Maldonado v. Excell Electrical Contractors Inc

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ADOLFO MALDONADO,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXCELL ELECTRICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-2307-X
MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Adolfo Maldonado’s motion for summary
judgment. (Doc. 21). After careful consideration, and as explained below, the Court
GRANTS Maldonado’s motion for summary judgment.
I. Factual Background
This case concerns Excell Electrical Contractor Inc.’s (Excell) alleged failure to
pay Maldonado overtime wages. Maldonado worked for Excell from February 2022
through April 2023 and regularly worked between 70 and 85 hours per week.
Maldonado was paid an hourly rate of $20, later increased to $22, but never received
an overtime premium. Excell asserts that the parties had an agreement under which
Maldonado would receive his regular hourly wages with room and board in lieu of
overtime pay.
II. Legal Standard
Courts may grant summary judgment if the movant shows that “there is no
genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.”1 A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law.”2 And “[a] dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”3
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
identifying the evidence “which it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine
[dispute] of material fact,” but need not necessarily support its motion with
“materials negating the opponent’s claim.”4 The nonmoving party must “go beyond
the pleadings and establish specific facts showing that there is a genuine [dispute]
for trial.”5
III. Analysis
A. Excell failed to pay Maldonado the overtime wages he was entitled to
under the FLSA.
Under the FLSA, covered employers must pay employees one and a half times
their regular rate for any hours worked over forty in a workweek.6 To establish a
prima facie claim for a violation of the FLSA’s overtime-compensation requirements,
an employee must prove:
(1) that there existed an employer-employee relationship during the
unpaid overtime periods claimed; (2) that the employee engaged in
activities within the coverage of the FLSA; (3) that the employer violated
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
2 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
3 Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
4 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 318, 323 (1986); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1).
5 McWhirter v. AAA Life Ins., 622 F. App’x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 324) (cleaned up).
6 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
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the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements; and (4) the amount of overtime
compensation due.7
Once the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts and the
employer must “come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed
or with evidence to [negate] the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the
employee’s evidence.”8
Excell’s limited9 response to Maldonado’s motion for summary judgment only
disputes whether Excell violated the FLSA’s overtime wage requirement.10 Excell
contends that Maldonado cannot establish an FLSA violation because the parties
purportedly agreed that Maldonado would “be paid for 40 hours of work each week
plus receive free room and board on the property in exchange for overtime pay.”11
This argument fails as a matter of law.
It is well settled that an employee may not waive his right to overtime
compensation under the FLSA—even in a private agreement between parties.12 So
7 Johnson v. Heckmann Water Res. (CVR), Inc., 758 F.3d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 2014).
8 Id.
9 Excell’s response is scant—two pages with barely three paragraphs of argument—that has
only one substantive contention. See Doc. 24. That argument, like a warm Dr Pepper left out in the
Texas sun, ultimately goes flat.
10 Excell’s amended answer admits that it is an employer subject to the FLSA but denies that
Maldonado was an employee under the FLSA. Doc. 13 ¶¶ 13, 14. That denial, however, is
conspicuously unsupported: Excell’s response to Maldonado’s motion raises no legal argument and
cites no evidence contesting Maldonado’s employee status or suggesting he was an independent
contractor. In any event, the Court concludes that Maldonado was an employee as a matter of law
under the Fifth Circuit’s economic realities framework, as all five factors weigh in favor of employee
status rather than independent-contractor status. See Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am., 545 F.3d 338, 343
(5th Cir. 2008). So the Court holds Maldonado was an employee of Excell under the FLSA.
11 Doc. 24, ¶ 6.
12 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981); Bodle v. TXL Mortg.
Corp., 788 F.3d 159, 162–63 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–
08 (1945); Mireles v. Frio Foods, Inc., 899 F.2d 1407, 1411 fn. 4 (5th Cir. 1990).
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any agreement attempting to substitute room and board—or any other benefit—for
overtime pay is unenforceable.13 And Maldonado’s right to overtime compensation
remains intact even assuming such an agreement existed. Thus, because an
employee’s right to FLSA overtime pay is nonwaivable, even through a private
agreement between the parties, no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to
Excell’s failure to comply with the FLSA’s overtime wage requirements. Moreover,
another court in this district expressly held that housing may not be treated as
compensation for unpaid overtime.14 Thus, even accepting Excell’s characterization
of the supposed agreement, the provision of room and board does not satisfy Excell’s
obligation to pay Maldonado overtime compensation.
The Court holds that Excell failed to pay Maldonado the overtime
compensation required by the FLSA.
B. Maldonado is entitled to unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages,
and attorney’s fees under the FLSA.
An employer who violates the FLSA by failing to pay overtime compensation
is liable to its employees for unpaid overtime plus an equal amount of liquidated
damages.15 An employer seeking to avoid liability for liquidated damages bears the
heavy burden of showing both good faith and reasonable grounds for believing that it
was not violating the FLSA.16
13 Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740.
14 Pineda v. JTCH Apartments, L.L.C., 126 F. Supp. 3d 797, 807 (N.D. Tex 2015) (Boyle, J).
15 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
16 LeCompte v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 780 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir. 1986).
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Here, Maldonado submitted Excell’s paystubs for the duration of his
employment, which includes entries for each shift worked, hours, and pay rate.
Maldonado also submitted a declaration authenticating the paystubs and a summary
of the invoices.17 Excell does not dispute the damages Maldonado provides.
Maldonado has therefore established the amount of unpaid overtime wages owed in
the amount of $26,673.50, and the Court finds this sufficient to support an award of
damages.18
Having established the final element of his FLSA claim—damages—
Maldonado prevails and succeeds on his FLSA claim in its entirety.
Further, because Maldonado prevails on his claim for unpaid overtime, he is
also entitled to an equal amount in liquidated damages unless Excell demonstrates
that the violation was made in good faith and based on reasonable grounds.19 Even
if the Court were to construe Excell’s limited response regarding the alleged
agreement with Maldonado as an assertion of good faith, Excell has not met its
substantial burden.20 The Court finds that Excell failed to show good faith or
17 Doc. 23, Exs. C, D, E.
18 See Gibbs v. Parr Mgmt., LLC, 2013 WL 2355048, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 29, 2013) (Lindsay,
J.) (determining that the plaintiff’s declaration detailing her hourly rate and number of hours worked
was sufficient to establish her amount of unpaid wages in a default judgment evaluation on her FLSA
claim).
19 29 U.S.C. § 260.
20 Reich v. Tiller Helicopter Servs., Inc., 8 F.3d 1018, 1031 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A district court may
not exercise its discretionary authority to reduce or eliminate a liquidated damage award unless the
employer sustains the substantial burden of persuading the court by proof that his failure to obey the
statute was both in good faith and predicated upon . . . reasonable grounds.” (cleaned up)).
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reasonable grounds for believing it was not violating the FLSA and awards
Maldonado liquidated damages in the amount of $26,673.50.21
Accordingly, the Court awards Maldonado $53,347.00 in total damages,
comprising unpaid overtime and liquidated damages for the entire period of his
employment.
Finally, an employee who prevails on an FLSA claim is entitled to reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.22 Maldonado is a prevailing party and is therefore entitled
to attorney’s fees and costs. The Court ORDERS Maldonado to file a motion for
attorney’s fees within 14 days that includes evidence supporting the amount of
reasonable fees and costs.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Maldonado’s motion for
summary judgment against Excell Electrical Contractors Inc. The Court awards
Maldonado actual and liquidated damages in the total amount of $53,347.00. By
separate order, the Court will issue a final judgment. The Court
further ORDERS Maldonado to file a motion to recover attorney’s fees within 14
days.
21 Heidtman v. Cnty. of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1042 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Even if the district court
determines that the employer’s actions were taken in good faith and based on reasonable grounds, the
district court still retains the discretion to award liquidated damages.”).
22 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 & n. 7 (5th
Cir. 2006).
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of January, 2026.
___________________________________
BRANTLEY STARR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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