USA v. Betford

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
No. 3:26-mj-10-BN
AARON TYRONE BETFORD,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING
THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR DETENTION
Defendant Aaron Tyrone Betford is charged with Unlawful Possession of a
Firearm by a Felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l) in a criminal complaint filed
in this district.
The government moved for Defendant's pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. §
3142.
On January 9, 2026, the Court held a preliminary hearing and a hearing on
the government's motion for detention. Defendant appeared in person and through
counsel. The government appeared through an Assistant United States Attorney for
the Northern District of Texas.
On the record at the end of the hearing on January 9, 2026, the Court found
probable cause to believe that Defendant committed the offense conduct alleged in
the complaint in this case and determined, for the reasons explained on the record
and further explained below, that Defendant should be released on conditions under
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l) while this case is pending.
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I. 	Eligibility for a detention hearing
"The provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3144 govern pretrial release." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 46(a).
"(18 U.S.C.] § 3142(£) does not authorize a detention hearing whenever the
government thinks detention would be desirable, but rather limits such hearings to
the 	[seven circumstances listed in 	(f)(l)(A), 	(f)(l)(B), 	(f)(l)(C), 	(f)(l)(D), 	(f)(l)(E),
(f)(2)(A), and (f)(2)(b)]." United States v. Byrd, 969 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
"A hearing can be held only if one of the [seven] circumstances listed in (f)(l)
and (2) is present; detention can be ordered only after a hearing is held pursuant to
§ 3142(£)." Id.
"Section 3142(£) specifies the circumstances under which a detention hearing
must be held, including: a case involving a crime of violence; an offense with a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death; certain drug offenses with a
maximum term of imprisonment for 	ten years or more; 	a 	felony 	offense if the
defendant 	has 	two 	or 	more 	previous 	conviction 	that 	would 	quality 	under 	the
preceding subsections; a serious risk that the person will flee; or a serious risk that
the 	person will obstruct or 	attempt to 	obstruct justice, 	or threaten, 	injure, 	or
intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure or intimidate, a prospective witness or
juror." United States v. Okhumale, 813 F. App'x 936, 938 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)(E) also provides for a hearing, "on motion of the attorney for
the Government, in a case that involves ... any felony that is not otherwise a crime of
violence that involves a minor victim or that involves the possession or use of a
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firearm or destructive device (as those terms are defined in [18 U.S.C. §] 921), or any
other dangerous weapon, or involves a failure to register under section 2250 of title
18, United States Code."
"Detention can be ordered, therefore, only in a case that involves one of the
[seven] circumstances listed in (f), and in which the judicial officer finds, after a
hearing, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community." Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109.
That is, ordering pretrial detention under Section 3142 "requires both the
presence of one of the circumstances outlined in § 3142(£) and a determination under
§ 3142(e) that the no conditions imposed could either assure the appearance of the
defendant or the safety of the defendant and community." Okhumale, 813 F. App'x at
939 (cleaned up).
And, 	so, 	as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
confirmed, "[t]here can be no doubt that [the Bail Reform Act of 1984] clearly favors
nondetention," and a defendant's "threat to the safety of any other person or the
community, in the absence of one of the [seven] specified circumstances, [cannot]
justify detention under the Act." Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109-10; accord Okhumale, 813 F.
App'x at 939.
In this case, Defendant is eligible for pretrial detention under 18 U.S.C. §
3142(f)(l)(E) because Defendant is charged by a criminal complaint with - and the
Court has found probable cause to believe that he committed - a felony that is not
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otherwise a crime of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)) but that involves
the possession of a firearm.
II. Burden on government's motion for pretrial detention
Under the Bail Reform Act, "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of
[18 U.S.C. § 3142(£)], the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the
detention of the person before trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(l).
On a motion for detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, the government always must
prove either
• 	by, a preponderance of the evidence, that there is no condition or combination
of conditions that could be set to reasonably assure the defendant's appearance
as required or,
• 	by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no condition or combination of
conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of the community or another
person if the defendant were released.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(£); United States v. Westbrook, 780 F.2d 1185, 1189 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1986); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1985).
"For pretrial detention to be imposed on a defendant, the lack of reasonable
assurance 	of either the 	defendant's 	appearance, 	or the 	safety of others or the
community, is sufficient; both are not required." United States v. Rueben, 974 F.2d
580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992); accord Westbrook, 780 F.2d at 1188-89 & n.5.
But, under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), the Court must "order the pretrial release of
the person unless the person is a flight risk or danger to the community." United
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States v. Baltazar-Sebastian, 990 F.3d 939, 944 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up); accord
Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109.
And, so, "[i]n making a pretrial detention determination, a judicial officer must
bear in mind that passage of the pretrial detention provision of the 1984 [Bail Reform]
Act did not ... signal a congressional intent to incarcerate wholesale the category of
accused persons awaiting trial" and that, "[r]ather, Congress was demonstrating its
concern about a small but identifiable group of individuals as to whom pretrial release
is inappropriate." Westbrook, 780 F.2d at 1189 (cleaned up).
Under Section 3142, "pretrial release is not inappropriate - 	that is, pretrial
detention is not required- in every case in which the government charges a defendant
with a crime that is considered particularly serious (which are generally the only
offenses for which detention is authorized at all under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(£)), or for
which the government has strong evidence, or for which the defendant is exposed to
a lengthy sentence." United States v. Roberson, 547 F. Supp. 3d 560, 565 (N.D. Tex.
2021).
"There is a difference under the Bail Reform Act between (1) the universe of
people whom prosecutors and law enforcement agents consider to be 'bad men' - or
have probable cause to believe are involved with or connected to criminal activity that
may be particularly repugnant or traumatizing or scary - 	and (2) the universe of
people whom the governing legal standards consider to be, even with restrictive
conditions, too dangerous going forward after arrest to be released while their cases
are pending." Id. at 566.
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III. 	Standards for pretrial detention versus release
Under 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3142, 	the 	Court 	is 	presented 	with 	essentially 	three
questions:
1. 	Does the defendant pose a risk, danger, or threat going forward not to appear
as required or to endanger the safety of the community or any other person?
2. 	If so, are there conditions of release that will reasonably assure the defendant's
appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the community
if the defendant is released?
3. 	And, if so, is there evidence that the defendant is unlikely to comply with those
conditions - 	that is, that the Court cannot be reasonably assured that the
defendant will comply with the least restrictive combination of conditions that
will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required and the safety
of any other person and the community while Defendant is on release?
At bottom, the issue is whether, pursuant to Section 3142(e)(l), any condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as
required and the safety of any other person and the community. Or , put another way,
can the defendant be subjected to conditions of release that will reasonably assure
(not guarantee) that he will not engage in harmful or illegal conduct in general or
toward a specific person - 	and that he will show up to court and for other court-
obligations as required- if he is released? See Roberson, 547 F. Supp. 3d at 566.
To prove that the defendant cannot based on danger to the community or
another person, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant presents an identified and articulable - and future or ongoing- threat
to a person or the community and that this demonstrable danger is one that no
condition or combination of conditions of release can reasonably be expected to dispel.
See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987); accord Foucha v. La ., 504 U.S.
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71, 81 (1992); United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 2021);
Roberson, 547 F. Supp. 3d at 566-67. "Clear and convincing evidence is that weight
of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and
weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the case." United States v.
Jackson, 19 F.3d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1994) (cleaned up).
Whether a defendant poses a particular threat depends on the nature of the
threat identified and a defendant's resources and capabilities. And, so, for example,
whether a 	defendant poses a 	threat of dealing drugs may depend on her past
experience and whether she has the means to continue to do so in the future. See
Munchel, 991 F.3d at 1283.
To prove that there is no condition or combination of conditions that could be
set to reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required, the government
must make a showing that allows the Court to determine, from the information before
it, that it is more likely than not that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required. See Fortna, 769 F.3d at
250.
And 	the 	defendant's 	potential 	for 	compliance 	with 	release 	conditions 	is
relevant to the detention inquiry, and the Court can consider whether it believes the
defendant will abide by its conditions when making the release determination in the
first instance 	under 	18 U.S.C. 	§ 3142. 	See Munchel, 	991 	F.3d at 	1280-81. 	But
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detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 cannot be based only on a finding that the defendant
is unlikely to comply with conditions of release 	absent the 	requisite finding of
dangerousness or risk of flight. See id. at 1283.
If the Court determines that the government has not met its burden to show
that detention is required based on the lack of reasonable assurance of either the
defendant's appearance as required or the safety of others or the community, the
Court is required to order the defendant's pretrial release on personal recognizance,
or on an unsecured appearance bond, subject to the condition that the defendant must
not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release and subject to
the condition that the defendant must cooperate in collecting a DNA sample if
required by federal statute - 	unless the Court determines that release on personal
recognizance 	or 	an 	unsecured 	appearance 	bond will not 	reasonably 	assure 	the
defendant's appearance as required or will endanger the safety of any other person
or the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b); Byrd, 969 F.2d at 109.
If release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) on personal recognizance or an unsecured
appearance bond will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required
or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community, the Court is
directed under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)(B) to release the defendant subject to the least
restrictive further condition or combination of conditions that the Court determines
will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required and the safety of any
other person and the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)(B); accord Byrd, 969 F.2d
at 108.
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That is, "[i]f conditions of pretrial release are reasonably necessary to assure
the appearance of the defendant in court or to prevent endangering the safety of
others [or the community], then the court shall order the defendant released 'subject
to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions,' to achieve
those goals." United States v. Davis, No. 23-50917, 2024 WL 3372682, at *2 (5th Cir.
July 11, 2024) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)(B)).
In setting conditions under Section 3142(c)(l), the Court's task, then, is to
identify 	and 	impose 	the 	least 	restrictive 	combination 	of conditions 	that 	will
reasonably assure - not guarantee - the defendant's appearance as required and the
safety of any other person and the community while the defendant is on release. See
Fortna, 769 F.2d at 250; United States v. Barker, No. 3:16-cr-516-D, 2017 WL 345643,
at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2017). And, so, under Section 3142(c), conditions are not
"presumptively appropriate" just because "they would not cause a defendant harm or
injury" - 	rather, 	any condition of release 	must be "part of the least restrictive
combination of conditions that will reasonably assure Ddefendants' appearances as
required and the safety of any other person and the community while they are on
release pending trial." Barker, 2017 WL 345643, at *15.
"The 	Bail Reform Act includes 	a 	non-exhaustive 	list" 	under 	18 U.S.C. 	§
3142(c)(l)(B) "of additional conditions" that "may be imposed to assure appearance"
or the safety of other persons or the community and includes, as a catch-all, "any
other condition that is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person
as required and to assure the safety of any other person and the community." 18
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U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)(B)(i)-(xiv); United States v. Aziz, No. 21-40878, 2022 WL 1056102,
at *3 (5th Cir. Apr. 8, 2022).
And, under Section 3142(c)(l)(B)(xiv), courts do sometimes impose conditions
of pretrial release that attempt to prevent or reduce the risk that a defendant will
engage in similar or related criminal activities to those charged in the complaint or
indictment. See Barker, 2017 WL 345643, at *14. "This Court has imposed special
conditions 	precluding 	certain 	defendants 	indicted 	for 	preparing 	fraudulent 	tax
returns from preparing tax returns for others while on release and precluding certain
defendants 	charged 	with 	submitting 	fraudulent 	billing 	to 	federal 	health 	care
programs from billing to those programs while on release." Id.
IV. 	Standards for and application of Section 3142(g) factors
To make all these determinations under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 regarding possible
detention or release with or without conditions, the Court must consider the available
information concerning the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) factors . See United States v. Flores,
53 F.4th 313, 315 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. Green, 793 F. App'x 223, 225 (5th
Cir. 2019); Rueben, 974 F.2d at 586; Fassler v. United States, 858 F.2d 1016, 1018 n.4
(5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Parker, 848 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 1262, 1264-66 (5th Cir. 1988); Westbrook, 780 F.2d at 1189.
But the Court is not required to expressly "address any specific conditions of
release and why they would be inadequate." Aziz, 2022 WL 1056102, at *3.
In this case, the Court has considered the testimony of the case agent, the
complaint and supporting affidavit, and the report of the pretrial services officer, in
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light 	of the 	factors 	listed 	in 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 3142(g) 	- 	including 	the 	nature 	and
circumstances of the charged offense; the apparent weight of the evidence against
Defendant; Defendant's history and characteristics; whether Defendant was, at the
time of the current offense or arrest, on probation, on parole, or on other release
pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under
federal, state, or local law; and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person
or the community that would be posed by Defendant's release.
As to the Section 3142(g)(l) factor - 	"the nature and circumstances of the
offense charged" - 	the Fifth Circuit has credited district courts' emphasizing "the
amount of drugs involved in [a] case and the fact that [a defendant] faced a lengthy
punishment." Flores, 53 F.4th at 315.
As to the Section 3142(g)(2) factor - "the weight of the evidence against the
person" - the Fifth Circuit has held that "[t]he government's introduction of extrinsic
incriminatory evidence ... is a required feature of the government's proof," and all the
more so where (unlike in this case) the government invokes the Section 3142(e)(3)
rebuttable presumption. See Jackson, 845 F.2d at 1264-66.
And the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has offered
reasoning that explains how this factor plays into a decision on whether to release or
detain a defendant. The Court of Appeals recently explained that a district court
properly considered this factor "in determining that there was significant evidence
that [a defendant] had in fact committed the charged murder" and that the proffered
witness testimony and other evidence all "formed a strong case against him"; that,
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"[i]n making a predictive assessment of the defendant's future 	dangerousness if
released into the community, common sense and§ 3142(g)(2) aligned with the district
court's consideration of the strength of this evidence, especially coupled with the
nature of the charged offense"; and that "[i]t stands to reason that the more strongly
the evidence indicated that the defendant committed the murder, the more likely he
poses a danger to the community if released on bail." United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th
141, 150 (2d Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). And, as to risk of flight, the Court of Appeals
observed that, just as (relevant to the Section 3142(g)(l) factor) "[t]he prospect of a
severe sentence can create a strong incentive for a defendant to flee and thereby avoid
that sentence," where "the evidence against a defendant is strong, it follows that the
defendant faces an elevated risk of conviction (and of the attendant punishment), and
therefore may present an elevated risk of flight." Id. at 151.
As to the Section 3142(g)(3)(A) factor - "the history and characteristics of the
person, including Dthe person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties,
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and
record concerning appearance at court proceedings" - the Fifth Circuit has recently
affirmed a detention order where, even where a defendant "presented evidence of his
family connections, work history, lack of prior felonies, past compliance with bond
conditions, 	and insufficient resources 	to flee," 	"the 	record also shows that 	[the
defendant] previously used and distributed drugs under his parents' roof' and "used
drugs on a weekly basis and committed the instant charged offenses while on state
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probation." Flores, 53 F.4th at 315-16.
And, 	as to danger to the community, the Fifth Circuit has held that the
government met its burden as to detention where it "presented substantial evidence
to show that [the defendants] have continuously engaged in the trafficking of drugs
for several years, including while being on parole or shortly after being released from
parole" and where the defendants "presented absolutely no evidence whatsoever to
indicate that they will not continue to engage in drug trafficking if released on bail
pending trial." Rueben, 974 F.2d at 587.
As to the Section 3142(g)(3)(B) factor - "the history and characteristics of the
person, including ... whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person
was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or
completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law" - the Fifth
Circuit has affirmed that a district court is "allowed to consider the fact that [a
defendant] was arrested while on parole from the state law conviction." United States
v. Barker, 876 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1989).
As to the Section 3142(g)(4) factor - "the nature and seriousness of the danger
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release" -
"applies when detention is premised on risk to the community." Aziz, 2022 WL
1056102, at *3 n.l. As to this factor, the Fifth Circuit has recently explained that a
"district court correctly recognized our precedent holding 'that the risk of continued
narcotics trafficking on bail does constitute a risk to the community," where the
defendant "was involved in trafficking a significant quantity of drugs and previously
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committed other drug offenses." Flores, 53 F.4th at 315 (quoting Rueben, 974 F.2d at
586).
In this case, the evidence as presented or proffered at the detention hearing
shows that
• 	Defendant was previously convicted in state court of robbery and aggravated
robbery on December 14, 2008 and sentenced in 2009 to 5 years imprisonment;
• 	Defendant was sentenced in 2021 to probation in state court for unlawful
possession of a weapon and remains on probation for that charge;
• 	Defendant admittedly has used marijuana while on probation;
• 	Defendant, while driving to or from the bookstore at which he has worked for
the last 7 years, was subjected to a traffic stop on January 5, 2026 and arrested
based 	on 	outstanding 	misdemeanor 	warrants, 	and, 	while 	conducting 	an
inventory following the arrest, officers found a firearm in the trunk of the car
that he alone was operating and that is co-registered to Defendant and his
common-law wife;
• 	the 	firearm 	was 	seized 	and 	remains 	in 	law 	enforcement 	custody, 	and
Defendant's common-law wife would testify that she owns the firearm and
accidentally left it in the trunk of the car after she last used the case by herself;
and,
• 	during recorded jail calls following his arrest, Defendant asked his common-
law wife to remotely delete text messages from his phone (which the police had
seized) and asked her to swear out an affidavit attesting that she owns the
firearm 	found 	in the 	trunk 	and 	made 	a 	statement that 	the 	government
interprets as admitting that the police found the firearm in his possession.
The 	government 	does 	not 	seek 	detention 	based 	on 	an 	alleged 	risk 	of
nonappearance. And so the 	Court must determine whether any combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community if Defendant were to
be released.
The 	identified 	and 	articulable 	- 	and 	future 	or 	ongomg - 	threat 	to 	the
community that the government points to is the danger that Defendant will continue
possessing firearms as a convicted felon.
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Firearm possession involves inherent risks and possible dangers - 	and is
prohibited under federal law by persons with felony convictions - but is not otherwise
any inherently violent crime. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(l)(E). And the Court can, and
often does, impose a special condition of pretrial release that prohibits a defendant
from possessing any firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)(B)(viii).
Defendant's 	prior 	felony 	convictions 	for 	robbery 	and 	aggravated 	robbery
involve violent crimes, but there is no evidence before the Court that, since his release
from his prison term for those offenses, Defendant has engaged in other violent
activity. And there is no evidence that Defendant has possessed a firearm since 2021,
prior to January 5, 2026.
And the particular facts in this case do not support a firm belief or conviction
that the Court cannot be reasonably assured that Defendant will comply with a
condition 	prohibiting 	him 	from 	any 	possession 	of a 	firearm 	while 	on 	release.
Defendant's asking his wife to delete text messages - 	reportedly, according to his
wife's proffered testimony, based on a concern that they would reveal marijuana use
while on probation - may weigh against the Court's being convinced that Defendant
will comply with conditions of release.
But the Court's task is to set the least restrictive combination of conditions
that will reasonably assure - 	not guarantee - 	the safety of the community while
Defendant is on release. And Defendant's ill-advised request to his wife does not
convince the Court that he is unlikely to abide by the Court's condition that -
consistent with the prohibition under federal law, for which he is now facing a
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possible federal prisoner sentences - he not possess any firearm.
And, here, the weight of the evidence against Defendant is strong enough to
support probable cause, but there is a possible case to be litigated on some of the
elements of the charged offense based on the facts presented so far . While Defendant
is on probation, there is no evidence of his engaging in any violent activity since 2008
or possessing 	a 	firearm 	outside 	of his 	home 	(where 	the 	2021 	offense 	conduct
apparently took place) prior to January 5, 	2026. And Defendant has long-term
employment, a stable residence, and lifelong ties to the community.
Under 	these 	circumstances 	and 	considering 	the 	available 	information
concerning in light of the Section 3142(g) factors, the Court finds that the government
has not established by clear and convincing evidence that there is no condition or
combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of the community if
Defendant is released.
The 	Court 	determines, 	under 	Section 	3142(c)(l), 	that 	a 	combination 	of
requiring Defendant to report to and be supervised by Pretrial Services and to
maintain employment; prohibiting Defendant from possessing any firearm and using
or unlawful possessing any narcotic drug or other controlled substances (as defined
by federal law) ; requiring Defendant to submit to testing for prohibited substance
use; requiring Defendant to report any further contact with law enforcement; and
ordering Defendant to surrender his passport and not to obtain another one while on
release (to account for his reported planned vacation to Jamaica) amount to the least
restrictive 	combination 	of 	conditions 	that 	will 	reasonably 	assure 	Defendant's
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appearance as required and the safety of any other person and the community while
Defendant is on release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)(B)(ii), (vi), (viii), (ix), (xiv).
For these reasons, and as the Court explained on the record at the end of the
detention hearing, the Court denies the government's motion for detention [Dkt. No.
3] and orders Defendant Aaron Tyrone Betford released under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(l)
subject to the conditions in the Court's Order Setting Conditions of Release separately
entered in this case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 9, 2026
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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Case 3:26-mj-00010-BN Document 9 Filed 01/09/26 Page 17 of 17 PageID <pageID>