Kinney v. Securus Technologies

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
TRAMAINE COLLIN KINNEY, §
#E39147, §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CIVIL NO. 3:25-CV-3345-S-BK
§
SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, §
DEFENDANT. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se case was referred to the
United States magistrate judge for case management, including the issuance of findings and a
recommended disposition where appropriate. Plaintiff Tramaine Collin Kinney, an inmate
incarcerated in Florida, filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Securus Technologies along
with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Doc. 3; Doc. 4. Upon review of the relevant
pleadings and applicable law, this action should be DISMISSED as barred by three strikes.
I. ANALYSIS
The “three-strike” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g), precludes a prisoner from bringing a civil action in forma pauperis if on three or more
prior occasions, while confined as a prisoner, he filed civil actions or appeals in federal court that
were dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failing to state a claim. Jackson v. Johnson, 475
F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287, 290-91 (5th Cir. 2017)
(“[S]ection 1915(g) comports with the PLRA’s effort ‘to filter out the bad claims filed by
prisoners and facilitate consideration of the good.’” (quoted case omitted)). “A dismissal of a
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suit for failure to state a claim counts as a strike, whether or not with prejudice.” Lomax v. Ortiz-
Marquez, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1727 (2020). Moreover, “a strike issues only when the
entire case is dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim.” Brown, 857
F.3d at 290-91.
Section 1915(g) also precludes prisoners from proceeding in forma pauperis in
mandamus actions that are civil in nature—i.e., actions that raise claims that are analogous or
arise out of a civil lawsuit to which § 1915(g) applies. In re Crittenden, 143 F.3d 919, 920 (5th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that where the underlying action is civil in nature, a mandamus
action is governed by the PLRA and the three-strike provision). But if the mandamus petition
seeks relief in relation to a criminal proceeding, § 1915(g) may not apply. See In re Stone, 118
F.3d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding mandamus petition that arose from post-conviction
habeas proceeding was not civil in nature and was not subject to PLRA fee payment
requirements).
Here, Kinney’s petition raises allegations that are analogous to a civil lawsuit. He seeks
to compel Securus Technologies to provide him copies of drafts on his prison-issued electronic
tablet. Doc. 3 at 1. Thus, the three-strike provision applies.
Online research confirms the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida found Kinney was barred by three strikes under § 1915(g) because he has filed at least
four actions that were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Kinney v. Flores, No. 3:25-cv-
00906, 2025 WL 2030583, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla July 10, 2025), rec. accepted, 2025 WL 2030582,
at *1 (N.D. Fla., July 21, 2025) (citing Kinney v. Bradford County Sheriffs Dep’t, 3:25cv303
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2025) (dismissing under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b) for failure to
state a claim); Kinney v. Advent Health Hospital, 3:25cv304/WWB/PDB (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7,
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2025) (same); Kinney v. Reckenseidler, 3:24cv314 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2024) (dismissing under §
1915A as an impermissible shotgun pleading); Kinney v. Biden, 3:24cv367 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 7,
2025) (dismissing under § 1915(e)(2)(B) as malicious for failure to truthfully disclose his
litigation history and for failure to state a claim)).
Having accumulated three “strikes,” Kinney is precluded by § 1915(g) from proceeding
in this action in forma pauperis unless he alleges that he is in “imminent danger of serious
physical injury” at the time of filing the complaint. See Banos v. O’Guin, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th
Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Kinney has not met that requisite. He only seeks to compel Securus
Technologies to provide him copies of drafts on the “emessaging system” tablet. Doc. 3 at 1.
Thus, his pleadings are wholly devoid of any allegation of imminent danger of serious physical
injury. Therefore, there is no exception to the § 1915(g) bar in this case.
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Kinney’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis should be DENIED and this
action should be DISMISSED as barred by the three-strike provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Such dismissal is with prejudice to Kinney refiling an in forma pauperis lawsuit raising the same
claims as herein presented, but without prejudice to him refiling this lawsuit with full payment of
filing and administrative fees of $405.00.
SO RECOMMENDED on December 19, 2025.
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by
law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific
written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.
1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to object
to 14 days).
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