USA v. Reis et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Criminal Action No. 4:24-CR-00287-O
§
STEPHANIE HOCKRIDGE 	(02) 	§
§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Stephanie Hockridge’s Motion for New Trial Based on
Newly Disclosed Brady Evidence (Doc. 341) and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 342); and the
Government’s1 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial (Doc 346). Having reviewed
the evidence presented at trial, the briefing and applicable law, the Court finds that the newly
disclosed evidence was not suppressed nor material for Brady purposes. Accordingly, Defendant’s
Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case has been extensively laid out in prior briefing, so the
Court does not recite it here. In the present motion for a new trial, Defendant argues that she is
entitled to a new trial because, following Defendant’s trial, the Government produced (1) an audio
recording and MOI of a 2023 interview with Newly Disclosed Government Witness #1 (“GW-1”),
(2) a transcript of an interview of Newly Disclosed Government Witness #2 (“GW-2”), and (3) the
audio recording and transcript of an interview of Newly Disclosed Government Witness #3 (“GW-
1 For purposes of this Order, the “Government” refers to the prosecution team of Northern District of
Texas, unless otherwise stated.
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3”), all of whom were involved in fraudulent activities with Karnezis related to their PPP
applications.2 Defendant argues that the newly disclosed evidence constitutes suppressed material
evidence under Brady v. Maryland.3 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(1), a defendant may move for a new trial
on the basis of newly discovered evidence within three years of a guilty verdict. The Court may
grant such a motion “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). The Court’s
inquiry on a Rule 33 motion “goes to the fairness of the trial rather than to the question of guilt or
innocence.” United States v. McRae, 795 F.3d 471, 481 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
“Under Brady and its progeny, due process requires that the prosecution disclose evidence
that is both favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment.” Floyd v. Vannoy, 894
F.3d 143, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). “This duty to disclose exists
irrespective of a request from the defense and extends to all evidence known not just to the
prosecutors, but ‘to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the
police.’” Id. at 161–62 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437
(1995)). 	“Giglio applies Brady to 	evidence 	affecting 	the 	credibility 	of 	key 	government
witnesses.” United States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “[W]hen
a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence raises a Brady claim, this court instead
applies the three-prong Brady test to determine whether a new trial is appropriate.” United States
v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 247 (5th Cir. 2002).
2 Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. New Trial 1–2, Doc. 342.
3 Id. at 4.
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To obtain a new trial pursuant to Brady and its progeny, defendants must demonstrate that
“(1) evidence was suppressed; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3)
the suppressed evidence was material to either guilt or punishment.” Id.
“Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant ‘knows or should know of the essential facts
that would enable him to take advantage of it . . . . The government is not required, in other words,
to facilitate the compilation of exculpatory material that, with some industry, defense counsel
could marshal on their own.’” Id. at 246 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Shoher,
555 F. Supp. 346, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)); see also United States v. Mulderig, 120 F.3d 534, 541
(5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[w]hen information is fully available to a defendant at the time
of his trial and his only reason for not obtaining and presenting the evidence to the court is his lack
of reasonable diligence, the defendant has no Brady claim”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). 	As 	to 	the 	second 	prong, 	“evidence 	impeaching 	a 	prosecution 	witness 	is
favorable Brady evidence.” Floyd, 894 F.3d at 163 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676 (1985)).
Finally, with respect to the third prong, evidence is material if there is “a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have 	been 	different.” United 	States 	v. 	Brumfield, 	89 	F.4th 	506, 	513–14 	(5th 	Cir.
2023) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). “A reasonable probability is established when the failure
to disclose the suppressed evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 514 (quoting Runyan, 290 F.3d at
247) (citation modified). The materiality of suppressed evidence is “considered collectively, not
item by item.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).
III. 	ANALYSIS
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A. Suppression of Evidence
Defendant argues that the Government was in possession of the allegedly withheld
evidence prior to trial or at the very least had access to the evidence and therefore possessed it for
Brady purposes.4 The Court has already addressed Defendant’s argument in its Memorandum
Opinion and Order denying Defendant’s motion to compel.5 Because Defendant has not raised any
new arguments here, the Court refers to its reasoning in denying the Motion to Compel and finds
that the evidence was not suppressed within the meaning of Brady. 6
B. Materiality of the Evidence
Even if the Court were to conclude that the evidence in question was suppressed under
Brady, Defendant has not shown that the evidence is material. “For evidence to be material, there
must be a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.” Brumfield, 89 F.4th at 513–14. A “reasonable
probability” is less than a preponderance of the evidence—it “does not mean that the defendant
‘would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,’ only that the
likelihood of a different result is great enough to ‘undermine confidence in the outcome of the
trial.’” Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012) (citation modified) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
Defendant argues that the newly disclosed evidence tends to show that she did not
knowingly join any conspiracy, and that the Government presented evidence at trial, not of one
conspiracy, but of several different conspiracies.7 In support, Defendant argues that GW-1 and
4 Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. New Trial 5–6, Doc. 342.
5 Order Den. Def.’s Mot. Compel 4–5, Doc. 348.
6 Id.
7 Def.’s Br. Supp. Mot. New Trial 4–6, Doc. 342.
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GW-2 were describing a different conspiracy that involved Karnezis but predated Defendant’s and
Karnezis’s meeting.8 The Government responds that even if Karnezis was involved in a separate
conspiracy in 2020, that does not absolve Defendant of her participation in a conspiracy with
Karnezis in 2021.9
The Court agrees with the Government. The fact that the newly disclosed evidence might
provide a basis for inferring a conspiracy that Defendant was not involved in does not mean that
Defendant did not engage in the convicted conspiracy. See Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 396
(5th Cir. 2010) (“The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of the
evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state.”). At most, the evidence at issue
could have impeached elements of Karnezis’s testimony. But as stated, there is sufficient
documentary evidence independent of Karnezis’s testimony to support Defendant’s guilt.10 See
Brumfield, 89 F.4th at 514-15 (“[S]uppressed evidence [is not] material when the testimony of the
witness who might have been impeached by the undisclosed evidence is strongly corroborated by
additional 	evidence 	supporting 	a 	guilty 	verdict.”). 	The 	Government 	presented 	evidence
independent of Karnezis’s testimony to show Defendant’s knowing involvement in submitting
fraudulent loans.11
The Court concludes that there is no reasonable probability that the result of Defendant’s
trial would have been different had the evidence in question been disclosed prior to trial. Therefore,
Defendant has failed to meet the materiality-prong of Brady.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
8 Id. at 6–10.
9 Gov.’s Opp. Def.’s Mot. New Trial 7, Doc. 346.
10 See e.g., Gov.’s Opp. Def’s Mot. J. Acquittal New Trial 1–22, Doc. 279-1.
11 See id.
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for New Trial under Brady is DENIED.
Additionally, Defendants’ Request for Hearing on the Motion (Doc. 350) is DENIED as moot.
SIGNED this 20th day of November, 2025.
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