Rico Cordova v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
FELIX RICO CORDOVA, 	§
Petitioner, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL NO. 3:26-CV-97-K-BN
§
KRISTI NOEM, et al., 	§
Respondents. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner Felix Rico Cordova’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 1] (the “Petition”) and Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order [Dkt. No. 2] (the “Motion for TRO”).
The Government filed a Response in Opposition [Dkt. No. 9] and Appendix in
Support [Dkt. No. 10] (together, the “Response”), and Petitioner filed a Reply [Dkt.
No. 11].
Having carefully considered the briefing, the relevant portions of the record, and
the applicable law, the Court GRANTS in part the Petition and DENIES the Motion
for TRO. And, consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court
DIRECTS Respondents to provide Petitioner Felix Rico Cordova with a bond hearing
before an immigration judge or release him from custody, under appropriate conditions
of release.
I. 	Background
It’s undisputed that Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the
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Unted States without inspection in March 2002 and had lived in the county for more
than two decades when he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. After he pled no
contest to this misdemeanor and served his sentence, he was transferred to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which released him on his own recognizance in
November 2022. And, while removal proceedings were also initiated at that time,
Petitioner remained released until November 2025, when, at his ICE check-in, he was
detained without a bond hearing and, at the time this habeas action was filed, was in
custody at the Prairieland Detention Center, a facility in the Dallas Division of this
federal judicial district.
In its response, the Government raises that Petitioner was arrested in 2012 on
suspicion of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but never charged because a
subsequent “arrest report states that ‘it was determined [Petitioner] was not the suspect
as originally thought.’” Dkt. No. 9 at 3.
While the Court acknowledges this, that an individual was wrongfully arrested
based on mistaken identity does not change the Court’s conclusion below that
Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing or release on conditions.
II. 	Legal Analysis
This is one of many habeas petitions that challenge ICE’s mandatory detention
authority while removal proceedings are pending. Nearly all courts, including the
undersigned, have held that the government new policy, which deprives people of an
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opportunity to seek release from an immigration court, violates the INA and Due
Process Clause. The Court is not persuaded to break from its earlier rulings here. See,
e.g., Amelia C. P. v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2872-K-BK, 2025 WL 3653872 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
17, 2025); Flores Perez v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2920-K-BN, 2025 WL 3532430 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 14, 2025), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 3530951 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025); Parada-
Hernandez v. Johnson, No. 3:25-cv-2729-K-BN, 2025 WL 3465958 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29,
2025), rec. accepted, No. 3:25-cv-2729-K-BN, 2025 WL 3463682 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2,
2025).
As background, two statutes in the [INA] principally govern [these]
detention[s]: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1226 provides the
general process for arresting and detaining noncitizens who are present in
the United States and eligible for removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The Supreme
Court has explained that Section 1226(a) “sets out the default rule: The
Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an
alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting
§ 1226(a)). “[T]he Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained
under § 1226(a) ‘on bond or conditional parole.’” Id. (citation modified).
But “aliens who are covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a
different process” and “‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding’ if
an immigration officer ‘determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond
a doubt entitled to be admitted’ into the country.” Id. (quoting §
1225(b)(2)(A)). Hence, “noncitizens detained under section 1225(b)(2)
must remain in custody for the duration of their removal proceedings,
while those detained under section 1226(a) are entitled to a bond hearing
before an IJ at any time before entry of a final removal order.” See, e.g.,
Rodriguez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
Flores Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at *2 (cleaned up; quoting Covarrubias v. Vergara, No.
5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025)).
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The main issue in these cases “is whether [the habeas petitioner] has been
erroneously 	categorized 	as 	a 	detainee 	subject 	to 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b)(2), 	which
prescribes mandatory detention during removal proceedings, or if he [or she] is subject
to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention and a bond hearing
regarding whether the noncitizen is a flight risk or poses a danger to the community.”
Id.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is Not Required
First, 	the 	Court 	rejects 	any 	argument 	that 	Petitioner 	should 	exhaust 	his
administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief by seeking a bond determination
from the immigration judge (“IJ”). The BIA recently held in In Matter of Yajure Hurtado,
29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025) that IJs lack authority to hear bond requests or
grant bond to noncitizens who are present in the United States without inspection and
admission, like Petitioner. So “[r]equiring [Petitioner] to request a bond hearing before
an IJ and (if bond were denied) appeal the decision ‘would be inappropriate because it
would exacerbate [the] alleged constitutional injury – detention without a bond
hearing.’” Flores Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at *3 (citations omitted).
B. Detention Without a Bond Hearing Violates the INA
Second, the Court finds that detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing under
Section 1225(b) violates the INA for the reasons explained in Flores Perez, 2025 WL
3532430, at *3.
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[Petitioner] contends that he is being detained under Section 1226(a)
and should have a bond hearing, but Respondents argue that [she] is
subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2), and therefore,
not entitled to a bond hearing.
The difference in interpretation emanates from the Government’s recent
reevaluation of immigration detention authority. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ) released
interim guidance on July 8, 2025, announcing a new legal position on
detention and release authorities. The guidance interprets INA Section
235 (8 U.S.C. § 1225) as applying to the detention of all “applicants for
admission,” 	including 	all 	noncitizens 	who 	have 	not 	been 	admitted,
whether or not they arrive at a port of entry....
[W]hether [Petitioner] falls under Section 1226(a) or 1225(b)(2) is a
matter 	of 	statutory 	interpretation. 	Statutory 	interpretation 	is 	the
province of the courts, not agencies. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 413 (2024).
The [undersigned] finds that Section 1226, not Section 1225, applies to
[Petitioner’s] detention. As almost every district court ... has concluded,
“the statutory text, the statute's history, Congressional intent, and §
1226(a)’s application for the past three decades” support application of
Section 1226. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. H-25-3726, 2025 WL
2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (Rosenthal, J.) (collecting cases).
Id. at *3 (quoting Covarrubias, 2025 WL 2950097, at *2).
The Court does acknowledge authority in this district reaching a different result,
but that authority is neither binding nor persuasive. See, e.g., P. B. v. Bergami, No. 3:25-
cv-2978-O, 2025 WL 3632752, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2025); Garibay-Robledo v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-177-H, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2026 WL 81679, at *3-9 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 9, 2026).
And the Court notes that, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
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Circuit 	has 	not 	ruled 	on 	this 	issue, 	the 	Seventh 	Circuit 	recently 	rejected 	the
government’s argument, in the context of a motion to stay pending appeal, finding that
Section 1226(a) applies to noncitizens discovered within the country. See Castañon-
Nava v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 161 F. 4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (holding ICE
and DHS were “not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument that those
individuals, whom ICE arrested in Chicago without a warrant, are subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”).
C. Detention Without a Bond Hearing also Violates Due Process
Third, the Court holds that Petitioner is entitled to procedural protections under
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and that detaining him without a bond
hearing violates his rights under the Fifth Amendment. See Flores Perez, 2025 WL
3532430, at *4.
And, 	insofar 	as 	Respondents 	may 	rely 	on 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Sec. 	v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), as a basis to deny Petitioner’s due process claim,
the Court rejects that argument too. See Flores Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at *4
(collecting district court cases within the Fifth Circuit and concluding Thuraissigiam is
distinguishable when applied to petitioners who have resided in the United States).
The Court also finds that all three factors in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), favor Petitioner for the reasons stated in Flores Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at
*4-5. 	And, 	so, 	the 	Court 	holds 	that 	denying 	Petitioner 	a 	bond 	hearing 	under
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§ 1225(b)(2) deprives him of procedural due process protections under the Fifth
Amendment.
D. Motion for TRO is Denied
Finally, to the extent that Petitioner’s Motion for TRO seeks the same ruling on
the merits as the habeas petition, the Court denies the Motion as “improperly seek[ing]
ultimate relief” for the reasons outlined in Flores Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at *6-7.
E. Remedy
Most courts, including this Court, confronting the issues here have determined
that the appropriate relief is a bond hearing. Flores Perez, 2025 WL 3532430, at *6-7
(collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Petitioner be given a bond
hearing before an IJ. The Court declines to award any other relief at this time.
III. 	Conclusion
For all these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED in
part and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is DENIED.
Respondents are DIRECTED to: (1) provide Petitioner Felix Rico Cordova with
a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the government shall bear the
burden of justifying, by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or flight risk,
Petitioner’s continued detention; or (2) release Petitioner Felix Rico Cordova from
custody, under appropriate conditions of release, to a public place.
Respondents are further DIRECTED to file a notice, by 5:00 p.m. Central
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Time, February 4, 2026, that informs the Court whether Petitioner Felix Rico
Cordova has been released from custody. If Petitioner Felix Rico Cordova has not been
released from custody, Respondents shall inform the Court whether and when a bond
hearing was held in accordance with the preceding paragraph. Respondents shall
further inform the Court, in detail, of the reasons for the immigration judge’s decision.
Finally, 	if 	Petitioner 	Felix 	Rico 	Cordova 	is 	released, 	Respondents 	are
DIRECTED to notify Petitioner Felix Rico Cordova’s counsel of the exact location and
exact time of his release as soon as practicable and no less than two hours before his
release.
SO ORDERED.
Signed January 28th , 2026.
_____________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
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