Teal v. Crete Carrier Corporation et al

United States District Court
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JASMINE TEAL §
8
v. §§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-2877-S
CURTIS ST. CLAIR, JR., and CRETE §
CARRIER CORPORATION d/b/a §
SHAFFER TRUCKING §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Defendants Curtis St. Clair, Jr. and Crete
Carrier Corporation’s Brief in Support of Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) [ECF
No. 66].! The Court has reviewed the Motion, Plaintiff Jasmine Teal’s Response to the Motion
(“Response”) [ECF No. 77], Defendants’ Specific Objections to Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment
Evidence (“Objections”) [ECF No. 84], Defendants’ Reply to the Response [ECF No. 85], the
summary judgment evidence, and the applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court
GRANTS the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This suit arises from a motor vehicle collision. Pl.’s First Am. Compl. (“Amended
Complaint”) [ECF No. 20] { 6. Plaintiff Jasmine Teal alleges that Defendant Curtis St. Clair, Jr.,
while driving a tractor-trailer owned by Defendant Crete Carrier Corporation d/b/a Shaffer
Trucking, made an unsafe lane change and struck her vehicle. Jd. 4] 7-17. She sued, asserting
negligence and gross negligence claims against St. Clair and claims of negligent entrustment,
respondeat superior, negligent hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision, and gross
negligence against Crete. Id. at 5-23.
1 Defendants filed two identical documents with different titles, ECF Nos. 65, 66. The Court construed ECF
No. 66 as a motion despite its title. See ECF No. 67.
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Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of gross negligence and
negligent entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision. See generally Mot. Defendants also object
to some of the evidence on which Plaintiff relies in her Response. Objs. 1-2.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
Courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. Civ.
P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In making this determination,
courts must view all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The moving
party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its belief that there is no genuine
issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
When the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he “must establish beyond
peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor.”
Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (Sth Cir. 1986). When the nonmovant bears the
burden of proof, the movant may demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment either by
(1) submitting evidence that negates the existence of an essential element of the nonmovant’s
claim or affirmative defense, or (2) pointing out that there is no evidence to support an essential
element of the nonmovant’s claim or affirmative defense. Celofex, 477 U.S. at 322-25. Once the
movant has made this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact so that a reasonable jury might return a verdict in its favor.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). “[C]onclusory
statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions” will not suffice to satisfy the nonmovant’s
burden. RSR Corp. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 612 F.3d 851, 857 (Sth Cir. 2010). The court resolves factual
controversies in favor of the nonmoving party “only when an actual controversy exists, that is,
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when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of
Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Wash. Cap. Dus,
Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (Sth Cir. 1995)).
I. ANALYSIS
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims of gross negligence and negligent
entrustment, hiring, training, and supervision. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
A. Gross Negligence
Under Texas law, gross negligence is conduct that “when viewed objectively from the
standpoint of the actor at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk, considering
the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others” and “of which the actor has actual,
subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceeds with conscious indifference
to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.” TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001(11). The Texas
Supreme Court describes gross negligence as having both an “objective and a subjective
component.” Medina v. Zuniga, 593 S.W.3d 238, 247 (Tex. 2019). An extreme degree of risk
sufficient to establish the objective component is “a threshold significantly higher than the
objective ‘reasonable person’ test for negligence.” /d. at 249.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot adduce any evidence to prove that either Crete or
St. Clair acted with gross negligence. Mot. §{ 16-17. In her response, Plaintiff does not argue in
support of the gross negligence claim against St. Clair or identify any evidence to show either that
St. Clair’s conduct involved an extreme degree of risk or that St. Clair acted with conscious
indifference to any such risk. St. Clair is therefore entitled to judgment in his favor on this claim.
Plaintiff's Response purports to provide evidence in support of Plaintiff's gross negligence
claim against Crete. The Response attaches excerpts from the deposition testimony of Matthew
DiVito, Crete’s corporate representative. App. in Support of Resp. (“Plaintiff's Appendix”) [ECF
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No. 77-1] 1-22.? Those excerpts establish that Crete was generally aware that hiring drivers who
do not drive defensively could increase the risk of accidents. Pl.’s App. 8:4-7. Those excerpts also
establish that Crete was aware that St. Clair had committed four moving violations, one in
connection with an accident, between 2010 and the time of the accident. fd. at 13:21-14:3.
That evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a claim for gross negligence.
“Gross negligence can be supported only by an extreme degree of risk, not a remote possibility of
injury or even a high probability of minor harm, but rather the likelihood of serious injury to the
plaintiff.” Medina, 593 S.W.3d at 249. “An act or omission that is merely thoughtless, careless, or
not inordinately risky cannot be grossly negligent.” /d. Plaintiff fails to show that Crete’s decision
to hire a driver with a handful of driving infractions over the span of more than a decade meets the
high threshold for an extreme degree of risk, so the objective component is not satisfied. See id. at
249-50 (calling driving at an unsafe speed, failing to stop at the exit from the parking lot, failing
to look both ways before exiting, and “cut[ting] the corner” of the sidewalk “common ingredients
in a garden-variety car accident” and finding that such conduct was insufficient evidence of the
objective component of gross negligence). And Plaintiff does not present evidence of Crete’s
subjective awareness of any extreme risk. Crete is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on Plaintiff's gross negligence claim.
B. Negligent Entrustment
To prevail on a claim for negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle under Texas law, a
plaintiff must establish five elements: (1) the defendant entrusted the vehicle to the operator;
(2) the operator was an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver; (3) at the time of the
2? Defendants object to Plaintiff's use of parts of the DiVito deposition transcript. See generally Objs. To
the extent that the Court relies on evidence but does not discuss an objection to it, the Court considered
both the evidence proffered and objections and overrules those objections. Accord Balfour Beatty Rail Inc.
y. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., No. 3:10-cv-1629-L, 2012 WL 3100833, at *20 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2012).
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entrustment, the defendant knew or should have known that the operator was an unlicensed,
incompetent, or reckless driver; (4) the driver was negligent on the occasion in question; and
(5) the driver’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. 4Front Engineered Sols., Inc.
vy. Rosales, 505 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Tex. 2016).
Crete argues that it is entitled to judgment in its favor on Plaintiff's claim for negligent
entrustment because St. Clair, not Crete, owned the vehicle involved in the collision. Mot. J 5. To
support that argument, Crete attaches excerpts from the transcript of St. Clair’s deposition in which
he testified that, in his work for Crete, he drives a truck that he owns. App. to Mot. (“Defendant’s
Appendix”) [ECF No. 66-1] 13:15-21. Plaintiff does not controvert that evidence; in fact,
Plaintiff's Response does not argue in support of the negligent entrustment claim at all. Because
St. Clair himself owned the vehicle, Crete did not entrust it to him. See Redmond v. Clasen, No.
01-20-00209-CV, 2021 WL 5182879, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 9, 2021, no
pet.) (explaining that a defendant is liable for negligent entrustment only if it owns or has a right
to control the vehicle). Plaintiff has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact on the first
element of her negligent entrustment claim, so Crete is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
C. Negligent Hiring
The Texas Supreme Court has not articulated the precise elements of a negligent hiring
claim. Endeavor Energy Res., LP. v. Cuevas, 593 8.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2019). But to the extent
that Texas law recognizes such a claim, it “requires negligence by two separate parties: the
employer’s negligence in hiring the employee and the employee’s subsequent negligent act or
omission.” Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake, 719 S.W.3d 525, 540 (Tex. 2025), “Both negligent acts
must proximately cause the injury.” /d. Proximate cause “includes two components, cause-in-fact
and foreseeability.” Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018).
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Crete argues that Plaintiff can identify no evidence that it was negligent in hiring St. Clair
or that its purported negligence proximately caused Plaintiff's injury. Mot. ff 10-11. Plaintiff
points out evidence that Crete knew that St. Clair had four moving violations and “some non-
preventable wrecks” spread out over a 13-year period. PL’s App. 19:10-17. But Plaintiff presents
no evidence that Crete’s decision to hire St. Clair was negligent or that her injuries were the
foreseeable result of that decision. See, e.g., Mireles v. Ashley, 201 8.W.3d 779, 783-84 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (explaining that one previous traffic violation does not establish a
driver’s incompetence, but that seven violations over three years or eight violations over five years
is some evidence of incompetence); Freyer v. Lyft, Inc., 639 S.W.3d 772, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2021, no pet.) (“A driving record containing listed violations or accidents in which no guilt or fault
is indicated is insufficient to show the individual is a habitually reckless or incompetent driver.”).
Crete is therefore entitled to judgment in its favor on this claim.
D. Negligent Training and Supervision
The Texas Supreme Court has not recognized negligent training and supervision as
independent theories of liability but has noted that “such claims would be subject to the same
requirement we have applied to negligent hiring claims”—that is, the requirement that both the
employer’s negligence and the employee’s negligence proximately caused the injury. Werner
Enters., 719 S.W.3d at 540.
Crete argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that it had a duty to train or supervise St. Clair
on lane changes, that it breached any such duty, or that any purported breach proximately caused
Plaintiff's injuries. Mot. ff 12-13. In support of her negligent training claim, Plaintiff points out
DiVito’s testimony, which establishes that Crete “expect[s] [its] drivers to know how to operate
the equipment, make a safe lane change before they come to work”; that Crete’s “training is not
intended to teach [drivers] how to drive”; and that, when St. Clair had violations for speeding and
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following too closely, Crete required him to participate in a defensive driving course. Pl.’s
App. 4:7-9, 17:13-15, 18:9-19. Plaintiff argues that this testimony demonstrates Crete’s failure to
train St. Clair as required by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ““FMCSRs”), 49 C.F.R.
§ 350.101 et seq.
Plaintiff points to two of the FMCRs: § 392.1 and § 383.111.3 Section 392.1 requires that
“[ejvery motor carrier, its officers, agents, representatives, and employees responsible for the
management, maintenance, operation, or driving of commercial motor vehicles, or the hiring,
supervising, training, assigning, or dispatching of drivers, shall be instructed in and comply with
the rules in this part.” Section 383.111 states that “[a]ll [commercial motor-vehicle] operators must
have knowledge of the following 20 general areas” and lists among those general areas “proper
9 <6
procedures for performing various basic maneuvers,” “principles and procedures for proper
communications and the hazards of failure to signal properly,” and the like. Plaintiff's evidence
does not establish any violation of those regulatory sections, and even if it did, “[t]he mere
existence of federal regulations does not establish the standard of care” for negligence claims.
U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 139 (Tex. 2012). Instead, Plaintiff's evidence
establishes that Crete did not train St. Clair in the basics of driving, which it had no duty to do. See
Nat’! Convenience Stores Inc. v. Matherne, 987 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (explaining that “an employer has no duty to . . . instruct an employee, who
is an experienced driver, with regard to dangers that are ordinarily incident to driving a vehicle
and require no special skills or knowledge other than that expected of all licensed drivers”).
Plaintiff's evidence also establishes that, when Crete became aware of St. Clair’s driving
infractions, it required him to participate in defensive driving training. Plaintiff therefore cannot
3 Plaintiff cites “40 C.F.R. 383.111,” see Resp. 9. No such section exists in the Code of Federal Regulations,
so the Court assumes Plaintiff intended to cite 49 C.F.R. § 383.111.
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establish that Crete either had a duty to train St. Clair on the conduct that resulted in Plaintiff's
injuries or that Crete breached any such duty. Crete is entitled to judgment in its favor on this
claim.
In support of her negligent supervision claim, Plaintiff points to DiVito’s testimony to the
effect that Crete requires some of its drivers to have “drive cams” installed in their trucks, but that
St. Clair was not required to use a drive cam. Pl.’s App. 10:21-11:7, 11:15-17. But Plaintiff
presents no evidence or argument that Crete’s decision not to use a drive cam to observe St. Clair’s
driving proximately caused the crash. Crete is entitled to summary judgment on this claim, too.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants Curtis St. Clair, Jr. and Crete
Carrier Corporation’s Motion Brief in Support of Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF
No. 66], which the Court construes as a motion. Plaintiff Jasmine Teal’s claims for gross
negligence and negligent hiring, entrustment, training, and supervision are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED January 12, 2026.
Ke Dae
KAREN GREN SCHOLER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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