Semien v. Dallas Independent School District et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PRENTISS SEMIEN, 	§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3: 24-CV-3147-L-BW
§
DALLAS INDEPENDENT 	§
SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 	§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant Dallas Independent School District’s (“DISD”)
motion to dismiss all claims asserted in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Dkt. No. 16 (“Motion”)
(“Mot.”).) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Special Order No. 3-251, this case is
referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management
and recommendation on claim-dispositive motions. (See Dkt. No. 1.)
Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the undersigned recommends
that the Motion (Dkt. No. 16) be GRANTED as set forth below.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2024, Prentiss Semien, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit
against Defendants DISD, W.H. Adamson High School (“AHS”), and AHS
Principal Stephanie Amaya (“Principal Amaya”) (collectively, “Defendants”),
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asserting claims of “discrimination, retaliation, violation of Title IX rights,[1] and
personal injury.” (See Dkt. No. 3 (“Compl.”).) Defendants jointly filed a motion to
dismiss Semien’s claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted (Dkt. No. 7), which the Court granted, dismissing all
claims against AHS and Principal Amaya and all tort claims against Defendant
DISD, for lack of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Dkt. Nos. 12, 14.) But the
Court granted Semien leave to amend his pleadings to replead his Title VII claims
against Defendant DISD. (See id.)
Semien filed an amended complaint on July 28, 2025 (Dkt. No. 15 (“Am.
Compl.”)), which is now the live pleading. Defendant DISD filed the present
Motion and Appendix in support (Dkt. No. 17 (“D. App.”)) on August 11, 2025, to
which Semien filed a response in opposition on August 31, 2025 (Dkt. No. 18
(“Resp.”)). DISD filed a reply on September 15, 2025. (See Dkt. No. 19 (“Reply”).)
On September 21, 2025, Semien sought leave to file a sur-reply (Dkt. No. 20), which
was denied. (See Dkt. No. 23.)
1 As explained in the undersigned’s previous Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendation (Dkt. No. 14), Title IX provides that “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Because Semien was employed by DISD at the
time of the allegations, he does not have standing to state a claim under Title IX. 	See 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681–88.
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Semien alleges the following facts in his amended complaint. Semien was
employed by DISD during the 2023-2024 schoolyear as an educator and certified
teacher assigned to AHS. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) Semien pleads that, beginning in or
around September 2023, Assistant Principial (“AP”) Oscar Rodriguez subjected him
to “unwelcome and inappropriate behavior of a sexual nature.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)
Semien pleads no specific facts regarding any inappropriate sexual contact or sex-
based behavior. (See id.) Semien merely alleges that in September 2023, AP
Rodriguez entered Semien’s classroom and “stared at him.” (Id.) Although Semien
acknowledges that AP Rodriguez was his supervisor, he alleges that AP Rodiguez
was there “without valid purpose.” (Id. ¶¶ 9, 30, 49.) According to Semien, AP
Rodriguez’s “intrusive presence” made him “increasingly uncomfortable” and
created a “hostile work environment.” (Id. ¶ 9.)
Semien alleges that, in late September and October 2023, he met with the high
school’s mental health clinician because of the “emotional distress” caused by AP
Rodriuez’s classroom visits and attended three counseling sessions through DISD’s
mental health services. (Id. ¶ 11.) On October 3, 2023, Semien sent an email to
Principal Amaya, but Semien complained only that AP Rodriguez had removed
Semien’s planning period to schedule meetings, not about AP Rodriguez’s classroom
visits. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On October 4, 2023, the day after Semien sent this email, Principal Amaya
and AP Rodriguez allegedly performed a walkthrough of Semien’s classroom, made
comments, and rearranged some of his classroom furniture. (Id. ¶ 14.) After the
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classroom visit, they followed up with an email. (Id.) AP Rodriguez also sent
Semien “text messages requesting lesson plans, materials, and other items” so he
could teach Semien’s fifth period class the next day. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16.)
AP Rodriguez reviewed Semien’s lesson plans and told him that his lesson
plans were unacceptable, and Coach Urbina was sent to supervise Semien. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Semien alleges that he experienced more “emotional distress” because of “attempted
isolation, shifting expectations, and rejection of [his] work.” (Id.) After being told
that his lesson plans were unacceptable, Semien told Principal Amaya that “he was
not mentally capable of continuing the day,” after which Principal Amaya sent
Semien home for the day. (Id. ¶ 19.) Semien alleges he then called DISD’s human
resources department and “formally reported the sexual harassment and retaliation.”
(Id. ¶ 20.)
On October 8, 2023, Semien alleges he “sent a follow-up email to Principal
Amaya requesting clarification about his status and expressing ongoing emotional
distress”; Principal Amaya did not respond to the email. (Id. ¶ 21.) When Semien
returned to the campus on October 9, 2023, he was “forced into [a] meeting with
Amaya and Rodriguez” that was “focused on alleged teaching performance issues,”
and the next day AP Rodriguez issued Semien a “Summary of Conference,” which
resulted in Semien being removed from his teaching duties from October 9 to
October 13, 2023, “without explanation”; Semien was also instructed to observe a
certified teacher who was provided as a “model of effective instruction.” (Id. ¶¶ 22–
25.) Semien alleges these events were “professionally humiliating.” (Id. ¶ 25.)
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Semien believes these actions indicated a decision by DISD to “sideline” him
and “sent a clear message of disapproval for his prior complaints and exacerbated the
hostile work environment.” 	(Id. ¶ 25.) Semien further alleges that over the
following months, “[h]is instructional judgment was undermined, his classroom was
micromanaged, and he was subjected to false allegations and exaggerated
criticisms.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Other than alleging that AP Rodriguez “continued to initiate
contact with [Semien]” (id. ¶ 27), the amended complaint does not contain facts
alleging that any of these actions were motivated by Semien’s sex or any explanation
regarding how these actions constituted unwelcome sexual or sex-based conduct.
In February 2024, Semien alleges he told Principal Amaya that AP Rodriguez
made him uncomfortable, and he believed AP Rodriguez was sexually attracted to
him. (Id. ¶ 28.) Semien does not explain why he believed AP Rodriguez was
sexually attracted to him, and he does not allege that AP Rodriguez said or did
anything inappropriate. (See id.) Principal Amaya told Semien she did not believe
that AP Rodriguez was sexually attracted to Semien, but she proposed that Ms.
Cerda, the Attendance Coordinator, be present when AP Rodriguez visited Semien’s
classroom. (Id.) Semien alleges he was told by another staff member that Cerda was
AP Rodriguez’s cousin. (Id.)
Then, on February 20, 2024, Semien alleges he “was unexpectedly added to a
group text message with Rodriguez and Cerda,” wherein AP Rodriguez sent Semien
a message asking if he was in his classroom (he was not). (Id. ¶ 29.) Semien believed
this message was “a pretext for further disciplinary action or another private
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confrontation” and “an act of surveillance and harassment.” (Id.) He also alleges
that Cerda’s involvement “heightened [his] discomfort” because she was “a close
associate or possible family member of Rodriguez.” (Id.)
Two days later, on February 22, 2024, Semien met with AP Michael Gee,
wherein AP Gee presented Semien with a “Summary of Conference” alleging that
Semien had left students unattended during fifth period on February 20, and that
Semien had told support staff that he needed to take the day off for a family
member’s medical appointment. (Id. ¶ 30.) Semien informed AP Gee that he had
communicated with AP Rodriguez about needing to leave campus, to which AP Gee
responded that he had not reviewed that correspondence. (Id.)
Semien also alleges that the printed copy of the text message communication
between Semien and AP Rodriguez presented to him by AP Gee (and allegedly
printed by Cerda) was “incomplete and selectively printed,” which “underscored a
broader pattern of retaliatory and bad-faith discipline by administrators acting in
concert.” (Id. ¶ 31.) When Semien emailed Principal Amaya about this “selective
use of evidence against him,” she responded by scheduling a meeting for February
27, 2024, but Semien alleges that “Amaya abruptly canceled the meeting” when
Semien “notified her that he intended to bring either a union representative or legal
counsel” to the meeting. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Semien next alleges that on May 16, 2024, a Hispanic female student called
him a racial slur after he denied her request to work in a group on her final exam,
and he “reassigned” the student the next day. (Id. ¶ 33.) Semien alleges that when
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he reported the incident to Principal Amaya and “described systemic racism on
campus” to her, she “became angry, yelled at [Semien], and ordered him to submit a
written statement before dismissing him from her office. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.)
Thereafter, on May 22, 2024, Semien alleges he was “placed on 24-hour
administrative leave without explanation and removed from campus by school
security under public and humiliating circumstances.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Although Semien
alleges that he was not told the reason for the leave (see id.), this statement is
contradicted by what he reported in his Charge of Discrimination filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (See D. App. 001 (“I
asked why was I being put on leave and I was told by principal Stephanie Amaya
that some of the parents had gotten together and didn't like some of the things I was
doing.”).)2 Semien alleges that DISD Executive Director Dr. Lourdes Garduño
called him later that day and instructed him not to speak to anyone and then called
back and stated that he was no longer on 24-hour administrative leave and must
report to the district’s central office the following morning. (Id. ¶ 36.)
Semien alleges that when he reported to district headquarters on May 23,
2024, “[h]e received no documentation and was not told the reason for his removal.”
(Id. ¶ 37.) Although Semien appears to allege that he was terminated on May 23
2 Semien’s EEOC Charge, a copy of which was submitted by DISD in support of its
motion to dismiss (App. 001-003), is properly before the Court because it is referred to in
Semien’s complaint (see Am. Comp. ¶¶ 3-4, 43, 41) and is central to his claims. See Collins,
224 F.3d at 498-99; see also Carter v. Target Corp., 541 F. App’x 413, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2013)
(holding that in a Title VII case, a plaintiff’s EEOC charge of discrimination should be
considered as part of a court’s inquiry into a motion to dismiss).
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(id.), he states in his EEOC Charge that he was “formally placed on paid
administrative leave on May 23rd, 2024,” and it was not until June 2024, when other
coaches started calling him, that he learned he had been fired from coaching at AHS
(see D. App. 002). He alleges that on June 12, 2024, his teaching position was
“publicly posted on DISD’s website, even though he was still on paid leave and had
not been terminated.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.)
On June 25, 2024, Semien alleges that his union representative requested all
employment and disciplinary records, but “the District failed to produce several
documents.” (Id. ¶ 39.) 	Then on July 23, 2024, Semien alleges he “received a
partial personnel file and found documents he had never seen[.]” (Id. ¶ 40.) On July
30, 2024, Semien called the Professional Standards Office to inquire about his status
and was told “they had no knowledge of why he was on leave and referred him to
the Title IX department.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Later that day, he “received a Notice of
Allegations from the Title IX department,” apparently arising from a complaint
against Semien by a student; according to Semien, this notice was “the first official
explanation for his removal.” (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.)
Semien also makes allegations taking issue with AP Rodriguez and Principal
Amaya’s participation in the Title IX investigation, allegedly because Principal
Amaya had not referred Semien’s sexual harassment allegations against AP
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Rodriguez “to the Title IX office”3 or initiated a formal investigation against
Rodriguez. 	(Id. ¶ 42.) According to Semien, “[t]his differential treatment reflects a
retaliatory and biased process in which [Semien’s] concerns were disregarded while
his alleged misconduct was pursued aggressively.” (Id.)
On December 13, 2024, Semien received written notice that he was found
“Not Responsible” in the Title IX investigation initiated against him by a student.
(Id. ¶ 44.) Semien was informed that he could return to AHS, but he would still be
expected to work under the supervision of AP Rodriguez. (Id. ¶ 45.) Semien alleges
that he refused this offer, and the District thereafter transferred him to a middle
school and assigned him to teach a subject he had never taught before. (Id.) Semien
alleges that these actions “represented a retaliatory and punitive demotion” that
“effectively terminated [his] high school teaching position and subjected him to
continued retaliation.” (Id.)
Semien alleges sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47-62.) 	Although Semien
asserts that he is an African American male (see, e.g., Id. ¶ 48), none of the factual
allegations in his amended complaint involve race-based discrimination or
retaliation, only sex-based discrimination. Semien seeks a monetary award of ten
million dollars, comprised of compensatory damages for emotional distress, pain and
3 As he did in his original complaint. Semien appears to confuse Title IX’s
prohibition on discrimination in educational programs with Title VII’s prohibition on
discrimination in employment. (See generally Dkt. No. 3.)
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suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, lost wages and other
employment benefits, as well as punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. (Id. ¶ 63.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches
Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). Such a motion therefore is “not meant
to resolve disputed facts or test the merits of a lawsuit” and “instead must show that,
even in the plaintiff’s best-case scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case
for relief.” Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020). A
plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts
with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” id. at
555. At this stage, the court does not evaluate the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.
See Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2017).
Rather, it only determines whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief
can be granted. See id.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
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possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. So, “[w]here a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (cleaned up); see also Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-
10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (unpublished) (“[J]ust as
plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible
inferences using speculation.”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed factual
allegations, but it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and
conclusions. And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it
is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Consequently, a
threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. And so, “to survive a motion to
dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”
that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,
and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court limits its review to the face of
the pleadings. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999). “Pleadings”
for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion include attachments to the complaint. In re
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Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d at 205; Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter,
224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941
F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The Civil Rules provide that an attachment to a
complaint generally becomes ‘part of the pleading for all purposes,’ including for
ruling on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); citations omitted)).
And “[w]hen ‘an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an exhibit attached to
the pleading, then indeed the exhibit and not the allegation controls.’” Rogers v. City
of Yoakrum, 660 F. App’x 279, 285 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States ex rel.
Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing, in turn,
Simmons v. Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co., 113 F.2d 812, 813 (5th Cir. 1940))).
Similarly, documents “attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered part of
the pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [his]
claim[s].” Collins, 224 F.3d at 498-99 (quotations omitted); accord Benchmark
Electronics, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 725 (5th Cir.2003). Attachments
falling under these categories may be properly considered without converting the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Benchmark Electronics,
343 F.3d at 725.
A plaintiff may not amend his allegations through a response to a motion to
dismiss, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but leave to amend must be granted freely “when
justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). One reason to deny amendment is
futility: “If the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal, then
amendment is futile and the district court [is] within its discretion to deny leave to
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amend.” Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2022)).
“Pro se complaints receive a ‘liberal construction.’ Even so, ‘mere conclusory
allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.’” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d
489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018);
United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989)). And “liberal
construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there
are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-CV-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at
*8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).
III. ANALYSIS
A. 	Semien’s Title VII Discrimination Claim
Semien asserts a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on sexual
harassment, specifically based on the allegation that he “was subjected to unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature by [AP Rodriguez].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) To state a
hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Semien must plausibly allege that
(1) he was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment by his supervisor; (2) the
harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive that it affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment; and (3) DISD knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const.
Co., 731 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013).
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1. Semien’s Title VII discrimination claim is time barred.
A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII must timely file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged discrimination
occurred. Stith v. Perot Sys. Corp., 122 F. App’x 115, 117 (5th Cir. 2005); see Pacheco v.
Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788–91 (5th Cir. 2006); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d
376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002). This 300-day time limit operates as a statute of
limitations. Storbeck v. Saks Fifth Ave., 224 F.3d 764, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). Claims that
are not based on any alleged discrimination that occurred within the 300-day
window must be dismissed. Woods v. Lancaster Indep. Sch. Dist., 834 F. Supp. 2d 512,
516 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379).
Semien filed his EEOC Charge on September 18, 2024. (D. App. 002.) So, to
pursue a Title VII claim, Semien must plausibly assert discrimination that occurred
300 days before September 18, 2024, the date he filed his filed his EEOC Charge. See
Anderson v. City of Dall., 116 F. App’x 19, 27 (5th Cir. 2004) (“An individual [raising
claims] under Title VII must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within
300 days of learning of the allegedly adverse employment action.”); Hendricks v. Boy
Scouts of America, No. 3:15-CV-00304-M, 2015 WL 5459612, at *5–6 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 16, 2015); Stith, 122 F. App’x at 117. Thus, the events underlying Semien’s
claim must have occurred on or after November 23, 2023, which is 300 days before
September 18, 2024.
Here, Semien’s allegations describe events that occurred in September and
October 2023, but those allegations cannot support his discrimination claim because
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they occurred more than 300 days before Semien filed his EEOC Charge. (Compare
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–27 with D. App. 001–002.) Because all of the events Semien
alleges in support of his sexual harassment claim occurred more than 300 days before
he filed his EEOC Charge, his discrimination claim must be dismissed as time
barred. Woods, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (citing Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379).
Semien’s response fails to meaningfully respond to DISD’s argument that his
discrimination claim is based on conduct that is time barred. (See Resp. at 8-9.) In
fact, he concedes that the “critical events” for his discrimination claim occurred in
October 2023. (See id. at 2–3.) And while Semien’s response discusses some events
that occurred after November 2023—for example, the February 2024 meeting with
AP Gee and the events that unfolded in May 2024 when Semien was placed on
administrative leave—he fails to explain how any of these events support his
allegations of sexual harassment. (See id. at 6, 8, 10.) In fact, it is clear from
Semien’s assertions that the events that occurred in May 2024 had nothing to do with
his allegations against AP Rodriguez, but rather, concerned DISD’s response to a
student’s Title IX complaint against Semien. (See id. at 8.) Although Semien alleges
that the Title IX investigation showed “differential treatment” and a “biased process”
when compared to the handling of his harassment allegations against AP Rodriguez
(see Am. Compl. ¶ 42), this is based on nothing more than Semien’s subjective beliefs
and unsupported conclusory assertions, which fails to plausibly allege that these later
events plausibly support his retaliation claim. Thus, Semien’s attempt to save his
discrimination claim by pointing to events that occurred within the 300-day time
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limit are unavailing, and his discrimination claim should be dismissed as time
barred.
2. Semien fails to plausibly state a Title VII discrimination claim.
Semien’s Title VII claim may also be dismissed on the independent basis that
he fails to allege facts that would support that claim. Although Semien asserts that
he was “subjected to unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature by” AP Rodriguez, his
complaint includes no factual allegations showing any harassment because of his sex.
To pursue a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must plausibly plead an adverse
employment action “taken against a plaintiff because of [the plaintiff’s] protected
status.” Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019)). When the
Title VII claim is based on an allegation of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must
plausibly plead conduct that is actually harassment because of his sex. Boh Bros.
Constr. Co., 731 F.3d at 453.
Although Semien’s amended complaint repeatedly makes conclusory
assertions of sexual harassment by AP Rodriguez (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10, 11, 20,
23, 28, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 53), Semien does not allege any well-pleaded facts showing
that AP Rodriguez did anything because of Semien’s gender. 	(See generally id.) And
there are no plausible allegations that AP Rodriguez engaged in any unwelcome
sexual conduct—such as flirting, sexual inuendoes, or touching. Rather, all Semien’s
allegations regarding AP Rodriguez describe nothing more than evaluations and
criticisms of Semien’s work performance, such as entering Semien’s classroom
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“without valid purpose” and “lingering,” changing Semien’s planning period to
schedule meetings, conducting a classroom walkthrough, and texting after hours to
request lesson plans and other materials. (Id. ¶¶ 9–18.) None of Semien’s objective
factual allegations describe any conduct by AP Rodriguez that was sexual in nature
or taken because of Semien’s gender or any other protected characteristic.
Semien also fails to allege any actionable harassment that was severe or
pervasive. Title VII is not a general civility code for the American workplace and
does not prohibit all perceived harassment in the workplace. See, e.g., Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998). A plaintiff must plausibly
plead that the alleged harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive. Strife v. Aldine
Indep. Sch. Dist., 138 F.4th 237, 248 (5th Cir. 2025) (affirming dismissal of a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII).
Courts analyze whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive by
asking whether a reasonable person would find the conduct to be hostile or abusive.
See Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2021). A hostile
work environment exists when a workplace is “permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive work environment.” Id.
at 399. Conduct is not sufficiently severe or pervasive unless the conduct rises to the
level that it can be considered to affect a term or condition of employment. Id.
For example, conduct has been deemed insufficiently severe or pervasive even
when the allegations describe “rampant offensive homosexual comments and
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innuendo.” Thomas v. Link Staffing, No. 4:17-CV-3902, 2019 WL 497617, at *1, 7
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 480133 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2019).
Similarly, allegations that a male employee grabbed plaintiff’s buttocks, attempted to
stick his tongue in her ear on several occasions, and solicited dates from plaintiff
have also been held to be insufficient. Gibson v. Potter, No. 05-1942, 2007 WL
1428630, at *6 (E.D. La. May 10, 2007); see also Hollins v. Premier Ford Lincoln
Mercury, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 736, 744 (N.D. Miss. 2011) (granting summary
judgment on hostile work environment claim where plaintiff was cursed at several
times, told that she needed to reward customer with sex for purchasing car from her,
and was called a “bitch” the same day her employment was terminated).
In this case, Semien alleges no conduct that comes close to establishing
offensive conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive. Semien does not allege that
AP Rodriguez ever made any offensive comments; he does not allege that AP
Rodriguez ever touched him inappropriately or asked him out on a date; and he does
not allege that AP Rodriguez ever cursed at him or made any sexually inappropriate
comments. (Compare Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–27 with Thomas, 2019 WL 497617 at *1, 7;
Gibson, 2007 WL 1428630, at *6; Hollins, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 744.)
Instead of alleging any objectively offensive conduct, Semien merely alleges
that his supervisor “entered [his] classroom, lingered for extended periods, stared
inappropriately, and created an increasingly uncomfortable and hostile work
environment through his persistent and intrusive presence.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)
Without more, however, these allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See Kaiser
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Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.
1982) (“Although we must accept as true the well-pleaded allegations of a complaint
[. . . ], we do not accept as true conclusory allegations in the complaint.”). Semien
also alleges that he felt “undermined,” “micromanaged,” and “professionally
humiliate[ed]” by AP Rodriguez’s oversight of his teaching performance. (See e.g.,
id. ¶ 26.) While this criticism and oversight may have been unpleasant, it is not the
type of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficient to support a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII. Rather, these allegations merely allege the
type of complaints that any employee might have about his supervisor and do not
rise to the level of conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to support a Title
VII claim. See Friend v. McAdams, 861 F. App’x 825, 830-31 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding
allegations of screaming at the employee, refusing to meet with her, saying that she
would not be around much longer, and other incidents insufficient to state a claim
for hostile work environment under Title VII).
Semien argues in his response that he is not required to allege a prima facie
case. (See Resp. at 2, 4, 6–7.) While it is true that a plaintiff is not required to plead
a prima facie case of discrimination in his complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, see, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002), a plaintiff still
must plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
his employer discriminated against him, Stone v. La. Dep't of Revenue, 590 F. App’x
332, 339 (5th Cir.2014); Hendricks v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. 3:15-CV-00304-M, 2015
WL 5459612, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2015). Therefore, Semien is required to
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provide more than an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Semien is required to adequately plead facts in
support of his Title VII claims, Lanier v. Wise Cnty., No. 24-10962, 2025 WL
2419612, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2025), which he has failed to do—even after the
Court provided him with the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
Because Semien has failed to state a Title VII discrimination claim, this claim
should be dismissed.
B. 	Semien’s Title VII Retaliation Claims
Semien asserts a Title VII retaliation claim based on the assertion that he
experienced a “pattern of materially adverse actions” because of his reports of sexual
harassment, racial discrimination by a student, and “differential retaliatory
treatment.” (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56–59.) Defendant DISD contends that Semien’s
retaliation claim should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) Semien did not exhaust
administrative remedies because he failed to mention any retaliation in his EEOC
Charge, and (2) the allegations in his amended complaint do not establish any of the
necessary elements. The undersigned agrees.
To state a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies, see Owens v. Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 793 F. App’x 298,
300 (5th Cir. 2019), and then allege that he (1) engaged in activity protected by Title
VII; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that a causal link exists
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Burlington N. &
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Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59–70 (2006); Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d
314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014).
1. Semien failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his Title VII
retaliation claim.
A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination or retaliation under Title VII
must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing his claims in federal court. See
Owens, 793 F. App’x at 300; Jefferson v. Christus St. Joseph Hosp., 374 F. App’x 485,
489–90 (5th Cir. 2010). Exhausting administrative remedies is a mandatory requisite
to filing suit. Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788–91. A plaintiff exhausts administrative
remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC and receiving a statutory right to
sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1); Taylor, 296 F.3d at 378–79; see also Brooks v.
Firestone Polymers, LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d 816, 841 (E.D. Tex. 2014) (“It is well settled
that courts may not entertain claims brought under Title VII as to which an
aggrieved party has not first exhausted [her] administrative remedies by filing a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.”).
“The scope of a Title VII complaint is limited to the scope of the investigation
which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.”
Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Jennings
v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 342 (5th Cir. 2021). A district court can entertain
only those claims that are either included in an EEOC charge or are based on
conduct subsequent to the EEOC charge that is reasonably related to the conduct
alleged in the charge. See Smith v. AT&T Mobility Servs., L.L.C., No. 21-20366, 2022
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WL 1551838, at *2 (5th Cir. May 17, 2022) (unpublished); Randel v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998). “Courts should not condone lawsuits that
exceed the scope of EEOC exhaustion, because doing so would thwart the
administrative process and peremptorily substitute litigation for conciliation.”
McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008). An EEOC
complaint must be “sufficiently precise” to describe the “action(s) or practice(s) that
form the basis of the complaint.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.106(c).
To determine whether an allegation falls within the scope of a charge, a court
must “engage in fact-intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the
administrative charge, and look slightly beyond its four corners, to its substance
rather than its label.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789. Even so, a “crucial element” of the
EEOC charge “is the factual statement contained therein.” Manning v. Chevron Chem.
Co., 332 F.3d 874, 879 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431
F.2d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 1970)). “The court will not read the EEOC charge so
liberally ‘that a plaintiff does not need to state the basic facts that make up his
discrimination claim because a plaintiff does not need legal assistance to merely
articulate the facts underlying his claims.’” Warren v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:15-CV-
02142, 2019 WL 13257716, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2019) (citing Stanley v. Univ. of
Tex. Med. Branch, Galveston, TX, 425 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (internal
citations omitted). Claims in a lawsuit are not exhausted unless they are “like or
related” to the claims in the charge. McClain, 519 F.3d at 273.
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Here, Semien’s EEOC Charge does not mention any allegations of retaliation.
(See D. App. 001–002.) In the “Particulars” section of the Charge, Semien details
many of the same harassment allegations from the 2023–24 school year discussed
above, as well as the incident of being called a racial slur by a student. (See id.) He
also mentions discovering a mold infestation in his classroom in October 2023. (Id.)
But Semien does not claim that any of these actions were in retaliation for any
protected activity. (See D. App. 001-001.) In fact, he does not use the word
“retaliation,” or any variation of that word, anywhere in his EEOC Charge. (See id.)
Other than briefly alleging his claims of sexual harassment, the mold infestation in
his classroom, and the racial slur by a student, he devotes most of the space in his
Charge to recounting the events that occurred in May 2024 when he was placed on
paid administrative leave, allegedly without being given a reason. (Id.) Semien did
not allege anywhere in his EEOC Charge that he believed he experienced any
unlawful retaliation. (Id.)
Because Semien’s EEOC Charge alleged only discriminatory conduct and did
not assert retaliation (or otherwise set forth any facts related to any purported
protected activity or retaliatory conduct), Semien has failed to exhaust administrative
remedies for any retaliation claim. See, e.g., Jefferson, 374 F. App’x at 490 (affirming
dismissal of plaintiffs’ retaliation claims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies where their EEOC charges only identified certain discrimination claims);
Teffera v. N. Tex. Tollway Auth., 121 F. App’x 18, 21 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming
dismissal of retaliation claim where plaintiff did not check “retaliation” on his EEOC
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charge, and referenced only national origin discrimination); Stanley, 425 F. Supp. 2d
at 822–23 (concluding that “[p]laintiff's failure to articulate any facts concerning
retaliation that would have put the EEOC on notice about the possibility of such,
accompanied by his failure to check the retaliation box” was fatal to his retaliation
claim).
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned determines that Semien failed to
exhaust administrative remedies on his retaliation claims and as a result, he cannot
seek review of these claims in federal court. Therefore, his retaliation claim should
be dismissed on this basis.
2. Semien does not plausibly allege that he reported an activity made
unlawful by Title VII.
Even if Semien had exhausted administrative remedies, his retaliation claim
still fails for failure to state a claim for an independent reason. An employee has
engaged in activity protected by Title VII if he either opposed a practice made
unlawful by Title VII or “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–3(a); Hagan v. Echostar Satellite LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008).
Internal complaints to employers may constitute protected activity, but such
complaints must at least reference unlawful discrimination. Phillips v. HCA
Healthtrust, No. 3:19-CV-2642-D-BN, 2020 WL 5636947, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19,
2020). “[A]n employee cannot simply complain that []he received unfair or
undesirable treatment” in the workplace to establish he engaged in protected activity.
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Carter, 541 F. App’x at 418–19; see also Harris-Childs v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 169 F.
App’x 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment of Title VII retaliation
claims because plaintiff’s internal complaints did not reference her race or sex).
Complaints about personality conflicts and undesirable work conditions that do not
reference unlawful discrimination under Title VII do not constitute Title VII
protected activity. See Harris-Childs, 169 F. App’x at 916.
Here, as discussed above, Semien’s factual assertions do not plausibly allege
any conduct that constitutes sexual harassment, a hostile work environment, or any
other discrimination actions. As such, he did not experience discrimination, so there
was no unlawful practice to oppose. Additionally, although Semien alleges that he
made various complaints throughout the year, those complaints concern working
conditions, student behavior, or administrative decisions—not discrimination
because of sex. And even though Semien alleges he “sought help” from the campus
mental health clinician on October 2, 2023, and called DISD’s human resources
department on October 6, 2023, to report the alleged sexual harassment (see Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 11, 20), those reports are not protected because the conduct Semien
alleges to have reported—AP Rodriguez entering his classroom, lingering, and
sending text messages—does not plausibly amount to sex-based harassment. (See id.
¶¶ 9–27.
Furthermore, with respect to the call to human resources, neither the amended
complaint nor Semien’s response describe what he reported, and he does not allege
that this complaint to human resources was ever communicated to any
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decisionmaker. (See id. ¶ 20; see also Resp. at 12.) Absent these essential factual
allegations, Semien’s internal report is not a protected activity and could not have
caused an adverse action. See, e.g., Carter, 541 F. App’x at 418–19 (affirming
dismissal of Title VII retaliation claim because, although the plaintiff alleged that she
internally reported discrimination, her internal report did not reference any
discriminatory employment practice).
Nor does Semien allege that, in making those complaints, he conveyed that he
believed that AP Rodriguez was engaging in unwelcome sexual conduct or singling
him out because of his sex. (See id.) Complaints about discomfort or unwanted
oversight, without more, do not suffice as Title VII protected activity. See Davis v.
Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that
statements that a supervisor created a hostile work environment did not constitute
protected activity, where the “complaint lacked a . . . gender basis” and that “a vague
complaint without any reference to an unlawful employment practice under Title
VII, does not constitute protected activity”); King v. Louisiana, 294 F. App’x 77, 85
(5th Cir. 2008) (“[A]llegations of unpleasant work meetings, verbal reprimands,
improper work requests, and unfair treatment do not constitute actionable adverse
employment actions as discrimination or retaliation.”).
Similarly, Semien’s February 2024 report to Principal Amaya that he believed
AP Rodriguez was sexually attracted to him (see id. ¶¶ 27–28) is not protected activity
because the conduct reported was not sex-based harassment. Furthermore, Semien
does not allege any facts to support this subjective belief. (See id.) An employee’s
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subjective belief that a supervisor might be physically attracted to him is not a report
of Title VII sexual harassment. See Davis, 448 F. App’x at 493; Brown v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 406 F. App’x 837, 840 (5th Cir. 2010); King, 294 F. App’x at 85. Semien
does not plead that he reported to Principal Amaya (or anyone else) that AP
Rodriguez had sexually harassed him or ever made any sexually inappropriate
comments, touched him inappropriately, asked him out on a date, or engaged in any
unwelcome sexual or sex-based conduct towards him.
Semien’s remaining allegations also have nothing to do with any conduct that
could be considered unlawful under Title VII. For example, Semien alleges that on
October 3, 2023, he emailed Principal Amaya to complain that AP Rodriguez had
improperly removed his planning period, but he pleads no facts that this action was
motivated by his sex or was harassment based on sex. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)
Semien also alleges that on October 5, 2023, he reported mold in his classroom (id.
¶ 17), but that report also has nothing to do with any unlawful employment practice
under Title VII. See King, 294 F. App’x at 85. Semien further alleges that he
reported a student’s use of a racial slur and raised concerns about “systemic racism”
impacting DISD students in May 2024 (id. ¶¶ 33–34), but complaints of student
misconduct or campus culture do not amount to reports opposing or complaining
about unlawful employment discrimination and therefore, cannot support a Title VII
retaliation claim. See Davis, 448 F. App’x at 493; King, 294 F. App’x at 85.
Semien’s Title VII discrimination claim cannot be based on allegations of
“opposition alone;” it must be based on allegations regarding “opposition of a practice
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made unlawful by Title VII.” E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Servs., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 240 (5th
Cir. 2016). Because Semien fails to identify any protected activity under Title VII, he
has not plausibly alleged that he engaged in Title VII protected activity.
Accordingly, his retaliation claim should be dismissed for this additional reason.
3. Semien does not allege any adverse employment actions in retaliation for
any of his “reports.”
Even if Semien had plausibly alleged that he engaged in protected activity, his
retaliation claim still fails because he does not plausibly allege that DISD subjected
him to any adverse employment action because of any protected activity. Long v.
Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (requiring the action be “materially adverse”).
Semien identifies various events that he labels as retaliatory, including
classroom walkthroughs, rejection of lesson plans, being required to observe another
teacher, changes to his teaching duties, and his eventual removal from campus and
reassignment. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14–16, 25, 30, 38, 45, 59.) But none of these
actions constitute an adverse employment action. First, Semien’s allegations that AP
Rodriguez criticized his performance, conducted walkthroughs, rearranged
classroom furniture, rejected instructional materials, and observed his teaching are
routine employment matters that cannot constitute adverse employment actions. See
Harris v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 3:22-CV-2279-K-BN, 2024 WL 4958265, at *5–6
(N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL 4960009 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2024)
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(holding that close scrutiny, schedule changes, denial of days off, and undesirable
assignments are not materially adverse employment actions).
Next, regarding Semien’s allegation that his removal from the classroom was
an adverse employment action (see Am. Compl. ¶ 59), Semien’s own allegations
establish that he was removed from the classroom and placed on paid administrative
leave because of a Title IX investigation initiated by a student complaint against him,
not in response to any of his complaints about AP Rodriguez (id. ¶¶ 35–38, 41–44).
Finally, Semien alleges that his reassignment to a middle school campus
following the favorable Title IX determination was an adverse employment action
(see id. ¶ 59), but Semien affirmatively pleads that DISD offered to reinstate him in
his position at AHS and only reassigned him when he refused to work under AP
Rodriguez (see id. ¶ 45). Rather than demonstrating retaliation, these pleaded facts
show that DISD attempted to work with Semien to honor his request to remain
similarly employed, but not at AHS because he did not want to work under AP
Rodriguez. (See id.)
Second, this allegation does not establish any connection between his reports
allegedly made in October 2023 and February 2024 and his reassignment, which
occurred over a year later, in February 2025 (id. ¶ 45). See Ajao v. Bed Bath and
Beyond Inc., 265 F. App’x 258, 265, 265 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that “temporal
proximity of four months is not close enough, without additional supporting
summary-judgement evidence.”); Garvin v. Sw. Corr., L.L.C., 391 F. Supp. 3d 640,
653 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (“Temporal proximity alone may suffice when the acts are
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separated by weeks, but a gap of five months is not sufficient without other evidence
of retaliation.”).
Accordingly, Semien fails to plausibly allege that DISD took any materially
adverse action against him because he engaged in protected activity, and his
retaliation claim should be dismissed on this additional basis.
C. 	No Leave to Amend
The Fifth Circuit advises courts to give pro se plaintiffs several opportunities
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Scott v. Byrnes, No. 3:07-CV-
1975-D, 2008 WL 398314, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2008); Sims v. Tester, No.
CIV.A.3:00CV0863D, 2001 WL 627600, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2001). District
courts therefore typically allow pro se plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their
complaints when the action is to be dismissed pursuant to a court order. See Robinette
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:96-CV-2923-D, 2004 WL
789870, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 12, 2004); Sims, 2001 WL 627600, at *2.
The Court may deny leave to amend only when “there is substantial reason to
deny leave to amend.” Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir.
1981). Factors to consider when deciding whether to grant leave to amend include
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated
failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to
the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of the
amendment.” Id. at 598. Granting leave to amend is futile when the amended
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complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See, e.g.,
Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000). Such is the case here.
For the reasons explained above, Semien’s Title VII discrimination claim is
time barred, and his Title VII retaliation claim is barred for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. These deficiencies cannot be cured, and therefore allowing
Semien to amend his claims would be futile.
Additionally, “granting leave to amend is not required if the plaintiff has
already pleaded his ‘best case.’” Bryant v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:17-CV-3121-
C (BT), 2018 WL 4290791, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL
4283556 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2018) (citing Wiggins v. La. State Univ.—Health Care
Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2017)). Here, Semien was previously
granted leave to amend his pleadings to replead his Title VII claims against DISD.
(See Dkt. No. 14.) At that time, Semien was advised that the Court would consider
his amended complaint to be his best pleaded case. (See id.) Furthermore, Semien
has had an opportunity to plead his best case in response to Defendant DISD’s
motion to dismiss. See Williams v. Richardson ISD, No. 3:24-CV-1288-D-BW, 2025
WL 2534677, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2025), adopted, 2025 WL 2533105 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 2, 2025). Accordingly, for this additional reason, the undersigned
concludes that Semien has pleaded his “best case” and further leave to amend is not
warranted. Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading U.S. of Am. Co., 195
F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1999) (a court has discretion not to allow amendment when
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an amendment would be frivolous or futile); Beam v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No.
3:19-CV-01201-M-BT, 2020 WL 5868567, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2020) adopted as
modified, 2020 WL 5848973 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2020) (dismissing plaintiff’s amended
complaint after determining plaintiff pleaded her best case); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v.
La. Land & Expl. Co., 110 F.3d 253, 258 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[J]udges have the power to
control their dockets by refusing to give ineffective litigants a second chance to
develop their case.”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant DISD’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff Semien’s First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 16) be
GRANTED, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and all claims
against Defendant DISD be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO RECOMMENDED on January 8, 2026.
BRIAN McKAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An
objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the
magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the
aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(extending the time to file objections to 14 days).
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