Hashmi v. Director, TDCJ

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SYED HUMZAH HASHMI, §
TDCJ No. 02374315, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
§
V. § No. 3:24-cv-2009-N-BN
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, § Consolidated with:
§ No. 3:24-cv-2011-N-BT
Respondent. § No. 3:24-cv-2012-N-BK
§ No. 3:24-cv-2013-N-BK
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Through consolidated, pro se applications for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 [Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 4], Petitioner Syed Humzah Hashmi, a Texas state
prisoner, challenges his 2021 Dallas County convictions and sentencing for
aggravated sexual assault of a child and possession of child pornography. See State v.
Hashmi, Nos. F19-33675-I, F19-35541-I, F19-35542-I, and F19-35543-I (2nd Crim.
Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., 2021).
The Court has reviewed the consolidated petitions, the state court record, and
the parties’ submissions. The relevant procedural history is set out below.
The State of Texas charged Appellant with aggravated sexual assault of a child
and three offenses of possession of child pornography under Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.021
and 43.26. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 11. Hashmi pleaded guilty to the offenses of aggravated
sexual assault of a child and possession of child pornography and was sentenced to
twenty years in prison on the aggravated-sexual assault case and eight years in
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prison in each of the possession-of-child pornography cases, with the sentences to run
concurrently. See Dkt. No. 10-1 at 21; Dkt. No. 10-1 at 39; 10-2 at 51; Dkt. No. 1-3 at
57; Dkt. No. 10-52 at 402-409.
After sentencing, Hashmi timely filed a motion for new trial, in which he
argued his trial counsel provided him with constitutionally ineffective assistance by
failing to file a motion to suppress certain evidence and by failing to present
mitigation evidence during punishment. See Dkt. No. 10-10.
Hashmi’s request for a new trial was ultimately denied along with his appeal
of final judgment. Dkt. No. 10-14, 10-16. He then filed a petition for discretionary
review (PDR) but was denied. See Hashmi v. State, PD-0705-22, PD-0706-22, PD-
0707-22, PD-0708-22 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2023); see also Dkt. No. 10-51.
Hashmi later sought collateral relief in state court by filing state applications
for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging the convictions at issue here. Dkt. No. 10-52
at 24-39; Dkt. No. 10-57 at 24-39; Dkt. No. 10-62 at 24-39; Dkt No. 10-66 at 26-41.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief without written order on June 19,
2024. See Dkt. Nos. 10-55, 10-60, 10-65, 10-70.
In his pending petition, Hashmi raises a single ineffective assistance claim. He
alleges that trial counsel advised him that by pleading guilty he could receive
“probation,” but that he was in fact ineligible due to the nature of the offense. He
further asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court
withdraw its finding of guilt so that he could be placed on deferred-adjudication
community supervision. Dkt. No. 1 at 6.
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For the reasons explained below, Hashmi has not demonstrated that the
State’s adjudication of his claims was contrary to or involved unreasonable
application of established federal law, nor that it was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. As such, the Court should deny federal habeas relief.
Legal Standard
“Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and
caselaw authority.” Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district
court, this process begins with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), under which “state prisoners face strict procedural requirements and
a high standard of review.” Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted). Under the
AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This standard “restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas
corpus” and ensures that “state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges
to state sentences based on federal law.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 124 (2020). A
state court decision is “contrary” to clearly established federal law only if “it relies on
legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it
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reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially
indistinguishable facts.” Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); see also
Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have emphasized, time and
time again, that the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on
their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly
established.’” (citation omitted)). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of
federal law when the state court “identifies the correct governing principle” but
“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000).
Critically, the question is not whether the state court was incorrect, but
whether its decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). “If this standard is
difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.” Id. at 102. Federal courts must
“determine what arguments or theories supported ... or could have supported the
state court’s decision” and then ask whether fairminded jurists could disagree that
those arguments are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id.
Under this highly deferential standard, a petitioner must do more than show
the state court’s factual or legal conclusions were incorrect, he must show that they
were “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10. As the Supreme Court
has explained, “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely
because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the
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first instance” and that federal habeas relief is precluded even where the state court’s
factual determination is debatable. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010). State
court factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner can rebut
this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 293.
This presumption applies not only to explicit findings of fact but also “to those
unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed
law and fact.” Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Ford
v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “[a]s long as there is
‘some indication of the legal basis for the state court’s denial of relief,’ the district
court may infer the state court’s factual findings even if they were not expressly
made.” (footnotes omitted)).
Analysis
I. Petitioner’s Ineffective-Assistance Claim Does Not Warrant
Habeas Relief
A. Legal Framework for Ineffective Assistance
When, as here, a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, that claim
is subject to both AEDPA’s deferential standard and the substantive framework
established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The result is a
review that is “doubly deferential,” applying first to the state court’s adjudication of
the claim and second to counsel’s professional judgment. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556
U.S. 111, 123 (2009); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190, 202 (2011)
(stating that a court’s review requires a “highly deferential” look at counsel’s
performance) (citation omitted)).
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That “double deference” requires more than showing that counsel’s
performance was imperfect or that the outcome might have been different. Richter,
562 U.S. at 112 (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.”). And “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. at 102. The petitioner must also prove
that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s substandard performance. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 692. “This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as
to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. The
trial counsel’s error must be “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed ... by the Sixth Amendment.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 119
(2017) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687).
To demonstrate prejudice, a habeas petitioner “must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This means a
petitioner must overcome both the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell
within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and that “under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105.
Simply making conclusory allegations of deficient performance and prejudice
is not sufficient to meet the Strickland test. See Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282
(5th Cir. 2000).
And a failure to establish either prong defeats the claim. See id. at 697.
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B. Petitioner’s Claim Rests on a Fundamental Misunderstanding of
Probation Law
Hashmi contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising that
he could receive “probation,” when the trial court ultimately imposed a twenty-year
sentence.
Whether Hashmi is entitled to relief depends on whether counsel’s advice
regarding “probation” fell below constitutional standards.
Hashmi’s argument rests on a misunderstanding of how Texas law
distinguishes between different forms of community supervision and does not
warrant relief.
Even assuming Hashmi’s characterization that he preferred to proceed to trial
but pleaded guilty based on counsel’s advice regarding probation, Hashmi still fails
to establish deficient performance.
Texas law recognizes two primary forms of what is colloquially called
“probation”: (1) judge-ordered community supervision following a conviction, and (2)
deferred adjudication community supervision, which occurs without a finding of guilt.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 42A.053, 42A.101.
Judge-ordered community supervision under article 42A.053 is available only
after a defendant has been adjudged guilty. Texas law excludes certain serious
offenses – including aggravated sexual assault of a child – from eligibility for this
form of supervision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 42A.053.
And, so, once Hashmi was adjudged guilty of that offense, the trial court could
not place him on judge-ordered community supervision.
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Deferred adjudication community supervision operates differently.
Under article 42A.101, a court may, after a guilty or nolo contendere plea, defer
further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt and place a defendant
on supervision if doing so serves the interests of justice. Eligibility for deferred
adjudication is governed by separate statutory provisions and does not turn on
whether judge-ordered community supervision would be available. See Garcia v.
State, No. 02-15-00442-CR, 2017 WL 1536211, at *4 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth Apr. 27,
2017) (“Community supervision probation and deferred adjudication probation are
independent of each other in the sense that a defendant may be eligible for one form
of probation but not the other.”).
Hashmi alleges counsel advised that “probation” was possible. Texas courts
recognize that defendants frequently use the term “probation” generically to refer to
community supervision in any form. See Jackson v. State, 550 S.W.3d 238, 246 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018). And courts have specifically rejected ineffective-
assistance claims premised on counsel’s use of the term “probation,” where the record
shows the defendant remained eligible for deferred adjudication and counsel sought
that form of community supervision. See Id. at 246. Thus, an attorney does not render
ineffective assistance by advising a defendant about a discretionary sentencing
possibility that ultimately is not granted. See Graves v. State, 803 S.W.2d 342, 345
(Tex. App. – Hous. [14th Dist.] 1990) (finding that a trial counsel’s unsuccessful
strategy in advising a defendant to plead guilty to receive a lesser sentence, did not
render the plea unknowing or involuntary to render ineffective assistance of counsel.)
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The decision whether to grant any form of community supervision rests within
the trial court’s discretion. See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Here, trial counsel’s advice that Hashmi could request probation accurately
described the available deferred adjudication sentencing framework and did not
guarantee any other particular result.
Most importantly, Hashmi does not show counsel guaranteed a probationary
sentence or misrepresented the applicable punishment range. A defendant’s
disappointment with the sentence imposed does not demonstrate constitutionally
deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
Hashmi further suggests that counsel should have requested that the trial
court withdraw its finding of guilt so that he could receive deferred adjudication
community supervision. See Dkt. No. 1 at 6. This argument again reflects a
misunderstanding of Texas procedure.
Deferred adjudication must be ordered in lieu of an adjudication of guilt, not
after one has been entered. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.101(a) (authorizing
deferral “without entering an adjudication of guilt”). Once a trial court adjudicates
guilt, deferred adjudication is no longer available as a sentencing option.
And, so, counsel could not have secured deferred adjudication by asking the
court to “withdraw” a finding of guilt, and the failure to pursue a legally unavailable
procedure does not constitute deficient performance under Strickland.
Hashmi likewise fails to demonstrate prejudice.
In the guilty-plea context, he must show a reasonable probability that, but for
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counsel’s advice, he would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial. See Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). A petitioner’s after-the-fact assertion that he would
have gone to trial is insufficient without objective support. See Armstead v. Scott, 37
F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, Hashmi identifies no objective evidence suggesting that rejecting the
plea and proceeding to trial would have been rational under the circumstances. He
does not allege a viable defense likely to succeed at trial, nor does he show that the
State’s evidence was weak. Instead, his allegations reflect dissatisfaction with the
sentence imposed and hindsight regret about the plea decision. Such post-hoc
disappointment does not establish Strickland prejudice.
And the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied state habeas relief. That
denial constitutes an adjudication on the merits entitled to AEDPA deference. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, this Court
presumes the state court’s factual findings and implicit credibility determinations
were reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Nothing in the record rebuts that presumption. Nor has Hashmi shown that
the state court’s rejection of his ineffective-assistance claim was contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
As such, Hashmi’s petition should be denied.
Recommendation
The Court should deny the consolidated Petitions for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
by a Person in State Custody [Dkt. No. 1] with prejudice.
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A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
Dated: on February 5, 2026.
____________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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