Polinski v. Avondale Premier Collection

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PETER J. POLINSKI,
Plaintiff,
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v. §
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No. 3:24-cv-3267-X-BT
AVONDALE PREMIER
COLLECTION, and PREMIERE CAR
COLLECTION, an Avondale
Dealership,
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Defedants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order 3, this pro se civil action
was referred to the United States magistrate judge for case management, including
the entry of findings and a recommended disposition where appropriate. Upon
review of the relevant pleadings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS
this case WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 26, 2024, Peter J. Polinski proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, filed this action against Avondale Premier Collection and Premiere Car
Collection, a car dealership in Dallas, Texas. See ECF No. 3. Polinski alleges
constitutional violations and various statutory claims arising from the dealership’s
refusal to finance his purchase of a Rolls Royce Ghost. See id.
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Polinski has filed several amended complaints all alleging substantially the
same claims and violations. See ECF Nos. 9, 12, 13. Under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 15(a), a party may amend its pleadings “once as a matter of course”
before service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Thereafter, a complaint may
be amended only with leave of the district court. Id.; see also United States ex rel.
Willard v. Human Health Plan of Tex., Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2003).
Here, Polinski filed an amended pleading (ECF No. 9), but then submitted two
additional amended complaints (ECF Nos. 12 and 13) without seeking
leave of court. Ordinarily, such pleadings would have no legal effect. See Ferris
Plaza, Ltd. v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., 2010 WL 2540826, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June
22, 2010) (explaining that an amended complaint filed without leave of court had
“no legal effect”). In this instance, however, the Court will liberally construe
Polinski’s filings and treat the most recent amended complaint (ECF No. 13), as
the operative pleading.
Polinski has also filed multiple “emergency” and other motions in this case,
several of which required no immediate judicial action. See ECF Nos. 17-25, 28-29.
This pattern of repetitive and procedurally irregular filings is consistent with
conduct Polinski has exhibited in other federal courts. A search of judicial dockets
uncovered that Polinski has filed numerous actions in other federal courts arising
from similar theories involving alleged negotiable instruments, private credit
instruments, or purported constitutional violations. In a recent decision, the Court
of Federal Claims noted that Polinski “has filed a dozen cases in this Court,” most
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of which were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, frivolity, or failure to comply with
court orders, and that his filings demonstrated “a concerning pattern of meritless
filings.” Polinski v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 782, 786-87 (2025). The court also
directed him to show cause why he should not be subject to an anti-filing
injunction. Id. In a subsequent order, that court further admonished Polinski for
“abusive litigation tactics,” including the repeated filing of non-meritorious
emergency motions and reliance on fabricated authority. Order and Notice, No.
25-760 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 3, 2025).
These decisions underscore the repetitive nature of Polinski’s filings in
federal courts and the consistent judicial conclusion that his claims lack any
cognizable legal basis. That same pattern is evident here. Despite multiple
amended filings and an opportunity to clarify his allegations through a Magistrate
Judge’s Questionnaire (the “MJQ”), Polinski has not articulated any facts that
would support a viable federal cause of action.
Although Polinski’s amended pleading is difficult to decipher, the Court
liberally construes it to assert constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Thirteenth Amendments, as well as
statutory claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA), and the Sherman Act. In addition, Polinski seeks more
than $30 million in compensatory and punitive damages, arising from the
dealership’s alleged refusal to process or approve his credit application.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a court must dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous “where it lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Even under the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, “threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although courts liberally construe pro se
pleadings, they do not accept “conclusory allegations” or “legal conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions.” Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d
376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “[d]ismissal is proper if the complaint lacks
an allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain relief.” Rios v. City
of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006). Here, Polinski’s claims rest on the
assertion that a private car dealership violated his constitutional rights by denying
him credit to purchase a Rolls Royce. Those allegations do not support any federal
claim.
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B. Polinski’s Constitutional Claims Fail for Lack of State Action
To state a § 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that
the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.
2012) (quoting James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir.2008)).
Polinski asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his
Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The only defendants
identified, however, are private parties—employees of Avondale Premier
Collection—and all alleged conduct arises from a private commercial transaction
involving his attempt to purchase a Rolls Royce. See ECF No. 13 at 5-7 (allegations
concerning denial of financing). His responses to the MJQ confirm the same: he
alleges exclusively private conduct and does not identify any governmental actor
or any state involvement of any kind. See ECF No. 27 (responses throughout).
Because private conduct is not actionable under § 1983, Polinski’s claims fail at the
threshold for lack of state action.
Nor do Polinski’s attempts to rely on federal regulation or database access
establish state action. He contends that the dealership is federally regulated, uses
DMV databases, and operates as a “de facto federal financial intermediary.” ECF
No. 27 at 2-3. These arguments fail as a matter of law. Private parties are not state
actors merely because they are licensed or regulated by the state. See Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982); see also Johnson v. State Farm Mut.
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Automobile Ins. Co., 520 S.W.3d 92, 101 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017) (“A private
party’s actions should not be construed as state action simply because the private
party is licensed by the state.”). Likewise, extensive state or federal regulation—
such as that applicable to the automobile or insurance industries—does not convert
private conduct into state action. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,
42 (1999); see also Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974).
Further, none of the limited circumstances under which private conduct may
be attributed to the government apply here. The Supreme Court recognizes state
action only when: (1) the private party performs a public function; (2) the state
coerced or “significantly encouraged” the conduct; (3) the state is “responsible” for
the private party’s actions; or (4) the state is a joint participant in the challenged
conduct. See Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 55 (2024); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)(“[S]tate action may be found if, though
only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’
that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”)).
None of these circumstances exist here. Merely accessing government databases
in the ordinary course of business or operating under state licensing requirements
does not transform private parties into state actors. See Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011
(receipt of government funding and extensive regulation is insufficient to
transform private businesses into state actors); see also Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at
841-43 (same).
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Because Polinski fails to allege any facts suggesting that Defendants acted
under color of state law, all of his § 1983 claims must be dismissed.
C. Polinski’s Constitutional Claims Fail Even if State Action Were
Present
Even assuming that Defendants acted under color of state law, Polinski’s
constitutional claims still fail because he has not plausibly alleged the deprivation
of any federally protected right. His allegations arise entirely from a private
business’s refusal to extend consumer credit—conduct that does not implicate the
Fourth Amendment, establish a protected property interest under the Fifth
Amendment, or remotely resemble involuntary servitude prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment.
To begin, a credit application voluntarily submitted to a private business is
not “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment
protects against unreasonable government interference with an individual’s
possessory interests. A seizure occurs only where there is “some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests.” United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). And individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in business or financial records they voluntarily provide to third parties.
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976) (bank records voluntarily
conveyed to financial institution are not protected by Fourth Amendment); Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”)). The
dealership’s handling or denial of Polinski’s application therefore cannot
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constitute a seizure. Likewise, Polinski has no constitutionally protected property
interest in receiving credit approval. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is
implicated only when the government takes private property for public use. See
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440-41 (no protected property interest in voluntarily submitted
financial documents). A denied credit application does not deprive a person of
property, and there is no constitutional right to obtain a loan on demand.
Finally, Polinski’s Thirteenth Amendment theory—that he was subjected to
involuntary servitude because he was “forced” into litigating this case—is without
merit. See ECF No. 27 at 8-9. To state a Thirteenth Amendment claim, a plaintiff
must allege that he was subjected to “involuntary servitude,” and was compelled
by “the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion” to work for another’s
benefit. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). Courts have
likewise recognized that even compelled professional services in aid of the judicial
process do not constitute involuntary servitude. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon,
346 F.2d 633, 635-36 (9th Cir. 1965) (“The enforcement of civil rights by
compelling the incidental giving of personal services cannot be considered an
imposition of involuntary servitude.”); Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 799
(5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (“A § 1983 plaintiff, even if demonstrably
indigent, is not entitled to appointed counsel as a matter of right.”); see also Gibson
v. Marsh, 710 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, no writ) (rejecting
argument that appointed representation of a criminal defendant, even with limited
compensation, violates the Thirteenth Amendment).
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Here, Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant used physical force, threats
of criminal sanction, or other state-imposed legal coercion to force him to work for
another’s benefit. He chose to file this lawsuit and to proceed without counsel, and
he remains free to dismiss the case or seek representation at any time. The ordinary
burdens of self-representation in civil litigation are not “servitude” within the
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635-36; see also
Gibson, 710 S.W.2d at 108-10. Polinski’s involuntary servitude theory therefore
“lacks an arguable basis in law” and is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
Because Polinski’s allegations do not plausibly describe any constitutional
violation, all of his § 1983 constitutional claims must be dismissed.
D. Polinski’s Statutory Claims Fail as a Matter of Law
Polinski’s remaining claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and the Sherman Act likewise fail because
his allegations do not support any statutory violation. Although he characterizes
Defendants’ refusal to approve his financing application as unlawful or
discriminatory, the statutes he invokes do not reach the conduct described in his
complaint or in his MJQ responses.
Starting with the FCRA, Polinski alleges that Defendants violated federal law
by accessing his credit report and then denying his application. See ECF No. 13 at
6; ECF No. 27 at 11-13. But the FCRA does not regulate the denial of credit in this
way. Its relevant obligations fall on “furnishers” of credit information—entities that
supply information to consumer reporting agencies—not on creditors who merely
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pull a credit report in evaluating an application. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2. Polinski
does not allege that Defendants supplied false information to any agency or failed
to correct inaccurate information. Instead, he alleges only that the dealership
accessed his report and declined to extend credit, which the statute explicitly
permits. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) (permissible purpose includes evaluating a
consumer’s eligibility for credit). His theory that his credit application is not
“consumer debt” but rather a private trust instrument does not change the
analysis. The statutory framework applies to precisely the kind of personal-use
vehicle financing Polinski sought; nothing in the FCRA supports his contrary
interpretation.
His ECOA claim fares no better. Polinski asserts that he was “discriminated”
against when Defendants refused to accept his self-styled “private credit
instrument” and failed to recognize him as a “lawful and original creditor.” See ECF
No. 13 at 5-7; ECF No. 27 at 14-17. The ECOA prohibits discrimination only on
specific protected bases—race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status,
age, or receipt of public-assistance income. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a). Courts regularly
reject ECOA claims where, as here, the applicant offers only disagreement with a
lender’s underwriting decision rather than evidence of prohibited discrimination.
See, e.g., Hood v. Midwest Sav. Bank, 95 F. App’x 768, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2004)
(affirming dismissal where borrower “failed to present” any direct evidence of
racial discrimination and could not show lender approved similar
applications). Even accepting his allegations as true, a creditor’s refusal to extend
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financing based on an applicant’s unconventional theories about credit does not
suggest discrimination within the meaning of the statute.
Finally, Polinski’s Sherman Act theory does not supply a viable federal claim.
Polinski alleges that Defendants “restrain[ed] trade” by refusing to process his
application and by purportedly coordinating with unnamed institutions to block
the use of “non-traditional” financial instruments. See ECF No. 13 at 7-8; see also
ECF No. 27 at 15-17. To state a Sherman Act claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) [the
defendants] engaged in a conspiracy, (2) the conspiracy had the effect of
restraining trade, and (3) trade was restrained in the relevant market.” Dexon
Computer, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 5:22-CV-53-RWS-JBB, 2023 WL 2941414,
at *16 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No.
522CV00053RWSJBB, 2023 WL 2730656 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting
Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 373 (5th
Cir. 2014)).
Here, Polinski identifies no agreement between Defendants and any party
other than himself. A single firm’s independent decision regarding its own
business practices—such as its underwriting criteria—does not constitute a
conspiracy. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768-
69 (1984). Moreover, a dealership’s decision not to finance a particular transaction
does not restrain trade in any relevant market. Polinski’s argument that
Defendants “coordinate[d] with financial clearing agents and affiliated institutions
to block the use of non-traditional but lawful financial instruments” is entirely
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speculative and unsupported by any factual allegations. ECF No. 27 at 16-17. Such
conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Taken together, these assertions reflect dissatisfaction with a private
lender’s decision not to extend credit, not conduct that violates federal statutory
protections. Because Polinski’s allegations do not state a plausible claim under the
FCRA, ECOA, or Sherman Act, and because further amendment would not cure
the legal defects identified, dismissal is warranted.
III. SANCTIONS
Sanctions may be appropriate when a pro se litigant has a history of
submitting multiple frivolous claims. Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195-97
(5th Cir. 1993); see also Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 802-
03 (5th Cir. 2003) (a violation of any provision of Rule 11(b) justifies sanctions).
Pro se litigants have “no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with
meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Farguson v.
MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, litigants who
abuse the judicial process are “not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the
normal filing fees -- indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period.” Free v.
United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989).
In light of Polinski’s extensive history of meritless filings in other federal
courts and the determinations made in Polinski v. United States, 177 Fed. Cl. 782
(2025), the Court notes that similar patterns have emerged in this case. The Court
of Federal Claims’ admonitions illustrate that Polinski has repeatedly advanced
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legally baseless claims and has previously required judicial warnings regarding
abusive filing practices. The Court should find that Polinski is a vexatious litigant
and direct the clerk of the court not to accept any further actions from him unless
he first obtains leave from a district or magistrate judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)
and (c)(1) (providing for sanctions against pro se litigants).
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no
purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas
Dep't of Veteran Affs., --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 3239806, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 20,
2025) (O'Connor); see also Sanders v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Nov. 14, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec.
4, 2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend
her complaint prior to a dismissal.”) But leave to amend is not required when the
plaintiff has already pleaded his “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-
68 (5th Cir. 2009).
Here, the Court sent Polinski a Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire and
ordered Polinski to state all facts that support his claims in response to this
questionnaire. Polinski has, therefore, pleaded his “best case,” and granting leave
to amend would be futile and cause needless delay. Polinksi’s complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
V. RECOMMENDATION
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court should DISMISS this case WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In addition, the Court should find that Polinski is a vexatious litigant and
direct the clerk of the court not to accept any further actions from him unless
Polinski first obtains leave from a district or magistrate judge.
SO RECOMMENDED.
______________________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in
the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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