Everetts v. Paxton

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHERITA EVERETTS, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. 3:25-cv-1325-S-BT
§
KEN PAXTON, §
§
Defendant. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Sherita Everetts filed the present action challenging Texas state
court proceedings regarding child support payments. For the following reasons,
the Court should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Background
Everetts filed a one-page handwritten complaint on May 28, 2025. See
Compl. (ECF No. 3). She contends that a case against her regarding child support
payments was improperly transferred to, or re-opened in, Texas state court.1 Id.
at 1. This supposedly amounts to fraud on the part of the Texas Attorney General.
Therefore, Everetts asks that the Court close her state court case.
1 According to the Child Support Payment Plan Everetts attached to her Complaint,
she owed $2,828.32 at the time of filing. Id. at 2.
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Legal Standards and Analysis
A federal court “is duty-bound to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction sua
sponte.” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 n.4 (5th Cir.
2017). A court does not have to—and in fact, should not—wait for a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. On the
contrary, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see
also Ins. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982) (explaining that while under Rule 12(h) defenses for lack of personal
jurisdiction are waived if untimely, even an appellate court may review subject
matter jurisdiction sua sponte).
I. Sovereign immunity bars Everett’s claims.
The Court construes Everett’s complaint as asserting claims against
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton in his official capacity. But the Eleventh
Amendment typically deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over “suits against a
state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has
waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.” Moore v. La.
Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014). Everetts
has not identified a waiver on Texas’ part allowing the suit against Paxton.
Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
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II. Alternatively, the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention
doctrines also may deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
a. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine2 divests federal district courts of jurisdiction
over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). This prevents lower federal
courts from reviewing state court error, as such review is best left to the state
appellate court. Smith v. Mortg. Elec. Reg. Sys., Inc., 2019 WL 4648263, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2019) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2019 WL 4643678 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 24, 2019) (citing MAPP Constr., LLC v. M&R Drywall, Inc., 294 F. App’x
89, 92 (5th Cir. 2008); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970) (emphasizing that lower federal courts cannot sit
in direct review of state court decisions)).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the United States Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to review final judgments or decrees entered by a state’s highest court.
2 This doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); those decisions
“exhibit the limited circumstances in which [the Supreme] Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United
States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it
would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of
authority.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp, 544 U.S. 280, 291
(2005).
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“[A] party losing in state court is,” therefore, “barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States
district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself
violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06
(1994) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416).
This jurisdictional bar extends to those cases “in which the constitutional
claims presented . . . are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s grant or
denial of relief.” Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 788 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7,
2003) (quoting Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 1986)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court
judgment if, in order to find in the plaintiff’s favor, the federal court would have to
conclude that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it or would
otherwise have to void the judgment.” Brown v. Crawford, 2008 WL 508390, at
*3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2008) (citing Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430 (3d Cir.
1989)).
Here, Everetts complains that her child support case should not have been
transferred to, or re-opened in, Texas. Compl. at 1. As relief, she asks that the Court
close her child support case. Compl. at 1. A ruling in Everett’s favor would
necessarily require overturning the State’s decision to re-open her child support
case. Accordingly, her claims should be dismissed without prejudice. See Davis v.
Dallas Cnty. Texas Child Support Enf’t Agency, 2021 WL 1111164, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
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Mar. 2, 2021) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2021 WL 1118372 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23,
2021) (dismissing action challenging child support payments for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, in part, because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the
Court of jurisdiction); see also Martin v. Taylor Cnty., 2023 WL 11052640, at *6
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2023), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 965298 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2024)
(applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to reject request for court to terminate state
court proceedings regarding child support payments).
b. Younger Abstention Doctrine
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts should generally
decline to exercise jurisdiction over requests to enjoin state proceedings when
three elements are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an
‘ongoing state judicial proceeding’; (2) the state has an important interest in
regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has ‘an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.’ ” Bice v.
La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics
Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)); see also Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Younger and its progeny require federal courts to abstain from entering
injunctions that would interfere with state court proceedings, whether they are
criminal, non-criminal, or administrative in nature, so long as important state
interests are involved. Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v. Morales, 986
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F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Thomas v. State, 294 F. Supp. 3d 576, 593
(N.D. Tex. 2018), rec. accepted 2018 WL 1254926 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12,
2018) (“While it was once thought that Younger applied only to state criminal or
‘quasi-criminal’ proceedings, the [Supreme] Court has now made it clear that ‘[t]he
policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial
proceedings when important state interests are involved.’ ”) (citations omitted).
This includes state proceedings related to child support. See McKenzie v. Texas,
2023 WL 4828404, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 16, 2023), rec. adopted, 2023 WL
4826224 (N.D. Tex. July 27, 2023) (“Federal courts previously have abstained
from ruling on cases that are inextricably connected to the important state interest
of child support.”) (citing in turn, Marlett v. Heath, No. 3:18-cv-2812-M-BN, 2018
WL 5723163, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2018), rec. adopted, 2018 WL 5717431 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 31, 2018) (abstaining under Younger from ruling on father’s challenge to
California state actions that allegedly violated a Texas child support and custody
order)).
Here, to the extent the relevant state court proceedings are still pending, all
three Younger elements are met: (1) granting Everetts her requested relief and
closing her child support case would interfere with an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) family and child support issues are important state interests, id.
(citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 434 (1979); Crouch v. Crouch, 566 F.2d 486,
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487 (5th Cir. 1978)); and (3) Everetts would have the opportunity to appeal an
adverse judgment to the applicable state appellate court.
Accordingly, if Everett’s child support case is still pending, the Court should
abstain from ruling on her claims under the Younger abstention doctrine.
Leave to Amend
“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no
purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas
Dep’t of Veteran Affs., --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 3239806, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 20,
2025) (O’Connor); see also Sanders v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 14, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
4, 2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to
amend her complaint prior to a dismissal.”) Indeed, leave to amend is not required
when plaintiffs have already pleaded their “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587
F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Everett’s claims. Everetts could not
overcome this deficiency in an amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court should
find that leave to amend is not required here.
Recommendation
Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss this action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
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SO RECOMMENDED.
January 27, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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