USA v. Mokewenye et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
IHECHILURU “CHARLES”
CHIBUEZE OSUEKE (02),
Defendant.
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No. 3:25-CR-379-L
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On March 2, 2026, Defendant Ihechiluru “Chares” Chibueze Osueke filed a
Renewed Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and, Alternatively, Motion to
Revoke or Amend Detention Order: Request for Hearing. (Dkt. No. 62 (“Mot.”).)
The government filed its brief in opposition on March 3, which incorporates its
opposition to a previous motion Osueke filed and later withdrew. (Dkt. No. 63
(“Resp.”); see Dkt. No. 34 (“Prior Resp.”).) By operation of Special Order 3-251, the
motion is automatically referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b).
Because Osueke seeks relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) in the alternative, the
undersigned enters these findings, conclusions, and recommendation under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 3145(b) for determination by United States
District Judge Sam A. Lindsay. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned
recommends that Osueke’s motion be denied.
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I. BACKGROUND
On August 19, 2025, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Osueke with
nine felony counts involving conspiracy, odometer fraud, and forgery. (See Dkt. No.
1.) He first appeared before the Court on the indictment on September 10, 2025,
assisted by stand-in counsel because his retained attorney could not appear that day.
(See Dkt. No. 5.) Osueke was informed that the government filed a motion to detain
and advised of his right to a detention hearing. The undersigned set the detention
hearing for the following week to give Osueke time to confer with his retained
attorney.
On September 15, Osueke appeared before the undersigned magistrate judge
for a detention hearing with a different stand-in attorney who appeared on behalf of
Osueke’s retained attorney. During the hearing, Osueke stated that he had elected to
waive the detention hearing after consulting with attorney, and he confirmed
understanding that, based on his waiver of the hearing, the Court would grant the
government’s motion and order that he remain in custody while the case is pending.
Osueke also verified that he signed the waiver form confirming his decision to waive
the hearing. (See Dkt. No. 21.) Based on his knowing and voluntary waiver, the
undersigned granted the government’s motion and ordered that Osueke be detained
while the charges in the indictment are pending, “subject to any reservation of rights
on the waiver form.” (See Dkt. No. 22.)
Osueke filed a motion to reopen the detention hearing on December 22, 2025.
(Dkt. No. 33.) After the government filed a response under seal (see Dkt. No. 34),
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Osueke filed a notice of his intent to withdraw the motion, stating that, “[a]fter
consultation with counsel, [he] no longer seeks pretrial release at th[at] time[.]”
(Dkt. No. 38.)
Osueke renewed his motion to reopen the detention hearing about two months
later. (See Mot.) He asks to reopen a detention hearing pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)(2) based on new information. Alternatively, he requests that his motion be
treated as one requesting review of a detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). He
contends that his release is appropriate based on the Court’s continuance of trial over
his objection, his current assessment of the government’s case against him, and the
advisory guideline range that he believes would apply if convicted in this case. (See
Mot. at 1-3.) The government asserts that Osueke waived his right to a detention
hearing in his case without reserving the right to move the instant motion, that his
current assessment of the evidence is not new information, and that his assessment of
the guideline range is irrelevant to detention. (See Resp.; Prior Resp. at 5-6.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
A. 	Waiver
The record is clear that Osueke waived his right to a detention hearing. (See
Dkt. No. 21.) The parties dispute whether he reserved rights under the Bail Reform
Act (“BRA”), which would include the right he invokes to request a detention
hearing under § 3142(f)(2) based on new information. The parties look at the same
waiver form signed by Osueke and draw different conclusions about the breadth of
his waiver.
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The form used in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas to
memorialize a defendant’s waiver of the detention hearing contains spaces that may
be marked to fit the particular circumstances of that case. By signing the form, a
defendant states that “I wish to waive my right to a detention hearing at this time”
and affirms his understanding that “waiving my right to a detention hearing will
cause the U.S. Magistrate Judge to grant the government’s motion for detention and
order that I be kept in custody.” (See Dkt. No. 21.) It further states, though, that “I
reserve my right to ask for a detention hearing later” provided that one (or both) of
two spaces is marked: “pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, including 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)(2) and (i); and/or . . . if I am released from state custody.” (See Dkt. No. 21
(footnotes omitted).) Neither of these options is checked on Osueke’s waiver form.
(Id.) The failure to mark either of these options to reserve signifies that Osueke
waived his right to a detention hearing in this matter without reserving any rights he
might have under the BRA. See United States v. King, No. 3:21-CR-439-X, 2022 WL
2670277, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2022).
Osueke contends that the stated reservations in the waiver form are effective in
the document without being affirmatively selected. (See Mot. 3 (“The written waiver
expressly states: ‘I reserve my right to ask for a detention hearing later pursuant to
the Bail Reform Act.’”).) But Osueke’s position ignores that there is a space
provided to select any applicable reservation. That he did not choose to reserve his
rights under the BRA is evident from the failure to check the option for either
reservation. Additionally, it is corroborated by the recording of court proceedings on
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September 15, 2025, when he confirmed his waiver of the detention hearing without
any mention of a reservation of rights by either him or his attorney.1
The record establishes that, after conferring with counsel, Osueke waived his
right to a detention hearing, understanding that his waiver would result in granting
the government’s motion and an order that he remain in custody. The record does
not reflect that Osueke reserved his right to request a detention hearing in the future
under the BRA, and the Court should deny the instant motion based on Osueke’s
waiver.
B. 	18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)
Even if the Court declines to enforce Osueke’s waiver, his motion should be
denied. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2), a court may reopen a detention hearing at any
time before trial if the judicial officer finds that “information exists that was not
known to the movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing on
the issue whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the
appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the
1 The waiver form also has four options from which to select the type of charges on
which the defendant appears in court: (1) indictment, (2) complaint, (3) a petition alleging
violation of supervised release, and (4) a petition alleging a violation of pretrial release. (See
Dkt. No. 21.) None of these options was checked on Osueke’s form. The absence of any
selection among these options on Osueke’s form does not help him in arguing that a failure
to mark a space manifests an understanding that the unselected language becomes part of
the waiver. Logic and the record in these proceedings would undermine any belief that, by
failing to mark any option, Osueke believed he was appearing in court on charges brought
by indictment, complaint, a petition to revoke supervised release, and a petition to revoke
pretrial release. Because Osueke and counsel would understand that the space required an
affirmative selection, the absence of a mark selecting a reservation would evince that a
reservation was not made.
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community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). “The Fifth Circuit has interpreted this
standard as requiring ‘new’ information.” United States v. Morris, 452 F. Supp. 3d
484, 487 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (citing United States v. Stanford, 367 F. App'x 507, 509–10
(5th Cir. 2010)). “New and material information for purposes of § 3142(f)(2)[]
consists of truly changed circumstances, something unexpected, or a significant
event, and courts have interpreted the requirements of this provision strictly.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Conclusory allegations that information was
“newly discovered” are insufficient; “a party seeking to reopen detention must show
how the evidence was discovered and why it was previously unavailable.” Id. (citing
United States v. Stanford, 341 F. App'x 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2009)).
Osueke points to three things that he contends contribute to “materially
changed circumstances that did not exist at the time of [his] waiver[.]” (Mot. at 1.)
First, he asserts that the Court’s continuance of the trial on a codefendant’s motion—
over Osueke’s objection—constitutes a material change in circumstances that extends
his pretrial detention beyond what he contemplated when he waived his detention
hearing. Osueke does not explain how the continuance has a material bearing on his
risk of flight or danger, as it must to be the kind of new information that might
prompt reopening a detention hearing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). In any event, a
brief continuance of trial is not the kind of new information that enables a defendant
to request a new detention hearing. Osueke filed a motion to continue trial (Dkt.
No. 28), resulting in a trial setting in March 2026. An additional continuance of trial
until August 2026 for reasons recognized in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) is entirely usual and
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foreseeable, particularly in a case charging a multi-defendant conspiracy. See Morris,
452 F. Supp. 3d at 487 (noting that new information amounts to something
unexpected or a significant event). This continuance of the trial date is not the kind
of new information that warrants reopening a detention hearing under § 3142(f)(2).
Second, Osueke argues that the government’s production of discovery has
“clarified the evidentiary posture of the case” and suggests that the proof of his
knowing participation in the charged offenses is weak. (See Mot. 2, 4-5 (“[T]he
government’s proof of alleged knowing participation rests primarily on interpretative
inferences drawn from communications rather than broader independent
documentary evidence.”).) The government asserts that Osueke was made aware of
the evidence against him when he, with counsel, attended meetings with the
government in October 2020 and April 2023 and made inculpatory statements about
his participation. (Prior Resp. at 4.) The government also notes that much of its
evidence came from Osueke’s possession, so even if he did not know precisely the
full breadth of the government’s case, he certainly understood what the government
generally knew about his case (as exhibited from his meetings with the government).
The undersigned agrees with the government that this not new information.
Osueke would have known generally of the government’s case and the evidence
supporting it from his pre-indictment meetings—and he does not dispute from the
government’s prior response that he would have known at that time that the
government’s case was premised on showing his guilt based on “interpretive
inferences drawn from communications[.]” (See Mot. at 5.) He could have
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presented that argument at a detention hearing in September 2025. What changed
since is his attorney’s receipt of that evidence in formal discovery and counsel’s
renewed assessment of that evidence. That counsel’s perception of the evidence has
changed since advising the defendant to waive the detention hearing does not
constitute new information that can justify reopening a detention hearing. See United
States v. Acevedo-Baldera, No. 3:18-CR-00155 (AWT), 2020 WL 9156933, at *5 (D.
Conn. Nov. 23, 2020).
Third, Osueke contends that counsel’s calculation of the estimated range of
punishment that the United States Sentencing Guidelines would recommend is an
additional new fact that warrants reopening detention proceedings. Applying a
“conservative, assumption-driven calculation” based on a conviction at trial on all
counts, he estimates that his guideline range would be 15 to 21 months. (Mot. at 5-
6.) In his view, this information is relevant to flight risk because he would not have
incentive to flee from such a low recommended punishment range. (Id. at 6.) Even
accepting that as true, Osueke has not explained how counsel’s calculation of the
guideline range is new information that could not have been known to him using
reasonable diligence at the time of his waiver. The facts (or assumptions) used to
compute Osueke’s guidelines range—no criminal history, conviction on all counts of
the indictment after a jury trial, applicable guideline provisions—were all
information that was available to Osueke when he elected to waive the detention
hearing. That counsel has since taken the time to use that information (or assumed
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information) to actually compute a guidelines range based on his professional
judgment does not render the calculation “new information.”
C. 	18 U.S.C. § 3145(b)
The Court next considers whether reconsideration of detention is appropriate
under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). That provision enables a person to file a motion seeking
review of a detention order that was entered by a magistrate judge. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3145(b). When a defendant seeks review of a magistrate judge’s detention order
within 14 days of the order, as provided by Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(a), the District
Judge’s review is de novo, and he must make an independent determination. See
United States v. Green, No. 3:18-CR-356-S, 2019 WL 6529446, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
4, 2019). When the defendant’s request to review a detention order comes after the
14-day deadline, however, “the right to review is waived, and review by the district
court following such a waiver is discretionary and not a matter of right.” United
States v. Watts, No. 3:09-CR-249-D, 2010 WL 11452009, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 25,
2010); see also United States v. Okoro, No. 3:21-CR-00435-N-4, 2023 WL 6166465, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2023). Osueke filed his motion long after the 14-day period
to seek de novo review. Review of the detention order, therefore, is discretionary.
The Court should decline to reopen a detention hearing. As stated above,
Osueke’s motion is based on no new information, and he has not established that
review is appropriate to remedy any error that accompanied the undersigned entry of
the detention order. In fact, Osueke only makes the motion § 3145(b) in the event
that release is procedurally unavailable under § 3142(f)(2).
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D. 	Due Process
Osueke also contends that, if he is not released, his pretrial detention threatens
to become punitive in violation of due process. (Mot. at 6-9.) The Fifth Circuit has
noted that there is no specific length of pretrial detention that violates due process;
instead, the “due-process limit on the duration of preventive detention requires
assessment on a case-by-case basis.” United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir.
1989). In making that assessment, courts must consider the § 3142(g) factors relevant
to the initial detention decision along with “additional factors such as the length of
the detention that has in fact occurred or may occur in the future, the non-speculative
nature of future detention, the complexity of the case, and whether the strategy of
one side or the other occasions the delay.” Id.
Osueke has been detained for six months, and his case is set for trial in five
months. (See Dkt. No. 61.) This anticipated 11-month period in custody does not, of
itself, constitute an excessively prolonged detention. Cf. United States v. Stanford, 722
F. Supp. 2d 803, 807–08 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (noting, where defendant had been
detained 12 months and would be detained for 19 months by the time of trial, that
“length of detention ‘will rarely by itself offend due process’” (quoting United States v.
Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1993)). Additionally, Osueke has not shown that
the government is to blame for any delay, much less that delay is a prosecutorial
strategy. Osueke joined in one motion to continue trial, and his codefendant sought
another continuance for reasons the Court deemed appropriate. (See Dkt. Nos. 28,
61.) Considering all the relevant factors, the undersigned finds that Osueke’s pretrial
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detention has not crossed over the line to become punitive in violation of his due
process rights and will not do so if detained until the trial scheduled in this case.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY
Osueke’s Renewed Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing and, Alternatively, Motion
to Revoke or Amend Detention Order. (Dkt. No. 62.)
SO RECOMMENDED on March 16, 2026.
_______________________________
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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