Macias Hernandez v. DHS Secretary et al

Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ERNESTO SALVADOR MACIAS
HERNANDEZ,
§
§
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § No. 3:26-cv-00736-L (BT)
§
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.
§
§
Respondents, §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Petitioner Ernesto Salvador Macias Hernandez’s (Petitioner) Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”) (Doc. 2) filed on March
6, 2026. After considering the Motion, pleadings, and applicable law, the Court denies Petitioner’s
Motion (Doc. 2).
A temporary restraining order preserves the status quo at the time the lawsuit was filed and
prevents irreparable harm to the movant so that a court can “render a meaningful decision after a
trial on the merits.” Apex Grp. Cap. Advisors LLC v. Related Fund Mgmt. LLC, No. 3:25-cv-1627-
X, 2025 WL 1869436, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 7, 2025) (Starr, J.) (citing Canal Auth. of Fla. v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974)). To warrant the extraordinary relief of a temporary
restraining order, the movant must show:
(1) A likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable
injury; (3) that the threatened injury if the injunction is denied outweighs any
harm that will result if the injunction is granted; and (4) that the grant of an
injunction will not disserve the public interest.
Ladd v. Livingston, 777 F.3d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 2
Preliminary relief should not “conclusively resolve legal disputes[,]” and thus a temporary
restraining order is an inappropriate vehicle for granting ultimate relief. Lackie v. Stinnie, 604 U.S.
192, 200 (2025). A court cannot render ultimate relief sought in a habeas petition—releasing a
detainee—in the form of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. See, e.g., Torres
Perez v. Warden of Prairieland Detention Center, No. 3:26-cv-858, 2026 WL 776039, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 19, 2026) (Brown, J.).
Here, Petitioner does not seek to maintain the status quo pending resolution of his Habeas
Petition (Doc. 1). Rather, he seeks immediate release from confinement, which is the ultimate
relief sought in his Habeas Petition. See Doc. 1 at 1, 15; Doc. 2 at 1, 5. That would be an
inappropriate use of injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court denies the Motion (Doc. 2). The
Habeas Petition remains pending.
It is so ordered this 27th day of March, 2026.
____________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
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