	“from 	immediately 	after 	its
ratification through the end of the 19th century” is a “critical tool of
constitutional interpretation.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 605; see also Rahimi,
602 U.S. at 738 (Barrett, J., concurring) (“[P]ost enactment history can
be an important tool.”). The Framers “intended” that post-ratification
history would be used to “interpret[] vague constitutional text and
determin[e] exceptions to individual constitutional rights.” Rahimi, 602
U.S. at 723, 725 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). That is why “[r]eliance on
post-ratification history ‘has shaped scores of Court cases spanning all
domains of constitutional law.’” Id. at 728 (quoting Sherif Girgis, Living
Traditionalism, 98 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1477, 1480 (2023), and collecting
cases).
Post-enactment history ensures that courts do not fall into the “use
it or lose it” trap and presume that “founding-era legislatures maximally
exercised their power to regulate” in 1791. Id. at 739–40 (Barrett, J.,
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concurring); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334,
375 	(1995) 	(Scalia, 	J., 	dissenting) 	(encouraging 	consideration 	of
“common practice in 1868”). The Founders knew that they would not
anticipate all of the modern social conditions to come. Most circuits have
held that “evidence stretching into the nineteenth century is useful to a
Bruen inquiry,” particularly when that evidence is consistent with 1791-
era history. Schoenthal v. Raoul, 150 F.4th 889, 913 (7th Cir. 2025); see
also NRA v. Bondi, 133 F.4th 1108, 1121 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (W.
Pryor, 	C.J.) 	(relying 	on 	[m]id-to-late 	nineteenth-century 	laws”);
Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 973 (same); Wolford, 116 F.4th at 280 (same);
Koons v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 156 F.4th 210 (3d Cir. 2025) (same).
Evidence 	from 	the 	Reconstruction 	era, 	however, 	cannot 	be
inconsistent with Founding era evidence. “[W]e must . . . guard against
giving postenactment history more weight that it can rightly bear.”
Bruen, 597 U.S. at 35–36. That is to say, it cannot contradict Founding
era practice: “[W]e recognize that where a governmental practice has
been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the
Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous
constitutional 	provision.” 	Id. 	(cleaned 	up). 	1868-era 	evidence 	is
“secondary” and must be “mere confirmation of what the Court thought
had already been established.” Id. at 37. “[E]vidence of ‘tradition’
unmoored from original meaning is not binding law.” Rahimi, at 738
(Barrett, J., concurring).
D. Locations 	Hosting 	Interscholastic 	Events 	are 	Sensitive
Places 	Where 	Prohibiting 	Firearms 	is 	Constitutionally
Permissible.
Schools are sensitive places. By extension, interscholastic events are
too. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. A place is sensitive because of the “people
found there” or the “activities that take place there.” See United States
v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2019). For instance, certain (but
not all) government buildings were likely deemed sensitive because “the
activities taking places” “were central government functions involving
weighty 	matters 	of 	public 	concern 	which 	might 	be 	influenced 	or
disturbed by the presence of firearms.” Firearms Pol’y Coal. Inc. v.
Bondi, 805 F. Supp. 3d 721, 731 (N.D. Tex. 2025). “[S]chools” and
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“analogous[ly]” “school grounds” have historically also been categorized
as sensitive to “protect children and to preserve a peaceful learning
environment.” Kipke, 165 F.4th at 212.
In and around the Founding era—as Plaintiffs note—there were
“prominent” “restrictions” on “students’ possession and use of firearms”
at “colleges and universities at the time of the Founding.” Pl.’s Resp. at
21–22; 	Kopel 	& 	Greenlee, 	The 	“Sensitive 	Places” 	Doctrine, 	13
CHARLESTON L. REV . 203, 247–48 (2018). Those restrictions admittedly
did not apply to non-students. But, the relevant point is that a majority
of people in those settings were disarmed entirely. And the purpose—
the “why”—of that regulation was to create a peaceful learning and
social environment for the sake of the students.
The 	1868 	evidence further clarifies 	this tradition 	of protecting
students 	through firearms 	regulations. 	For instance, 	Texas’s 	1870
sensitive places law prohibited specified knives and all firearms in
certain public spaces including: “[a]ny church ore religious assembly,
any 	school 	room or other place 	where persons 	are 	assembled 	for
educational, literary, or scientific purposes, or into a ball room, social
party, or other social gathering . . . or any other public assembly.” An
Act Regulating the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12th Leg., 1st C.S.,
ch. 46, § 1, 1870 Tex. Gen. Laws 63. And there are a number of other
late 19th century state laws throughout the nation that prohibited
people from carrying firearms where persons gathered for educational,
literary or scientific purposes. See, e.g., 1875 Mo. Laws 50, § 1; TEX.
PENAL CODE , tit. 9, ch. 4, art. 320 (1879); 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws 17,
§ 3; 1890 Okla. Terr. Stats. 496, ch. 25, art. 47, § 7; 1903 Mont. Gen.
Laws 49, ch. 35, § 3.
The same “how” and “why” applies to the contemporary Texas law’s
provision regarding interscholastic events; it prohibits carry for the sake
of students’ peaceful learning and social environment. Interscholastic
events 	at all 	levels 	are 	meant to 	educate 	and 	socialize 	students,
“purposes furthered by prohibitions on bringing firearms into those
locations.” Md. Shall Issue v. Montgomery County, Md., 680 F. Supp. 3d
567, 584 (D. Md. 2023). They “are meant to protect the same or similar
vulnerable populations.” Id. And “Bruen did not distinguish between
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public schools and private schools or limit the term ‘schools’ based on
the age of the students.” Id. at 583. Courts have made similar analogies
before. Wolford, 116 F.4th at 985 (“[Y]outh centers . . . are akin to
schools.”); Kipke, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 660 (“School grounds are plainly
analogous to school buildings, and therefore the grounds may also be
designated as sensitive places.”); Md. Shall Issue, 680 F. Supp. 3d at 584
(analogizing childcare facilities to schools); Mintz v. Chiumento, 724 F.
Supp. 3d 40, 64–65 (N.D.N.Y. 2024) (upholding firearm restrictions at
summer 	camps 	and 	analogizing 	them 	to 	schools). 	Ultimately, 	the
Firearms Prohibitions at interscholastic events are constitutional.
E. Bars and Restaurants are Sensitive Places Where Prohibiting
Firearms is Constitutionally Permissible.
Bars, restaurants, and other settings that predominantly serve
alcohol have also historically been deemed sensitive places warranting
restrictions on firearms. See Wolford, 116 F.4th at 986 (“[B]ars and
restaurants that sell alcohol are among the Nation’s ‘sensitive places’
where firearms may be prohibited.”). Places are not sensitive “simply
because [they are] crowded,” even though “people sometimes congregate
in ‘sensitive places.’” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 31. Otherwise, the general right
to publicly carry arms “would eviscerate.” Id. But, here, although not yet
explicitly labeled by the Court as “sensitive places,” the historical record
shows that in practice these settings were treated as sensitive places
where laws forbade the carrying of firearms. So, likewise contemporary
businesses that predominantly profit from alcohol sales, such as bars,
are also sensitive places.
The American legal tradition includes two notable themes that
predate 	and 	continue 	from 	the 	Founding 	through 	the 	nineteenth
century. First, the Americans inherited and continued a legal tradition
consisting of location-based prohibitions on carrying firearms in certain
social settings. Second, the Founders also inherited and enforced a legal
tradition that regulated the mix of firearms and alcohol. These legal
traditions together provide precedent for the Texas statutes and are
further confirmed by 19th century state laws prohibiting and restricting
firearms in social settings centered around alcohol. While these may not
perfectly resemble the Texas statutes, the Court need not identify a
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“historical twin.” Indeed, in Rahimi, there was no twin for the federal
statute prohibiting those with a domestic violence restraining order
from possessing a firearm. Yet, surety laws and going-armed laws led
the Court to conclude that the ban on “the possession of firearms by
those found by a court to present a threat to others fit[] neatly within
that tradition.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 694, 698.
Amici identify laws that prohibited the carrying of firearms starting
with English society’s quintessential social settings. A 1328 English
statute prohibited going “armed by night []or by day, in fairs, markets,
nor in the presence of the [King’s] justices or other ministers.” Statute
of Northampton 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c.3. A 1402 law include a prohibition on
firearms to Welshmen in “merchant towns,” “churches,” “congregations
in the same,” and “highways.” 1402, 4 Hen. 4, c.29. Other location-based
laws include prohibitions on a “town, church, fair, market or other
congregation” in Wales. 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c.6 § 4. A similar statute existed
in Scotland. 1715, 1 Geo., c.54, §§ 1, 6–10.
American society continued this tradition of location-based laws.
Virginia passed a similar law prohibiting going or riding armed “in fairs”
or “markets.” See An Act Forbidding and Punishing Affrays, ch. 49, 1786
Va. Acts 35. That tradition continued into the early stages of the United
States. In 1816, Congress prohibited arms at fairs in Washington, D.C.
See An Act for Punishment of Crimes and Offences, within the District
of Columbia § 40 (1816), available at https://rb.gy/7q0cv.
Lawmakers at the Founding also understood “the need to disarm
intoxicated individuals who could not be trusted with weapons” and
could cause violence, particularly in “crowded space[s].” Antonyuk, 120
F.4th at 1031. “[I]n a long line of regulations dating back to the colonial
era, colonies, states, and cities have regulated in ways reflecting their
understanding that firearms and intoxication are a dangerous mix.”
Wolford, 116 F.4th at 985. In 1656, Virginia prohibited “shoot[ing] any
gunns at drinkeing [events],” regardless of intoxication. Acts of Mar. 10,
1655, Act XII, reprinted in 1 William Waller Hening, THE STATUTES AT
LARGE : BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE , IN THE YEAR 1619 at 401–02 (1823),
available at https://tinyurl.com/4sr6xfv3. In 1771, New York prohibited
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shooting around New Year’s Eve for similarly motivated reasons. Act of
Feb. 16, 1771, ch. 1501, reprinted in 5 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF N EW YORK
FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 244–46 (1894).
Plaintiffs counter that these laws are distinct because they did not
necessarily burden the gun rights of those not drinking in these settings
and did not apply to all places selling alcohol. They say also that the
same problem posed by intoxicated individuals now existed then—
without any significant technological changes in the interim. First, the
fact that the Legislature could have made these laws applicable in a
wider range of settings does not undermine the fundamental import of
these laws. The lawmakers believed they had the authority to prevent
firearms violence committed by intoxicated individuals by regulating or
banning the use of firearms by such individuals or in such settings.
There is no evidence that their lawfulness was ever in question. Second,
these laws likely assumed that practically everyone was drinking in
these settings, and the Virginia law specifically prohibits shooting by
anyone at drinking events. So these laws likely disarmed most if not all
persons at these events. Plus such laws need not be ubiquitous to form
a tradition for purposes of Bruen. So they are relevantly similar for
purposes of the Court’s analysis, even if they are not “twins,” and even
if the contemporary law operates in a more prophylactic manner than
previous laws.
Additionally, nineteenth century state and territorial laws further
confirm and cement these traditions through the similar prohibitions on
carrying 	firearms 	in 	social 	settings 	that 	revolved 	around 	alcohol
consumption 	and 	in 	the 	prohibitions 	on 	carrying 	firearms 	while
intoxicated. Many states prohibited the carrying of firearms while
intoxicated in the nineteenth century. See 1867 Kan. Sess. Laws 25, ch.
12, § 1; MO. REV . S TAT. § 1274 (1879); 1883 Wis. Laws 290, ch. 329 § 3;
Wis. Stat. § 4397b(3) (1878); 1909 Idaho Sess. Laws 7, § 1; see also 1878
Miss. Laws 175, ch. 46, § 2 (“That it shall not be lawful for any person
to sell to . . . any person intoxicated, knowing him to be . . . in a state of
intoxication, any dangerous weapons.”). There was no dispute about the
constitutionality of those laws. See Wolford, 116 F.4th at 985.
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Likewise, many laws prohibited firearms in settings where alcohol
was sold. Western territories, for instance, banned firearms in many
venues selling alcohol. In 1890, Oklahoma banned firearms at “any place
where intoxicating liquors are sold.” 1890 Okla. Terr. Stats. 496, ch. 25,
art. 47 § 7. In 1853, New Mexico prohibited firearms at a “Ball or
Fandango” and any “room adjoining said ball where Liquors are sold.”
1853 N.M. Terr. Laws 67, § 3. In 1889, the territory of Arizona required
“drinking saloon[s]” to “keep posted up in a conspicuous place in his bar
room . . . a 	plain 	notice 	to 	travelers 	to 	divest 	themselves 	of 	their
weapons.” 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws 17, § 7. Certainly territorial laws
are given less weight than state laws, but Bruen does not require
“automatic rejection of any territorial laws and statutes from the latter
half of the nineteenth century.” Antonyuk, 120 F.4th at 1029.
Next, states and territories prohibited firearms in ballrooms and
other social gatherings revolving around alcohol (including a Texas law
passed close in time to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See TEX. PENAL CODE , tit. 9, ch. 3, art. 320 (1879); 1853 N.M. Terr. Laws
67, § 3; 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws 17, § 3; 1890 Okla. Terr. Stats. 496,
ch. 25, art. 47, § 7; 1875 Mo. Laws 50 § 1. For example, a Texas sensitive
places law from 1870 prohibited specified knives and all firearms in
certain public spaces, including “[a]ny church or religious assembly, any
school room or other place where persons are assembled for educational,
literary, or scientific purposes, or into a ball room, social party, or other
social gathering . . . or any other public assembly.” An Act Regulating
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 12th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 46, § 1, 1870
Tex. Gen. Laws 63. This tradition extended to localities throughout
Texas and throughout the nation, for instance, in the thriving cowtown
of Abilene, Kansas—a town where Texas cowboys travelled to and had
a reputation for wielding firearms and drinking alcohol. J OSEPH G.
ROSA , THEY CALLED H IM WILD BILL: THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF
J AMES BUTLER H ICKOK 120–121 (Univ. Okla. Press 1964). As the cattle
trade prospered and the city experienced an influx of “gunmen” and
thriving cowboys eager to socialize, the city became “alarmed” by the
possibility of confrontations. Id. The city, therefore, “banned [firearms]
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within the city limits”, and those laws were rigorously enforced by the
town’s toughest “Southern boys.” Id. at 122.
The actions taken by Abilene illustrate the mid-nineteenth century
trend in Texas and beyond of regulating firearms in response to a
concern about firearms violence, which also could be attributed to the
“infusion of guns and veterans after the Civil War.” BENJAMIN H EBER
J OHNSON , TEXAS: AN AMERICAN H ISTORY 165 (2025). So the West is no
stranger to these kinds of firearms regulations even given its reputation
for protecting Second Amendment liberties. See Matt Jancer, Gun
Control is as Old as the Old West, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://tinyurl.com/54a4cp93 (“Contrary to the popular imagination,
bearings arms on the frontier was a heavily regulated business.”); An
Act Relating to the Issuance of a License to Carry a Concealed Handgun,
R.S., ch. 229, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 1998 (the concealed-carry licensing
law signed by then-Governor Bush); Firearm Carry Act of 2021, 87th
R.S., ch. 809 Tex. Gen. Laws 1960 (legalizing permitless carry for
handguns in public). Those laws were passed at the municipal level more
often 	than 	at other 	levels. 	Id.; 	see San 	Antonio, 	Tex., 	Ordinance
Concerning the Carrying of Arms or Deadly Weapons, § 1 (Dec. 14,
1870).
The prohibitions on firearms in ballrooms are especially probative
because ballrooms “often served” alcohol “and drinking (sometimes
copiously) was a favorite ballroom activity.” Kellen Heniford & Kari
Still, Panic! At the Ballroom: The 1804 New Orleans Ballroom Weapons
ban in a Post-Bruen Context, 73 BUFF. L. REV . 679, 703 (2025). Balls
“united wine, whiskey, [and] honor-conscious men often heavily armed,”
and “[v]iolence [was] commonplace.” Id. at 708 (cleaned up). Thus many
jurisdictions 	legislated 	ballrooms 	and 	similar 	social 	gatherings
accordingly.
These laws together form a well-established tradition of regulating
the carry of firearms by those intoxicated or prone to become intoxicated
in settings serving significant amounts of alcohol.
Amici also marshal laws that prohibit the sale of alcohol to militia
members on duty. See Wolford, 116 F.4th at 985; see, e.g., An Act for
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Better Settling and Regulating the Militia of this Colony of New Jersey,
for 	the 	Repelling 	Invasions, 	and 	Suppressing 	Insurrections 	and
Rebellions, May 8, 1746, reprinted in 3 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF
N EW JERSEY 1746-1760 at 5–11 (1980) (prohibiting the sale of liquor to
militiamen on duty); An Act for the Regulation of the Militia of the
Commonwealth 	of 	Pennsylvania, 	ch. 	167, 	1780 	Pa. 	Laws 	368
(prohibiting militiamen from meeting at taverns and from appearing for
military service carrying firearms while intoxicated). The Court declines
to accept those laws as support for the tradition of prohibiting firearms
in places selling alcohol. The purpose of those laws was to ensure
militiamen were fit for military service and not to disarm lay people
from carrying firearms for fear of violence ensuing.
F. Professional Sports Stadiums and Racetracks are Sensitive
Places 	Where 	Prohibiting 	Firearms 	is 	Constitutionally
Permissible.
While professional sports stadiums and racetracks are not sensitive
places just because they are crowded, the American legal tradition has
long-maintained 	laws 	regulating 	Second 	Amendment 	liberties 	in
crowded places of social amusement. And the historical evidence shows
that social places of amusement were treated as sensitive places.
Because of the similarities between those settings and professional
sports stadiums and racetracks, the Texas statutes lawfully treat them
as 	sensitive 	places 	as 	they 	do 	interscholastic 	events, 	bars, 	and
restaurants.
As described before, many English laws prohibited the carrying of
arms in fairs and markets where people gathered for amusement, and
this tradition extended into the early stages of the United States. See
supra Section E. One should not expect to see laws regulating stadiums
anyways because modern professional sports did not come anywhere
close 	to 	their 	current 	form 	until 	1869, 	when 	the 	Cincinnati 	Red
Stockings became the first salaried professional team. Steven A Riess,
S PORTS IN AMERICA 	FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 15–17 (2015) (“[A] real boom in sports took place after the Civil
War” due to urbanization and industrialism.). But, like sports stadiums
and racetracks, these regulations strived to preserve a peaceful social
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environment for entertainment where large crowds gather by means of
disarmament.
The 1868 evidence confirms this tradition. Once again, Texas was a
leader in this regard. Texas banned firearms at “any circus, show, or
public exhibition of any kind.” TEX. PENAL CODE , tit. 9, ch. 4, art. 320
(1879); see Tenn. Acts 23, ch. 22, § 2; 1889 Ariz. Terr. Sess. Laws 17 § 3.
The Texas Supreme Court then interpreted this law to be constitutional.
Therein, the Texas Supreme Court addressed Section 3 of the above
statute, which was the sensitive places restriction, and said that it was
almost “ridiculous, that any one should claim the right to carry upon his
person any of the mischievous devices inhibited by the statute, into a
peaceable public assembly, as for instance, into a church, a lecture room,
a ball room, or any other place where 	ladies and gentleman are
congregated.” English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872); see also Antonyuk,
120 F.4th at 1036, 1038 (upholding statute “regulat[ing] firearms in
discrete, densely crowded physical spaces wherein people assemble for
amusement”). Although Bruen has called English an “outlier[],” that
interpretation 	was 	only 	in 	regards 	to 	the 	public-carry 	restriction
provision in the statute, not the sensitive-place restriction. Bruen, 597
U.S. at 64–65 (taking issue with § 1 of the Texas statute, which forbade
anyone from “carrying . . . unless he has reasonable grounds for fearing
an unlawful attack”). Other state courts likewise agreed that laws
banning 	firearms 	at 	public 	gatherings 	for 	amusement 	were
constitutional. See Wolford, 116 F.4th at 987–88 (collecting cases); Hill
v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 476 (1874) (“[T]he bearing [at a concert] of arms of
any sort, is an eye-sore to good citizens, offensive to peaceable people,
an indication of a want of a proper respect for the majesty of the laws,
and a marked breach of good manners.”); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn.
165, 182 (1871) (“[A] man may well be prohibited from carrying his arms
to . . . [a] public assemblage.”). Thus, professional sporting events are
analogous to places of amusement where firearms were restricted
“[b]oth before and shortly following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment [in] cities, states, and territories.” Wolford, 116 F.4th 987.
The same analysis applies to the provision covering racetracks: They
are relevantly similar to the historical regulations governing crowded
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places 	of 	amusement. 	Racetracks 	arguably 	present 	different
considerations because American horseracing has existed since the
1600s. 1 J OHN HERVEY, RACING IN AMERICA : 1665–1865, at 29 (1944).
But, ultimately, the same analysis applies as it does to professional
sports because of its evolution. In the colonial era, horseracing was not
formalized but instead “unorganized” and “spontaneous,” taking place
in streets at times, and only one racecourse existed. Id. Americans even
led an “Anti-Racing Crusade” as part of “[a] natural reaction against
things English.” Id. at 131. So a historical twin would be impossible to
find for horseracing just as it would be for professional sports stadiums.
Because racing took place in the streets and was dangerous, there
was a movement to ban it or at least severely restrict it. Id. at 43, 16.
States passed laws to prevent it, and if it was permitted, there were no
grandstands. Id. at 31–33. Or they banned gambling altogether. Joshua
Hochman, 	The 	Second 	Amendment 	on 	Board: 	Public 	and 	Private
Historical Traditions of Firearm Regulation, 133 YALE L.J. 1676, 1721
(2024) (“[M]any colonies and states throughout the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries banned gambling.”).
But, after the Civil War, racing started to expand as did “trackside
betting” to develop revenue. Gary A. O’Dell, Under Siege: Kentucky and
the Transformation of American Thoroughbred Racing, 1865–1936, 118
REG. K Y. H IST . S OC ’Y 389, 402 (2020). That led to bookmaking and pari-
mutuels and “transformed” horseracing into a “national industry.” Id. at
402–05. Accordingly, in 1868, Tennessee made it unlawful for “any
person attending any . . . race course . . . to carry about his person,
concealed or otherwise, any pistol.” 1869 Tenn. Acts 23, ch. 22 § 2. The
rise in gambling at racetracks raised concerns about a heightened risk
of firearms violence, serving as an impetus for these restrictions.
Regardless, horseracing events qualify as social places of amusement in
the same way professional sports events do. Therefore, similar evidence
supporting a ban at sports stadiums supports a ban at racetracks.
In 	short, 	the 	laws 	are 	similar in 	that they 	intend 	to 	“protect
individuals engaged in these recreational and social activities from
confrontations and encounters involving firearms.” Md. Shall Issue, 680
F. Supp. 3d at 587, 588. Coupled with the concern that gambling and
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horseracing would heighten tensions and potentially escalate violence,
these regulations are relevantly similar in both the burdens they impose
and in the purposes behind their enactments.
CONCLUSION
In coming to its holding, the Court is mindful of the important, but
restrained role, the federal judiciary must serve in American democracy.
Courts indeed serve a critical role in protecting constitutional liberties,
particularly those liberties that may easily be trampled on by the
tyranny of the majority. But the Court is also mindful that it is
ultimately the people that govern our nation and the people that pass
legislation 	through 	their 	duly-enacted 	representatives—the 	same
American people who treasure constitutional liberties. This is not an act
of “judicial abdication.” Rather, the Court’s role is not to impose its view
of the merits of these policies on the people, but instead to uphold the
law and Constitution independent of its or anyone else’s political
preferences.3 “For [the Founding Fathers], the question involved in
judicial 	restraint 	was 	not—as 	it 	is 	not—will 	we 	have 	liberal 	or
conservative courts?” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, President
Reagan’s Remarks at Swearing in of Chief Justice William Rehnquist
and Associate Justice Antonin Scalia. East Room, on September 26,
1986, YOU TUBE (August 8, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/ku2kzwt6. “The
question was and is, will we have government by the people?” Id.
And it is especially incumbent on a district judge to maintain his
independence because unlike appellate judges, he operates unilaterally.
“There’s a reason why there are jokes about God wishing that he was a
federal district judge.” Hon. James C. Ho, Not Enough Respect for the
Judiciary—Or 	Too 	Much? 	Arrogance 	and 	the 	Myth 	of 	Judicial
Supremacy, 24 H ARV . J. L. PUB . POL ’Y: PER CURIAM , 6 (2026). “So it’s vital
3 “One single object... [will merit] the endless gratitude of the society: that
of restraining the judges from usurping legislation.” Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Edward Livingston (Mar. 25, 1825), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF
T HOMAS J EFFERSON 112, 113 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1904).
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that district judges exercise their powers carefully and with integrity.”
Id.
Here, Texans—arguably among the most prominent protectors of our
Second Amendment liberties—made a decision to balance their rights to
firearms with other special factors concerning sensitive places. In such
a situation, the Court must proceed with great care at the risk of
trampling on the will of the people. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S.
1, 	78–79 	(1936) 	(Stone, 	J., 	dissenting) 	(“[W]hile 	unconstitutional
exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the
government is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint. For the removal of
unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies, not to the courts but to
the ballot and to the process of democratic government.”). Indeed, lest it
be forgotten, Texans can renege on the Firearms Prohibitions if they so
choose 	through 	their 	elected 	representatives. 	See 	Speaker 	Sam
Rayburn, quoted in ALFRED STEINBERG, SAM RAYBURN : A BIOGRAPHY 351
(1975) (“The American people, when properly appealed to, respond.”). As
President Lyndon B. Johnson, a native Texan, advised Congress: “Come
now, let us reason together.” J OHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 872
(15th ed. 1980).
The Court, therefore, holds that the Texas Firearms Prohibitions do
not violate the Constitution. Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED
that Texas’s Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 24th day of March 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
REGINALEA KEMP ,
Plaintiff,
v. 	No. 4:23-cv-00841-P
REGIONS BANK ET AL .,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Leave to File
Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18. Having considered the Motion
and applicable docket entries, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
SO ORDERED on this 18th day of September 2023.
______________________________________________
Mark T. Pittman
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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