Yusufu v. Texas Oncology PA

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARGARET YUSUFU, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-3016-K
§
TEXAS ONCOLOGY, P.A., 	§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Margaret Yusufu’s Motion to Compel Defendant
to Respond to Plaintiff’s Discovery Requests and for Reasonable Attorney’s Fee filed
on March 16, 2025. (Dkt. No. 22.) United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade
referred the motion to the undersigned magistrate judge for a hearing, if necessary,
and resolution. (Dkt. No. 25.)
On March 19, the Court entered an order requiring the parties to fulfill their
responsibilities to meaningfully confer on the matters raised in the motion to compel
and to subsequently file a joint report identifying the matters resolved through
attorney conference and, with respect to the matters that remained in need of Court
resolution, the parties’ respective arguments and authority. (See Dkt. No. 26.) The
parties submitted an amended joint report (Dkt. No. 29 (“JR”)) and appendix (Dkt.
No. 29-1 (“App.”)) on April 4.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint filed on January 20, 2026, is the
operative pleading. (See Dkt. No. 21 (“Compl.”).) According to the allegations
therein, Yusufu—a 60-year-old black female—was employed as a senior nurse at
Defendant Texas Oncology, P.A. (“TXO”) from 2012 until her termination on June
4, 2024. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 15.) She avers that she was a lead nurse but that, in December
2022, her supervisor and manager began falsely accusing her of not fulfilling assigned
tasks and refused to accept documentation showing that she had been timely
completing her work. (Id. ¶ 8.) She alleges that, after this point, she received false
criticism about her work, was subjected to a greater workload than her peers, and
was counseled about alleged violations of the company’s code of conduct. (Id. ¶¶ 8-
12.) Yusufu alleges that her mistreatment and false reports of poor work
performance continued beyond that point.
In February 2023, Yusufu was placed on administrative leave for an alleged
violation of patient care that she alleges was not her fault. (Id. ¶ 24.)1 Following
what Yusufu characterizes as an inadequate investigation, her supervisor reported
her to the Texas Nursing Board, and TXO placed her on administrative leave prior
to her termination on April 22,2024. (See id. ¶¶ 24-29.)
1 Yusufu alleges in her amended complaint that the incident occurred on February 8,
2023. (Compl. ¶ 24.) In the Joint Report, the parties seem to agree that it occurred on
February 8, 2024. (See JR at at 9.)
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Yusufu asserts claims against Texas Oncology for age and race discrimination
and retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 33-45.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
Rule 26 provides for the discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”
The parties report that they resolved several of the matters raised in Yusufu’s
motion to compel through attorney conference.2 There continues to be a dispute
between them with respect to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Nos. 1, 9, 10, 14, 16, and 18;
and Request for Production Nos. 3, 12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 36, and 37. (JR at 2.)
The Court addresses them in turn.
A. 	Interrogatories
Interrogatory No. 1: Yusufu’s first interrogatory requires TXO to “[i]dentify
each person providing answers to these interrogatories.” (App. 4.) TXO objected to
the term “each person providing answers” as vague and ambiguous and on the basis
2 Specifically, the parties report reaching agreement on Plaintiff’s Request for
Admission Nos. 13 and 17; Interrogatory Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, and 17; and
Requests for Production Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 25, 26,
28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35. (JR at 2.) Plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied as moot
as to these discovery requests.
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that TXO is a professional organization and not a person. In TXO’s view, it cannot
answer because “no one individual person provided any answers to the
interrogatories.” (JR at 5.) Additionally, TXO believes it is excused from providing
an answer to this interrogatory because it has already identified people who it
believes has personal knowledge of the claims and defenses in its initial disclosures.
(Id.)
TXO’s objections are overruled. “A ‘party objecting to discovery as vague or
ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity’ and ‘must explain
the specific and particular way in which a request is vague.’” Vaughn v. Solera
Holdings, LLC, No. 3:23-CV-2612-N, 2025 WL 790954, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12,
2025) (quoting VeroBlue Farms USA Inc. v. Wulf, 345 F.R.D. 406, 419 (N.D. Tex.
2021)). TXO has not explained how, exercising “reason and common sense to
attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases,” it is unable to identify each
person who provided answers to an interrogatory. See VeroBlue Farms, 345 F.R.D. at
419 (quoting Lopez v. Don Herring Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 567, 580 (N.D. Tex. 2018)). Nor
has it stated that it made any “attempt to obtain clarification by conferring with
[Yusufu] prior to objecting on this ground.” See id. (quoting Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at
580) (brackets omitted).
Likewise, TXO has not explained how its status as a legal entity—rather than
a natural person—renders it unable to answer the interrogatory propounded. TXO
answers each interrogatory using information provided by people, and the
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interrogatory seeks the identities of the people providing those answers. This kind of
interrogatory to a corporate entity has been characterized as “routine.” Randleman v.
Louisiana Sugar Ref., LLC, No. CV 17-3532, 2018 WL 2045396, at *2 (E.D. La. May
2, 2018).
TXO’s objection to answering the interrogatory because it identified people in
its initial disclosure also lacks merit. TXO points to no authority that allows it to
refuse to answer an interrogatory because the information sought is contained in the
party’s initial disclosures. More importantly, though, the information sought by the
interrogatory is not duplicative. TXO was required to disclose the identity of
individuals having discoverable information “that [it] may use to support its claims
or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(A)(i). That is not necessarily synonymous with the information requested
by Yusufu’s interrogatory.
Interrogatory No. 9: This interrogatory directed TXO to “identify any
meetings you held with [Yusufu] to counsel or reprimand her during her
employment with [TXO]” and, for each meeting, state the date, participants, place,
and substance of the discussion. (App. 6.) TXO did not assert any objection to the
interrogatory and provided substantive responses. (Id.) Yusufu has not explained
how the response is inadequate or what additional information should be compelled.
Yufusu’s motion is denied as to this interrogatory.
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Interrogatory No. 10: Interrogatory No. 10 asks TXO to “identify what steps,
if any, you took to investigate whether Plaintiff was a victim of discrimination or
whether she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job.” (App. 6.)
TXO’s only response was to object to the phrase “investigate whether Plaintiff was a
victim of discrimination or whether she was qualified to perform the essential
functions of her job” as “vague, ambiguous, and not reasonably defined.” (App. 6.)
After conferring, however, TXO does not assert a vagueness challenge in the Joint
Report, so it does not explain how the interrogatory is vague or how it remains to so
after attempting to obtain clarification. See VeroBlue Farms, 345 F.R.D. at 419.
In the Joint Report, Yusufu asserts that “all information and/or
documentation relating to Defendant’s actions against discrimination is relevant.”
(JR at 5.) TXO first contends that Yusufu did not allege discrimination prior to
initiating these proceedings, but it does not elaborate how that prevents it from
answering the question. If, as it seems to suggest, it did nothing to investigate
allegations of discrimination against Yusufu because she made no such allegations
during her employment, it can answer the question in that manner.
TXO also argues in the Joint Report that Yusufu, through her argument, is
modifying the interrogatory to request its policies and procedures generally relating
to discrimination. (JR at 5-6.) The Court does not agree. In any event, TXO
provides no objection or explanation for failing to answer the interrogatory
requesting TXO to identify steps taken to investigate whether Yusufu was a victim of
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discrimination or whether she was qualified to perform the essential functions of her
job.
Yusufu’s motion is granted as to Interrogatory No. 10.
Interrogatory No. 14: This interrogatory directs TXO to “identify (specifying
the name, age, medical reason for termination, and date of termination) any
employee who has been terminated since January 1, 2020, because of failure to meet
the job requirements of [TXO].” (App. 7.) TXO objected to the interrogatory based
on relevance and disproportionality, because it seeks “confidential and privileged”
information, including information protected by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) to the extent it seeks a “medical reason for the
termination,” and overbreadth. (App. 7.) In the JR, TXO reasserts its relevance
objection—contending that the identification of any other employee terminated for
failure to meet its job requirements is “wholly irrelevant” to Yusufu’s discrimination
claims—and also persists in its HIPAA-based objection. (JR at 6.) It does not assert
its conclusory objection based on overbreadth. (See id.)
Yusufu contends that she was fired as a result of discrimination and
retaliation. TXO defends Yusufu’s firing, at least in part, based on its assertion that
she failed to comply with her job requirements, violated TXO policies and
procedures, and violated the Texas Nursing Board’s policies and procedures. (See
Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 26.) Whether others were fired for failing to comply with job
requirements during the relevant period and, if so, their identity and age, may be
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relevant to Yusufu’s discrimination claims and TXO’s defenses. See Braud v. Geo
Heat Exchangers, L.L.C, 314 F.R.D. 386, 391 (M.D. La. 2016) (concluding requested
discovery from personnel file of employee allegedly terminated for same reason as
plaintiff was relevant and discoverable); see also Solis v. United Med. Clinic, P.A., No.
EP-20-CV-2-KC, 2020 WL 2813127, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2020) (ordering
defendant to answer similar interrogatory identifying “employees who had been
terminated for one or more of the same reasons as Plaintiff” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). TXO does not persist in its objection based on proportionality and,
in any event, does not support any such objection. See Lopez, 327 F.R.D. at 584
(“[A] party seeking to resist discovery on Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)
grounds . . . bears the burden of making a specific objection and showing that any
discovery request that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense fails the
proportionality calculation mandated by Rule 26(b) by coming forward with specific
information to address—insofar as that information is available to it—the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”). TXO’s relevance objection is overruled.
With respect to its objection based on HIPAA-protected information, TXO
does not specify whether its objection concerns the employee’s protected information
or patients’ protected information. (See JR at 6.) To the extent TXO is objecting to
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the disclosure of protected medical records of an employee, the Court notes that the
interrogatory seeks information about employees terminated “because of failure to
meet” TXO’s job requirements. Such request does not require the disclosure of an
employee’s protected medical information, and TXO is not required to provide
protected information relating to an employee.
Instead, the Court understands this interrogatory to request information
concerning the medical reason—i.e., the failure to meet the job requirements—that
supported an employee’s termination (if any). Providing that information—for
example, by stating that an employee was terminated for administering an incorrect
medication, failing to document or follow a doctor’s orders, or failing to properly
apply a medical device—can be done without disclosing an identified patient’s
medical information. Unlike in Wilson v. Martin Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 149 F.R.D. 553
(W.D. Tex. 1993), upon which TXO relies, Yusufu’s interrogatory does not seek the
disclosure of confidential communications between a patient and physician, nor does
it require TXO to identify any patient or disclose any medical records. See id. at 555–
56.
Yusufu’s motion is granted as to this interrogatory.
Interrogatory No. 16: This interrogatory instructed TXO to state “[w]hat
options . . . Plaintiff [had] to challenge her removal as Dr. Nadler’s lead nurse.”
(App. 8.) TXO objected to the interrogatory as irrelevant and not proportional
because Yusufu did not make any challenge based on her removal as Dr. Nadler’s
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lead nurse and her ability to grieve that action is irrelevant. (App. 8.) In the Joint
Report, Yusufu points to her complaint allegations that she was replaced as lead
nurse by a younger white nurse as the basis for relevance. (JR at 7.) TXO contends
that the information is not relevant because Yusufu remained employed in the same
position and that her removal as lead nurse does not relate to her suspension or
termination. (Id.)
TXO’s relevance objection is overruled. In her amended complaint, Yusufu
alleges that she was a lead nurse until her supervisor and manager harassed,
intimidated, and discriminated against her compared to younger white colleagues.
(Compl. ¶ 7.) Such conduct appears to fall within the race discrimination claim
asserted. (See id. ¶ 42.)3 The requested information does not fall outside the broad
realm of relevance. And, again, TXO neither reasserts its objection based on
proportionality nor supports such an objection in response to the motion to compel.
TXO’s objections are overruled, and Yusufu’s motion is granted as to this
interrogatory.
Interrogatory No. 18: This interrogatory calls on TXO to “state all trainings
received by Grace Rosenberry to qualify and prepare her for a supervisory role.”
(App. 8.) TXO objected to this interrogatory based on relevance and proportionality;
3 TXO’s response borders on disingenuous by relying exclusively on Yusufu’s age
discrimination claim in arguing irrelevance, completely ignoring her race discrimination
claims. (See JR at 7 (“Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that she was discriminated
against when she was ‘suspended and terminated.’”).)
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objects to “all trainings” as vague, ambiguous, and overly broad; and objects to the
term “to qualify and prepare her for a supervisory role” as vague and ambiguous.
(App. 8.)
In the Joint Report, Yusufu explains that Rosenberry was her direct supervisor
who she alleges ignored or refused Yusufu’s requests for help in fulfilling her job
duties. (JR at 7.) Yusufu alleges that Rosenberry blocked her transfer to another
facility and removed her as a lead nurse without making a genuine effort to help her
satisfy the job requirements. TXO contends that “all trainings” is overbroad because
it does not “limit[] any such trainings to any relevant subject matter.” (JR at 8
(criticizing the interrogatory as asking about “all trainings received by Grace
Rosenberry. . . .” (emphasis in original)).) Again, TXO’s response is unmeritorious.
With its ellipses, TXO omits the portion of the interrogatory that belies its argument.
The interrogatory obviously requests the identity of trainings that qualify Rosenberry
for her supervisory role. If TXO contends that a training Rosenberry completed
during or prior to her supervision of Yusufu was relevant to qualifying or preparing
Rosenberry for the supervisory position, TXO is ordered to identify them.
B. 	Requests for Production (“RFPs”)
RFP No. 3: RFP No. 3 seeks all internal TXO communications and all TXO
external communications with others (expressly including government agencies,
insurance companies, and current/former employees) “relating to or concerning any
claims or defenses asserted in this litigation or any aspect of this case.” (App. 12.)
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Yusufu excludes from her request any documents covered by attorney-client
privilege. (Id.) TXO produced responsive documents and did not assert any
objections to this request. (See id.)
In the Joint Report, Yusufu contends that TXO that it reported her to the
Texas Nursing Board and responded to her complaint of discrimination to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission but has not produced such communications.
(JR at 8.) TXO reiterates that it did not assert objections to this RFP and has
produced responsive documents. (Id.) But TXO does not clearly state that it has
produced all responsive documents in his custody, control, or possession.
Yusufu’s motion is granted at to this RFP to the extent TXO has not already
produced responsive documents. If it has produced all responsive documents,
subject to its duty to supplement, it must say so.
RFP No. 12: Yusufu requests the entire personnel file for any TXO employee
who has knowledge of the facts and is anticipated to be a witness in the case,
including 20 named doctors and other individuals. (App. 15-16.) TXO objected to
the request as overbroad, harassing, irrelevant, and outside the scope of permissible
discovery. (App. 16.) It further objects on the basis that the personnel files are
confidential and contain personal information, some of which may be protected by
HIPAA. (App. 16.)
In the Joint Report, Yusufu states that each person identified has knowledge
about her treatment and, for her white colleagues (who are not specifically identified
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among the listed individuals), the personnel files would contain documentation
relevant to their dissimilar treatment for similar conduct. (JR at 8.) Yusufu
disclaims any request for HIPAA-protected information about these employees. (Id.)
TXO contends that the request for entire personnel files is overbroad and argues that
Yusufu is not entitled to “rummage through the personnel files . . . in hopes of
discovering information that might possibly be relevant” to her claims. (JR at 9
(quoting Beasley v. First Am. Real Est. Info. Servs., Inc., No. 3-04-CV-1059-B, 2005 WL
1017818, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2005)).)
Even accepting Yusufu’s assertion that each of the 20 identified individuals
has knowledge about her claims, she has not explained why their respective
personnel file would contain information relevant to her claims or TXO’s defenses.
And, while a “court may order production of personnel files of a discrimination
plaintiff’s comparators if the information contained therein may be relevant to show
that a defendant’s reasons for terminating a plaintiff were pretextual,” Martin v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 292 F.R.D. 361, 365 (N.D. Tex. 2013), Yusufu has not provided the
Court with information sufficient to show that any of the listed individuals might
meet the rigorous requirements to qualify as a comparator, see id. at 365–66
(discussing qualities and differences for recognized comparators); see also Gordon v.
Greenville Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:13-CV-0178-P, 2014 WL 6603420, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 20, 2014) (“In a case involving claims for disparate treatment, the plaintiff is
entitled to discovery of comparator data only for ‘similarly situated’ employees.”).
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Given the privacy concerns of non-party employees, see Vaughn, 2025 WL 790954, at
*2, the Court concludes that Yusufu has not shown that her requests for the
personnel files of the identified individuals is relevant to her claims or TXO’s
defenses or proportional to the needs of this case. Yusufu’s motion is denied as to
this RFP without prejudice to her ability to conduct further discovery to identify
relevant comparators and, at an appropriate time, seek discovery of information from
their personnel files.
RFP Nos. 18 and 37: In RFP No. 18, Yusufu requests documents “showing
that Plaintiff failed to help a distress patient on February 8, 2024,” including the
medical record, physical exams, complaints, vitals, and doctor’s note for the patient.
(App. 17.) TXO objected to the request because it seeks information that is subject to
protection under HIPAA. (Id.) In RFP No. 37, Yusufu requests all documents,
including emails, medical records, and doctors’ notes, “regarding the incident of
February 8, 2024” that led to her termination. (App. 21.) TXO objected because it
seeks information protected by HIPAA and information protected by the attorney-
client privilege. (App. 21.) TXO has, however, produced non-confidential and non-
privileged documents. (Id.)
Yusufu asserts in the Joint Report that the requested information is relevant to
rebutting TXO’s defense that her failure to properly execute her job duties on
February 8, 2024, caused her suspension and termination. (JR at 9.) Yusufu has
stated that she would accept the production of patient medical records that are
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redacted to shield the patient’s identifying information, and she contends that a
federal regulation allows disclosure in this circumstance notwithstanding HIPAA
protection. (JR at 9 (erroneously citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(i)).) TXO contends
that it has produced all non-confidential documents relating to the February 8, 2024
event but declines to produce the patient’s medical records on the basis that it is
protected by HIPAA and cannot be produced without the patient’s consent. (Id.)
TXO contends that redacting the patient’s personally identifying information is
impractical because it would result in redacting the entire record. (JR at 10.) TXO
does not address Yusufu’s argument that HIPAA provides for the disclosure of
medical records in litigation such as this.
TXO rightfully does not object to relevance, as Yusufu’s performance of her
job duties in connection with the February 8, 2024, incident appears to be at the
center of its defense against her discrimination claims. Rather, TXO’s position is
that it is prohibited by law from disclosing patient records protected by HIPAA.
TXO’s assertion that HIPAA-covered records simply cannot be produced is
not well founded. TXO contends that HIPAA’s exception to disclosure applies only
in suits involving patient malpractice claims against the medical provider. (JR at 10.)
That is not so. In Rutledge v. Elliot Health Sys., No. 17-CV-110-JD, 2018 WL 456149,
at *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 17, 2018), for example, a plaintiff sued her former employer for
age discrimination and wrongful termination and, like here, requested the “complete
chart of the patient whose care . . . was the basis for the explanation by the Hospital
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of the reason for terminating” her. Id. at *1. The defendant similarly objected based
in HIPAA. Id. at *2. But the court recognized that 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) “create[s]
a procedure for obtaining authority to use medical records in litigation.” Id. (quoting
Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 924–25 (7th Cir. 2004)). It additionally
noted that, although “patient consent is one means for allowing disclosure, health
care providers may also disclose patient health information in response to a
discovery request or a court order.” Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)). Other
courts routinely require the production of HIPAA records with redactions or under a
protective order. See, e.g., Byrnes v. St. Catherine Hosp., No. 21-2086-DDC-ADM,
2023 WL 2734229, at *20 (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2023) (requiring production of HIPAA
records under protective order); Salcedo v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr., No. 1:19-CV-
2201, 2023 WL 2392040, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2023) (requiring production of
redacted HIPAA records under confidentiality agreement); Arsberry v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., No. 3:17-CV-50044, 2021 WL 5232733, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2021)
(requiring production of redacted HIPAA information under a protective order);
Thomas v. SC Dep’t of Mental Health, No. CV 3:20-1333-MGL-PJG, 2021 WL
5991013, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 10, 2021) (ordering production of medical records with
personally identifying information redacted); Hernandez v. Clearwater Transportation,
Ltd., No. 1:18-CV-319 RP, 2021 WL 148053, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2021)
(ordering production of HIPAA-protected files under protective order).
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Finally, TXO’s position with respect to the practicality of redaction is
unpersuasive. It does not explain how “[r]edacting the ‘patient’s personal identifying
information’ would result in redacting the entire record.” (See JR at 10.)
Information pertaining to the patient’s condition, medical treatment providers’
actions, or observed outcomes, for example, would not readily identify the patient.
Rather, personally identifying information of the kind that must be redacted includes
things such as names, addresses, personally identifying numbers (e.g., social security
numbers, driver’s license numbers), phone numbers, dates of birth, and the like.
TXO’s objections are overruled, and Yosufu’s motion is granted as to these
RFPs. TXO is ordered to either produce documents responsive to one or both of
RFP Nos. 18 and 37, except that it may redact patient personally identifying
information from the records or produce the records under a HIPAA-compliant
protective order entered by the Court.4
RFP No. 19: Yusufu requests “[a]ll documents showing Plaintiff was not
timely moving Chemo as alleged by supervised Gracy Rosenberry in Defendant’s
Performance Counseling dated January 20, 2023.” (App. 18.) TXO objected to the
4 If the parties agree to the terms and entry of a protective order, they must, within
ten days of this order, file an agreed motion and present the proposed protective order to the
Court. If the parties agree to the entry of a protective order but disagree as to its terms, they
shall both file, within ten days of this order, their respective motion for entry of a protective
order with their proposed order attached, identifying the terms in dispute and arguing why
the Court should adopt their proposed terms.
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request because it seeks documents protected by HIPAA—“particularly the patient’s
medical record information”—but it produced non-protected documents. (App. 18.)
In the Joint Report, Yusufu contends that the documents in dispute—i.e., the
patient medical records—are relevant to whether she was “moving Chemo” or not.
(JR at 10.) As with the immediately preceding requests, Yusufu is willing to accept
redacted records and contends that they fall within a permissible disclosure under
HIPAA. (Id.) And TXO reproduces its position concerning its inability to produce
patient records without patient consent. The Court grants the motion with respect to
this request on the same grounds and same qualifications as applied to RFP Nos. 18
and 37.
RFP Nos. 20 and 27: In RFP No. 20, Yusufu requests “[a]ll phone
conversations including written or recorded conversation, that show Plaintiff refused
to discuss a patient’s lab work with such patient as per the performance review of
April 12, 2023.” (App. 18.) TXO objected to the request as vague and ambiguous,
saying a request for all “phone conversations” is nonsensical and cannot be
reasonably determined. (App. 18.) In RFP No. 27, Yusufu requested “a copy of the
lab result and the phone conversation transcripts or recordings that support” any
contention that she refused to discuss a lab result with a patient. (App. 19.) TXO
objected to the disclosure of HIPAA-protected patient information but produced
non-protected information in response. (App. 19.)
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In the Joint Report, Yusufu contends that the information sought is relevant
because TXO has pointed to her refusal to discuss lab work with a patient as one of
the grounds for adverse employment action. (JR at 11.) Yusufu requests documents
pertaining to conversations evidencing such refusal. She also notes her willingness to
accept HIPAA-protected information with redactions. As to RFP No. 20, TXO
contends that the phrase “phone conversations” is vague because phone
conversations are verbal and cannot be reproduced. That objection is overruled, as
the request only encompasses documents, which may be (and are specifically
identified) as conversations that are recorded, either in writing (i.e., transcripts) or
audio files.
As to RFP No. 27, TXO makes its same objection to the production of
documents protected by HIPAA. (JR at 12.) The Court overrules TXO’s objection
on the grounds discussed as to RFP Nos. 18, 19, and 37 above.
The Court grants Yusufu’s motion as to RFP Nos. 20 and 27 as discussed.
RFP Nos. 23 and 24: In RFP No. 23, Yusufu requests a copy of TXO’s
“policy on the acceptance of gifts.” (App. 18.) In RFP No. 24, she seeks a “copy of
[TXO’s] employee handbook.” (App. 19.) TXO did not object to these requests and
states that it will produce the requested documents. Yusufu nonetheless requests that
the Court compel TXO to produce them. TXO does not dispute that the documents
are discoverable, and it specifically agrees to produce them. Yusufu’s motion is
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denied as moot with respect to RFP Nos. 23 and 24, subject to Yusufu’s ability to re-
urge her motion if the documents are not timely produced.
RFP No. 26: RFP No. 26 states, “If you contend that Plaintiff’s action
resulted in injuries to Defendant’s patients, please provide all documents that support
this contention.” (App. 19.) TXO objected to the production of patient medical
records subject to HIPAA protection but produced non-confidential documents.
(App. 19.) Although TXO has produced documents related to disciplinary actions
taken based on allegations that Yusufu caused injury to a patient, it has not produced
the medical documentation that would prove or disprove the accuracy of those
allegations. (JR at 13.) TXO asserts its same objections to the production of
documents containing information protected by HIPAA. (JR at 13-14.) The Court
overrules TXO’s objection on the grounds and to the extent discussed as to RFP
Nos. 18, 19, and 37 above.
RFP No. 36: RFP No. 36 seeks Yusufu’s “activity and phone call log for
March 2, 2023, March 3, 2023, March 6, 2023, and February 8, 2024.” (App. 21.)
TXO objected to the request as overly broad and irrelevant as to time and scope.
(App. 21.) It stated that it is a large organization with clinics across Texas, and states
that the request is “not limited to any location, phone number, or time period that
might narrow the request to a permissible request.” (App. 21.)
TXO stands on its objections after attorney conference. (See JR at 14.) To the
extent TXO persists in asserting that the request is overbroad, the Court disagrees.
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Yusufu identifies four specific days at issue, and it stands to reason that the request is
limited to the hours when and location(s) where she was on duty on those four days.
To the extent TXO now objects based on vagueness or an inability to ascertain
her calls, however, the Court finds merit in the objection. TXO explains that Yusufu
was not assigned a specific telephone number, making it impossible to identify her
phone calls. (JR at 14.) And producing all calls made during her work hours at her
work location is overly broad and unlikely to be helpful or proportionate to the
claims and defenses asserted in this action. To the extent documents can be
identified, however, TXO has agreed to produce them. (JR at 14-15.)
Yusufu’s motion is denied as to this request for production.
C. 	Payment of Expenses
Yusufu requests repayment of her expenses associated with filing her motion
to compel. (Dkt. No. 22 at 7.) When a motion to compel discovery is granted, a
court may order a party resisting discovery, its attorney, or both to pay the movant’s
reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorneys’ fees. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). The rule, however, instructs the court not to award costs if
“(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the
disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure,
response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an
award of expenses unjust.” Id. When a motion to compel is granted in part and
denied in part, as Yusufu’s has been, the court “may, after giving an opportunity to
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be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(C).
It does not appear that the parties have not conferred with respect to Yusufu’s
request for payment of costs. If, after reflection, Yusufu contends that she is entitled
to an apportioned payment of fees associated with making her motion, she must
meaningfully confer in person or by phone or videoconference with TXO’s counsel
to determine whether the parties can agree on a proper amount of repayment. In the
absence of such agreement after meaningful conference, Yusufu may make a motion
for repayment of expenses no later than 21 days after this order is entered.
III. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Yusufu’s Motion to Compel (Dkt. No. 22) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Texas Oncology is ORDERED, within 14
days, to serve complete responses without objections to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory Nos.
1, 10, 14, 16, and 18 and produce documents responsive to RFP Nos. 3, 18, 19, 20,
26, 27, and 37 as provided herein.
SO ORDERED on April 7, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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