Cottonland Properties LLC v. Jones-Reyes

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
COTTONLAND PROPERTIES, LLC, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:26-cv-00322-D (BT)
§
BRIDGETT ANNETTE JONES-
REYES,
§
§
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se defendant Bridgett Annette Jones-Reyes removed a state court
forcible detainer action from Ellis County Court at Law 1 to this Court. Not. of Rem.
at 1 (ECF No. 3). For the following reasons, the District Judge should remand this
action to the state court from which it was removed or dismiss it without prejudice
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute and follow
Court orders.
Background
Defendant removed a “forcible detainer/possession proceeding” from Ellis
County Court at Law 1—where it was on appeal from a Justice of the Peace ruling—
to this Court. See Not. of Rem. at 1. (ECF No. 3); see No. 25-C-4200 (Ellis Cnty.
Crt. at Law No. 1). The Notice of Removal states that federal question jurisdiction
exists because of issues about (1) the validity of the foreclosure sale, (2) the
authority and standing of the purported purchaser, (3) defects in notice and due
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process, and (4) competing claims of title and superior right to possession. Id. at
1-2. It also states that diversity jurisdiction exists because Defendant is a citizen of
Texas and Plaintiff is a “citizen of the United States” and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. Id. at 2.
But Defendant failed to attach the state court pleadings—such as the
petition—that might establish federal jurisdiction over removed cases. See
generally Not. of Rem. and Statement of Jurisdiction, Standing, and Necessity of
Equitable Adjudication (ECF No. 4). She also filed an in forma pauperis (IFP)
application lacking required information. IFP App. (ECF No. 5). So the Court
issued an order and notice of deficiency (NOD) requiring Defendant to, by March
23, 2026, (1) file copies of the relevant process, pleadings, or orders served on her
in the state court proceedings, including the state court petition or amended
petition that started this case; and (2) file a corrected and complete in forma
pauperis application with all required information. See NOD at 1 (ECF No. 6)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)).
Defendant filed a corrected IFP application (ECF No. 7), but not copies of
the relevant state court proceedings, including the state court petition. Instead,
she filed a document entitled “Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Title
Clarification Estate & Trust Notice of Interest” that does not include the relevant
state court record. See generally Motion (ECF No. 8).
Given Defendant’s failure to establish subject matter jurisdiction over this
action and to comply with Court orders, remand or dismissal is appropriate.
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Legal Standards
The court “is duty-bound to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction sua
sponte.” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 n.4 (5th Cir.
2017).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; “[t]hey possess only that
power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by
judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(citations omitted). Unless otherwise provided by statute, federal subject matter
jurisdiction requires: 1) an action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or 2) complete diversity of citizenship
between adverse parties combined with an amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Regarding federal question jurisdiction, the most common cases “arising
under” federal law “are those in which federal law creates the cause of action.”
Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). In rare
situations, a case may arise under federal law “where the vindication of a right
under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.” Franchise
Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. California, 463 U.S.
1, 9 (1983).
In cases invoking diversity jurisdiction, each plaintiff’s citizenship must be
diverse from each defendant’s citizenship, and the amount in controversy must
exceed $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (b). “The basis for diversity jurisdiction
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must be ‘distinctly and affirmatively alleged.’” Dos Santos v. Belmere Ltd. P’ship,
516 F. App’x 401, 403 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). “‘The failure to adequately
allege the basis for diversity jurisdiction mandates dismissal.’” Id. (quoting
Stafford v. Mobil Oil Corp., 945 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1991)).
While pleadings by pro se litigants are construed liberally, see, e.g., Perez v.
United States, 312 F.3d 191, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2002); Mass v. McDonald’s Corp.,
2004 WL 2624255, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004), the court “must presume that
a suit lies outside [its] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins.,
243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). And “even though a
particular statute or rule need not necessarily be cited by name[,]” the party
asserting jurisdiction must allege the jurisdictional basis “affirmatively and
distinctly”; jurisdiction cannot be “established argumentatively or by mere
inference.” Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted). “[C]ourts are not obligated to search out the identity of a
party’s vaguely-pleaded claims.” Mass, 2004 WL 2624255, at *2.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), the general removal statute, allows a defendant to
remove a case to the federal district court for the district or division within which
the underlying state action is pending, provided that the district court possesses
original jurisdiction. A state court lawsuit may be removed if it includes a claim
arising under federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1331. Whether federal question
jurisdiction exists in a removal action is based on the allegations in a plaintiff’s
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“well-pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question jurisdiction depends on
whether there appears on the face of the complaint some substantial, disputed
question of federal law.” Baron v. Strassner, 7 F.Supp.2d 871, 873 (S.D. Tex. 1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, if the
complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim and instead asserts only
state law causes of action, a case does not arise under federal law. See Kramer v.
Smith Barney, 80 F.3d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. at 10). Doubts about whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be
resolved against federal jurisdiction. Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335,
339 (5th Cir. 2000). If, at any time before final judgment, “it appears that the
[federal] district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Analysis
1. The District Judge should remand this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Defendant fails to establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, which is
her burden as the removing party. See Boone v. Citigroup, Inc., 416 F.3d 382, 388
(5th Cir. 2005).
First, the Court cannot find federal question jurisdiction on this record.
Defendant failed—despite opportunity—to provide the state court petition that
alleges a claim created by federal law or a state law claim depending on a
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substantial, disputed question of federal law. Instead, by all available information,
the state court petition asserts a traditional state law forcible detainer claim. See
Not. of Rem. at 1. Forcible detainer actions are state law actions that provide no
basis for federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mort. Ass’n v. Morse,
2016 WL 6871143, at *4-5 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2016).
Defendant argues that federal question jurisdiction exists because this case’s
resolution turns on federal issues, such as alleged due process and notice defects
in the foreclosure process. See Not. of Rem. at 1-2; Statement of Jurisdiction,
Standing, and Necessity of Equitable Adjudication at 1-2. She argues that issues
related to the foreclosure proceeding are structural to the plaintiff’s claim, and not
collateral or defensive, positing that “[i]f statutory and constitutional notice
requirements were not met, title and possession cannot pass as a matter of law.”
Statement of Jurisdiction, Standing, and Necessity of Equitable Adjudication at 2.
But such arguments in the Notice of Removal and related documents are
insufficient to support federal question jurisdiction over a removed action. See,
e.g., Stump v. Potts, 322 F. App’x 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“The
complaint provided no basis for federal question jurisdiction. The fact that Potts
brought up possible federal question claims in her answer and counterclaim
cannot be considered in determining the existence of removal jurisdiction.”); Scojo
Solutions v. Mitchell, 2012 WL 5933056, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2012) (Ramirez,
J.), rec. accepted 2012 WL 5935407 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2012) (Lynn, J.)
(remanding forcible detainer action because defendant’s federal due process claim
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asserted in a notice of removal failed to support the exercise of federal question
jurisdiction). Because Defendant fails to show that the state court petition presents
a federal question, she fails to justify removal under federal question jurisdiction.
And she similarly fails to establish diversity jurisdiction. Again, because
Defendant has failed to produce the relevant state court petition, the Court cannot
find diversity jurisdiction. Even the allegations in the Notice of Removal fail to
support diversity jurisdiction because Defendant does not allege that the parties
are citizens of different states. See Not. of Rem. at 2. She instead alleges that she is
a citizen of Texas while Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States. Not. of Rem. at 2.
But “it is not sufficient for diversity purposes that a party be a citizen of the United
States….[A] party must also be a citizen of one of the states of the United States.”
Fabry v. Carrico, 2013 WL 5146779, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2013) (citing 13E
Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3621 (3d ed.
1998) (Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1996).
Because Defendant fails to establish this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
this case should be remanded to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. Alternatively, the District Judge should dismiss this case under Rule 41(b).
Alternatively, this case should be dismissed because Defendant has failed to
prosecute and comply with Court orders. The Court ordered Defendant to file
copies of the relevant process, pleadings, or orders served on her in the state court
proceedings. See NOD. The Court warned her that her failure to comply might
result in the dismissal of this action under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute and
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follow Court orders. Defendant’s deadline to comply with the NOD has passed, but
she has not filed the pertinent state court pleadings.
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court to dismiss
an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with the
federal rules or any court order. Larson v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir.
1998). “This authority [under Rule 41(b)] flows from the court’s inherent power to
control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.”
Boudwin v. Graystone Ins., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v.
Wabash, R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)). The Court’s authority under Rule 41(b) is
not diluted by a party proceeding pro se, as “[t]he right to self-representation does
not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” Wright v. LBA Hosp., 754 F. App’x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in
turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))).
Defendant’s failure to provide the relevant state court record hampers the
Court’s ability to evaluate its own jurisdiction and shows that Defendant is not
interested in prosecuting this action. Accordingly, the District Judge should
dismiss Defendant’s case without prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to
follow Court orders.
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Recommendation
The District Judge should remand this action to the state court from which
it was removed or dismiss it without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute and follow Court orders.
SO RECOMMENDED.
April 2, 2026.
______________________________
HON. R. RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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