Khanchandani v. ASK IT Solutions, LLC et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DIMPLE KHANCHANDANI, 	§
individually and on behalf of others 	§
similarly situated, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	No. 3:25-CV-793-K
§
ASK IT SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Dimple Khanchandani’s Motion for Enforcement
of the Parties’ Settlement Agreement and Sanctions Against Defendants filed on
December 8, 2025. (Dkt. No. 43 (“Mot.”).) Plaintiff filed a supporting appendix
with the motion that contains a copy of the executed Settlement Agreement. (Dkt.
No. 43-1 (“P. App.”).) After a substitution of counsel, ASK IT Solutions, LLC and
Sai Kiran Singh Takoor (“Sai Kiran”) (collectively “Defendants”) filed a response on
January 27, 2026. (Dkt. No. 55 (“Resp.”).) Plaintiff filed her reply on February 10.
(Dkt. No. 57 (“Reply”).) United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade referred the
motion to the undersigned magistrate judge for a hearing, if necessary, and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). (Dkt. No. 44.)
For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that the Court
grant in part the motion to enforce by concluding that the Settlement Agreement is a
valid and binding contract, deny the motion to extent it seeks an order imposing
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sanctions or finds contempt of court, enter judgment dismissing this action with
prejudice, and decline to retain jurisdiction for continued enforcement of the
Settlement Agreement.
I. BACKGROUND
Khanchandani filed this lawsuit on April 1, 2025, asserting claims against her
former employer, ASK IT Solutions and associated individuals relating to unpaid
wages, including overtime wages, and for retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”). (See Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff served ASK IT Solutions by
serving its registered agent and filed proof of service. (Dkt. No. 9.) And Defendants’
former counsel stated that he agreed to accept service of process on behalf of each of
the individual defendants. (See Dkt. No. 22 at 2 ¶ 4.)
Counsel first appeared in this action on behalf of Defendants on April 23,
2025. (Dkt. No. 12.) Defendants requested, and the Court granted, three unopposed
extensions of Defendants’ deadline to file an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Dkt.
Nos. 13, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25.) In the last two instances, Defendants represented that
the extension was needed to allow for continued settlement discussions or mediation.
(Dkt. No. 22 at 2; Dkt. No. 24 at 2.)
On July 23, 2025, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Settlement asking the
Court to vacate pending deadlines but leave the case open for 30 days while they
finalized the settlement agreement and dismissal papers. (Dkt. No. 27.) The Court
administratively closed the case and ordered the parties file dismissal papers by
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September 12, 2025. (Dkt. No. 28.) On September 10, however, the parties filed a
joint motion to extend the deadline for dismissal papers again. (Dkt. No. 29.) In the
motion, they advised that they signed a confidential Settlement Agreement on
August 28, 2025, but Defendant did not make the first of multiple payments by the
deadline established in the Settlement Agreement. (Dkt. No. 29 at 2.) The parties
noted that Defendant advised of “unexpected issues” that delayed the first settlement
payment and that “Defendant is actively seeking financing to fund the settlement,”
which was taking longer than anticipated. (Id. at 2.) The Court gave the parties
additional time to submit the dismissal documents. (Dkt. No. 30.)
After additional time passed without Khanchandani receiving any payment,
she filed the instant motion to enforce the settlement agreement and impose
sanctions. Defendants’ counsel sought to withdraw from the case (see Dkt. Nos. 37,
48), and was allowed to do so once successor counsel appeared on behalf of
Defendants ASK IT Solutions and Sai Kiran (see Dkt. Nos. 53, 56).
Khanchandani asserts that, through a mediation on July 21, 2025, the parties
reached a binding agreement to settle the case and executed the written Settlement
Agreement on August 28. (Mot. at 4.) The Settlement Agreement was entered into
between Khanchandani and ASK IT Solutions, LLC, and Sai Kiram signed it on
behalf of ASK IT Solutions. (P. App. 4, 11.) The Agreement requires ASK IT
Solutions to make four partial payments of the settlement amount, on August 30,
September 15, October 15, and November 15, 2025. (P. App. 5-6.) Late payments
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would incur additional daily penalties. (P. App. 10.) The Settlement Agreement
also provided that, in exchange for consideration received from ASK IT,
Khanchandani “forever releases and discharges ASK IT and its affiliates, parents,
predecessors, successors, employees and agents (including, without limitation, Sai
Kiran)” from all wage and hour claims. (P. App. 7.) The Agreement further
required Khanchandani to dismiss the lawsuit upon executing the Settlement
Agreement. (P. App. 7.)
Having not received any payment under the Settlement Agreement,
Khanchandani asks the Court enforce the contract, order “Defendants” to pay the
settlement amount and late penalties provided for in the Settlement Agreement,
retain jurisdiction over this matter, enforce its order through contempt sanctions, and
order Defendants to pay Khanchandani’s attorney’s fees and costs incurred to
enforce the agreement. (See Mot.) Defendants acknowledge that an enforceable
agreement was created between Khanchandani and ASK IT Solutions and do not
oppose enforcement of the Settlement Agreement. (Resp. at 1-2.) They do oppose
the imposition of sanctions. Defendants also ask the Court to craft an alternative
payment schedule, waive or reduce late penalties required under the Settlement
Agreement, and retain jurisdiction.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“A District Court has the power to enforce summarily a settlement agreement
reached in a case pending before it.” Mid-S. Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d
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386, 389 (5th Cir. 1984). Where, as here, the claims before the Court are premised
on federal law, “[q]uestions regarding the enforceability or validity of such
agreements are determined by federal law[.]” Mid-South Towing Co., 733 F.2d at 389.
Federal law treats a settlement agreement as a contract, Guidry v. Halliburton
Geophysical Servs., Inc., 976 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1992), meaning that “[a] binding
settlement agreement exists where there is a manifestation of mutual assent, usually
in the form of an offer and an acceptance,” Chen v. Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., No.
3:10-CV-1039-D, 2012 WL 5935602, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 27, 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Federal law does not require settlement agreements to
be reduced to writing.” E.E.O.C. v. Philip Servs. Corp., 635 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir.
2011).
Although the Court is guided by federal law, “[t]he federal law of contracts
uses the core principles of the common law of contracts that are in force in most
states.” Bowers v. Abundant Home Health, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-1314-C, 2021 WL
706783, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted), accepted,
2021 WL 693652 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2021). “Because ‘federal contract law is
largely indistinguishable from general contract principles under state common law,’
the Court may rely on federal cases, state contract law cases, and other treatises to
the extent it finds them persuasive.” Id. (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 786 F.3d
344, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2015)).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. 	The parties agree there is an enforceable settlement agreement between
Khanchandani and ASK IT Solutions.
This is not a case in which the Court must determine whether the parties
entered into a binding agreement to settle the case. Khanchandani and Defendants
agree that the Settlement Agreement is a binding contract. (See Mot. at 8; Resp. at 1
(“Defendants acknowledge the Settlement Agreement executed on August 28, 2025,
is valid and binding.”).) Indeed, the Settlement Agreement is written, signed by
Khanchandani and ASK IT Solutions (through Sai Kiran), and contains all the
material terms of the agreement. The Court should conclude that the Settlement
Agreement is valid and enforceable.
B. 	The Court should decline the parties’ requests to impose sanctions or
modify the Settlement Agreement.
Because the parties agree that the Settlement Agreement is binding and
enforceable, the issues in dispute concern the relief the Court can and should grant
based on the enforceable agreement. In addition to deeming the Settlement
Agreement enforceable, Khanchandani asks the Court to compel “Defendants” to
pay the settlement amount and impose sanctions, including by using its contempt
power. (Mot. at 9-11.) Defendants ask the Court to change the terms of the
Settlement Agreement by reviving the long-lapsed payment deadlines to push them
months into the future and either waiving or reducing the late penalties imposed
under the Agreement. (Resp. at 4-5.) Both parties ask the Court to retain
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jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement, although Defendants asks that it
do so “without contempt threat.” (Mot. at 9; Resp. at 5.) Setting aside for the
moment their last request, the undersigned addresses each one in turn.
1. 	Only ASK IT Solutions is responsible for making payments under the
Settlement Agreement.
The Court should decline Khanchandani’s request to order all “Defendants”
to pay the settlement amount. Khanchandani entered into an agreement with ASK
IT Solutions alone, and only ASK IT Solutions is obligated to make payments to
Khanchandani. (P. App. 4 (“This Settlement Agreement and Release . . . is entered
into by and between Plaintiff Dimple Khanchandani . . . and ASK IT Solutions,
LLC . . . on behalf of itself, its parents, subsidiaries, officers, directors, owners,
shareholders, and agents, individually and in their official capacities[.]”).)
Defendant Sai Kiran signed the agreement for ASK IT Solutions, and there is no
indication that he also executed the agreement in his personal capacity. (See P. App.
11.) See Covington v. Aban Offshore Ltd., 650 F.3d 556, 559–62 (5th Cir. 2011)
(concluding person who signed arbitration agreement in representative capacity did
not become personally bound); Elgohary v. Herrera, 405 S.W.3d 785, 790-91 (Tex.
App.—Houston 2013, no pet.) (“[S]igning a contract in a representative capacity
does not bind the agent personally to the contract.”). To the extent Khanchandani
asks the Court to order the individual Defendants Sai Kiran, Paul Petrucelli, or
Keerthi Chenna to make payments based on the Settlement Agreement, she has not
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shown that these Defendants have agreed to undertake any personal obligation to
make such payments.
2. 	Khanchandani has not shown the Defendants have violated a court
order or engaged in bad faith conduct warranting sanctions.
Khanchandani’s request for court-imposed sanctions should be denied. She
points to no statute or rule authorizing sanctions in this circumstance. Rather, she
relies solely on the Court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions for vexatious,
oppressive, bad faith, or wanton misconduct. (Mot. at 10.)
“Courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions on a party or attorney
when they find that the party or attorney has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’” Fuller v. CIG Fin., LLC, No. 3:22-CV-1289-D,
2023 WL 8482889, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2023) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991)). “To award sanctions under its inherent power, a court
‘must make a specific finding’ of bad faith.” Id. (quoting In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553,
559 (5th Cir. 2016)).
In Khanchandani’s view, Defendants have engaged in bad faith misconduct
by failing to pay the settlement amount. She considers these circumstances
“strikingly similar” to those in Sixela Inv. Grp. v. Hope Fed. Credit Union, No. CV 23-
0277, 2025 WL 2882059 (W.D. La. Oct. 8, 2025). (Reply at 6-7.) The undersigned
disagrees. In that case, the court pointed to a considerable record supporting its
finding that a party engaged in bad-faith conduct, specifically noting the party failed
to comply with “numerous” court-ordered deadlines and was “uncooperative,”
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“deceitful to the Court,” “noncommunicative,” and “primarily responsible
for . . . misconduct during litigation,” and it “attempted fraud on the Court.” Id. at
7–8. In contrast to the prolonged misconduct and attempted fraud found there, this
is a case in which a defendant has not followed through on a promise to pay a
settlement agreement. ASK IT Solutions contends that its inability to pay is due to
unexpected issues and its failure to find financing for the settlement. (See Resp. at 2;
see also Dkt. No. 29 at 2.) Khanchandani believes otherwise and argues that ASK IT
Solutions’s refusal to follow through on its obligations results from Defendants’ bad
faith misconduct. But her belief that Defendants have acted in bad faith is not
sufficient alone to warrant sanctions. Whether her allegation are true or not, the
record does not equip the Court to find based on nonpayment alone that ASK IT
Solutions has been deceitful or otherwise engaged in bad faith. Khanchandani has
not made the case that the Court can impose sanctions under its inherent authority,
much less that it should.
Likewise, the undersigned concludes that Khanchandani’s request for
contempt sanctions should be denied. To warrant contempt sanctions,
Khanchandani would have to show, among other things, that the contemnor failed
to comply with a court order. See United States v. City of Jackson, Miss., 359 F.3d 727,
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731 (5th Cir. 2004). As stated above, Khanchandani does not point to any court
order that ASK IT Solutions or any other defendant has violated.1
3. 	Defendants have not shown any basis upon which the Court may
modify the Settlement Agreement.
Defendants request as “alternative relief” that the Court issue an order
postponing ASK IT Solutions’s obligation to make payments under the Settlement
Agreement until at least 30 days after the Court resolves the instant motion. (Resp.
at 4-5.) They also ask the Court to waive or reduce the contractual late penalties that
have accrued. (Id. at 5.)
Defendants’ request that the Court order enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement on modified terms is apparently based on equitable considerations,
because they have not pointed to any legal authority that allows the Court to modify
the agreement. (See Resp. at 4-5.) Neither party suggests that the Settlement
Agreement is ambiguous with respect to the late penalties, and, in the absence of any
ambiguity, the Court seeks to enforce the agreement as it was written, not as
Defendants now would like it to be. Cf. Interstate Contracting Corp. v. City of Dallas,
Tex., 407 F.3d 708, 712 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The court’s primary concern is to enforce
the parties’ intent as contractually expressed, and an unambiguous contract will be
enforced as written.”); see also Est. of Alexander v. DLJ Mortg. Cap., Inc., No.
1 To the extent Khanchandani is instead asking the Court to enter orders that it
would then enforce using its contempt power, the undersigned addresses that request below.
See infra. § III.C.
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3:15CV293-TSL-RHW, 2017 WL 9512369, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 28, 2017)
(“[S]ettlement agreements are enforced as a matter of contract law and courts will
not rewrite them to satisfy the desires of either party.” (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted) (applying Mississippi law)). ASK IT Solutions, represented by
counsel, entered into a contract resulting from an arms-length negotiations, and it
agreed to incur substantial monetary penalties if it did not timely fulfill its obligation
to pay the settlement amount. Even if the Court has authority under law or in equity
to reform the Settlement Agreement, Defendants have not shown any reason why
the Court should relieve ASK IT Solutions of the burden it voluntarily incurred.
C. 	The Court should enter judgment dismissing this action with prejudice and
decline to retain jurisdiction over further enforcement of the Settlement
Agreement.
As explained above, the parties do not dispute that the Settlement Agreement
is binding and should be enforced. Under the terms of that agreement, the parties
agreed that Khanchandani “fully, finally, and forever release[d]” Defendants “from
any and all federal or state wage and hour statutory or common law claims.” (P.
App. 7 ¶ 3.1.) Additionally, Khanchandani agreed to “voluntarily dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice upon executing th[e] Agreement.” (P. App. ¶ 3.2.)
Because the parties reached a binding agreement to settle and dismiss this lawsuit,
the Court should enter judgment dismissing the lawsuit based on their settlement.
The final issue to consider is the parties’ mutual request that the Court retain
jurisdiction to enforce the Settlement Agreement after entry of judgment. The
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Supreme Court has made clear that enforcement of a settlement agreement after a
case is dismissed “is more than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit,
and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). In Kokkonen, the Court recognized that a district
court can retain jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement beyond entry of
judgment when doing so comes within its ancillary jurisdiction to “manage its
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” See id. at 380. To
exercise such ancillary jurisdiction, the parties’ obligations to comply with the
settlement agreement must be made part of the dismissal order. Hosp. House, Inc. v.
Gilbert, 298 F.3d 424, 430 (5th Cir. 2002). “The [Supreme] Court specified two ways
in which a court may make a settlement agreement part of its dismissal order: ‘either
by separate provision (such as a provision “retaining jurisdiction” over the settlement
agreement) or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order.’”
Id. (quoting Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381).
Although the Court may retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement post-
judgment, whether to do so is entrusted to the Court’s discretion. See Kokkonen, 511
U.S. at 381 (“[T]he parties’ compliance with the terms of the settlement
contract . . . may, in the court’s discretion, be one of the terms set forth in the
order[.]”); see also Vikas WSP, Ltd. v. Econ. Mud Prods. Co., 23 F.4th 442, 456 (5th Cir.
2022); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 903 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (“The question,
then, is not whether the Court can dismiss with prejudice and retain jurisdiction, but
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whether the Court should.”). A court is not obligated to grant parties’ requests to
retain jurisdiction. See Brass Smith, LLC v. RPI Indus., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 377, 381
(D.N.J. 2011) (“Parties, even if they mutually agree, do not have a right to
incorporation of all their settlement terms in a dismissal order, since nowhere in
Kokkonen does it say that a court must allow such an incorporation.” (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
After weighing several factors, the undersigned concludes the Court should
decline to retain jurisdiction here. First, declining to retain jurisdiction will not
significantly prejudice the parties. ASK IT Solutions has acknowledged that the
Settlement Agreement is a binding contract, and Khanchandani can readily enforce
her rights under that contract in a new lawsuit alleging that ASK IT Solutions has
committed a material breach by nonpayment. See Cross Media Mktg. Corp. v. Budget
Mktg., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (declining to retain jurisdiction
where “the only practical effect of this ruling is that the plaintiff will have to
commence a new action and pay a filing fee to sue on the agreement”).
Second, enforcement of the Settlement Agreement through the Court’s
ancillary jurisdiction may limit Khanchandani’s available remedies. If, for example,
Khanchandani believes Sai Kiran or anyone else lured her into executing the
Settlement Agreement and releasing her claims without any intention of paying her,
her ability to pursue fraud or other claims would be limited through a continuation of
this lawsuit. See Nat'l Oilwell Varco, L.P. v. Auto-Dril, Inc., 68 F.4th 206, 215–16 (5th
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Cir. 2023) (holding district court lacked jurisdiction to address claim that party
fraudulently induced settlement agreement although court retained jurisdiction to
enforce settlement agreement). By filing a new lawsuit on the Settlement
Agreement, Khanchandani would have the full panoply of claims and remedies
available to her.
Third, circumstances suggest that enforcement of the Settlement Agreement
would impose substantial burdens on the Court. See Cross Media Mktg., 319 F. Supp.
2d at 483 (noting court “might . . . properly decline to retain jurisdiction where the
administration of a settlement threatened to impose undue burdens on it”). This is
not a case in which the parties ask a court to retain jurisdiction so that it can readily
address the matter should something go awry in the future. Nonperformance of the
Settlement Agreement is already at issue, and it is obvious that substantial additional
litigation will ensue. Rather than resolve matters of breach relating to the Settlement
Agreement through collateral proceedings anchored to this FLSA action, they should
instead be adjudicated in an action dedicated to the contractual (and possibly other
tort) claims.
Fourth, the parties have not shown any reason why the Court’s continued
jurisdiction is needed for any relief that might become necessary. Khanchandani
asks the Court to at least threaten the use of its contempt power if ASK IT Solutions
does not make good on its promise to pay her. But the only obligation involved is
the payment of money. There may be instances when exercising the Court’s
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contempt power to enforce an obligation freely undertaken by a party is both possible
and appropriate. But it does not appear to be so here. That is, even an obligation to
pay money set out in a judgment is generally not enforced by contempt. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (“[a] money judgment is enforced by a writ of execution[.]”); see also
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Faulkner, No. 3:16-CV-1735-D, 2018 WL 5459178, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2018) (“[A] final judgment per Rule 69 usually is not enforceable
by contempt.”); Pemex Exploración Y Producción v. BASF Corp., No. CV H-10-1997,
2016 WL 6806421, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2016) (concluding that contempt
sanctions were unavailable for nonpayment of a money judgment). So, to the extent
Khanchandi’s request for retained jurisdiction is build on an expectation that the
Court will hold ASK IT Solutions in contempt for failing to pay her, it might not be a
tenable expectation.
Fifth, the Court does not see a strong public interest that weighs in favor of
retaining jurisdiction. Here, two private parties—both represented by counsel—
entered into an agreement to settle the case.
Considering each these factors together, the undersigned concludes that the
Court should not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement after entry of
judgment. Rather, Khanchandani may enforce her rights in a separate lawsuit.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons discussed, the District Judge should GRANT IN PART
Plaintiff’s Motion for Enforcement of the Parties’ Settlement Agreement (Dkt. No.
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43) by concluding that the Settlement Agreement is binding and enforceable and
DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it seeks a finding of contempt or
imposition of sanctions. Based on the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement,
the Court should enter judgment dismissing this action with prejudice and decline to
retain jurisdiction.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 23, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner
provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation
must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify
the finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the
objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to
file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual
findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by
the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. 	See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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