Elmon v. State of Texas

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SERTEN ELMON, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-18-K-BT
§
STATE OF TEXAS, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Serten Elmon filed a single-page document that the Court interprets
as seeking to assert civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally
Compl. (ECF No. 3). Elmon states, without more, that the State of Texas
discriminated against him on account of his race and violated his right to an
attorney and attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1. He asks that “an Anti Black Hate
Crime Bill [be] signed into to [sic.] Texas & Federal law by way of executive order
immediately.” Id. Elmon has neither paid the $405.00 filing fee nor filed a motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As explained below, the District Judge
should dismiss this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court may summarily dismiss a
complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous or
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malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in
law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a
complaint as frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or
when the factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 32 (1992). The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful,
fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible.” Id. at 33.
I. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Elmon’s claims.
“Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not
fully expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski
v. Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)). “‘Federal courts are without jurisdiction
over suits against a state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity
unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly
abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented by statute, and [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” for
example, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v.
Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore v. La. Bd. of
Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014)) (further
citation omitted).
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Elmon has not identified any waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Therefore, the Court should dismiss his claims against the State for lack of
jurisdiction.
II. Alternatively, Elmon fails to state a claim for relief.
Even under the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings,
“threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although courts liberally
construe pro se pleadings, they do not accept “conclusory allegations” or “legal
conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc.,
296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[d]ismissal is proper if the
complaint lacks an allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain
relief.” Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006).
Here, Elmon provides only threadbare and conclusory allegations that he is
the victim of some sort of discrimination at the hands of the State of Texas. He
provides no support for these allegations, as he does not even explain how the State
discriminated against him. Such threadbare allegations make dismissal
appropriate.
Additionally, this action is moot because the relief Elmon seeks already
exists. Elmon requests that “an Anti Black Hate Crime Bill [be] signed into to [sic.]
Texas & Federal law by way of executive order immediately.” Compl. at 1. But there
is already federal and Texas hate crime legislation criminalizing discrimination
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based on race. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Hate Crimes: Laws and
Policies, https://www.justice.gov/hatecrimes/laws-and-policies (last accessed
Feb. 13, 2026). If Elmon only seeks an executive order criminalizing hates crimes,
this action is moot. “[I]f in the course of litigation a court finds that it can no longer
provide a plaintiff with any effectual relief, the case generally is moot.” In re
Westcott, 135 F.4th 243, 246 (5th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
Thus, to the extent this Court retains subject matter jurisdiction, Elmon
cannot state a claim for relief.
Recommendation
The District Judge should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Alternatively, the District Judge should dismiss Elmon’s claims with
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 13, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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