Alcala-Garcia v. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SAMUEL ANTONIO ALCALA-GARCIA, §
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3536-S-BN
§
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity 	§
as Secretary of the Department of 	§
Homeland Security, ET AL., 	§
§
Respondents. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Samuel Antonio Alcala-Garcia (“Alcala”), while detained at the
Prairieland Detention Center, a facility in this district, filed this habeas action under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 on December 24, 2025 with the assistance of counsel, arguing at
least that his detention by immigration authorities without a bond hearing violates
both the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the due process clause of the
United States constitution, and requesting a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
and declaratory and injunctive relief. See Dkt. No. 1.
The presiding United States district judge referred this habeas action to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
After reviewing Alcala’s initial filings in this case, the undersigned determined
that service and an expedited response from the United States Attorney’s Office were
required. See Dkt. No. 3. A response was filed. See Dkt. Nos. 7 & 8. But Alcala did not
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file a reply by January 16, 2026, the deadline to do so. See Dkt. No. 3.
And, for the reasons discussed below, the Court should grant in part the habeas
petition [Dkt. No. 1].
Applicable Background
Alcala alleges that he
is a thirty-three-year-old citizen of Venezuela who has resided in the
United 	States 	since 	his 	lawful 	parole 	into 	the 	country 	in 	early
September 2022. After being apprehended by DHS near the United
States–Mexico border on or about September 3, 2022, he was inspected,
processed, and released into the United States on parole under INA §
212(d)(5). He has continuously lived in the United States since that date
and has established his home and community here.
Until his recent transfer to the remote Prairieland Detention
Center in Alvarado, Texas, Mr. Alcala had lived and worked in the West
Texas community for several years, application that has conferred
lawful presence and permitted him to remain in the United States while
his claim is adjudicated. During this time, he established deep ties to his
community and consistently complied with the requirements of both
USCIS and ICE. He has no history of violence and no disqualifying
criminal convictions that would justify treating him as a danger to the
community or warrant the imposition of continued detention.
On or about October 22, 2025, ICE apprehended Mr. Alcala
during his regularly scheduled check-in in El Paso County, Texas.
Shortly thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
served him with a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), alleging removability under
INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)] on the theory that he
entered the United States without inspection – even though DHS had
previously inspected, processed, and paroled him into the country in
September 2022, and notwithstanding his approved I-130 family-based
petition.
Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6 (citation omitted).
In October 2025, Alcala did not receive a bond hearing. See id. 6-7.
The government’s response, filed January 12, 2026, does not refute these
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allegations but adds that Alcala was “set for an Individual hearing before the Houston
Immigration Court via WebEx on January 15.” Dkt. No. 8 at 6.
The government has not updated the Court since. So the undersigned will
assume that Alcala remains in custody in the United States.
Legal Standards and Analysis
This habeas action is another in a what has become a tsunami of similar
actions filed after the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) eliminated the ability of
immigration judges (“IJs”) to make individualized bond determinations as to certain
persons placed in removal proceedings. See, e.g., Kyle Chaney, Hundreds of judges
reject Trump’s mandatory detention policy, with no end in sight (Jan. 5, 2026, 5:55
AM), 	https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/05/trump-administration-immigrants-
mandatory-detention-00709494 (noting that, at the time of publication, judges had
ruled against the administration in more than 1,600 cases); Kyle Chaney, Judges,
inundated with immigration cases, don’t mince words on ICE tactics (Jan. 26, 2026,
11:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/26/minnesota-immigration-cases-
ice-00746275 (noting that its “analysis has identified 347 judges across the country
who have rejected the administration’s detention policy – in more than 2,400 cases –
while just 20 judges have sided with the administration, a small minority that has
nevertheless grown in recent weeks”).
As background,
[t]wo statutes in the [INA] principally govern [these] detention[s]: 8
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U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1226 provides the general process for
arresting and detaining noncitizens who are present in the United
States and eligible for removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The Supreme Court has
explained that Section 1226(a) “sets out the default rule: The Attorney
General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an alien
‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting
§ 1226(a)). “[T]he Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained
under § 1226(a) ‘on bond or conditional parole.’” Id. (citation modified).
But “aliens who are covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a
different process” and “‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding’ if
an immigration officer ‘determines that [they are] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted’ into the country.” Id. (quoting §
1225(b)(2)(A)). Hence, “noncitizens detained under section 1225(b)(2)
must remain in custody for the duration of their removal proceedings,
while those detained under section 1226(a) are entitled to a bond
hearing before an IJ at any time before entry of a final removal order.”
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bostock, 802 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1306 (W.D. Wash.
2025).
Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025) (cleaned up).
And “[t]he principal issue” in these cases “is whether [the habeas petitioner]
has been erroneously categorized as a detainee subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which
prescribes mandatory detention during removal proceedings, or if he [or she] is
subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention and a bond
hearing regarding whether the noncitizen is a flight risk or poses a danger to the
community.” Id.
Against this background, the undersigned turns to Alcala’s request for relief.
I. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
While Respondents do not appear to argue that the Court should deny Alcala’s
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claims because he has not exhausted administrative remedies, see generally Dkt. No.
7, the undersigned finds that Alcala need not exhaust administrative remedies before
the Court may properly consider his current claims, see, e.g., Parada-Hernandez v.
Johnson, No. 3:25-cv-2729-K-BN, 2025 WL 3465958, at *2-*3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29,
2025), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 3463682 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2025).
II. 	The INA
The undersigned finds first that detaining Alcala without a bond hearing
under Section 1225(b) violates the INA for the reasons succinctly explained in
Covarrubias, 2025 WL 2950097, at *2, which, in turn, relied on almost every other
federal district court in this circuit and elsewhere that has tackled this issue:
[Alcala] contends that he is being detained under Section 1226(a) and
should have a bond hearing, but Respondents argue that he is subject to
mandatory 	detention 	under 	Section 	1225(b)(2), 	and 	therefore, 	not
entitled to a bond hearing.
The difference in interpretation emanates from the Government’s
recent 	reevaluation 	of 	immigration 	detention 	authority. 	The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice
(DOJ) released interim guidance on July 8, 2025, announcing a new
legal 	position 	on 	detention 	and 	release 	authorities. 	The 	guidance
interprets INA Section 235 (8 U.S.C. § 1225) as applying to the detention
of all “applicants for admission,” including all noncitizens who have not
been admitted, whether or not they arrive at a port of entry…..
[W]hether [Alcala] falls under Section 1226(a) or 1225(b)(2) is a
matter 	of 	statutory 	interpretation. 	Statutory 	interpretation 	is 	the
province of the courts, not agencies. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024).
The [undersigned] finds that Section 1226, not Section 1225,
applies to [Alcala’s] detention. As almost every district court … has
concluded, “the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional
intent, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades” support
application of Section 1226. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. H-25-
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3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (Rosenthal, J.)
(collecting cases).
Id. at *3 (cleaned up); see also Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (“The
court need not repeat the ‘well-reasoned analyses’ contained in these opinions and
instead 	simply 	notes 	its 	agreement. 	The 	respondents 	have 	failed 	to 	provide
controlling authorities or persuasive reasons that would justify reaching a different
result. Section § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), applies to [the petitioner].” (cleaned up));
accord George v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2935-S-BW, 2025 WL 3852946, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 19, 2025), rec. accepted, 2026 WL 30829 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2026).
The undersigned does acknowledge authority in this district reaching a
different result, but that authority is neither binding nor persuasive. See P. B. v.
Bergami, No. 3:25-cv-2978-O, 2025 WL 3632752, at *3-5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2025);
Garibay-Robledo v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-177-H, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2026 WL 81679,
at *3-9 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2026).
And the undersigned does note that, while the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on this issue, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected
the government’s argument, in the context of a motion to stay pending appeal, finding
that Section 1226(a) applies to noncitizens discovered within the country. See
Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., 161 F. 4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025)
(holding ICE and DHS were “not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument
that those individuals, whom ICE arrested in Chicago without a warrant, are subject
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to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A)”).
III. 	Procedural Due Process
A. 	Availability of Procedural Due Process Protections
The undersigned also finds that detaining Alcala without a bond hearing
violates his Fifth Amendment rights. Accord George, 2025 WL 3852946, at *4-*6.
In this case, Respondents do not seem to elect to expressly rely on Department
of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), to oppose Alcala’s due
process arguments.
Regardless, 	because 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	Alcala 	is 	erroneously
categorized 	as 	detained 	under 	Section 	1225(b)(2), 	the 	Court 	should 	reject
Respondent’s related argument that, because Section 1225 “says nothing ‘whatsoever
about bond hearings’ … [n]o procedural due process claim is stated.” Dkt. No. 7 at 25
(quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
And, to the extent that Respondents may rely on Thuraissigiam to deny this
due process claim, the undersigned agrees with the court in Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa,
801 F. Supp. 3d 668 (W.D. Tex. 2025) and other courts in the Fifth Circuit that have
found Thuraissigiam to be distinguishable in this context. See 801 F. Supp. 3d at 681-
85; see also, e.g., Perez v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2920-K-BN, 2025 WL 3532430, at *4 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 14, 2025), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 3530951 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2025); George,
2025 WL 3852946, at *4-*5; Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, No. EP-
25-cv-432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880, at *4-5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025); Gonzales
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Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-cv-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21,
2025); Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-cv-361-KC, 2025 WL 2792588, at *7-10 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 2, 2025); Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-cv-773-JKP, 2025 WL
2976923, at *7-8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025).
In Thuraissigiam, “[t]he [Supreme] Court did not address whether noncitizens
mandatorily detained under § 1225(b) have a constitutional due process right to
challenge the fact or length of their detention, as [Alcala] does here.” Lopez-Arevelo,
801 F. Supp. 3d at 682. Unlike in Thuraissigiam, where the petitioner challenged his
deportability and the denial of his asylum admission, Alcala challenges his detention
without a bond hearing. See 591 U.S. at 114-15.
In the context of detention under Sections 1225(b) and 1226(a), the Fifth
Circuit has “expressly left open the constitutional due process question” for lower
courts to consider. Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 682 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S.
at 312).
The petitioner in Thuraissigiam was also stopped and detained “within
twenty-five yards of the border” and was not released or permitted to reside in the
United States. 591 U.S. at 114.
But Alcala has resided in here for more than three years after he was released
into the United States on parole. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d
at 683-84 (distinguishing Thuraissigiam because petitioner had resided in the United
States for three years).
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And, 	so, 	Alcala 	is 	entitled 	to 	procedural 	protections 	under 	the 	Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And the undersigned will consider his claim that
his detention violates his due process rights.
B. 	Mathews Balancing Test
“To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process
rights, courts apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).” Martinez v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-1007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 8, 2025) (cleaned up). The three factors to consider are (1) “the private interest
that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335 (cleaned up).
“The essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of
serious loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.” Id.
at 348 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1976)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
1. 	Private Interest
“Freedom from imprisonment – from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause
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protects.” Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690(2001)). Alcala alleges – and the government does not refute that he “was
inspected, processed, and released into the United States on parole” in September
2022. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5. And, so, the undersigned cannot find that he did not acquire
a “cognizable interest in his freedom from detention that deserves great weight and
gravity.” Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6.
The first factor therefore weighs in favor of Alcala.
2. 	Risk of Erroneous Deprivation and Value of Additional
Safeguards
As to the second factor, Alcala is in custody. Without a bond hearing, he will
likely remain in custody. And the risk of an arbitrary deprivation is greater given the
BIA’s new interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). See Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *7,
Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686.
“[A]gency 	decisionmakers 	regularly 	‘conduct[] 	individualized 	custody
determinations … consider[ing] flight risk and dangerousness.’” Gonzales Martinez,
2025 WL 2965859, at *4 (cleaned up). So a bond hearing would “give [Alcala] the
opportunity to be heard and receive a meaningful assessment of whether he is
dangerous or likely to abscond.” Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686.
And, so, a bond hearing would reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Alcala’s liberty.
So the second factor also weighs in favor of Alcala.
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3. 	Government’s Interest
Respondents argue that the government “needs flexibility in policy choices
rather than the rigidity often characteristic of constitutional adjudication when it
comes to immigration regulation.” Dkt. No. 7 at 26. But they do not then persuasively
explain their interest in “flexibility” while detaining Alcala without bond. And, in any
event, the government’s inarguable interest in ensuring that Alcala appears for his
removal 	proceedings 	“would 	be 	squarely 	addressed 	through 	a 	bond 	hearing.”
Gonzalez Martinez, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4.
And, so, the third factor too weighs in favor of Alcala.
Because all three Mathews factors support Alcala, the undersigned finds that
denying him a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2) deprives him of his procedural
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
IV. 	Other Claims
Because the denial of a bond hearing violates Alcala procedural due process
rights and the INA, the undersigned declines to address any substantive due process
or Administrative Procedure Act claims that Alcala may make. See Santiago, 2025
WL 2792588, at *6 n.2 (“[B]ecause the Court grants [the petition] on procedural due
process grounds, the Court need not reach [the petitioner’s] substantive due process
… claims.”).
V. 	TRO
As “[a] TRO is simply a highly accelerated and temporary form of preliminary
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injunctive relief,” “[t]o obtain a temporary restraining order, an applicant must show
entitlement to a preliminary injunction.” Horner v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
665-D, 2017 WL 978100, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2017) (cleaned up).
But granting a preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy which
requires the movant to unequivocally show the need for its issuance.” Valley v.
Rapides Par. Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Allied Mktg. Grp.,
Inc. v. C.D.L. Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989))
And, so, to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a movant must unequivocally
“show (1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial
threat that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his
threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to
enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53
(5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up); accord Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
And the Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly cautioned that [such relief] should not
be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden of persuasion
on all four requirements.” Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir.
2013) (cleaned up).
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is always to prevent irreparable
injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the
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merits.” Canal Auth., 489 F.2d at 576 (cleaned up).
So the decision on a motion seeking a TRO or preliminary injunction does “not
amount to a ruling on the merits” of a plaintiff’s claims, Jonibach Mgmt. Trust v.
Wartburg Enters., Inc., 750 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2014), considering that “the
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by a court granting a preliminary
injunction are not binding at trial on the merits” and “may be challenged at a later
stage of the proceedings,” id. (cleaned up).
In short, a TRO or preliminary injunction is not a device “to give a plaintiff
the ultimate relief he seeks” through his claims. Peters v. Davis, No. 6:17CV595, 2018
WL 11463602, at 2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2018); accord Lindell v. United States, 82 F.4th
614, 618 (8th Cir. 2023) (“This Court has repeatedly recognized that the purpose of
injunctive relief is 	to 	preserve 	the 	status 	quo; 	it 	is 	not 	to 	give 	the 	movant
the ultimate relief he seeks.”); Kane 	v. 	De 	Blasio, 	19 	F.4th 	152, 	163 	(2d 	Cir.
2021) (“The 	purpose 	of 	a 	preliminary 	injunction 	is 	not 	to 	award 	the 	movant
the ultimate relief sought in the suit but is only to preserve the status quo by
preventing during the pendency of the suit the occurrence of that irreparable sort of
harm which the movant fears will occur.” (cleaned up)). And, so, a motion or
application for a TRO or preliminary injunction is properly denied when it is no more
than a “motion to win.”
Here, the arguments supporting Alcala’s request for a TRO focus on the harms
of mandatory detention without bond.
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So, insofar as Alcala seeks the same ruling on the merits as the habeas petition,
the undersigned finds that the request for a TRO improperly seeks ultimate relief.
See Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL 2886346, at *4 (denying TRO as moot because it
sought the same relief as the petitioner’s habeas petition – to release the petitioner
from custody or order a bond hearing).
And, so, the Court should deny the request for a TRO.
Remedy
Most courts confronting this issue have determined that the appropriate relief
is a bond hearing. See Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 687-88 (collecting cases);
Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *7 (collecting cases). And, so, the Court should order
that Alcala be given a bond hearing before an IJ and decline to award any other
requested relief at this time.
That said, in at least one recent case in this district, although the Court
ordered that relief – and the government did not appeal – the IJ still refused to obey
the Court’s order to provide it. See Parada-Hernandez, No. 3:25-cv-2729-K-BN (N.D.
Tex.), Dkt. Nos. 18, 19, & 20.
And, so, if the Court accepts or adopts the recommendations set out above and
requires that Alcala receive a bond hearing, the undersigned further recommends
that the Court enter a judgment tailored to enforce compliance with the Court’s order.
See, e.g., Amelia C. P. v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2872-K-BK, 2025 WL 3653872, at *3-*4
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025) (requiring (1) that the respondents provide the petitioner
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“with a bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the Government shall
bear the burden of justifying, by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or
flight risk, Petitioner’s continued detention” or “release Petitioner … from custody,
under appropriate conditions of release, to a public place”; (2) that the respondents
file a notice by 5:00 p.m. six days after entry of the Court’s order requiring that a
bond hearing be provided “that informs the Court whether Petitioner … has been
released 	from 	custody. 	If 	Petitioner 	… 	has 	not 	been 	released 	from 	custody,
Respondents shall inform the Court whether and when a bond hearing was held in
accordance with the preceding paragraph. Respondents shall further inform the
Court, in detail, of the reasons for the immigration judge’s decision”; and (3) that “if
Petitioner … is released, Respondents [must] to notify Petitioner[’s] counsel of the
exact location and exact time of her release as soon as practicable and no less than
two hours before her release”).
Recommendation
The Court should grant in part Petitioner Samuel Antonio Alcala-Garcia’s
application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Dkt. No. 1] and require
Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing before an immigration judge by a
date certain and then require Respondents to provide notice to the Court.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
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within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. ‘ 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judges’ findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 26, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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