CS Diagnostics Corp v. Wilson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CS DIAGNOSTICS, CORP., 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:25-cv-1158-N-BN
§
LUKE WILSON, 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff CS Diagnostics, Corp. (“CSDX”) filed a complaint against Defendant
Luke Wilson. See Dkt. No. 1.
After Wilson filed a pro se motion requesting dismissal based on improper
venue, see Dkt. Nos. 7 & 8, Senior United States District Judge David C. Godbey
referred this case to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), see Dkt. No. 9.
A fuller history of this proceeding to date is recorded elsewhere. See CS
Diagnostics, Corp. v. Wilson, No. 3:25-cv-1158-N-BN, 2025 WL 2053285 (N.D. Tex.
July 21, 2025); CS Diagnostics, Corp. v. Wilson, No. 3:25-cv-1158-N-BN, 2025 WL
2532673 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2025); CS Diagnostics, Corp. v. Wilson, No. 3:25-cv-1158-
N-BN, 2025 WL 2664243 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2025).
And, while the undersigned will not set it out here, the Court may take notice
that CSDX and Wilson have been feuding (in and out of court) for some time.
Currently, the Court is attempting to sort out whether Wilson has sufficient
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ties to the United States such that the Court has jurisdiction over him for purposes
of CSDX’s claims in this lawsuit.
While that’s ongoing, Wilson moved on February 17, 2026 and (effectively)
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to request that the Court dissolve a trading
restraint that he claims has existed since May 2025 (based on a settlement agreement
that the parties executed in February 2025 under “which Defendant received
2,000,000 restricted CSDX shares as consideration”). Dkt. Nos. 50 & 51.
Although it’s not clear that Wilson’s request is related to the aims of this
lawsuit, the parties have responded to the request for a preliminary injunction. See
Dkt. Nos. 52-54. And the undersigned recommends that the Court deny Wilson’s
motion for the following reasons.
Discussion
To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a litigant must unequivocally “show (1)
a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat
that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) his
threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom he seeks to
enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest.” Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 577 F.3d 250, 252-53
(5th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up); accord Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974).
A court can issue a preliminary injunction of one of two types: prohibitory or
mandatory.
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“[T]he issuance of a prohibitory injunction freezes the status quo, and is
intended ‘to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits
can be held.’ Preliminary injunctions commonly favor the status quo and seek to
maintain things in their initial condition so far as possible until after a full hearing
permits final relief to be fashioned.” Wenner v. Tex. Lottery Comm’n, 123 F.3d 321,
326 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted; quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S.
390, 395 (1981)).
“A mandatory preliminary injunction, as opposed to a prohibitory injunction,
seeks to alter the status quo prior to litigation rather than maintain it. That is, it
mandates that [a litigant] take some action inconsistent with the status quo rather
than prohibiting them from altering the status quo.” Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,
EP-17-CV-179-PRM, 2018 WL 1566866, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2018).
A party seeking “a mandatory injunction … bears the burden of showing a clear
entitlement to the relief under the facts and the law.” Justin Indus., Inc. v. Choctaw
Secs., L.P., 920 F.2d 262, 268 n.7 (5th Cir. 1990); accord Martinez v. Mathews, 544
F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Mandatory preliminary relief, which goes well
beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite, is particularly disfavored,
and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.”).
Because 	“[a]n 	indispensable 	prerequisite 	to 	issuance 	of 	a 	preliminary
injunction is prevention of irreparable injury, [o]nly in rare instances is the issuance
of a mandatory preliminary injunction proper.” Tate v. Am. Tugs, Inc., 634 F.2d 869,
870 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (cleaned up).
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But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also cautioned:
It must not be thought, however, that there is any particular magic in
the phrase ‘status quo.’ The purpose of a preliminary injunction is
always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability
to render a meaningful decision on the merits. It often happens that this
purpose is furthered by preservation of the status quo, but not always.
If the currently existing status quo itself is causing one of the parties
irreparable injury, it is necessary to alter the situation so as to prevent
the injury, either by returning to the last uncontested status quo
between the parties, by the issuance of a mandatory injunction, or by
allowing the parties to take proposed action that the court finds will
minimize 	the 	irreparable 	injury. 	The 	focus 	always 	must 	be 	on
prevention of injury by a proper order, not merely on preservation of the
status quo.
Canal Auth., 489 F.2d at 576 (citations omitted).
Despite these words of caution, the rule in this circuit remains that, “when a
plaintiff applies for a mandatory preliminary injunction, such relief ‘should not be
granted except in rare instances in which the facts and law are clearly in favor of the
moving party.’” Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 441 F.2d 560,
561 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Miami Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Callander, 256
F.2d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1958) (“A mandatory injunction of this nature, especially at
the preliminary stage of proceedings, should not be granted except in rare instances
in which the facts and law are clearly in favor of the moving party.”)); see also Ysleta
del 	Sur 	Pueblo, 	2018 	WL 	1566866, 	at 	*9 	(“While 	the 	mandatory/prohibitory
distinction is not crucial to the inquiry, the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that
mandatory 	injunctions 	warrant 	an 	even 	higher 	standard 	than 	prohibitory
injunctions.” (citations omitted)).
The Fifth Circuit’s pronouncement of that rule predates its Canal Authority
decision, and “[t]he rule in this circuit is that where two previous holdings or lines of
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precedent conflict the earlier opinion controls and is the binding precedent in this
circuit (absent an intervening holding to the contrary by the Supreme Court or this
court en banc).” Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006);
accord United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 F.3d 431, 444 n.62 (5th Cir. 2003) (“‘When
faced with conflicting panel opinions, the earlier controls our decision.’” (quoting
United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 199 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994))).
While it does seem that the relief Wilson seeks is a change in the current status
quo – and so a mandatory preliminary injunction – even if the Court does not apply
the heightened burden associated with seeking such relief, Wilson still has not shown
that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction.
First, Wilson’s “delay in seeking a … preliminary injunction militates against
issuance of a … preliminary injunction.” Joseph Paul Corp. v. Trademark Custom
Homes, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-1651-L, 2016 WL 4944370, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2016)
(citing Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The
Board waited three months before petitioning the district court for temporary relief.
Although the time span between commission of the alleged unfair labor practices and
[this] filing … is not determinative of whether relief should be granted, it is some
evidence that the detrimental effects of the discharges have already taken their toll
on the organizational drive. It is questionable whether an order of reinstatement
would be any more effective than a final Board order at this point.” (citations
omitted))); accord Wireless Agents, L.L.C. v. T-Mobile, USA, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-94-D,
2006 WL 1540587, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2006) (“Delay in seeking a remedy is an
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important factor bearing on the need for a preliminary injunction. Absent a good
explanation, a substantial period of delay militates against the issuance of a
preliminary injunction by demonstrating that there is no apparent urgency to the
request for injunctive relief.” (cleaned up)).
And, even if the Court excuses the delay, Wilson has not shown that, if the
motion is not granted, he “is likely to suffer irreparable harm, that is, harm for which
there is no adequate remedy at law.” Daniels Health Sci., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health
Sci., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
That is because, “when the threatened harm is more than de minimis, it is not
so 	much 	the 	magnitude 	but 	the 	irreparability 	that 	counts 	for 	purposes 	of 	a
preliminary injunction. It is thus well-established that an injury is irreparable only
if 	it 	cannot 	be 	undone 	through 	monetary 	remedies. 	Mere 	injuries, 	however
substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence
of [an injunction], are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or
other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of
litigation, [weighs] heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Dennis Melancon,
Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 703 F.3d 262, 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
So, if the movant’s “only alleged harm can be obviated by monetary relief, it
does not constitute the ‘irreparable’ injury necessary to obtain the extraordinary
relief 	of 	a 	preliminary 	injunction.” 	Id. 	at 	280 	(footnote 	omitted); 	accord 	SO
Apartments, L.L.C. v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 109 F.4th 343, 353 (5th Cir. 2024)
(“In general, a harm is irreparable where there is no adequate remedy at law, such
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as monetary damages.” (quoting Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir. 2011)
(citing Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir. Unit
B 1981); Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1975)))).
Recommendation
The Court should deny Defendant Luke Wilson’s construed motion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 [Dkt. No. 50].
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 5, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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