K v. G6 Hospitality Franchising LLC et al

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LYDIA K., pseudonymously, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-0755-N
§
G6 HOSPITALITY FRANCHISING 	§
LLC, et al., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Order addresses the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants G6 Hospitality
Franchising LLC (“G6”) [33], Omni Hotels Management Corporation (“Omni”) [27], and
PKA Enterprises, LLC (“PKA”) [54] (collectively “Hotel Defendants”). Because Lydia K
fails to state a plausible claim for relief, the Court grants the motions to dismiss.
I. O RIGINS OF THE MOTIONS
This case involves claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1581, et seq., the Child Abuse Victims Rights Act
(“CAVRA”), 18 U.S.C § 2255, and T EX. CIV. P RAC . & R EM . CODE A NN. § 98.002, the
Texas statute prohibiting sex trafficking. Pl.’s Comp. ¶¶ 134-135, 140, 148 [23]. Lydia K
is a sex trafficking survivor.1 Id. ¶ 56. She was trafficked across multiple hotels in Texas,
Nevada, Colorado, and Florida between August 2015 through October 2015. Id. In Texas,
1 For the purposes of these motions, the Court assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts
in the Complaint.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 2
Lydia was trafficked at the Fort Worth Motel 6 for several weeks, the Omni hotel in Dallas
on at least four occasions, and the Omni hotel in Fort Worth on at least eight occasions. Id.
¶¶ 80, 92, 101. 	Lydia’s traffickers controlled her through financial and physical abuse,
forcing her to engage in commercial sex acts for their financial benefit. Id. Lydia was 17
years old at the time of her trafficking. Id. ¶ 32.
Lydia alleges that Henry David Jackson and Samantha Rochelle Baker, who are also
named defendants in the present lawsuit, trafficked her in the Dallas-Fort Worth metroplex.
Id. ¶¶ 56-57. 	She further alleges that she and her traffickers exhibited several common
indicators of sex trafficking at the defendant hotels. Id. ¶ 14. Lydia also alleges that Baker
regularly performed commercial sex acts and had sold sex to one of the hotel staff members
at the Fort Worth Motel 6. Id. ¶¶ 85-86.
Due to the prevalence of sex trafficking within the hotel industry, hotel employees
encounter victims of sex trafficking much more frequently than members of the public. Id.
¶¶ 11-12. Non-profit entities such as No Room for Trafficking by the American Hotel and
Lodging Association have identified potential indicators of sex trafficking in hotels, such
as: paying for hotel stays in cash or with pre-paid credit cards, extended stays with few
possessions, excessive foot traffic in and out of hotel rooms by men, women in lingerie or
otherwise dressed inappropriately for the setting or climate, and women exhibiting fearful
or submissive behavior under constant monitoring by their companions. Id. ¶¶ 13, 18-19.
G6 is a franchisor of Motel 6 hotel properties, including the Fort Worth Motel 6
operated by PKA. Id. ¶ 5. Omni Hotel Management is the owner and operator of the Omni
hotel branches in Dallas and Fort Worth.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 3
Lydia asserts TVPRA, CAVRA, state human trafficking, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress (“IIED”) claims against each Hotel Defendant.2 Id. ¶¶ 134-135, 140,
145, 148. The Hotel Defendants now move to dismiss all claims against them for failure
to state a claim.
II. R ULE 12(B )(6) L EGAL S TANDARD
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether
the plaintiff has asserted a legally sufficient claim for relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall,
42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). A viable complaint must include “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). 	To meet this “facial plausibility” standard, a plaintiff must plead “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court generally
accepts well-pleaded facts as true and construes the complaint in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Gines v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 699 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 2012). But a plaintiff
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all
the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted).
Additionally, in “deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may permissibly
refer to matters of public record.” Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1343 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994);
2 Lydia dropped her IIED claims against all Hotel Defendants. Pl.’s Resp. 5 [32], Pl.’s
Resp. 19 [36], Pl.’s Resp. 22 [57]. Accordingly, those claims are dismissed.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 4
see also, e.g., Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating, in upholding
district court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), that the “district court took appropriate
judicial notice of publicly-available documents and transcripts produced by the FDA,
which were matters of public record directly relevant to the issue at hand”).
III. T HE COURT G RANTS D EFENDANTS’ M OTIONS TO D ISMISS
Lydia brings TVPRA claims against G6, Omni, and PKA under financial beneficiary
and perpetrator theories of liability. Pl.’s Comp. ¶ 135. She also asserts CAVRA and state
human trafficking claims against each Hotel Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 140, 148. The Court takes
each of these theories in turn.
A. The Court Dismisses Lydia’s TVPRA Beneficiary Liability Claims
Section 1595 of the TVPRA allows victims of sex trafficking to bring a civil action
against “whoever knowingly benefits . . . from participation in a venture which that person
knew or should have known” has engaged in the trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Thus,
to state a claim under a section 1595 financial beneficiary theory, Lydia must allege facts
from which it can be reasonably inferred that Defendants “(1) ‘knowingly benefitted
financially or by receiving anything of value,’ (2) from participation in a venture, (3) they
‘knew or should have known has engaged in’ sex trafficking” under section 1591, which
defines the criminal act. 	E.S. v. Best W. Int’l, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 3d 420, 426 (N.D. Tex.
2021) (alteration omitted) (quoting J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 2020 WL 6318707, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. 2020)).
1. 	Knowingly Benefitted –The “knowing benefit” element requires “only that the
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 5
defendant was aware that it was benefitting in some way from its participation in the
venture,” and the venture need not be the result of sex trafficking. G.G. v. Salesforce.com,
Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 564 (7th Cir. 2023); see also Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714,
723–24 (11th Cir. 2021). 	In the hotel context, simply renting a room and knowingly
receiving value in exchange is sufficient to satisfy this element. See e.g., E.S., 510 F. Supp.
3d at 426–27; M.A. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 964–65 (S.D.
Ohio 2019); Doe, (H.E.W.) v. Radisson Hosp., Inc., 2025 WL 349556, at *5 (W.D. Tex.
2025), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 560708 (W.D. Tex. 2025); A.B. v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 455 F.
Supp. 3d 171, 190–91 (E.D. Pa. 2020); S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251,
1257 (M.D. Fla. 2020). Thus, none of the Defendants contest that Lydia sufficiently pled
this element by alleging that Lydia and her traffickers booked rooms at each hotel.
However, Lydia failed to establish that G6 or Omni participated in a venture or that any
defendants knew or should have known that Lydia’s traffickers were engaged in sex
trafficking at the respective hotels.
2. 	Participation in a Venture – Lydia alleges that each Hotel Defendant participated
in ventures sufficient to establish liability. 	She asserts that the Omni hotels and PKA
participated in lodging ventures with Lydia’s traffickers. 	Pl.’s Resp. 12 [32]; Pl.’s Resp.
16 [57]. 	She also alleges that G6 directly participated in a franchisee-franchisor venture
with PKA. Pl.’s Resp. 15 [41].
Participating 	in 	a 	venture 	“does 	not 	require 	actual 	knowledge 	of 	criminal
wrongdoing.” 	G.G., 76 F.4th at 559. 	Nor does it require direct participation in the sex
trafficking. 	Id. 	For beneficiary liability, it is sufficient to show “a continuous business
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 6
relationship between the participant and the trafficker.” 	Id. 	“Where the participant
provides assistance, support, or facilitation to the trafficker through such a ‘continuous
business relationship,’ a court or jury may infer the participant and trafficker have a ‘tacit
agreement’ that is sufficient for ‘participation’ under Section 1595.” Id.; see also Ricchio
v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553, 555 (1st Cir. 2017) (Souter, J.) (concluding that participation can
be inferred, in part, where trafficker and hotel operators had similar prior dealings). The
defendant need not have committed “some overt act that furthers the sex trafficking aspect
of the venture” or have “associated” with the sex trafficker “for the purpose of furthering
the sex trafficking.” 	M.A., 425 F. Supp. 3d at 968–70 (citation modified). The ordinary
meaning of the statutory language requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant “took part
in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit.” 	Doe #1, 21
F.4th at 725.
This Court has previously concluded that the alleged beneficiary must “have an
ongoing interest in the success of a specific venture and elect to further the ends of the
venture 	beyond 	what 	would 	reasonably 	be 	expected 	in 	an 	ordinary 	commercial
transaction.” Doe (S.M.A.) v. Salesforce, Inc., 2024 WL 1337370, at *13 (N.D. Tex. 2024);
see also Doe (C.A.A.) v. Hyatt, 2025 WL 1953857, at *6 (N.D. Tex. 2025). 	Simple
ineffectiveness at curtailing traffickers is not participation in a venture. 	A.D. v. Choice
Hotels Int’l, Inc., 2023 WL 5510267, at *4 (M.D. Fla. 2023). And there must be particular
facts connecting the venture to the specific plaintiff’s trafficking. 	See E.S., 510 F. Supp.
3d at 428 (stating the alleged venture must be the “specific venture that trafficked Plaintiff
on specific occasions at the specific hotels”).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 7
Here, Lydia sufficiently alleged that PKA participated in a venture but did not plead
sufficient facts to infer that G6 or Omni participated in a venture. First, Lydia argues that
G6 participated in a franchisee-franchisor venture with PKA, while PKA’s Motel 6 staff
participated in a venture with Lydia’s traffickers. Pl.’s Resp. 15 [36]. She further asserts
that the Motel 6 staff engaged in the venture by renting rooms to Lydia’s traffickers on a
near daily basis for two months. Pl.’s Resp. 19 [57]. Lydia also alleged that Motel 6 staff
was familiar with at least one of her traffickers because she regularly performed
commercial sex acts and had sold sex to one of the hotel staff members at the Motel 6. Pl.’s
Compl. ¶¶ 85–86. The Court concludes that these allegations of familiarity between hotel
staff and Lydia’s traffickers, combined with the repeated commercial dealings with the
traffickers at the subject hotel bring the hotel staff’s actions “beyond the realm of an
ordinary business transaction.” Doe, 2025 WL 1953857 at *4; see also J.H. v. Paramount
Hosp. LP, 2025 WL 2201051 at *4 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (Concluding the defendant hotel’s
association with plaintiff’s traffickers “was a venture because Plaintiff’s traffickers had
prior commercial dealings with said Defendant at the subject hotel premises by means of
rooms repeatedly rented by the traffickers.”) Thus, these allegations are sufficient to satisfy
the “participation in a venture” element of section 1595 beneficiary liability.
However, Lydia insufficiently alleges that Omni and G6 participated in a venture
because she did not plead any factual allegations that Omni or G6 participated in any
venture 	beyond 	what 	would 	reasonably 	be 	expected 	in 	any 	ordinary 	commercial
transaction. See Doe (S.M.A.), 2024 WL 1337370, at *13. First, she does not allege that
the hotel staff at Omni’s Fort Worth or Dallas locations were familiar with Lydia’s
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 8
traffickers or that any of the hotel staff engaged in specific acts to facilitate the traffickers’
venture. Similarly, while Lydia argues that G6, as PKA’s franchisor, exercises control over
PKA’s management including reservation processes and staff training, these facts do not
allow the Court to infer that G6 participated in a venture with the traffickers. Pl.’s Compl.
¶¶ 115–131. 	Thus, her allegations against Omni and G6 amount to failures to curtail
traffickers rather than participation in any venture. 	A.D., 2023 WL 5510267, at *4.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the beneficiary claims against Omni and G6 for failure
to allege participation in a venture.
3. 	Knew or Should Have Known of Lydia’s Sex Trafficking – Next, Lydia alleges that
each Hotel Defendant knew or should have known of her sex trafficking based on alleged
signs of sex trafficking outlined by No Room for Trafficking. 	These allegations are
insufficient to establish actual or constructive knowledge of Lydia’s trafficking.
Civil liability under TVPRA requires that the defendant “knew or should have
known” the venture has engaged in a criminal TVPRA violation. 	18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
This requires the defendant to have at least “constructive knowledge that the venture
committed the specific § 1591 violation sued upon in the § 1595 civil action.” 	Doe
(S.M.A.), 2024 WL 1337370, at *14. In other words, there must be plaintiff-specific facts
to support this element. 	E.S., 510 F. Supp. 3d at 428–29. 	General allegations about sex
trafficking problems in the hospitality industry are insufficient to put a Hotel Defendant on
notice of the specific plaintiff’s trafficking. J.C., 2020 WL 6318707, at *6. But they may
be relevant, alongside plaintiff-specific facts, to establish a defendant should have known
of a TVPRA violation. Cf. Doe v. Mindgeek USA Inc., 558 F. Supp. 3d 828, 839 (C.D. Cal.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 9
2021) (considering general and plaintiff-specific facts together in concluding defendant
should have known of a violation).
Here, Lydia makes general allegations about sex trafficking issues in the hospitality
industry and specific “classic signs of sex work” demonstrated by Lydia and her traffickers
at each hotel. 	See e.g., Pl.’s Resp. 4 [57]. 	The alleged signs include: (1) Lydia’s
provocative clothing; (2) the fact that Lydia’s bruises were visible to hotel staff; (3)
payment for rooms with cash or a prepaid a prepaid Visa card; (4) requests for extra towels
and linens; (5) several used condoms discarded in the hotel trashcans; and (6) heavy foot
traffic by non-guest men. 	Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 74. 	Lydia also alleges that, at the Forth Worth
Motel 6, one of her traffickers sold sex to a hotel staff member. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 85–86.
These allegations do not suggest that G6, Omni, or PKA knew or should have been
aware of Lydia’s trafficking. 	While these alleged facts may be sufficient to say that an
observer knew or should have known of commercial sex, they do not suggest that G6, Omni
or PKA should have known that Lydia was trafficked as a result of force, fraud, or coercion,
the specific activity prohibited by the TVPRA. 	18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); see also J.B. v. G6
Hosp., LLC, 2020 WL 4901196, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (requiring Plaintiff to plead facts
suggesting defendant should have known of “sex trafficking that violated TVPRA” as
opposed to other “nefarious conduct”).
Because Lydia has failed to allege sufficient facts to establish Defendants had at
least constructive knowledge of her trafficking, the Court grants the motions to dismiss
Lydia K’s beneficiary claim against all Hotel Defendants.
B. The Court Dismisses Lydia’s Perpetrator Liability Claims
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 10
In addition to the beneficiary liability claims, Lydia asserts a perpetrator liability
claim against the Hotel Defendants. 	Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 134. 	A perpetrator liability claim
incorporates the elements of a criminal TVPRA violation under section 1591. Doe (K.E.C.)
v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 719, 728 (E.D. Tex. 2024). Section 1591 states:
(a) Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits,
entices, 	harbors, 	transports, 	provides, 	obtains, 	advertises,
maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in
violation of paragraph (1),
knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1)
is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of
such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex
act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused
to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Thus, while a beneficiary liability claim requires only constructive
knowledge of a sex trafficking violation, a perpetrator liability claim requires a higher level
of knowledge as to the use of force, fraud, or coercion. See Doe (C.A.A.), 25 WL 1953857,
at *6. See also Doe (L.M.) v. 42 Hotel Raleigh, LLC, 717 F. Supp. 3d 464, 473 (E.D.N.C.
2024).
The Court has concluded 	that Lydia failed 	to 	allege actual 	or constructive
knowledge of force, fraud, or coercion as to each Hotel Defendant. Accordingly, Lydia
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 11
likewise fails to meet the more stringent knowledge requirement for perpetrator liability.
Thus, the Court grants the motions to dismiss Lydia’s perpetrator liability claims.
C. The Court Dismisses Lydia’s CAVRA claims
Congress enacted Section 2255, a supplemental civil remedies statute, as part of the
Child Abuse Victims Rights Act of 1986 and created a federal cause of action for victims
of certain federal statute violations relating to trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors,
including the TVPRA. 	18 U.S.C § 2255; see also M.B. v. Camp Stewart for Boys, Inc.,
2013 WL 2297112 at *3 (W.D. Tex. 2013). 	Lydia asserts that each Hotel Defendant is
liable for monetary damages under this statute because she has a TVPRA claim, and Lydia
was trafficked as a minor. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 32. However, as the Court has explained, Lydia
does not have a viable TVPRA claim against any of the Hotel Defendants. Accordingly,
the Court grants the motions to dismiss the CAVRA claims.
D. The Court Dismisses Lydia’s Section 98.002 Claims
Chapter 98 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code imposes civil liability on
any “defendant who engages in the trafficking of persons or who intentionally or
knowingly benefits from participating in a venture that traffics another person.” T EX. C IV.
P RAC . R EM. C ODE § 98.002(a). 	The Texas statute “closely resembles” the TVPRA and
requires knowledge of the plaintiff’s specific trafficking to impose liability. 	A.S. v.
Salesforce, Inc., 2025 WL 1287910, at *7 (N.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting In re Facebook, Inc.,
625 S.W.3d 80, 96 (Tex. 2021)).
The Court finds that Lydia has failed to allege that G6, Omni, or PKA had actual or
constructive knowledge of her trafficking as necessary to state a claim under the TVPRA.
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Because the Texas statute mirrors the TVPRA, the Court concludes that Lydia also fails to
allege facts sufficient to state a claim under Section 98.002(a). 	Accordingly, the Court
grants defendants’ motion to dismiss Lydia’s section 98.002 claim.
C ONCLUSION
Because Lydia fails to plead sufficiently plausible claims under the TVPRA, the
CAVRA, and the Texas human trafficking statute, the Court grants G6, Omni, and PKA’s
motions to dismiss.3
Signed February 10, 2026.
___________________________
David C. Godbey
Senior United States District Judge
3 Lydia did not request leave to amend her complaint. Therefore, the claims are dismissed
with prejudice.
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