Mathews v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
WESLEY MON MATHEWS,
#2271426,
§
§
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § No. 3:26-cv-16-S (BT)
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Wesley Mon Mathews, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court should dismiss
Mathews’s petition with prejudice under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 cases.
Background
Mathews pleaded guilty in Texas state court to one count of causing serious
bodily injury to a child by omission. See Pet. at 1. On June 26, 2019, he was
sentenced to life in prison. Id.; Ex Parte Wesley Mon Mathews, W-17-45865-S(B),
State Resp. at 1, 3 (282nd Jud. Distr. Ct.). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
(CCA) refused discretionary review of Mathews’s direct appeal on February 10,
2021. Pet. at 3–4; see also Mathews v. State, 2020 WL 7332676, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Dec. 14, 2020, pet. ref’d).
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Since his conviction became final, Mathews has filed three habeas
applications in Texas state court. See State of Texas v. Mathews, W-1745865-A
(282nd Jud. Distr. Ct. Nov. 16, 2021); State of Texas v. Mathews, W-1745865-B
(282nd Jud. Distr. Ct. Apr. 18, 2022); State of Texas v. Mathews, W-1745865-C
(282nd Jud. Distr. Ct. July 14, 2025). The court denied him relief and dismissed
each of these applications. See Pet. at 4–5; State of Texas v. Mathews, W-1745865-
A (282nd Jud. Distr. Ct. Mar. 2, 2022).
On July 22, 2022, Mathews filed his first § 2254 application in this Court
challenging his 2019 conviction for causing serious bodily injury to a child by
omission. See Mathews v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 3:22-cv-1600-G-BW (N.D. Tex.
July 22, 2022). After the petition was fully briefed, Mathews moved to voluntarily
dismiss his case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 “as other claims of relief
need[] to be exhausted in State courts.” Id., Order at 1 (ECF No. 27). The
respondent had argued that Mathews’s claim challenging the presentation of
extraneous evidence at trial was unexhausted. Id., Resp. at 9–12. The Court warned
Mathews that a future “2254 petition may be barred by the one-year statute of
limitations applicable to § 2254 petitions and may be subject to the rules applicable
to successive habeas petitions,” id. at 3, and dismissed the case on June 9, 2025.
Id., Judgment (ECF No. 28).
Mathews filed the instant action on January 6, 2026. He challenges the same
2019 conviction on four grounds: (1) actual innocence; (2) his guilty plea was
involuntary; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) his due process rights
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were violated because he was convicted of a crime while being innocent. Pet. at 6–
12. Mathews now asks that the Court “overturn the judgment of conviction and
have Tex. Court of Crim. Appeals remand the case to habeas court for an
evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 16.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Under Habeas Rule 4, a district court may summarily dismiss a 28 U.S.C. §
2254 habeas application “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any
exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court,” id.,:
This rule differentiates habeas cases from other civil cases with
respect to sua sponte consideration of affirmative defenses. The
district court has the power under [Habeas] Rule 4 to examine and
dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other
pleading by the state. This power is rooted in “the duty of the court to
screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would
be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.”
Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
“[E]ven though the statute of limitations provision of the [Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)] is an affirmative defense rather than
jurisdictional,” a district court may dismiss a time-barred Section 2254 application
sua sponte under Habeas Rule 4. Kiser, 163 F.3d at 329. Before doing so, however,
the district court must give the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present
their positions. Wyatt v. Thaler, 395 F. App’x 113, 114 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(quoting Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006)) (alteration to original).
These findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide Mathews fair notice,
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and the opportunity to object (explained below) gives him a chance to explain why
his case is not barred under the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See, e.g., Reyna v.
Dir., TDCJ-CID, 2021 WL 6297752, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2021), rec. accepted
2022 WL 60351 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2022).
The AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for federal habeas
proceedings. See AEDPA, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Under the statute,
the limitations period runs from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking direct
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
In most cases, the limitations period begins to run when the judgment
becomes final after direct appeal or the time for seeking such review has expired.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The “filing of a state habeas application ordinarily tolls
the federal one-year statute of limitations.” Flores v. Quarterman,467 F.3d 484,
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485 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006). But a state habeas application filed after the limitations
period has expired does not toll the one-year limitations period. Id.
I. Matthews’s habeas application is time-barred.
Here, Mathews’s conviction became final on February 10, 2021, when the
Texas CCA refused discretionary review of his direct appeal. His first two state
habeas applications were dismissed on March 2, 2022, and June 9, 2022,
respectively. See State of Texas v. Mathews, W-1745865-A; State of Texas v.
Mathews, W-1745865-B. Mathews filed his third state habeas application on July
14, 2025. See State of Texas v. Mathews, W-1745865-C (282nd Jud. Distr. Ct. July
14, 2025).
Matthews’s third application was filed over three years after the dismissal of
his prior state habeas applications. His third habeas application, therefore, did not
toll the limitations period. See Carroll v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, 2022 WL 4086790, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2022) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2022 WL 4084424
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2022). So, at the latest, the limitations period began to run on
June 9, 2022. Thus, Mathews’s federal habeas application was due by June 9,
2023.
But Mathews did not file the instant petition until, at the earliest, December
29, 2024, which is the date it was stamped and apparently mailed to the Court. See
Pet. at 16. Therefore, absent statutory or equitable tolling, his petition is untimely.
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II. Matthews is not entitled to equitable tolling.
As for statutory tolling, the filing of a state habeas application generally tolls
the limitations period. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that a state habeas application tolls the limitations period under §
2244(d)(2)); Broussard v. Thaler, 414 F. App’x 686, 687–88 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“AEDPA provides that ‘[t]he time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).
The one-year limitation period also is subject to equitable tolling in “rare
and exceptional cases.” Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir.1999) (asserting that courts must
“examine each case on its facts to determine whether it presents sufficiently 'rare
and exceptional circumstances' to justify equitable tolling”) (quoting Davis, 158
F.3d at 811). The Fifth Circuit has held that “[e]quitable tolling applies principally
where the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the cause of action or
is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his rights.” Coleman v.
Johnson, 184 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by
Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2006). A petitioner bears the
burden of proof to show he is entitled to equitable tolling. Phillips v. Donnelly, 216
F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Mathews fails to meet the high burden of showing that equitable tolling
applies here. In response to a question on his § 2254 petition asking why AEDPA’s
one-year limitations period does not bar his petition, Mathews argues that he is
actually innocent. Pet. at 14–15.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “actual innocence, if
proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the
impediment is a procedural bar, . . . or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of
limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). A petitioner who
claims actual innocence, however, “must show that it is more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.
Mathews’s actual innocence argument fails for at least two reasons. First, his
bare reference to “actual innocence” is vague and conclusory and consists of no real
substantive argument. Mathews merely states that evidence supporting his
innocence was never introduced at trial because he pleaded guilty. Pet’r’s Br. at
7–8 (ECF No. 4). Although pro se filings are liberally construed, this does not
mean the court must develop the arguments on behalf of the litigant. See United
States v. Pineda,988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[M]ere conclusory allegations
on critical issues are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.”). Federal courts
do not “consider a habeas petitioner’s bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro
se petition . . . mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional issue in a
habeas proceeding.” Smallwood v. Johnson, 73 F.3d 1343, 1351 (5th Cir.
1996) (quoting Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011–12 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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Second, Mathews’s actual innocence argument fails because he pleaded
guilty, and thus likely foreclosed the “gateway” to overcome the limitations
bar. See Thomas v. Stephens,2014 WL 929031, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2014); see
also Jackson v. United States,2013 WL 5295701 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 18,
2013); Sidener v. United States, 2013 WL 4041375 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2013); United
States v. Cunningham, 2013 WL 3899335 (S.D. Tex. July 27, 2013). But see Green
v. Williams,2013 WL 4458971 (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2013).
The Court can discern no other basis to apply equitable tolling from the
record. Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss Mathews’s petition with
prejudice as untimely.
Recommendation
The Court should sua sponte dismiss with prejudice Mathews’s federal
habeas application under Habeas Rule 4.
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 26, 2026.
______________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge's report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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