Guzman Diaz v. Warden Prairieland Detention Center et al

-1-
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MICHAEL STEVEN GUZMAN DIAZ, 	§
§
Petitioner, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-3008-X-BN
§
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary, U.S. 	§
Department of Homeland Security, 	§
ET AL., 	§
§
Respondents. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge
for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference
from presiding District Judge Brantley Starr. See Dkt. No. 2.
Petitioner Michael Steven Guzman Diaz, detained at Prairieland Detention
Center in this district, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 with the assistance of counsel on November 4, 2025 against five government
officials (“Respondents”). See Dkt. No. 1. He argues that his detention without bond
violates the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”); bond regulations set forth
in 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19; and the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See id.
After reviewing Guzman Diaz’s initial filings in this case, the undersigned
determined that service and an expedited response from the United States Attorney’s
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 1 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-2-
Office was required. See Dkt. No. 3. Respondents filed a response. See Dkt. No. 5.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court should grant in part the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 1].
Background
Petitioner Guzman Diaz is a citizen of El Salvador. See Dkt. No. 1-1; Dkt. No.
5 at 7. He has resided in the United States since September 9, 2012, when he entered
without an inspection. See Dkt. No. 6 at 6.
He was ordered to attend a hearing in immigration court on August 16, 2023.
See Dkt. No. 5 at 7-8; Dkt. No. 6 at 8. When he did not appear, an Immigration Judge
(“IJ”) ordered that Guzman Diaz be removed to El Salvador in abstentia. See Dkt. No.
6 at 8.
With the assistance of counsel, Guzman Diaz filed a motion to reopen his in
absentia removal proceedings, which was granted on August 16, 2023. See id. at 20-
21. On April 18, 2024, upon a joint motion, an IJ dismissed the case without prejudice.
See id. at 24-29.
On October 23, 2025, Guzman Diaz was arrested during a traffic stop. See id.
at 6. The same day, he was issued a Notice to Appear by the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”). See id. at 31-33.
Guzman Diaz remains in custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) at the Prairieland Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas. See Dkt. No. 1 at 2;
Dkt. No. 1-1.
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 2 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-3-
Guzman Diaz filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming that he was
misclassified under 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)(2), which authorizes mandatory detention, and
should be classified under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Dkt. No. 1 at 14. He alleges that he
is unlawfully detained without bond under Section 1225, in violation of the INA, bond
regulations, and his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 14-16.
Guzman Diaz asks the Court to (1) assume jurisdiction over the matter; (2)
enjoin the government from transferring him to another detention facility; (3) issue
a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release him immediately or provide
him with a bond hearing under Section 1226(a) within 7 days; (4) declare that his
continued detention violates federal law and the Constitution; (5) award him costs
and fees; (6) grant any further relief the Court deems just and proper. See id. at 16.
Respondents argue that Guzman Diaz is not entitled to relief because he is
properly classified, and subject to mandatory detention, under Section 1225(b)(2). See
generally Dkt. No. 6. And they contend that Guzman Diaz is not entitled to relief
under the Due Process Clause. See id. at 26-28.
Legal Standards and Analysis
This habeas action is another in a flood of similar actions filed after the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) eliminated the ability of IJs to make individualized
bond determinations as to certain persons placed in removal proceedings. See In re
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025) (affirming “the Immigration
Judge’s determination that he did not have authority over [a] bond request” by a
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-4-
noncitizen who has resided in the United States for more than two years); see also
Kyle Chaney, More than 100 judges have ruled against the Trump admin’s mandatory
detention 	policy 	(Oct. 	31, 	2025, 	4:29 	PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/31/trump-administration-mandatory-
detention-deportation-00632086.
As background,
[t]wo statutes in the [INA] principally govern [these] detention[s]: 8
U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. Section 1226 provides the general process for
arresting and detaining noncitizens who are present in the United
States and eligible for removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The Supreme Court has
explained that Section 1226(a) “sets out the default rule: The Attorney
General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an alien
‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting
§ 1226(a)). “[T]he Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained
under § 1226(a) ‘on bond or conditional parole.’” Id. (citation modified).
But “aliens who are covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a
different process” and “‘shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding’ if
an immigration officer ‘determines that [they are] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted’ into the country.” Id. (quoting §
1225(b)(2)(A)). Hence, “noncitizens detained under section 1225(b)(2)
must remain in custody for the duration of their removal proceedings,
while those detained under section 1226(a) are entitled to a bond
hearing before an IJ at any time before entry of a final removal order.”
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bostock, ___ F. Supp. 3d ____, 2025 WL 2782499,
at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025).
Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-cv-112, 2025 WL 2950097, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025).
And “[t]he principal issue” in these cases “is whether [the habeas petitioner]
has been erroneously categorized as a detainee subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 4 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-5-
prescribes mandatory detention during removal proceedings, or if he [or she] is
subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detention and a bond
hearing regarding whether the noncitizen is a flight risk or poses a danger to the
community.” Id.
Against this background, the undersigned turns to Guzman Diaz’s request for
relief.
I. 	THE INA
The undersigned first finds that detaining Guzman Diaz without a bond
hearing under Section 1225(b)(2) violates the INA.
Although Respondents point to cases in federal district court that hold
differently, see Dkt. No. 5 at 25-26, the undersigned reaches its conclusion for the
reasons succinctly and persuasively explained in Covarrubias, 2025 WL 2950097, at
*2, which, in turn, relied on almost every other federal district court in this circuit
and elsewhere that has tackled this issue:
[Guzman Diaz] contends that he is being detained under Section 1226(a)
and should have a bond hearing, but Respondents argue that he is
subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2), and therefore,
not entitled to a bond hearing.
The difference in interpretation emanates from the Government’s
recent reevaluation of immigration detention authority. The [DHS] and
Department of Justice (DOJ) released interim guidance on July 8, 2025,
announcing a new legal position on detention and release authorities.
The guidance interprets INA Section 235 (8 U.S.C. § 1225) as applying
to 	the 	detention 	of 	all 	“applicants 	for 	admission,” 	including 	all
noncitizens who have not been admitted, whether or not they arrive at
a port of entry….
[W]hether 	[Guzman 	Diaz] 	falls 	under 	Section 	1226(a) 	or
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 5 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-6-
1225(b)(2) 	is 	a 	matter 	of 	statutory 	interpretation. 	Statutory
interpretation is the province of the courts, not agencies. Loper Bright
Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024).
The [undersigned] finds that Section 1226, not Section 1225,
applies to [Guzman Diaz’s] detention. As almost every district court …
has concluded, “the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional
intent, and § 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades” support
application of Section 1226. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. H-25-
3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (Rosenthal, J.)
(collecting cases).
Id. at *3 (cleaned up); see also Buenrostro-Mendez, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (“The
court need not repeat the ‘well-reasoned analyses’ contained in these opinions and
instead 	simply 	notes 	its 	agreement. 	The 	respondents 	have 	failed 	to 	provide
controlling authorities or persuasive reasons that would justify reaching a different
result. Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b), applies to [the petitioner].” (cleaned up)).
And, because the undersigned finds that Respondents have violated the INA,
it need not address Guzman Diaz’s parallel argument that Respondents have violated
the bond regulations set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1, 1236.1, and 1003.19.
II. 	PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Availability of Procedural Due Process Protections
The undersigned also finds that detaining Guzman Diaz without a bond
hearing violates his Fifth Amendment rights.
In 	this 	case, Respondents 	elect 	not 	to expressly 	rely 	on Department 	of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), to oppose Guzman Diaz’s due
process arguments. See Dkt. No. 11 at 27-30.
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 6 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-7-
Regardless, because the undersigned finds that Guzman Diaz is erroneously
categorized 	as 	detained 	under 	Section 	1225(b)(2), 	the 	Court 	should 	reject
Respondent’s related argument that, because Section 1225 “says nothing ‘whatsoever
about bond hearings’ … [n]o procedural due process claim is stated.” Dkt. No. 5 at 28
(quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
And, to the extent that Respondents may rely on Thuraissigiam to deny this
due process claim, the undersigned agrees with the court in Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa
and 	other 	courts 	in 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	that 	have 	found 	Thuraissigiam 	to 	be
distinguishable in this context. See ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, No. EP-25-cv-337-KC, 2025
WL 2691828 at *7-10 (W.D. Tex.); see also, e.g., Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, ___ F. Supp.
3d ____, No. EP-25-cv-432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880, at *4-5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2025);
Gonzalez Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-cv-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); Santiago, 2025 WL 2792588, at *7-10; Hernandez-Fernandez v.
Lyons, No. 5:25- cv-773-JKP, 2025 WL 2976923, at *7-8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025).
In Thuraissigiam, “[t]he [Supreme] Court did not address whether noncitizens
mandatorily detained under § 1225(b) have a constitutional due process right to
challenge the fact or length of their detention, as [Guzman Diaz] does here.” Lopez-
Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *8. Unlike in Thuraissigiam, where the petitioner
challenged his deportability and the denial of his asylum admission, Guzman Diaz
challenges his detention without a bond hearing. See 591 U.S. at 114-15. In the
context of detention under Sections 1225(b) and 1226(a), the United States Court of
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 7 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-8-
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has “expressly left open the constitutional due process
question” for lower courts to consider. Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *8 (citing
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 312).
The petitioner in Thuraissigiam was also stopped and detained “within
twenty-five yards of the border” and was not released or permitted to reside in the
United States. 591 U.S. at 114.
But Guzman Diaz has resided in the United States since 2012. See Dkt. No. 1,
¶ 20; Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *9 (distinguishing Thuraissigiam because
petitioner had resided in the United States for three years).
And, so, Guzman Diaz is entitled to procedural protections under the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And the undersigned will consider his claim that
his detention violates his due process rights.
B. Mathews Balancing Test
“To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights,
courts apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).” Martinez v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-1007-JKP, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 8, 2025) (cleaned up).
The three factors to consider are (1) “the private interest that will be affected by
the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest, including the function
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 8 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-9-
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (cleaned up).
“The essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious
loss (be given) notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’” Id. at 348
(quoting 	Joint 	Anti-Fascist 	Comm. 	v. 	McGrath, 	341 	U.S., 	at 	171-172 	(1976)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
1. 	Private Interest
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause
protects.” Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2001)). Even though Guzman Diaz entered the United States without inspection,
he has been present in our society for over a decade. And, based on that, the
undersigned finds that he acquired a “cognizable interest in his freedom from
detention that deserves great weight and gravity.” Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *6.
And, so, the first factor weighs in favor of Guzman Diaz.
2. 	Risk 	of 	Erroneous 	Deprivation 	and 	Value 	of 	Additional
Safeguards
As to the second factor, Guzman Diaz is in custody. Without a bond hearing,
he will likely remain in custody. And the risk of an arbitrary deprivation is greater
given the BIA’s new interpretation of Section 1225(b)(2). See Vieira, 2025 WL
2937880, at *7; Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *11.
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 9 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-10-
“[A]gency 	decisionmakers 	regularly 	‘conduct[] 	individualized 	custody
determinations … consider[ing] flight risk and dangerousness.’” Gonzalez Martinez,
2025 WL 2965859, at *4 (cleaned up). So a bond hearing would “give [Guzman Diaz]
the opportunity to be heard and receive a meaningful assessment of whether he is
dangerous or likely to abscond.” Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *11.
And, so, a bond hearing would reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Guzman Diaz’s liberty. And the second factor weighs in favor of Guzman Diaz.
3. 	Government’s Interest
Respondents argue that the Supreme Court has recognized an interest in
detaining undocumented individuals during “the limited period necessary for their
removal proceedings.” See Dkt. No. 5 at 27 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 526
(2003)). And they contend that Guzman Diaz “is being detained for the limited
purpose of removal proceedings and determining his removability.” Id.
But they do not explain their interest in making those determinations while
detaining Guzman Diaz without bond – that is, they do not explain why holding him
without bond is “necessary.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 526.
And, in any event, the government’s interest in ensuring that Guzman Diaz
appears for his removal proceedings “would be squarely addressed through a bond
hearing.” Gonzalez Martinez, 2025 WL 2965859, at *4.
And, so, the third factor weighs in favor of Guzman Diaz.
Because all three Mathews factors support Guzman Diaz, the undersigned
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 10 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-11-
finds that denying him a bond hearing under Section 1225(b)(2) deprives him of his
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
III. 	SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Because the denial of a bond hearing violates Guzman Diaz’s procedural due
process rights and the INA, the undersigned declines to address his substantive due
process claims. See Santiago, 2025 WL 2792588, at *6 n.2 (“[B]ecause the Court
grants [the petition] on procedural due process grounds, the Court need not reach
[the petitioner’s] substantive due process … claims.”).
Remedy
Guzman Diaz asks the Court to (1) assume jurisdiction over the matter; (2)
enjoin the government from transferring him to another detention facility; (3) issue
a writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release him immediately or provide
him with a bond hearing under Section 1226(a) within 7 days; (4) declare that his
continued detention violates federal law and the Constitution; (5) award him costs
and fees; (6) grant any further relief the Court deems just and proper. See Dkt. No. 1
at 16.
Most courts confronting this issue have determined that the appropriate relief
is a bond hearing. See Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828, at *12-13 (collecting cases);
Vieira, 2025 WL 2937880, at *7 (collecting cases).
And, so, the Court should order that Guzman Diaz be given a bond hearing
before an IJ and decline to award any other requested relief at this time.
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 11 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-12-
Recommendation
The Court should grant in part Petitioner Guzman Diaz’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 1] and require Respondents to provide him with a bond
hearing before an IJ.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1); F ED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judges’ findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 13 PageID <pageID>

-13-
DATED: November 25, 2025
__________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-03008-X-BN Document 7 Filed 11/25/25 Page 13 of 13 PageID <pageID>