Reagan v. USA

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DARREN L. REAGAN, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-1955-N-BT
§
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
After being convicted of conspiracy to commit extortion and aiding and
abetting extortion, serving a custodial sentence in the Bureau of Prisons (BOP),
and being released from custody, Petitioner Darren L. Reagan filed a petition for a
writ of coram nobis under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (ECF No. 3). He asks that the Court
vacate his conviction. For the reasons set forth below, the District Judge should
deny Reagan’s petition for a writ of coram nobis.
Background
Following a jury trial, Reagan was convicted of conspiracy to commit
extortion and aiding and abetting extortion and was sentenced to two concurrent
terms of 168 months’ imprisonment. See United States v. Reagan, No. 3:07-cr-
0289-M(07) (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d, 725 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2013). The
conviction stems from Reagan’s involvement—as chairman and CEO of the Black
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State Employees Association of Texas (BSEAT) and the BSEAT Community
Development Corporation—in an illegal kickback scheme. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471 at
477. Reagan unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief through a motion for a
new trial,1 initial and successive motions to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. §
2255,2 and two habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.3
According to Reagan, he was released to home confinement on December 3,
2019. Pet. ¶ 2. Reagan was then released from BOP custody on June 22, 2022. Id.;
see also BOP, Find an Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search “Find By
Name,” “First”: Darren; “Last”: Reagan). Reagan “successfully completed the full
three years of supervised release” on June 27, 2025. Pet. ¶ 2.
He filed the instant petition for a writ of coram nobis on July 25, 2025.
Reagan claims that he was “wrongfully convicted” due to purported conflicts of
interest. Id. ¶ 1. Specifically, the “entire criminal case” against him was supposedly
“founded on the testimony and cooperation of a conflicted individual, James R. Bill
Fisher.” Id. ¶ 3. Fisher had purportedly acted as a “confidential informant and
1 United States v. Reagan, 592 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2015).
2 Reagan v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-3420, 2016 WL 3023890 (N.D. Tex. May
2, 2016), rec. accepted, 2016 WL 3030173 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016); Reagan v.
United States, No. 3:17-CV-2217, Doc. 9; (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2017); Reagan v.
United States, No. 3:18-CV-1007, 2018 WL 10424864 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2018), rec.
accepted, 2018 WL 1899352 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2018).
3 Reagan v. Warden, 2:17-CV-0807, 2018 WL 7142196, at *1–2 (W.D. La. Dec. 27,
2018), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 386870 (W.D. La. Jan. 30, 2019); Reagan v. Wells,
No. 3:21-CV-00507-M (BT), 2021 WL 1877060, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2021)
(Rutherford, J.), rec. accepted, 2021 WL 1872580 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2021).
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government agent” while represented by some members of Reagan’s team of
defense counsel. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6. Reagan claims that his defense counsel and federal
prosecutors failed to disclose this information, thus undermining the fairness of
Reagan’s trial—and harming Reagan’s First and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 9.
Accordingly, Reagan requests that the Court vacate his conviction and
provide him with any other relief that the Court deems just and proper.
Reagan has sought to amend or otherwise supplement his Petition four
times since his initial filing. See ECF Nos. 4, 8, 10–12. In each of these filings,
Reagan submits supposedly new evidence supporting his claims for relief.
Legal Standards and Analysis
I. Collateral estoppel bars Reagan from relitigating the issues
raised in his Petition.
Courts may raise and consider the issue of collateral estoppel sua sponte.
Williams v. Thaler, 2011 WL 1750702, at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 6, 2011) (citing Arizona
v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412–13, (2000); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 80 (2d
Cir.1998)).
Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, “applies when ‘(1) the
identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; and
(3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision.’ ” Amrollah v.
Napolitano, 710 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch.
Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 290 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc)); see also Hacienda Records, L.P.
v. Ramos, 718 F. App’x 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Issue preclusion
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or collateral estoppel prevents a party from litigating an issue it previously
‘litigated and lost’ in another action” and thus “ ‘prevent[s] repetitious litigation of
what is essentially the same dispute, ... conserv[es] judicial resources, [ ]
maintain[s] consistency, and [ ] avoid[s] oppression or harassment of the adverse
party.’ ”) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327
(1979); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmts. c, e. (1982)). The
determination of a question directly involved in one action is conclusive as to that
question in a second suit. See B & B Hardware, Inc., v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575
U.S. 138, 148 (2015).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also applies to petitions for writs of coram
nobis. See Mwalumba v. United States, 2019 WL 3021171, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June
26, 2019), rec. accepted, 2019 WL 3006655 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2019) (applying
doctrine of collateral estoppel to claims raised in petition for writ of coram nobis).
a. Identical issues were previously adjudicated.
Reagan raised claims related to Fisher and his counsel’s alleged conflict of
interest at trial and on direct appeal. The district court and Fifth Circuit have
already addressed the issues raised by Reagan in his petition:
[Reagan] alleges that he and Fisher had both at times used the
same attorney prior to that attorney’s death a few months
before the start of trial.
. . .
The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to hold
a Garcia hearing into, or to otherwise investigate, any of these
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claims, as none presented an instance of conflicted counsel that
would have necessitated such a hearing on Sixth Amendment
grounds, or required an investigation with respect to any other
type of conflict of interest. . . . [T]he fact that a now-deceased
attorney represented Reagan and Fisher in other matters prior
to the trial did not implicate Reagan’s right to conflict-free
counsel. Cf. Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 801–06 (5th Cir.
2000) (discussing the conflict of interest present when a
defendant’s trial counsel also represents a witness against the
defendant).
Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 488 (5th Cir. 2013).
Reagan insists in his response to a Magistrate Judge Questionnaire (MJQ)
that his current claims were never adjudicated at trial or on appeal. Resp. at 4–5.
He contends that his claims in this action relate to three of his former defense
attorneys—James Murphy, John Carney, and William Ravkind—while the Fifth
Circuit only addressed the merits of arguments related to Murphy. Id. at 4. Further,
Reagan mentions that additional conflicts existed involving senior partners
employed at Haynes & Boone, the same firm as the husband of the government’s
lead prosecutor. Id. at 5.
But Reagan did, in fact, raise all these claims on appeal. First, he argued that
Murphy, Carney, and Ravkind were all conflicted:
James M. Murphy represented Fisher in all of his cases,
criminal and civil, leading to the case sub judice. However,
Murphy was Reagan’s personal and corporate attorney since
1999 and until his death a few months before trial in this case.
Also Carney, Fisher’s codefendant in the criminal case and co-
plaintiff in the civil cases against the government, was Reagan’s
corporate attorney at BSEAT and represented Reagan in the
matter of West Cliff Shopping Plaza Partnership Bankruptcy
proceedings. William M. Ravkind was also a corporate attorney
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for Reagan and BSEAT. Ravkind also represented Carney in his
criminal case, which had Fisher as a codefendant. Murphy was
representing Reagan simultaneously with Fisher, who was
working for the government and building a criminal case
against Reagan concerning BSEAT’s business activities which
Murphy was also representing.
Reagan v. United States, 10-10211, Appellant’s Br. at 130–31 (Doc. No. 497) (5th
Cir. 2013). Reagan also explained the conflict related to Fisher and Haynes &
Boone at length. See id. at 125, 135–37.
The Fifth Circuit rejected all these arguments and affirmed the judgment of
the district court.
Accordingly, identical issues raised by Reagan now were previously
adjudicated.
b. The issue here was actually litigated in the trial court and on
direct appeal.
“An issue is actually litigated ‘when it is raised by the pleadings, submitted
for determination, and is actually determined.’” Sawyer v. Long Beach Mortg. Co.,
2011 WL 13234273, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2011) (citing Matter of Gober, 100
F.3d 1195, 1203 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by, In re Caton, 157
F.3d 1026, 1030 n. 18 (5th Cir.1998)); see also Stanley Tools v. Madison Mills,
Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 500, 502 (E.D. La. 2000) (“The ‘actually litigated’
requirement does not necessitate that the issue be disposed of at trial . . . [T]o
satisfy the ‘actually litigated’ requirement, the issue need only be presented to the
adverse party with the full opportunity and motive for the adverse party to contest
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it.”) (citing Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987));
see also Jenkins v. United States, 2008 WL 5095973, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19,
2008) (quoting United States v. Rocha, 109 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir.1997))
(“Substantive claims raised and rejected on direct appeal are ‘barred from
collateral review.’ ”).
Here, Reagan raised claims related to Fisher and his defense counsel’s
conflict of interest at trial and on direct appeal before the Fifth Circuit;4 the United
States responded to these arguments on appeal;5 Reagan filed a reply brief;6 and
the Fifth Circuit addressed the issues.
Thus, the issues raised by Reagan in this action were “actually litigated” in
the trial court and on direct appeal.
c. The previous determination was necessary to the decision.
The determination rejecting Reagan’s arguments about Fisher and his own
defense counsel was necessary to deny Reagan’s appeal. So the third element of
issue preclusion is satisfied.
In sum, collateral estoppel bars Reagan’s claims in this lawsuit because this
identical issue was previously adjudicated in the criminal proceedings and on
appeal. Thus, the District Judge should dismiss this action with prejudice.
4 Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 487–88; United States v. Reagan, 10-10211, Appellant’s
Br. at 124–37 (Doc. No. 497).
5 Id., Appellee’s Br. at 138–42 (Doc. No. 528).
6 Id., Appellant’s Reply Br. at 23–37 (Doc. No. 600).
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II. Alternatively, Reagan is not entitled to a writ of coram nobis.
A writ of coram nobis is “an extraordinary remedy available to a petitioner
no longer in custody who seeks to vacate a criminal conviction in circumstances
where the petitioner can demonstrate civil disabilities as a consequence of the
conviction[.]” United States v. Esogbue, 357 F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir.
2004) (quoting Jimenez v. Trominski, 91 F.3d 767, 768 (5th Cir.1996)); see
also United States v. Hatten, 167 F.3d 884, 887 n.6 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United
States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1994)). A petitioner must show that a
fundamental error justifies vacating his conviction and that sound reasons exist for
his delay in seeking earlier relief. See United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 422 (5th
Cir. 1998) (coram nobis will issue only to correct errors of “the most fundamental
character” and “sound reasons” must exist for failure to seek appropriate relief
earlier) (quoting United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511–12 (1954)). A
petitioner must also show that the error challenged is of a sufficient magnitude to
justify the extraordinary relief sought—a “complete miscarriage of
justice.” Jiminez, 91 F.3d at 768 (citing Castro, 26 F.3d at 557); see also Esogbue,
357 F.3d at 535.
A writ of coram nobis is available only when “no other remedy may be
available.” See United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1989); see
also Dyer, 136 F.3d at 422. The Supreme Court has noted that it “is difficult to
conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where [the writ] would be
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necessary or appropriate.” Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996). The
writ of coram nobis should “not be used as a substitute for appeal and should only
be employed to correct errors ‘of the most fundamental character.’” Dyer, 136 F.3d
at 422 (quoting Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512); see also Esogbue, 357 F.3d at 535. A
writ of coram nobis also cannot be used to “override” § 2255’s statute of
limitations or to “circumvent” the restrictions it imposes on unauthorized,
successive motions. Frasier v. United States, 343 F. App’x 985, 986 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam). “In addition, a petitioner bears the considerable burden of
overcoming the presumption that previous judicial proceedings were
correct.” Dyer, 136 F.3d at 422.
Reagan’s petition fails on the merits because he fails to show the required
elements necessary to issue a writ of coram nobis. See Langston v. United States,
2016 WL 800210, at *14 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 29, 2016). The requisite elements
for coram nobis relief are: (1) the ground for relief involves a fundamental error;
(2) no other judicial remedy is available; (3) valid reasons excuse the petitioner’s
failure to seek relief on these issues in earlier proceedings; and (4) the petitioner is
suffering or is threatened with adverse collateral consequences because of his
conviction. Id. As a result, the Court may summarily dismiss the petition without
briefing. See United States v. Duke, 2001 WL 733347, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 26,
2001).
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a. Reagan has not shown he is suffering from collateral
consequences.
Reagan alleges that he suffers from four collateral consequences because of
his conviction: (i) employment barriers for “high-quality” opportunities in
“business finance and consulting, insurance and marketing related industries”; (ii)
inability to hold public office; (iii) housing restrictions; and (iv) firearms
restrictions. Resp. at 5. But even with the liberal construction due pro
se pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), Reagan fails
to allege, much less demonstrate, he is suffering from a specific collateral
consequence that warrants coram nobis relief.
Courts in this Circuit do not find that the types of collateral consequences
“which ordinarily flow from a felony conviction . . . warrant coram nobis relief.”
United States v. Harrison, 2014 WL 12848415, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 24, 2014)
(citations omitted). These include each alleged consequence identified by Reagan.
See Mihailovich v. United States, 2015 WL 5326172, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 22,
2015), rec. accepted, 2015 WL 5396033 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2015) (citations
omitted) (rejecting arguments that barriers to employment, inability to carry a
firearm, and housing restrictions warrant coram nobis relief); Neal v. Texas, 2020
WL 5262529, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 30, 2020), rec. accepted, 2020 WL 5258336
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2020) (citations omitted) (finding that inability to hold public
office is not a collateral consequence for purposes of coram nobis). Indeed, Reagan
has failed to show that any of his disabilities cause a present, continuing harm,
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which arises out of his alleged erroneous conviction, and that is beyond the normal
and incidental effects of being convicted.
Accordingly, the District Judge should deny Reagan’s petition for writ of
coram nobis.
b. Reagan has not shown a complete miscarriage of justice.
Reagan’s petition also fails because he has not shown a complete miscarriage
of justice. A writ of coram nobis “will issue only to correct errors resulting in a
complete miscarriage of justice.” Esogbue, 357 F.3d at 534 (quoting Jimenez v.
Trominiski, 91 F.3d 767, 768 (footnote omitted)). When the claims set forth in a
petition for writ of coram nobis were raised or could have been raised in a prior
habeas action, the petitioner has not established “a complete miscarriage of
justice.” United States v. Kessler, 335 F. App’x 403, 404 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (citing Esogbue, 357 F.3d at 535). When a petitioner fails to make the
requisite showing of a complete miscarriage of justice, the district court does not
abuse its discretion by denying coram nobis relief. United States v. Calzada, 2023
WL 2010750, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2023) (per curiam) (citing Esogbue, 357 F.3d
at 535).
Reagan is raising the same claims he presented in a prior § 2255 motion. See
Reagan v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-3420, 2016 WL 3023890, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
May 2, 2016), rec. accepted, 2016 WL 3030173 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2016). The
Court rejected this argument and denied him relief. Id. at *2–3. So Reagan is not
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entitled to a writ of error coram nobis now. After all, “[t]he ‘regurgitation’ of claims
already presented in an unsuccessful § 2255 petition does not make ‘the necessary
showing of a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Tucker, 555 F.
App’x 434, 434–35 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Esogbue, 357 F.3d at 535)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Reagan’s claims. See United States v.
Miller, 705 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (denying relief on a
petition for writ of coram nobis where the petitioner’s argument was previously
addressed and denied in his § 2255 motion) (citing Esogbue, 357 F.3d at 535).
For these reasons, if the District Judge does not find this action is barred by
collateral estoppel, the District Judge should dismiss Reagan’s petition for coram
nobis. This conclusion is not altered by Reagan’s motions for leave to file amended
petitions or supplements to the same (ECF Nos. 4, 8, 10). Accordingly, the Court
should deny these motions, as well as Reagan’s Motion to Compel Government
Response (ECF No. 9) and Expanded Motion to Compel Judicial Action (ECF No.
14), as moot.
Leave to Amend
“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no
purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas
Dep’t of Veteran Affs., 160 F.4th 161, 169 (5th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025); see also Sanders
v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec.
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accepted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro
se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend her complaint prior to a
dismissal.”) Indeed, leave to amend is not required when plaintiffs have already
pleaded their “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir.
2009).
Here, Reagan’s claims are barred by collateral estoppel. He could not
overcome this deficiency in an amended complaint. Additionally, Reagan has filed
a response to an MJQ and multiple proposed amendments or supplements to his
petition. He has had sufficient opportunity to state a claim and cannot do so. Thus,
the Court should find that leave to amend is not required here.
Motion to Withdraw Reference to Magistrate
Reagan also asks that the District Judge withdraw the referral of this case to
this Magistrate Judge. See Mot. Withdraw Reference (ECF No. 13). He complains
that he is entitled to relief and that the Court should have acted on his petition
sooner.
The Court need not address these frivolous arguments. “Consent [to proceed
before a Magistrate Judge] is needed only in some circumstances.” Herrmann v.
Pointer, 2024 WL 5397296, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2024). And Reagan fails to
establish why his consent is necessary here.
So the District Judge should deny Reagan’s request
to withdraw the reference to the Magistrate Judge. See id. (denying motion to
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withdraw reference to magistrate judge).
Recommendation
The District Judge should:
• DENY Reagan’s Motion to Withdraw Reference from Magistrate
Judge (ECF No. 13);
• DENY Reagan’s Motion for Leave to Amend Petition (ECF No. 4),
Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Petition (ECF No. 8),
Motion to Order and Compel Government Response (ECF No. 9),
Third Motion for Leave to Supplement the Record (ECF No. 10),
and Expanded Motion to Compel Judicial Action (ECF No. 14) as
moot; and
• DISMISS this action with prejudice.
SO RECOMMENDED on February 9, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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