Broome v. Garland Independent School District et al

Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SARAH YVONNE BROOME,
Individually and as Next Friend of J.B.,
§
§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-1532-L
§
GARLAND INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROSA
MENDIOLA, JANET ARELLANO,
AND JAY LEWIS,
§
§
§
§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant Garland Independent School District (“GISD”)’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) (“Motion”), filed August 18, 2025. After
considering the Motion, response, reply, pleadings, and applicable law, and for the reasons set
forth herein, the court grants the Motion and also grants Plaintiff leave to replead.
I. 	Factual Background and Procedural History
This matter arises from the alleged physical assault and verbal harassment of J.B., a
disabled GISD student, at the hands of three former GISD employees: his teacher, Jay Lewis
(“Lewis”); paraprofessional Rosa Mendiola (“Mendiola”); and paraprofessional Janet Arellano
(“Arellano”) (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”). Sarah Yvonne Broome (“Plaintiff” or
“Broome”), individually and on behalf of J.B., a minor (Broome’s son), filed this action against
GISD for alleged violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794
(“Section 504”), and against the Individual Defendants, solely in their individual capacities,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of J.B.’s constitutionally protected rights. In
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the First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) (Doc. 8), the live pleading, Plaintiff alleges
the following facts.1
J.B. is a child with documented disabilities of autism and intellectual disability that
substantially limit one or more major life activities. Am. Compl. ¶ 9 (Doc. 8). During the 2024-
2025 school year, J.B. was enrolled at Webb Middle School, a school operated by GISD. Id. ¶ 10.
J.B. had an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) and his primary classroom setting was in a
special education classroom. Id. ¶¶ 11-14.
On February 20, 2025, J.B. asked his teacher, Defendant Lewis, if he could access his
Chromebook in the classroom. Id. ¶ 15. Lewis was texting on his personal cell phone, became
irritated, and denied J.B.’s request. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Despite not being permitted to use the
Chromebook, J.B. accessed the Chromebook and sat down at his desk. Id. ¶ 18. Upon learning that
J.B. was using the Chromebook, Lewis approached J.B. and began verbally harassing him. Id. ¶
19. While Lewis spoke to J.B., Defendant Mendiola approached J.B., “shoved her index finger in
J.B.’s face and verbally berated [him].” Id. ¶ 20. In response, J.B. attempted to bite Mendiola’s
index finger, resulting in Mendiola grabbing J.B. from his desk and violently throwing him to the
floor. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. While J.B. was on the floor, Defendant Arellano restrained J.B.’s legs while
Mendiola “forcefully slammed her boot on J.B.’s neck.” Id. ¶¶ 21-23. While Mendiola “forcefully
applied her boot on J.B.’s neck, Lewis slammed his palm to the left side of J.B.’s face and
repeatedly smashed the right side of J.B.’s face to the floor.” Id. ¶ 24. “The incessant pressure that
Lewis used in smashing J.B.’s face to the floor caused swelling, bruising and abrasions to J.B.’s
face.” Id. ¶ 25. “The entire time Defendants . . . violently assaulted J.B., they yelled, cussed and
1 The court’s recitation of the facts is taken from the Amended Complaint (Doc. 8). At the 12(b)(6) stage,
these facts are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).
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incessantly berated J.B.” Id. ¶ 26. “During the time that J.B. was being physically assaulted and
verbally harassed, J.B. did not fight back, nor attempt[] to defend himself against the three adults.”
Id. ¶ 27.
Broome 	alleges 	that 	the 	Individual 	Defendants 	“subjected 	J.B. 	to 	abuse 	and/or
discriminatory treatment solely on the basis of J.B.’s disability.” Id. ¶ 28. She alleges they acted
with “specific animus towards J.B.’s disabilities (i.e. they targeted J.B. because of his disabilities)”
and “were all individually and collectively frustrated with J.B.’s inability to communicate and
respond to the instructions provided in the classroom [and their] collective frustrations manifested
themselves in the conduct” described in the Amended Complaint. Id.
With respect to GISD, Broome alleges that:
Despite 	receiving 	multiple 	complaints 	from 	parents 	and 	staff 	concerning
Defendants Mendiola, Arellan[o] and Lewis [sic] ongoing physical mistreatment of
disabled students—including the incidents described herein —GISD failed to take
corrective action. GISD had no training in place for managing behavioral
challenges in disabled students like J.B., and had received prior notice of
Defendants Mendiola, Arellan[o] and Lewis’s [sic] misconduct. Its refusal to
retrain, supervise, or discipline Defendants Mendiola, Arellan[o] and Lewis
constituted deliberate indifference and led directly to continued abuse and
educational exclusion of J.B.
Id. ¶ 32.
Broome also asserts that GISD “knew or should have known of the abusive conduct or
risk” and that its officials, including Stephanie Roberts, Director of Special Education; Jill Havard,
Assistant Director of Special Education; Robin Balderson, Coordinator, Elementary Resource and
Early Childhood; Nichole Smith, Coordinator, Behavior; and Dr. Molly Guerra, Coordinator,
Adapted Behavior and Communications “failed to act appropriately, such as failing to investigate,
reprimand, or remove” the Individual Defendants. Id. ¶ 33.
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Broome alleges, “There was a policy, custom, or practice of not training staff properly, not
supervising them adequately, or failing to discipline them when abuses occurred. GISD had prior
complaints or reports about Defendants Mendiola, Arellan[o] and Lewis’s [sic] conduct from
parents and/or staff.” Id. ¶ 34. She asserts that GISD “fail[ed] to implement or enforce disciplinary
procedures when violations of the rights disabled students like J.B. occur[ed].” Id. ¶ 34.
In addition, Broome contends that GISD “failed to train, supervise, or discipline individual
Defendant staff appropriately, contributing to the violation of J.B.’s rights”; “acted with deliberate
indifference to J.B.’s federally protected rights”; “inflicted harm by reason of its failure to train,
supervise or discipline the [I]ndividual Defendants”; and, “[a]s a proximate cause of Defendants’
actions and inactions described herein, J.B. has suffered severe emotional distress, physical harm,
educational setbacks and was effectively excluded from participation in and/or was denied the
benefits of educational services from GISD.” Id. ¶¶ 36-37.
On June 16, 2025, Broome filed the instant suit. After GISD moved under Rule 12(b)(6)
to dismiss Broome’s Section 504 disability discrimination claim, the sole claim against it, Broome
filed the Amended Complaint. GISD again moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).2
II. 	Rule 12(b)(6) Legal Standard
To defeat a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v.
Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2008); Guidry v. American Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177,
2 In its Motion, GISD informs the court that the Individual Defendants “are no longer employed by the
District and are being sued in their individual capacity only”; and that GISD and its counsel “do not
represent the individual defendants, nor make any claims as to the validity of the Section 1983 claims
Plaintiff asserted, as Plaintiff only sues these former employees in their individual capacity under Section
1983 as opposed to their official capacity.” Def.’s Mot. 8 n.1.
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180 (5th Cir. 2007). A claim meets the plausibility test “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (internal citations omitted). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual
allegations, it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). The
“[f]actual allegations of [a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). When the allegations of the pleading
do not allow the court to infer more than the mere possibility of wrongdoing, they fall short of
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007); Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas
Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir.
1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. 	Id.; Spivey v.
Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). The pleadings include the complaint and any
documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir.
2000). Likewise, “‘[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered
part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to [the
plaintiff’s] claims.’” Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429,
431 (7th Cir. 1993)). In this regard, a document that is part of the record but not referred to in a
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plaintiff’s complaint and not attached to a motion to dismiss may not be considered by the court
in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 820 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). Further, it is well-established and ‘“clearly proper in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion
[that a court may] take judicial notice of matters of public record.”’ Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631
F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir.
2007) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994)).
The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid
claim when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Great Plains Trust Co. v.
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002). While well-pleaded facts of a
complaint are to be accepted as true, legal conclusions are not “entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citation omitted). Further, a court is not to strain to find inferences favorable
to the plaintiff and is not to accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal
conclusions. R2 Invs. LDC v. Phillips, 401 F.3d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The
court does not evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success; instead, it only determines whether
the plaintiff has pleaded a legally cognizable claim. United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s
Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2004). Stated another way:
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim concerns the formal
sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief, not a lawsuit’s merits. So when
reviewing such a motion, we assume that the facts the complaint alleges are true
and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The complaint
survives if it contains sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.
Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2020) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, the denial of a 12(b)(6) motion has no bearing as to whether a plaintiff
ultimately establishes the necessary proof to prevail on a claim that withstands a 12(b)(6)
challenge.
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III. 	GISD’s Motion to Dismiss
Count One of the Amended Complaint, the sole claim against GISD, alleges disability
discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Broome alleges that GISD “is
a recipient of federal financial assistance and is subject to Section 504”; that J.B. “was denied the
benefits of, or subjected to discrimination in, his education solely by reason of his disability”; and
that “Defendants, collectively, acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s federally protected
rights.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-40. GISD moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. Def.’s Mot. 9.3
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), both prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals
with disabilities; they employ many of the same legal standards and offer the same remedies. See
Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010).4 While Section 504 applies to federally funded
programs and activities, Title II of the ADA only applies to public entities. Id. “The only material
difference between the two provisions lies in their respective causation requirements.” Bennett-
Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
3 Citations to the parties’ briefs refer to the CM/ECF page numbers at the top of the page, rather than the
parties’ pagination at the bottom.
4 “Both the ADA and § 504 generally prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities.” T.O. v. Fort
Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 2 F.4th 407, 416 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Although Broome does not bring
a claim under the ADA, “[c]laims brought under § 504 or the ADA, or both, are subject to the same
analysis.” Id. “The only material difference between the two provisions lies in their respective causation
requirements.” Id. at 416-417. “Cases concerning either section apply to both.” Id. (quoting Doe v.
Columbia-Brazoria Indep. Sch. Dist. by & through Bd. of Tr., 855 F.3d 681, 690 (5th Cir. 2017)). Thus, the
court applies “jurisprudence interpreting either section” to Broome’s Section 504 claims. See Hainze v.
Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000); D.A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir.
2010) (evaluating the plaintiff’s claims under section 504 and the ADA together because the Fifth Circuit
“equated liability standards” under the two statutes).
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Section 504 prohibits discrimination “solely by reason of” a person’s disability, whereas
Title II of the ADA provides that “discrimination need not be the sole reason” for the adverse
action or exclusion but rather “a motivating factor.” Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 516-19
(5th Cir. 2008). Both the ADA and Section 504 require a plaintiff to establish that: (1) she is a
qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of Section 504 or the ADA; (2) she was
excluded from participation in, or was denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for
which the school district is responsible; (3) her exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was
by reason of her disability; and (4) the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was
intentional. Melton v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004).
B. The Parties’ Contentions
GISD maintains that the Amended Complaint “provides only ‘threadbare recitals’ of
supposed discrimination.” Def.’s Mot. 13 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). More specifically,
GISD contends that the Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that (1) “J.B. was excluded
from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which
[G]ISD is responsible, or was otherwise discriminated against by the District”; (2) the “alleged
actions of the teacher and paraprofessionals on February 20, 2025, occurred solely by reason of
J.B.’s disability”; (3) the Amended Complaint “fails to allege a plausible claim under Section 504
for failure to train, supervise, or discipline.” Id. at 14, 16, 21. In addition, even if Broome has
alleged a plausible Section 504 claim, GISD moves to dismiss any individual claims brought by
Broome and any claim for mental and emotional distress damages, contending that such relief is
not available under Section 504. Id. at 10, 31-32.
In response, Broome contends that “Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss seeks to obscure the
well-pleaded allegations of deliberate indifference and discrimination on the basis of disability,
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improperly requesting the Court to resolve factual disputes at the pleading stage.” Pl.’s Resp. 2
(Doc. 16). She maintains that “[c]ontrary to GISD’s assertions, Plaintiff has stated plausible claims
for relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act based on: direct discrimination ‘by reason
of’ J.B.’s disability, deliberate indifference through failure to train, supervise, or discipline, and
damages resulting from emotional distress, which remain unresolved in contexts involving
physical abuse.” Id. In addition, although Broome filed the pleadings “Individually and as Next
Friend of J.B.,” she clarifies in her response brief that “[a]ll claims are grounded in J.B.’s rights
and injuries, not personal injuries to the parent.” Id. at 6.
C. Discussion
The parties do not dispute that, in light of a recent Supreme Court decision, the deliberate
indifference standard applies to disability discrimination claims under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. See A. J. T. by & through A. T. v. Osseo Area Schs., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 279,
605 U.S. 335, 345 (2025).5 Accordingly, the court will apply the deliberate indifference standard
in deciding GISD’s Motion.
Additionally, the parties do not dispute that J.B. is a qualified individual with a disability
within the meaning of Section 504. The parties, however, dispute whether Broome has alleged
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim regarding the remaining elements of a Section 504 claim.
5 In A.J. T. by & through A. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, the Supreme
Court resolved the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals, and rejected the requirement in some circuits
that schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims relating to their education must make a
heightened showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” 605 U.S. 335, 344-345 (2025). The Court held
“that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on educational services should be subject to the same
standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts.” Id. at 345. Thus, the appropriate standard
for Section 504 claims is deliberate indifference. Id. A plaintiff need not prove that the defendant had
personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled person but must show that the defendant disregarded a
strong likelihood that the challenged action would result in a violation of federally protected rights. Id.
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Prior to addressing these arguments, the court notes that Broome makes additional factual
allegations for the first time in her response to GISD’s Motion, including that that J.B. was denied
benefits or excluded from participation solely by reason of his disability because “Defendants’
conduct toward J.B.—including extreme, unwarranted restraint and verbal abuse—was not
directed at similarly situated non-disabled students” and that such differential treatment suffices
to state a claim. See Pl.’s Resp. 4. Factual allegations presented for the first time in response to a
motion, however, are generally not properly before the court. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc.,
540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Middaugh v. InterBank, 528 F. Supp. 3d 509, 535
(N.D. Tex. 2021) (Hendrix, J.). The court will, therefore, limit its consideration to the facts alleged
in the Amended Complaint and will not consider allegations of differential treatment.
1. 	Exclusion from participation in, or denial of benefits of, services, programs, or
activities for which GISD is responsible
In support of its Motion, GISD points to the absence in the Amended Complaint of any
allegations that J.B. was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, services,
programs, or activities at GISD. Def.’s Mot. 14. In response, Broome argues that “exclusion under
Section 504 may occur when a student is subjected to disability-based abuse that deprives him of
meaningful access to educational service.” Pl.’s Resp. 5. For the reasons that follow, the court
determines that Broome fails to adequately allege that J.B. was excluded from participation in, or
denied the benefits of, services, programs, or activities at GISD.
In the Amended Complaint, Broome alleges that, as a result of the alleged incident, J.B.
was deprived “of access to the educational opportunities which were required to be afforded for
him, including, but not limited to learning the required GISD special education curriculum and all
life skills for which J.B. was required to be educated on.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30. She also alleges that
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“[b]y reason of the actions of all Defendants, J.B. was deprived of all benefits of the GISD special
education program.” Id.
Here, other than these conclusory statements, Broome alleges no facts showing how the
alleged February 20, 2025 incident of abuse excluded J.B. from his educational programming or
services. Broome fails to allege facts that connect this single incident to a loss of educational
programming or to allege any facts related to changes to J.B.’s educational placement or
curriculum as a result of the incident. Simply put, the court agrees with GISD that Broome “ha[s]
not alleged enough to show that J.B. was excluded from participation in, or denied benefits of,
services, programs, or activities of GISD by this one incident and/or by a need for training,
supervision, or discipline of the individual employees based on vague prior complaints.” Def.’s
Mot. 16. See Doe v. Columbia-Brazoria Indep. Sch. Dist. by & through Bd. of Trs., 855 F.3d 681,
690 (5th Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Section 504 claim at motion-to-dismiss
stage, when student failed to sufficiently allege that he was excluded from an educational benefit
after a singular incident of sexual assault by a classmate); see also C.M. v. Pemberton Twp. High
Sch., 2017 WL 384274, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2017) (dismissing a Section 504 claim at the pleading
stage when a plaintiff alleged “at most two isolated instances of disability harassment or
discrimination” but did not state how this harassment/discrimination denied her equal access to
educational opportunities); Sciacca v. Durham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 509 F. Supp. 3d 505, 524
(M.D.N.C. 2020) (dismissing a claim of disability discrimination under Rule 12(b)(6) when a
Complaint, which alleged a singular incident during which a bus driver paid other students to slap
the student, did not allege beyond conclusory allegations that this incident deprived the student of
educational opportunities).
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Here, a single incident of alleged abuse, coupled with conclusory statements that J.B. was
deprived “of access to the educational opportunities,” such as learning the required GISD “special
education curriculum and all life skills,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 30, is insufficient to state a plausible
claim under Twombly that J.B. was excluded or denied a benefit or access to his special education
programming as a result of the alleged incident. As in Doe, where the allegations failed to connect
the assault with exclusion from any educational benefit, see Doe, 855 F.3d at 690, beyond
conclusory allegations, Broome fails to allege any connection between the verbal and physical
assault on J.B. with the exclusion from participation in, or denial of benefits of, services, programs,
or activities for which GISD is responsible.
For these reasons, the court determines that Broome has failed to adequately allege that
J.B. was excluded from participation in, or was denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities
for which GISD is responsible. See Melton, 391 F.3d at 671-72, 676. Accordingly, the court grants
GISD’s Motion on this basis.
2. 	Alleged actions solely by reason of J.B.’s disability
GISD contends that Broome “has failed to state a claim of Section 504 discrimination
because she does not show that J.B. was mistreated solely because of his disability, and in fact
seems to proffer other reasons unrelated to J.B.’s disability.” Def.’s Mot. 16. The court agrees.
In the Amended Complaint, Broome alleges that the Individual Defendants “subjected J.B.
to abuse and/or discriminatory treatment solely on the basis of J.B.’s disability.” Am. Compl. ¶
28. She alleges they acted with “specific animus towards J.B.’s disabilities (i.e. they targeted J.B.
because of his disabilities)” and “were all individually and collectively frustrated with J.B.’s
inability to communicate and respond to the instructions provided in the classroom [and their]
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collective 	frustrations manifested themselves in 	the 	conduct” 	described 	in the Amended
Complaint. Id.
The 	court 	determines 	that 	these 	types 	of 	“naked 	assertion[s] 	devoid 	of 	factual
enhancement” cannot meet the standard required by Section 504 that the incident be solely because
of J.B.’s disability. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As previously explained, “Section 504 requires that
the plaintiff’s disability be the ‘sole reason’ for the exclusion or denial of benefits, [while] the
ADA’s standard is less stringent.” J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 449 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Bennett-
Nelson, 431 F.3d at 454); accord Smith v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020)
(“In essence, Title II of the ADA extends Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act such that it applies
to all public entities while simultaneously weakening its causation requirement.” (citations
omitted)).
In T.O. v. Fort Bend Independent School District, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiffs’ ADA and Section 504 claims after a teacher grabbed a disabled student by the
neck—as he tried to re-enter a classroom—threw him to the floor, and held him in a chokehold for
several minutes. 2 F.4th 407, 412-18 (5th Cir. 2021). During the incident, the teacher yelled at the
student that he “had hit the wrong one” and “needed to keep his hands to himself.” Id. at 412. The
plaintiffs alleged that the teacher intervened because she was “angered by T.O.’s disabilities and
that he was being treated in compliance with his Behavioral Intervention Plan” and that she was
“motivated by . . . 	prejudicial animus to his disabilities.” Id. at 418 n.44. The Fifth Circuit,
however, disagreed, noting that the amended complaint lacked any factual allegations that permit
the inference that the defendants’ actions were “‘by reason of his disability’—an essential element
of a discrimination claim” because “the only allegations linking [the teacher’s] conduct to T.O.’s
disability are conclusional ones that cannot withstand Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny.” Id. at 418.
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Here, like in T.O., Broome alleges in conclusory fashion that GISD employees “took the
actions herein with specific animus towards J.B.’s disabilities . . .” and that the employees “were
all individually and collectively frustrated with J.B.’s inability to communicate and respond to
instructions provided in the classroom.” Am. Compl. ¶ 28. These types of allegations are like those
in T.O., in which the teacher was “angered by [the students] disabilities” and “motivated by
prejudicial animus[.]” 2 F.4th at 41. As in T.O., these skeletal pleadings are insufficient to plausibly
allege under Section 504 that the incident was solely because of J.B.’s disability.
Further, case law highlights that when “alternative motivations”—such as discipline—are
pleaded in a Section 504 claim, dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate. See, e.g., S.B.
on behalf of S.B. v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., No. 22-30139, 2023 WL 3723625, at *4 (5th Cir. May
30, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 562 (2024) (dismissing Section 504 claims under Rule 12(b)(6),
finding that, although the student’s “autism was the root of her classroom outburst,” “punishing
[the student] for her disruptive behavior is not the same as treating her differently due to her
disability.”); G.M., a minor, by & through his guardians, Antonio Mauro & Crystal Mauro v. Vir.
Beach Sch. Bd., 2025 WL 1819269, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2025) (dismissing claims under Rule
12(b)(6), finding that when plaintiff’s petition alleged reasons other than the student’s disability
as reason for physical discipline, their Section 504 claims could not survive a motion to dismiss,
as any discriminatory actions must be based solely based on the student’s disability).
Broome alleges that the alleged verbal and physical assault on J.B. ensued after he defied
Lewis’s instructions and accessed the Chromebook. See Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Further, as another
motivator for the restraint, the Amended Complaint alleges that J.B. “attempted to bite Defendant,
Rosa Mendiola’s index finger.” Id. ¶ 21. On the face of the Amended Complaint, J.B.’s inability
to communicate and respond to instructions still does not mean the Individual Defendants’ actions
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were solely because of J.B.’s disability. Otherwise stated, the Amended Complaint alleges that
there are at least two other motivators for the Individual Defendants’ alleged behavior, thereby
negating the requirement that the discipline be based “solely” on the student’s disability.
For these reasons, the court determines that Broome has failed to adequately allege that
J.B. was mistreated solely because of his disability. See J.W., 81 F.4th at 449. Accordingly, the
court grants GISD’s Motion on this basis.
3. 	Failure to train, supervise, or discipline
GISD contends that the Amended Complaint fails to allege a plausible claim under Section
504 that it acted with deliberate indifference to any known need for training, supervision, or
discipline. Def.’s Mot. 21. In response, Broome contends that she has properly alleged deliberate
indifference by GISD because she has alleged that “GISD had a custom or practice of failing to
train, supervise, or discipline staff despite notice of misconduct,” that there are “systemic failures
of GISD in training and supervising staff assigned to work with disabled students,” that “GISD
placed unqualified or untrained individuals in classrooms with vulnerable students without
adequate supervision,” and that “the fact that the abuse occurred during instructional time in a
special education classroom implicates institutional failures.” Pl.’s Resp. 5-6. The court agrees
with GISD, however, that “these conclusory allegations, supported only by the alleged facts from
one classroom incident cannot survive a motion to dismiss.” Def.’s Reply 7-8 (Doc. 17).
In T.O., the Fifth Circuit stated that, when making a Section 504 claim for failure to train
and failure to discipline, there must be “factual allegations that permit the inference that . . . [the
District’s] failure to train, investigate, or discipline [the teacher], were ‘by reason of [the student’s]
disability’—an essential element of a discrimination claim.” T.O., 2 F.4th at 418. Here, the
Amended Complaint merely alleges that J.B. is a student with certain disabilities and alleges there
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have been unidentified prior “complaints” about the Individual Defendants. The Amended
Complaint, however, does not allege how GISD failed to provide training, supervision, or
discipline to these former employees because of J.B.’s disability, as required by Section 504.
On this basis alone, the court agrees with GISD that Broome has failed to adequately allege
that it acted with deliberate indifference to any known need for training, supervision, or discipline.
Accordingly, the court grants GISD’s Motion on this basis.6
4. 	Broome’s individual claims
The court now turns to GISD’s assertion that Broome has no individual claim under Section
504. See Def.’s Br. 10, 31. In response, Broome clarifies that she did not intend to plead an
individual cause of action, see Pl.’s Resp. 6, nor can she under clear precedent. Section 504
provides remedies for individuals with disabilities who are discriminated against on the basis of
their disabilities. Because Broome does not allege that she is disabled or that she has been
discriminated against on the basis of a disability, she has not alleged individual claims under
Section 504. “A parent does not have standing under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act to bring
an individual claim under either act on the basis of alleged discrimination against her child.” Crow
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2025 WL 2533108, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.)
6 GISD seeks to apply the standard outlined in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 289-
90 (1998). Gebser is a non-disability discrimination case that requires an additional pleading that an
appropriate person with authority to take corrective action had knowledge of the plaintiff’s disability and
need for accommodation. Id. “Some circuits have applied Gebser in the disability discrimination context,
but the Fifth Circuit, prior to A. J. T., declined to do so.” Crow v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 2025 WL
2533108, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.) (citing Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex., 302
F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2002)). In at least one non-precedential opinion, where the parties agreed to apply
the deliberate indifference standard, the Fifth Circuit applied the Gebser standard. Id. (citing Harrison v.
Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 856 F. App’x 480, 484 n.4 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)). The court need not address
whether the Amended Complaint satisfies Gebser’s additional pleading requirement because it concludes
that the Amended Complaint does not plausibly plead deliberate indifference.
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(citation omitted). Accordingly, to the extent the Amended Complaint alleges any claims on behalf
of Broome in her individual capacity, they are dismissed.
5. 	Plaintiff’s Request for Emotional Damages
Broome makes a demand for “emotional distress and mental anguish,” and claims that “J.B.
suffered severe emotional distress.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 44. GISD contends that emotional distress
damages are not recoverable in private actions to enforce antidiscrimination statutes enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause, including Section 504, and moves to dismiss any emotional
distress damages with prejudice.
Given the procedural posture of this case, the court declines to address whether, following
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 596 U.S. 212
(2022), emotional distress damages are available for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The court will consider this purely legal issue at a later juncture, if necessary.
IV. 	Amendment of Pleadings
The provision of Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that states, “[t]he
court should freely give leave when justice so requires” is not without limitation. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(2). The decision to allow amendment of a party’s pleadings is within the sound discretion of
the district court. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d
1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). In determining whether to allow an amendment of
the pleadings, a court considers the following: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of
amendment.” Foman, 371 U.S. at 182; Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 566
(5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
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When a plaintiff has previously amended her pleadings, “[a]t some point, a court must
decide that a plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to make [her] case; if, after that time, a cause of
action has not been established, the court should finally dismiss the suit.” Jacquez v. Procunier,
801 F.2d 789, 792-93 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Schiller, 342 F.3d at 567 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s situation is markedly different from that of the plaintiffs in Schiller and Jacquez.
In this case, although Plaintiff previously amended her pleadings as a matter of right following
GISD’s initial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5), she has not had an opportunity to amend with the
benefit of the court’s analysis regarding the noted deficiencies in her pleadings. Further, GISD
suffers no legal prejudice because it will have the opportunity to file another dispositive motion to
the amended pleading. Additionally, there is no repeated failure on Plaintiff’s part to cure
deficiencies previously identified by the court. Under these circumstances, justice requires that
Plaintiff be allowed another opportunity to plead her son’s case consistent with the law as set forth
in the court’s opinion.
V. 	Conclusion
For these reasons, the court grants Defendant Garland Independent School District Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. 14); however, in keeping with Supreme
Court and Fifth Circuit precedent, the court will allow Broome leave to amend. There is no
indication that she cannot, or is unwilling to, cure the pleading defects the court has identified.
Further, she has expressly moved for leave to amend if the court concludes that GISD’s arguments
have merit. See Pl.’s Resp. 6-7. Accordingly, Broome is permitted to file a second amended
complaint no later than April 21, 2026. If she fails to cure the pleading deficiencies identified by
the court by this date, her claims against GISD are subject to dismissal with prejudice pursuant to
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order.
It is so ordered this 27th day of March, 2026.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
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