Atkins v. Nguyen et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JEREMY WAYNE ATKINS, §
PLAINTIFF,1 §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3: 25-CV-1784-B-BK
§
HOA MINH NGUYEN, AN DUY §
LENGUYEN, THE NAIL ROOM LLC, §
AND PHAN NGUYEN, §
DEFENDANTS. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action was referred
to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including the entry of findings and a
recommended disposition when appropriate. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis but did not issue process pending preliminary screening. Upon
review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, this action should be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jeremy Wayne Atkins, proceeding without legal counsel, filed an Amended
Complaint (the operative complaint) asserting claims for fraud, civil conspiracy, abuse of
process, unjust enrichment, deprivation of property rights, and mail and wire fraud against his
former spouse and related parties. Doc. 10 at 1-3. Atkins alleges that, pursuant to a divorce
decree, he was awarded a fifty-percent interest in marital property located in Royse City, Texas.
1 Plaintiff previously asserted claims on behalf of the United States under the False Claims Act
but later withdrew them. Doc. 9. Plaintiff now proceeds solely in his individual capacity.
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He contends that Defendants filed a false lien against the property, deprived him of his equitable
interest, interfered with his parental rights, and benefitted financially from the property.
Atkins seeks compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief recognizing his
interest in the property, and injunctive relief preventing transfer or encumbrance of the property.
Doc. 10 at 3.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the power authorized by
the United Sates Constitution and federal laws and statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing that jurisdiction exists. Federal jurisdiction may arise through either: (1) a federal
question arising under the Constitution, a federal law, or a treaty, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) a
case in which there is complete diversity of citizenship between parties and the matter in
controversy exceeds $75,000, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
The Court should always examine, sua sponte, if necessary, the threshold question of
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. The Lamar Co., L.L.C. v. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n,
976 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2020); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time
that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). “Under the well-
pleaded complaint rule, ‘a federal court has original or removal jurisdiction only if a federal
question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint; generally, there is no
federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action.’” Gutierrez v.
Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251-52 (5th Cir. 2008).
The Court must also liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and “held
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to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e)
(“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under the most liberal construction,
however, Atkins has not alleged facts that establish federal question or diversity jurisdiction.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction Not Established
“A federal question exists only [in] those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint
establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Singh v. Duane
Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Whether such jurisdiction exists depends on whether the complaint presents a viable
federal cause of action. A plaintiff cannot create federal jurisdiction simply by invoking federal
statutory labels or constitutional terminology. Here, none of Atkins’ asserted claims present a
cognizable federal question.
Counts I through III and V, alleging fraud, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, and unjust
enrichment, are state law claims. Atkins alleges that (1) Defendants filed a fraudulent lien
claiming sole ownership of marital property in which Atkins had a fifty-percent interest under a
divorce decree, and (2) Defendant Phan Nguyen, acting as legal counsel, repeatedly filed
protective orders based on false allegations to obstruct Atkins’ access to his child and property.
Doc. 10 at 2. Common-law fraud of the kind alleged here—misrepresentation of property
ownership in lien filings—is a creature of state law and presents no federal question. Bauman v.
Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that fraud claims rooted in state
common law do not arise under federal law but may justify pendent jurisdiction where federal
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jurisdiction already exists). Abuse of process is likewise a state law tort, see Hunt v. Baldwin, 68
S.W.3d 117, 129 (Tex. App.--Hous. [14th Dist.] 2001), and Atkins’ contention that Defendants
misused judicial process to isolate him from his child and deprive him of his property interest
raises no question of federal law. Further, Atkins’ unjust enrichment claim—premised on the
theory that Defendants financially benefited through proceeds derived from the fraudulent lien—
is a quasi-contract claim arising entirely under state law and likewise provides no basis for
federal jurisdiction. See Coghlan v. Wellcraft Marine Corp., 240 F.3d 449, 452 n.2 (5th Cir.
2001).
Atkins’ civil conspiracy claim fares no better. Civil conspiracy is a derivative claim that
rises or falls with its underlying tort, and the conspiracy alleged here—that Defendants
coordinated the fraudulent lien filing and litigation abuse to deprive Atkins of his property and
parental rights—rests entirely on state-law predicates. Matter of 3 Star Properties, L.L.C., 6
F.4th 595, 609 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d
136, 141-42 (Tex. 2019) (“[C]ivil conspiracy is not an independent tort but rather a
“‘derivative’” one that “depends on some underlying tort or other illegal act.”)).
Further, to the extent Atkins intends to invoke the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
proscribing a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights, the complaint contains no allegations of
class-based discriminatory animus or facts showing that Defendants conspired to deprive Atkins
of equal protection of the laws, as § 1985(3) requires. See Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of
Opelousas, 255 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir. 2001). And while Count IV alleges that Defendants
violated Atkins’ “constitutional right to property” by recording false liens, excluding him from
the Royse City property, and financially benefiting from his dispossession, a colorable claim
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires action by a defendant under color of law. See Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Atkins alleges misconduct solely by private
individuals and a private attorney, none of whom is alleged to be a state actor. The fact that
Defendants may have used court filings or legal process in furtherance of their alleged scheme
does not, without more, transform private conduct into state action. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 878 F.
Supp. 911, 915 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
Finally, Count VI, alleging mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343, based on
Defendants’ use of electronic communications and court filings to support the fraudulent lien,
also fails to establish federal jurisdiction. Doc. 10 at 3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1343 are criminal
statutes that do not create a private right of action. See Napper v. Anderson, Henley, Shields,
Bradford & Pritchard, 500 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S.
120, 121 (2017) (reasoning that if a statute does not display an intent to create a private remedy,
courts may not create one, regardless of policy considerations). And while Atkins suggests civil
liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), he does not
assert a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 or plead the required elements of a civil RICO action,
including the existence of an enterprise, a pattern of racketeering activity, and injury to business
or property caused by racketeering conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); St. Germain v. Howard,
556 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of civil RICO claim for failure to plead
requisite elements). A passing reference to RICO in the prayer for relief is insufficient to invoke
federal jurisdiction.
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B. Diversity Jurisdiction Not Established
Atkins’ assertions in the operative complaint that he and Defendants are all either
residents of or doing business in Texas defeats subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of
citizenship. Doc. 10 at 1-2; See Corfield v. Dallas Glen Hills LP, 355 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir.
2003) (finding district court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction if the plaintiff shares the same
state of citizenship as any one of the defendants) (citation omitted).
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction Inapplicable
Atkins also attempts to invoke supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. That
statute, however, is not an independent source of subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 1367
permits a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over related state-law claims only when the court
already possesses original jurisdiction over at least one claim in the action. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a); Halmekangas v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 603 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 2010)
(“Section 1367 grants “supplemental jurisdiction” over state claims, not original jurisdiction.”).
Although courts may retain supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims are dismissed,
see Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008), such retention presupposes that
supplemental jurisdiction properly attached at the outset. Here, because none of Atkins’ claims
presents a viable federal question, this Court lacks original jurisdiction over any claim in the
complaint. Accordingly, § 1367 provides no independent basis for this Court to exercise subject-
matter jurisdiction over Atkins’ state-law claims, and dismissal is warranted.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his complaint before
dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pleaded his “best case.” Brewster v.
Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As demonstrated above, the facts as alleged in
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Atkins’ complaint demonstrate a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court that is not
curable by amendment. Thus, the Court concludes that Atkins has already pleaded his best case
and granting leave to amend would be futile and cause needless delay.2
V. RECOMMENDATION
Atkins’ complaint should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
SO RECOMMENDED on March 19, 2026.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by
law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(b). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, the basis for the objection, and the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific
written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.
1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to object
to 14 days).
2 Nevertheless, the 14-day objection period attendant to this report and recommendation will
allow Atkins the opportunity to proffer facts or claims, if any, establishing subject matter
jurisdiction in this Court.
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