Jerry Williams v. City of Dallas

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JERRY WILLIAMS 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-01044-O
§
CITY OF DALLAS 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant City of Dallas’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original
Complaint and Brief in Support (ECF No. 5) and Plaintiff Jerry William’s Response (ECF No. 9),
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Brief in Support (ECF
No. 10), Plaintiff’s Response (ECF No. 11), and Defendant’s Reply (ECF No. 12). After
examining the relevant arguments and authorities, the Court DENIES as moot Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
This action stems from an employment dispute. Jerry Williams (“Plaintiff”) worked for the
City of Dallas (“the City”) for 26 years with his last position being an Asphalt Manager within the
Transportation and Public Works Department (“TPW”). Plaintiff’s supervisors at TPW were
Michael Bonsu (“Bonsu”), Tina Richardson (“Richardson”), and Carlos Fletcher (“Fletcher”).
1 Unless otherwise noted, the Court’s recitation of the facts is taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint. See Pl.’s First Am. Compl., ECF No. 8. At the 12(b)(6) stage, the facts are taken as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 509 F.3d 673,
675 (5th Cir. 2007).
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According to Plaintiff, Richardson is an Assistant Director at TPW and Bonsu and Fletcher
reported to her.
In late September or October 2023, Plaintiff informed Bonsu that a citizen reported a
hazardous defect on a public road. Bonsu responded that he was aware of the issue and told
Plaintiff that “[h]azards we do address [but] any service request that can be held off should wait
till [sic] after October 1st.”2 Bonsu suggested coning off the area until TPW could get to it.
According to Plaintiff, the Dallas Mayor’s Office became involved in the situation after Bonsu’s
“directive of no more requests and inaction.”3 Plaintiff subsequently submitted a request through
the City’s ethics portal for an investigation into Bonsu for delaying a public service request.
Around this same time, Plaintiff was accused by several City employees of violating City
employment guidelines for allegedly stealing City materials, namely asphalt. Plaintiff received
notice of these allegations on February 13, 2024. The same day, Plaintiff alleges that Bonsu
“aggressively bang[ed] his hand on a table [and] shouted to plaintiff that he needed to resign.”4
Plaintiff claims that Bonsu told Plaintiff that he needed to resign because Bonsu had videos
showing that Plaintiff was part of the theft of City materials along with other employees. Plaintiff
asserts he reported this incident to the City’s human resources department. The next day, Bonsu
sent an email to Plaintiff and another individual, Felix Soto, that he was making managerial
changes and that Plaintiff would be overseeing concrete and Soto would be overseeing asphalt.
On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave by the City based on
the theft allegations against him. Several days later, on February 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a
grievance against Bonsu, Richardson, and Fletcher for not responding to his ethics complaint
2 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 4, ECF No. 8.
3 Id. at 7.
4 Id. at 9.
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against Bonsu. After being placed on leave, Plaintiff requested an update from the City’s
investigator assigned to Plaintiff’s ethics complaint, but no action occurred. Plaintiff then sought
out and participated in the City’s appeals process regarding his administrative leave but was
ultimately discharged from the City on October 16, 2024.
Plaintiff then filed this lawsuit on April 28, 2025, which he amended on June 12, 2025,
alleging retaliation under Title VII and violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act. The City filed a
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint,5 and after Plaintiff amended his complaint, the
City filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff subsequently filed a response, and the City filed a Reply. The City’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is ripe for the Court’s review.6
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The
Rule 8(a) pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). If a plaintiff fails
to satisfy this standard, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim is facially
5 Pursuant to the filing of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the Court DENIES as MOOT the City’s
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (ECF No. 5). See Singh & Singh LLC v. Berkley
Assurance Co., No. 4:16-CV-00481-O, 2017 WL 3723770, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2017) (explaining it
is well-settled that “the filing of an amended complaint generally renders pending motions to dismiss as
moot”) (cleaned up).
6 See Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 10.
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plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Unlike a
“probability requirement,” the plausibility standard instead demands “more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Where a complaint
contains facts that are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line
between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier, 509 F.3d at
675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the court may not accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678–79. To avoid dismissal, pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts rather than
conclusory allegations. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). “When there
are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts claims for (1) retaliation under Title VII, U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq., and (2) violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act, Texas Government Code
§ 554.002.7 The City moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.8 The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff argues that the City retaliated against him for filing multiple internal grievances
against Bonsu, Richardson, and Fletcher, which Plaintiff asserts is a protected activity under Title
7 See Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 12–13, ECF No. 8; see also Pl.’s Resp. 5, ECF No. 11.
8 See Def.’s Mot Dismiss 6, ECF No. 10.
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VII.9 The City asserts that Plaintiff’s grievance filings are not a protected activity under Title VII,
but even if they were, Plaintiff has not proven a causal relationship between the activity and any
adverse employment action.10 The Court agrees with the City.
“To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged
in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Cabral v. Brennan, 853
F.3d 763, 766–67 (5th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff engages in protected activity if he has “(1) opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or (2) made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
this subchapter.” Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
42 § 2000e-3(a) (citation modified). Only the opposition clause is relevant here. The Fifth Circuit
has interpreted “Title VII’s opposition clause to mean that a plaintiff engages in protected activity
when []he complains of an employment practice that []he reasonably believes violated Title VII.”
Badgerow v. REJ Properties, Inc., 974 F.3d 610, 619 (5th Cir. 2020).
Plaintiff’s assertion that filing his ethics complaint against Bonsu and filing a grievance
against Bonsu, Richardson, and Fletcher for not responding to his ethics complaint are protected
activities under Title VII is incorrect. Merely filing an internal grievance or ethics complaint does
not automatically classify as engaging in protected activity. See Moore v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
150 F. App’x. 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding that a retaliation claim was not viable because the
plaintiff “was not engaged in a protected activity, as his grievance did not oppose or protest racial
discrimination or any other unlawful employment practice under Title VII”). Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint does not provide any indication that his ethics complaint or grievance alleged or
9 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 12, ECF No. 8.
10 Def.’s Mot Dismiss 7–9, ECF No. 10.
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opposed any unlawful employment practices. Indeed, Plaintiff says in his Amended Complaint
that he filed his ethics complaint against Bonsu for “delaying a public service request.”11 Likewise,
Plaintiff says he filed his grievance against Bonsu, Richardson and Fletcher “for not responding to
[his] ethics complaint.”12 Neither of these is a protected activity under Title VII. See Turner v.
Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Title VII provides that ‘[i]t shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). An employee’s complaint to his employer that is
“without any reference to an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, does not constitute
protected activity.” Jenkins v. Louisiana Workforce Comm’n, 713 F. App’x. 242, 246 (5th Cir.
2017) (quoting Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 986 (5th Cir. 2015)). Thus, Plaintiff has not
sufficiently shown he engaged in conduct protected by Title VII.
Even if Plaintiff’s conduct was a protected activity under Title VII, he has not plausibly
alleged a causal relationship between his filings of the ethics complaint and grievance and his
termination. “At the prima facie case, a plaintiff can meet his burden of causation simply by
showing close enough timing between his protected activity and his adverse employment action.”
Garcia v. Prof’l Contract Services, Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 2019). However, a grievance
filed after any adverse employment action lacks a causal connection to substantiate a retaliation
claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 472 (5th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave on February 21, 2024, and was not terminated
until October 16, 2024. According to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, only after Plaintiff was
11 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 8, ECF No. 8.
12 Id.
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placed on administrative leave, did he file his grievance on February 26, 2024. Thus, a sufficient
causal connection does not exist between Plaintiff’s grievance and any adverse employment action.
Turning to Plaintiff’s ethics complaint, the Fifth Circuit has held that a period of two and
a half months between filing a grievance and an adverse employment action is close enough in
time to support a causal connection for retaliation, but the Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
has approvingly cited a case that held three months was insufficient to show causation. See Garcia,
938 F.3d at 243 (citing Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001)). Here, it is
not clear when Plaintiff filed his ethics complaint, but Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint implies that
it was in late September/October 2023, which was 4-5 months before he was placed on
administrative leave on February 21, 2024. Using this timeline, Plaintiff has not established a
causal connection between his ethics complaint and an adverse employment action.
Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he engaged in conduct protected by Title
VII and has not adequately shown a causal link between his activity and an adverse employment
action, Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim is dismissed.
B. Plaintiff’s Texas Whistleblower Act Claim
Plaintiff’s 	second 	cause 	of 	action 	is 	entitled 	“Employment 	Discrimination
(Whistleblower)” and alleges that the City “retaliated against plaintiff in violation of Section
21.051 [of the Texas Labor Code] as related to Texas Whistleblower Act, Texas Government Code
§ 554.002.”13 Plaintiff then clarifies in his response to the City’s Motion to Dismiss that this is not
a “pure employment case—this case is a whistleblower case”14 and “[t]he claims [he is bringing]
are Title VII and the Texas Whistleblower Act.”15 The City argues that Plaintiff’s Texas
13 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 13, ECF No. 8.
14 Pl.’s Resp. 1, ECF No. 11.
15 Id. at 5.
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Whistleblower Act claim and discrimination claim, to the extent he has pled one, should be
dismissed because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged either claim.16 The Court agrees with The
City.
Section 21.051 of the Texas Labor Code provides that an employer commits an unlawful
act if based on “race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer
. . . discharges an individual, or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in
connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” TEX. LABOR
CODE § 21.051. It is unclear to the Court how this statute relates to Plaintiff’s Texas Whistleblower
Act Claim. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to allege a claim for discrimination under Section
21.051, Plaintiff has not pled any facts to support that the City took any employment actions based
on race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff intended
to bring this claim, it is dismissed. The Court turns next to Plaintiff’s Texas Whistleblower Act
claim.
To state a claim under the Texas Whistleblower Act, a plaintiff must prove “1) he is a
public employee; 2) he acted in good faith in making a report; 3) the report involved a violation of
law by an agency or employee; 4) the report was made to an appropriate law enforcement authority;
and 5) he suffered retaliation.” Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff pleads in his Amended Complaint that he “engaged in protected activity by filing
grievances internally concerning dereliction of public safety and Failure [sic] to carry out
governmental functions.”17 The City moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Texas Whistleblower Claim
arguing that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged (1) a reported violation of law, (2) that he reported
16 Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 11–12, ECF No. 10.
17 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 13, ECF No. 8.
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any violation of law to the appropriate authority, or (3) sufficient causation to support that he
suffered retaliation.18 Without explaining how, Plaintiff responds that “[a] casual [sic] connection
exists as to the harm suffered by plaintiff” and that it would be “absurd” to read into the Texas
Whistleblower Act a “require[ment] that there be some report to law authorities that bar plaintiff’s
claims.”19
Nowhere in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does he allege a violation of law or that he
reported a violation of law to the appropriate authority. Plaintiff does allege that he “requested an
investigation of Bonsu and others through the ethics portal presenting allegations to the City about
Michael Bonsu delaying a public service request” and that he “filed a grievance against Bonsu,
Richardson and Fletcher for not responding to [Plaintiff’s] ethics complaint.”20 But the Texas
Whistleblower Act defines “law” to include only: “(A) a state or federal statute; (B) an ordinance
of a local governmental entity; or (C) a rule adopted under a statute or ordinance.” TEX. GOV ’ T
CODE § 554.001(1). “Other complaints and grievances, including alleged violations of an agency’s
internal procedures and policies, will not support a claim.” Mullins v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 357
S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2012, pet. denied). A report is made to an appropriate law
enforcement authority within the meaning of the Texas Whistleblower Act only if “the authority
is a part of a state or local governmental entity or of the federal government that the employee in
good faith believes is authorized to: (1) regulate under or enforce the law alleged to be violated in
the report; or (2) investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law.” TEX. GOV ’ T CODE
§ 554.002(b). To satisfy the statute’s good faith requirement, a Plaintiff must show he (1) believed
18 Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 12–14, ECF No. 10.
19 Pl.’s Resp. 6, ECF No. 11.
20 Pl.’s First Am. Compl. 8, ECF No. 8.
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that the conduct reported was a violation of law and (2) that his belief was reasonable in light of
the employee’s training and experience. Wichita Cnty.. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996).
Here, Plaintiff admits that he was filing internal grievances and does not allege any
violation of law as defined under the Texas Whistleblower Act. He likewise does not plead that he
reported any alleged violation to an appropriate law enforcement agency. Based on the facts pled,
Plaintiff fails to allege that the conduct he reported was a violation of the law or that he in good
faith reported an alleged violation to the appropriate authority. Thus, he has not adequately pled a
claim under the Texas Whistleblower Act, and the Court need not decide whether he suffered
retaliation. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Texas Whistleblower Act claim is dismissed.
C. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once in response to the City’s initial Motion
to Dismiss. And although Plaintiff does not ask the Court for leave to amend, the Court nonetheless
evaluates whether leave to amend should be given.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) permits a court to grant leave to amend pleadings
and even “evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend.” Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent
Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 566 (5th Cir. 2002). But “leave to amend under Rule 15 is by no means
automatic.” Goldstein v. MCI WorldCom, 340 F.3d 238, 254 (5th Cir. 2003). “Nevertheless, a
party must ‘expressly request’ leave to amend. Estes v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 613
Fed. Appx. 277, 280 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan
of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003)). Although “[a] formal motion is not always
required,” the requesting party must still “set forth with particularity the grounds for the
amendment and the relief sought.” Willard, 336 F.3d at 387. When a plaintiff fails to request leave
to amend or indicate what might be added to the complaint if allowed to amend, a district court
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may dismiss the cause of action with prejudice. See Joseph v. Bach & Wasserman, L.L.C., 487 F.
App’x 173, 178 (5th Cir. 2012). Because Plaintiff has neither requested leave to amend nor
indicated what he might add to a second amended complaint, the Court declines to sua sponte
permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint a second time.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES as moot Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (ECF No. 5) and GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff’s Title VII Retaliation claim and
Texas Whistleblower Act claim are DISMISSED with prejudice.
SO ORDERED on this 29th day of January, 2026.
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