Duke v. Dallas Police Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LONNIE DUKE, 	§
Dall. Cnty. Jail BookIn No. 23050976, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:24-cv-1966-S-BN
§
DALLAS POLICE 	§
DEPARTMENT, ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In a pending habeas action, Lonnie Duke, at least then detained pretrial at
Dallas County’s jail, “filed a civil rights complaint,” “along with three briefs in
support. [And b]ecause Duke seems to raise non-habeas claims in the civil rights
complaints and memorandums, and given his pro se status, the Court severe[d] the
amended complaint and accompanying memorandums from [the habeas] action and
direct[ed] that they be filed in a new civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the Dallas Police Department and two unknown Dallas Police Department Officers.”
Dkt. No. 8 (cleaned up); see also Dkt. Nos. 3 & 5-7.
This civil action was opened. And the presiding United States district judge
referred 	it 	to 	the 	undersigned 	United 	States 	magistrate 	judge 	for 	pretrial
management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. The Court
entered an order under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) granting Duke’s
request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See Dkt. Nos. 4 & 10. And the
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undersigned now recommends that the Court dismiss Duke’s lawsuit.
Discussion
Under the PLRA, where prisoners (whether incarcerated or detained pending
trial) seek relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on
initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Taking the well-pleaded facts as true, Duke brings this Section 1983 lawsuit
against unidentified police officers based on injuries that he sustained while being
transported in a police car when “in route to the jail a near accident cause[d him to
become] un-seatbelt-ed” and “to slide out of seat,” “banging [his] face and mouth on
protective glass.” Dkt. No. 3 at 4. Duke then alleges that the officers did not
immediately check to see if he was okay. See id. at 4-5.
“A plaintiff makes out a § 1983 claim if he ‘shows a violation of the Constitution
or of federal law and then shows that the violation was committed by someone acting
under color of state law.’” Rich v. Palko, 920 F.3d 288, 293-94 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned
up; quoting Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)).
As the source for a Constitutional violation based on his allegations, Duke cites
the Fourth Amendment. See Dkt. No. 3. And that’s correct if Duke had just been
arrested and was being transported to the jail by an arresting officer.
“While the Fourth Amendment protects arrestees, once an arrest is complete,
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pretrial detainees are protected by the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments,” as applicable. Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 452 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). And, “[a]lthough the point at which an arrest ends and
pretrial detainment begins is not always clear,” the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has held “that the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments begin to
protect persons after the incidents of arrest are completed, after the plaintiff has been
released from the arresting officer’s custody, and after the plaintiff has been in
detention awaiting trial for a significant period of time.” Id. (cleaned up).
Even so, to the extent that Duke alleges a Fourth Amendment violation based
on excessive force, for example, his allegations do not allow for the reasonable
inference that his injuries were caused by contact that was more than accidental.
Accidental contact between an officer and a civilian is not a Fourth
Amendment seizure – even if it injures the civilian – so a § 1983 plaintiff
claiming excessive force must show that force was applied intentionally.
See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (explaining that
a seizure occurs only when a suspect’s “freedom of movement” is
terminated “through means intentionally applied” by the governmental
actor); Gorman v. Sharp, 892 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding there
can be no § 1983 liability for excessive force “in the absence of intentional
conduct”). And even if the seizure involves intentional conduct, the
district court must consider whether it was unreasonable under the
specific circumstances of the seizure. See, e.g., City of Escondido v.
Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 53-44 (2019) (per curiam) (reversing the denial of
qualified immunity where officers threw a man to the ground during an
arrest).
McDonald v. McClelland, 779 F. App’x 222, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)
(cleaned up); cf. Boyd v. McNamara, 74 F.4th 662, 667 n.3 (5th Cir. 2023) (noting that
“the standard for excessive force is the same under either” the Due Process Clause or
“the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures” (applicable to
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prisoners) – “whether the force was objectively unreasonable in light of the ‘facts and
circumstances of each particular case.’” (citations omitted).
Consistent with that and more broadly, mere negligence cannot amount to a
violation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Diggs v. Waybourn, No. 4:20-cv-706-P, 2021
WL 961676, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021) (“Allegations of negligence are not
sufficient to maintain an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (concluding that the constitution ‘is simply not implicated
by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or
property’); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986) (stating that ‘lack of due
care ... simply does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct’ which rises
to the level of a constitutional violation); see also Dyson v. Cox, CA No. 3:12-CV-3053,
2013 WL 4813557, *3 (W.D. La. Sep. 3, 2013) (holding that claims arising from an
auto accident while officers transported Plaintiff to a dental appointment failed to
state a § 1983 claim, and that ‘at worst, plaintiff has only alleged negligence on [the
officers] part; negligence cannot support a claims for damages under Section 1983.’).
Similarly, to the extent Diggs’s asserts a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
arising from the van accident while Officer Martinez was driving and Franklin was
also present, does not state any claim of the violation of a constitutional right. Any
such claims against these transport officer thus must be dismissed.”).
And, if Duke also intends to allege that the transporting officers were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, the factual content of the complaint does
not support such a claim. See Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th
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Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“Deliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond mere
negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice, not
merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577
F.3d 612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386,
392 (5th Cir. 1992)))); Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[D]eliberate
indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent
response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the plaintiff must show that
the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him
incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton
disregard for any serious medical needs.” (cleaned up)).
Last, the undersigned notes that, although this lawsuit was severed from a
habeas action that Duke filed, he nevertheless then filed a habeas petition in this
civil lawsuit. See Dkt. No. 12. The Court need not take that up, as Duke already filed
a habeas action, and the “two forms of relief” available – “monetary damages, which
are primarily available in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” and
“release to parole or mandatory supervision, which is available in a habeas corpus
action” – “cannot be obtained in the same suit.” Reed v. Thaler, No. 2:11-cv-93, 2011
WL 3924171, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011), rec. adopted, 2011 WL 3927746 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 7, 2011).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b).
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A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: November 22, 2025
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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