Evans v. Legacy at Corsicana Rehabilitation and Healthcare et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHLOE VERNELL EVANS, 	§
#0194674 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3: 26-cv-00940-E-BW
§
LEGACY AT CORSICANA, ET AL., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action was
referred to the United States magistrate judge for judicial screening including the entry
of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. 	Upon review of the
relevant pleadings and applicable law, this case should be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE as duplicative of a pending case.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2026, Plaintiff Chloe Vernell Evans filed a pro se civil rights
complaint purporting to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous state
and local officials, including jail personnel, county officials, and judicial officers, and
against healthcare providers. (Dkt. No. 3 at 1-4.)
Liberally construed, Evans alleges that, beginning in October 2025,
Defendants engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy to violate her constitutional rights
by restricting her communications while incarcerated in the Limestone County jail,
interfering with her access to courts, and facilitating the unlawful control and
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disposition of her grandmother’s property and medical care. Evans further claims
that Defendants retaliated against her for filing complaints with various agencies,
denied her access to mail and telephone communications, and participated in judicial
proceedings that resulted in the appointment of counsel and other actions allegedly
taken against her wishes. She seeks injunctive relief, release or transfer from custody,
return of property, and monetary damages.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
Because Evans did not pay the filing fee, the Court presumes that she seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As a result, her complaint is subject to screening
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Those statutes provide
for the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it is frivolous or
malicious. The Court is therefore “statutor[ily] mandate[d] to dismiss a complaint
whenever it becomes apparent to the court that no claim for relief is stated.” Harmon
v. Nguyen, No. 3:14-cv-2038-D-BN, 2016 WL 750923, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 4, 2016)
(quoting Moore-Bey v. Cohn, 69 F. App’x 784, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003)), rec. adopted,
2016 WL 740381 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2016).
A. 	Plaintiff’s pleadings are considered malicious and subject to dismissal
Although Evans purports to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, her
complaint fails before the merits of her allegations are considered. Evans has already
filed a nearly identical action, which is currently pending in the Western District of
Texas. See Evans v. Legacy at Corsicana Rehabilitation, et al., No. 6:26-CV-00190,
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2026). Because Evans’ complaint appears to duplicate claims
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already pending in another federal action, the Court turns to whether dismissal as
malicious is appropriate.
“A complaint is malicious if it duplicates claims involving the same series of
events and allegations of many of the same facts asserted by the same plaintiff in
prior or pending litigation.” Amrhein v. United States, 740 F. App’x 65, 66 (5th Cir.
2018) (citing Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also Shakouri
v. Davis, 923 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We have repeatedly stated that a claim
qualifies as malicious if it is virtually identical to and based on the same series of
events as a claim previously brought by the plaintiff.” (citing Bailey v. Johnson, 846
F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988))).
Moreover, “[r]eading Pittman and Wilson[ v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 850 (5th
Cir. 1989),] in conjunction, it is clear that the Court may dismiss an action as
malicious when the complaint raises claims that would be barred by the principles of
res judicata, whether or not the prior litigation has ended unsuccessfully for the
plaintiff.” McGill v. Juanita Kraft Postal Serv., No. 3:03-cv-1113-K, 2003 WL
21355439, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2003), rec. accepted, 2003 WL 21467745 (N.D.
Tex. June 18, 2003). In other words, a duplicative complaint is properly considered
malicious because it seeks to relitigate claims arising from the same nucleus of
operative facts, even where the earlier action remains pending.
Here, Evans’ complaint arises from the same nucleus of operative facts as her
pending action in the Western District of Texas. The claims, parties, and underlying
events substantially overlap, if not identical. And, although the Court must liberally
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construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (noting pro se pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers”), Evans’s complaint raises no claims that are not
already pending in Case No. 6:26-CV-00190 in the Western District of Texas.
Because this action merely repeats those claims, dismissal as malicious is warranted.
B. 	Leave to amend is not warranted
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint
before dismissal, but leave is not required when she has already pled her “best case.”
Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, Evans has failed to
state any claim that is not already pending in another district. Under the most
deferential reading of her complaint, it is highly unlikely that, given the opportunity,
Evans could allege any viable claim in this Court. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that granting leave to amend under these circumstances would be futile and cause
needless delay. Nevertheless, Evans will have an opportunity to object to this
recommendation withing the applicable 14-day period to respond.
III. 	RECOMMENDATION
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the Court should dismiss
without prejudice Evans’ complaint as duplicative and malicious.
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SO RECOMMENDED on April 9, 2026.
______________________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served
with a copy. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 	To be specific, an
objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made,
state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. 	An objection that
merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is
not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from
appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are
accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 	See
Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996),
modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file
objections to 14 days).
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