Young v. United States et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KAREEM JAMAL YOUNG, §
#71410-019 §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:25-cv-3328-S-BN
§
UNITED STATES, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Kareem Jamal Young, a federal prisoner, submitted a pro se civil
complaint. See Dkt. No. 3. And the presiding United States district judge referred
Young’s complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
Young did not pay the filing fee or file a motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”). So the Court ordered Young to “file an IFP motion on the form
provided and attach to that motion a complete and verified certificate of inmate trust
account” (“CTA”) or pay the filing fee by January 23, 2026. See Dkt. No. 5. And the
Court warned Young that “failure do so may result in a recommendation that the
complaint be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Id. at 1. The
order also cautioned Young that, because he filed the lawsuit while incarcerated, he
was obligated to pay the full filing fee under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See id.
at 1-2/
On January 13, 2026, Young filed a motion seeking leave to proceed IFP, but
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it was not on the form provided by the Court and did not attach a CTA. See Dkt. No.
6. Because it is dated December 20, 2025 (four days before the Court’s order), it
appears that the deficient IFP motion may have been drafted before receiving the
Court’s order. But it has now been more than a month since the deadline in the
Court’s order, and Young has not filed any amended or corrected IFP motion that
meets the requirements of the Court’s order.
Considering this procedural record, the undersigned enters these findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this
action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Legal Standards
Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for
failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court
order.” Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing
McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord
Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure
to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir.
2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also Campbell v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d
798, 800-01 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a
failure to comply with a court’s local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify
as a failure to prosecute (discussing Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th
Cir. 1992))).
This authority “flows from the court’s inherent power to control its docket and
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prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases.” Boudwin v. Graystone Ins.
Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.
1978) (“Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the
defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua
sponte whenever necessary to ‘achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.’” (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)); Campbell, 988 F.3d at 800 (“It is well
established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant,
but also on the court’s own motion.” (citing Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 248,
251 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing, in turn, Link, 370 U.S. at 631))).
A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons,
77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although “[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice
are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b)
dismissal is appropriate where there is ‘a clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would
not serve the best interests of justice.’”
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep’t,
757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the
result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser
sanctions would be futile); Haynes v. Turner Bass & Assocs., No. 20-40787, 2022 WL
2383855, at *1 (5th Cir. July 1, 2022) (per curiam) (“A dismissal with prejudice is
improper unless the case history evidences both (1) a clear record of delay or
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contumacious conduct by the plaintiff, and (2) that a lesser sanction would not better
serve the best interests of justice. A petitioner’s delay meriting a Rule 41(b) dismissal
with prejudice must be longer than just a few months; instead, the delay must be
characterized by significant periods of total inactivity. A party’s negligence does not
make conduct contumacious; rather, it is the stubborn resistance to authority which
justifies a dismissal with prejudice.” (cleaned up)); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442
(noting that “lesser sanctions” may “‘include assessments of fines, costs, or damages
against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit
warnings’” (quoting Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).
“When a dismissal is without prejudice but ‘the applicable statute of
limitations probably bars future litigation,’” that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is
reviewed as – “a dismissal with prejudice.” Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting
Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright v. LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App’x 298,
300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially
effectively with prejudice – where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the
consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’” but she
“disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).
Analysis
By not complying with the order to file an IFP motion on the correct form with
a complete and verified CTA or to pay the filing fee – in addition to leaving the
impression that Young no longer wishes to pursue these claims – Young has
prevented this action from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit.
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A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted under
these circumstances.
Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the
Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Young
decides to obey the Court’s order and submit a proper IFP motion or pay the filing
fee, the Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the
disposition of pending cases and sua sponte dismiss this action without prejudice
under Rule 41(b).
And, while it is not apparent based on the record here that dismissal of this
lawsuit without prejudice at this time would effectively be a dismissal with prejudice,
insofar as the recommended dismissal may somehow prejudice Young, these findings,
conclusions, and recommendation afford notice and the opportunity to file objections
(as further explained below) to explain why this case should not be dismissed for the
reasons set out above. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The
broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as
the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires
both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing
sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
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all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 4, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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