United States of America v. Rostro

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
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v. No. 3:25-CV-00808
JUAN CARLOS ROSTRO,
Defendant.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the United States of America’s Motion for Default
Judgment (ECF No. 8). For the following reasons, the District Judge should
GRANT the Motion in part, enter Default Judgment as to Defendant Juan Carlos
Rostro, and award the damages in the amount recommended below, along with
post-judgment interest at the applicable judgment rate.
Background
The government filed this action against Defendant Juan Carlos Rostro on
April 3, 2025, to recover debts related to civil penalties assessed by the Department
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Compl. at 1–
2 (ECF No. 1). The government personally served Rostro with process on April 12,
2025. See Aff. Service (ECF No. 5). Rostro did not answer or otherwise respond to
the lawsuit. Accordingly, the government moved for, and obtained, a clerk’s entry
of default. See ECF Nos. 6, 7. By defaulting, Rostro admitted to the “well-pleaded
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allegations of fact” in the Complaint. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank,
515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus, the following facts are undisputed:
On October 16, 2020, OSHA conducted an inspection of Rostro’s job site in
Dallas, Texas and assessed civil penalties for “workplace safety violations.” Compl.
¶¶ 6—8 (ECF No. 1). OSHA issued one citation for two penalties related to
improper scaffolding, totaling $6,940.00. Id. Defendant did not contest the
issuance of the citation or the assessment of the penalties. Id. ¶ 10. OSHA referred
the debt to the U.S. Department of Treasury for collection and, to date, the
Treasury Department has collected three payments totaling $786.48 from Rostro.1
Id. ¶ 11—12.
After Rostro defaulted, the government filed this Motion for Default
Judgment (ECF No. 8). By its Motion, the government seeks a default judgment
“for all damages, prejudgment interest and penalty, postjudgment interest and
costs to which it is entitled and as provided by law.” Mot. Def. J. (ECF No. 8). The
government asserts that its damages are for a “sum certain” and attaches a
Certificate of Indebtedness from the Treasury Department in support of the
Motion. See id. (ECF No. 8-1).
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of default and
default judgment. There are three stages to entry of default judgment. First, a
1 Only $283.88 of the amount collected was applied to the principal, while the remainder
was applied to interest, penalties, and fees. See Compl. ¶ 12 (ECF No. 1).
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default occurs “when a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise respond to the
complaint within the time required by the Federal Rules.” New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (noting
default occurs when the defendant “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” against
the complaint). Second, the Clerk may enter a defendant’s default if it is
“established by affidavit or otherwise.” Brown, 84 F.3d at 141 (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 55(a)). Third, if the Clerk enters default and the plaintiff’s claim is not “for a sum
certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation,” the plaintiff must apply
for a default judgment from the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (1-2). But even when a
Plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be
made certain, the Default Judgment may still be sought through the Court.
Finally, “a party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right,
even where the defendant is technically in default.” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766,
767 (5th Cir. 2001). Rather, courts retain ultimate discretion to grant or deny
default judgments. Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998). To
determine whether to enter default judgment, the Court conducts a two-part
analysis: In part one, courts first ask if default judgment is “procedurally
warranted.” See Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. To determine whether default is
“procedurally warranted,” the Court may consider whether: (1) material issues of
fact exist; (2) there has been substantial prejudice; (3) the grounds for default are
clearly established; (4) the default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable
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neglect; (5) default judgment would be too harsh; and (6) the court would be
obliged to set aside the default upon motion from the defendant. Id.
If default is procedurally warranted, courts proceed to part two of the
analysis, considering the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims. See
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. 515 F.2d at 1206. In part two, courts ask if the pleadings
establish a sufficient basis for default judgment. See id. In determining whether
there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for judgment, the Fifth Circuit “draw[s]
meaning from the case law on Rule 8.” Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc.,
788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015). This “low threshold” is less rigorous than that
under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 498. Factual allegations in the complaint need only “be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that
all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. To be
sure, the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” but “detailed factual allegations” are not
required. Id. Indeed, “[t]he defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-
pleaded allegations of fact” but the “defendant is not held to admit facts that are
not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Id.
A default judgment may not be entered against an infant or incompetent
person unless represented in the action by a general guardian, conservator, or
other like fiduciary who has appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Likewise,
a default judgment may not be entered against an individual in military service
until an attorney is appointed to represent the defendant. 50 U.S.C. § 3931. While
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the Fifth Circuit has “adopted a policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits
and against the use of default judgments,” this policy is “counterbalanced by
considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a weighing process ... largely
within the domain of the trial judge’s discretion.” In re Chinese-Manufactured
Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F.3d 576, 594 (5th Cir. 2014).
But default judgment remains “a drastic remedy, not favored by the
Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun Bank of
Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989) (citations omitted).
Analysis
A. Entry of Default
Summons was returned executed as to Rostro and the return of service
reflects that he was served in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
See Aff. Service (ECF No. 5). At the government’s request, the clerk of court,
therefore, entered a default against Rostro on May 6, 2025. See ECF No. 7.
Accordingly, the prerequisite that the clerk enter default has been satisfied.
B. Fitness of Defendant Juan Carlos Rostro as a Defaulting Party
The government must establish, and the Court must confirm, that Rostro is
not an infant, incompetent person, or person in military service exempted from
default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); 50 U.S.C.§ 3931. In connection with the
Motion for Default Judgment, the government provided the declaration of Doug
W. Ray, counsel for the government. In his declaration, counsel states that, to his
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knowledge, “Defendant, Juan Carlos Rostro, is not an infant, incompetent, or
entitled to relief under the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act” and that Rostro is not
“in active military service.” See App. Mot. Def. J., Ray Decl. (ECF No. 8-1). The
government also submitted a “Status Report Pursuant to Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act” which further indicates that Rostro is not in active military service. See
id., Status Rep. (ECF No. 8-1). Accordingly, the Court should find that all
prerequisites to entry of default judgment have been satisfied, and that Juan Carlos
Rostro is not an infant, incompetent person, or person in military service exempted
from default judgment.
C. Default Judgment is Procedurally Warranted
Here, Default Judgment is “procedurally warranted.” See Nishimatsu Const.
Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. First, there are “no material issues of fact in dispute.” See id.
(“[t]he defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of
fact.”). Second, Rostro’s failure to respond to or participate in these proceedings
substantially prejudices the government. United States v. Torres, 2023 WL
2355912, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2023) (Toliver, J.), rec. adopted, 2023 WL
2355930 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2023) (Scholer, J.) (“Defendant’s failure to respond
threatens to halt the adversary process and ‘effectively prejudice Plaintiff’s
interests.’”) (quoting United States v. Holland, 2018 WL 354542, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 10, 2018) (Boyle, J.)). Third, the grounds for default are clearly established
given that the government served Rostro with the complaint, and Rostro has failed
to answer or otherwise defend his case for over nine months See id. at *2. Fourth,
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there is no evidence indicating Rostro’s failure to respond results from a “good
faith mistake or excusable neglect.” Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. Fifth, entry of a
default judgment against Rostro will not be unusually harsh as the government
only seeks the relief it is entitled to under law for Rostro’s OSHA citations. See
Torres, 2023 WL 2355912, at *2. Finally, the pleadings, applicable law, and
admitted facts indicate a lack of good cause for the Court to set aside a default
judgment, should a motion to do so be filed. Thus, a default judgment is
procedurally warranted.
D. The Pleadings Establish a Sufficient Basis for Default Judgment
The pleadings provide a sufficient factual basis for default judgment. As
discussed above, Rostro has admitted the government’s “well-pleaded allegations
of fact.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. The well-pleaded allegations
establish that OSHA cited Rostro for violations relating to “improper scaffolding.”
See Compl. ¶¶ 7–8 (ECF No. 1); See also id., Ex. A, at 11–14. 2 The government
notified Rostro of the citation and made a demand for payment. Id. ¶ 9. Rostro “did
not contest the issuance of the citation or the assessment of the penalties.” Id. ¶ 10.
Thus, the cited violations and assessed penalties are “not subject to review by any
court or agency.” See 29 U.S.C. § 659(a). And while Rostro made some payments,
the principal amount of $6,656.12, along with the interest and penalties related
2 The citation indicates that Rostro’s employees working on a scaffolding system “climbed
the frame to access the work platform” in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(e)(1). Compl.,
Ex. A, at 11–14 (ECF No. 1). Additionally, employees working on the second tier of the
scaffolding system were not protected from falling to the ground below, violating 29
C.F.R. §§ 1926.451(g)(1), (g)(4)(i). Id.
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thereto, remains unpaid. See Compl. ¶13 (ECF No. 1); see also App. Mot. Def. J.,
Cert. Indebt., May 7, 2025 (ECF No. 8-1) Accordingly, the pleadings contain a
sufficient basis for default judgment against Rostro.
E. The Government’s Claim is for a Sum Certain.
Once the Court finds that a Default Judgment is warranted, the Court must
then determine what relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive. See U.S. For Use of
M-CO Const., Inc. v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987) (Noting
that “a default judgment . . . establishes the defendant’s liability but it does not
“establish the amount of damages”). As a threshold matter, no hearing on damages
is necessary because the government’s claim is for a “sum certain.” See Green as
Tr. Of Green Childs. Tr. v. Coord, LLC, 2018 WL 5267518, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23,
2018) (Boyle, J.). The damages sought can be determined with mathematical
calculation by reference to the pleadings and supporting documents. See, e.g.,
Leedo Cabinetry v. James Sales & Distrib., Inc., 157 F.3d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1998).
Here, the government seeks: “all damages, prejudgment interest and penalty,
postjudgment interest and costs to which it is entitled and as provided by law.” See
Mot. Def. J. (ECF No. 8).
With its Motion, the government submitted a Certificate of Indebtedness
from the Treasury Department. (the “Certificate”). See App. Mot. Def. J. (ECF No.
8-1); see also Garza, 2019 WL 4452147, at *4 (considering the plaintiff’s certificate
of indebtedness and attorney’s declaration when determining the appropriate
amount of damages). Based on the Certificate, the government is entitled to a
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default judgment in the amount of $11,140.61, plus interest and penalties at a rate
of $1.27 per day from May 7, 2025, until judgment is entered in this action.3
F. The Government is Entitled to Post-judgment Interest
The government also seeks to recover post-judgment interest. See Mot. Def.
J. (ECF No. 8). “Post-judgment interest is awarded as a matter of course” under 28
U.S.C. § 1961(a). Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d 161, 173 (5th
Cir. 2010). Since “district courts do not have the discretion to deny post-judgment
interest on monetary judgments,” Paisano Cap. SA de CV v. 23 Tex. Produce, Inc.,
2019 WL 3239152, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2019) (citation omitted), the
government’s request for post-judgment interest should be granted and awarded
at the applicable federal rate from the date of final judgment until it is paid in full.
G. The Government Has Not Shown its Entitlement to Attorney’s
Fees or Costs.
In its Complaint, the government requests “costs and attorneys’ fees.”4 The
government bears the burden of proving its entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs. See, e.g., Humana Inc. v. AllCare Phys. Grp., 2021 WL 5566052, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Nov. 29, 2021) (Pittman, J.) (“Following the entry of a default judgment, a
plaintiff must prove the amount of its damages.”). But the government submitted
no evidence or argument related to the fees or costs incurred. Thus, the District
3 The Certificate is current as of May 7, 2025. Plaintiff included no evidence showing that
the principal had been reduced, or that fees had increased, in the time since the Certificate
was signed.
4 To be sure, the government appears to have abandoned its request for attorneys’ fees
in its Motion for Default Judgment.
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Judge should deny the government’s motion to the extent that it seeks recovery of
attorneys’ fees and costs of court. See id.
Recommendation
For the reasons explained above, the District Judge should GRANT in part
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 8), enter a default judgment as
to Defendant Juan Carlos Rostro, and award the government damages in the
amount of $11,140.61, increasing by $1.27 per day until default judgment is entered
by the District Judge, and post-judgment interest at the applicable federal rate
from the date of judgment until paid in full.
SO RECOMMENDED.
January 2, 2026.
________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
judge, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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