Vance et al v. Mims

ORDER – PAGE 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
In Re: 	§
REVOLUTION MONITORING, LLC, 	§
§
Debtor 	§
______________________________________ §
§
JEREMIAH VANCE, 	§
§
Appellant, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-1833-K
§
JEFFREY MIMS, 	§
§
Appellee. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (the “Motion”) (Doc. No. 7), filed by Appellant Jeremiah Vance
(“Appellant”). Appellee Jeffrey Mims, Liquidating Trustee, (“Appellee”) did not file a
response. 	The Court has carefully considered the Motion, the applicable law, and
relevant portions of the record. 	The Court DENIES the Motion because Appellant
fails to establish that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
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ORDER – PAGE 2
The Court gives a brief recitation of only the procedural background that is
relevant for purposes of this Motion. 	Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 20,
2024, to appeal from a bankruptcy court order entered on May 21, 2024. Doc. No. 1-
1 at 3 (amended notice of appeal correcting date of order); see Doc. No. 1-1 at 5
(bankruptcy court order dated May 21, 2024). 	(All record citations herein are to the
CM/ECF page number.) 	On July 18, 2024, Appellee moved to dismiss this appeal as
untimely. See generally Doc. No. 2; see also Doc. No. 1 (the bankruptcy court clerk noted
on transmittal and certification of record on appeal form that the record was deficient
because “Appeal not timely filed.”). In granting the motion to dismiss, the Court found
it was deprived of jurisdiction because Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal more than
2 weeks past the 14-day deadline to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8002(a). 	Doc. No. 3 at 2 (citing In re Berman-Smith, 737 F.3d 997, 1003
(5th Cir. 2013)). 	The Court also observed that “Appellant did not file a motion
requesting an extension of time either before or after filing his Notice of Appeal.” 	Id.
(citing F ED . R. B ANKR . P. 8002(d)). 	The Court entered its order dismissing the
bankruptcy appeal on August 13, 2024.
More than 3 months later, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fifth
Circuit appealing the Court’s order dismissing the appeal. Doc. No. 4. That same day,
Appellant filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and motion to extend
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ORDER – PAGE 3
time “in compliance with Tex. R. App. P 10.5(b).” Doc. No. 5 at 1. Appellant claimed
“inadequacy of counsel” as the reason he missed the 14-day deadline and asked the
Court to extend the time to file a notice of appeal to November 22, 2024, or the date
the motion was received by the Court. 	Id. at 1-2. 	The Court duly considered the
motion to extend and denied Appellant’s request in an order entered on December 13,
2024. 	Doc. No. 6 at 1; see id. (denying Appellant’s request to proceed IFP on appeal
to Fifth Circuit because that appeal was not taken in good faith). 	The Fifth Circuit
dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction on July 7, 2025. Doc. Nos. 8 & 9.
Appellant filed this Motion for Relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) on June 4, 2025,
almost ten months after the Court dismissed his appeal. 	Appellant asserts that his
“former counsel misadvised him of the deadline to file a notice of appeal and failed to
forward to him court documents resulting in the late filing of the Notice of Appeal.”
Doc. No. 7 at 1. 	Appellant then claims that “[u]pon discovering this error, [he] filed
a Motion to Extend Time and Proceed In Forma Pauperis to appeal under Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 8002(d), citing excusable neglect.” Id. at 2. Finally, Appellant contends that
this Court “dismissed the appeal as untimely, citing a frivolity of merit, without
substantively ruling on Appellant’s pending motion for extension of time.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) allows a court to relieve a party from a
final judgment for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” F ED . R. CIV.
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ORDER – PAGE 4
P. 60(b)(1). 	Appellant signed the Notice of Appeal himself and listed his name and
contact information, indicating he was not represented by an attorney. 	See Doc. No.
1-1 at 4. Pro se litigants are bound to follow the federal rules and to observe deadlines.
See Arredondo v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 950 F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir.
2020); London v. Potter, 2007 WL1655325, at * 7 (E.D. Tex. June 7, 2007). Appellant
simply lays blame on his former counsel for misinforming him. But Appellant, as a pro
se litigant, is himself obligated to know and to follow the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure and the deadlines that are clearly set forth therein. See Arredondo, 950 F.3d
at 298. Appellant submits no explanation for his own failure to observe the 14-day
deadline, other than to blame his former counsel, and ignorance of the rules is not
excusable neglect for purposes of relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1). 	Pioneer Inv. Servs.
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993) (“[I]nadvertence,
ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute
‘excusable’ neglect.”).
Even so, Appellant fails to establish mistake or excusable neglect based on
erroneous advice from his former counsel. 	The well-established case law is clear—an
attorney’s mistake in calculating or calendaring deadlines is not the type of mistake or
excusable neglect that falls within Rule 60(b)(1). 	See, e.g., id.; Edward H. Bohlin Co. v.
Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 356–57 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that district court did
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ORDER – PAGE 5
not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to set aside a dismissal
“when the proffered justification for relief is the ‘inadvertent mistake’ of counsel”); see
Rayford v. Karl Storz Endoscopy Am., Inc., 740 F. App'x 435, 436–37 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“Calendaring errors and mistakes about deadlines qualify as a careless mistake of
counsel” and, as such, do not justify relief from judgment). 	In fact, the Fifth Circuit
expressly held that, because “gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules, or ignorance of
the law are insufficient bases for Rule 60(b)(1) relief,” it would be an abuse of discretion
for a district court “to reopen a case under Rule 60(b)(1) when the reason asserted as
justifying 	relief 	is 	one 	attributable 	solely 	to 	counsel’s 	carelessness 	with 	or
misapprehension of the law or the applicable rules of court.” Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 356-57;
see also Pioneer, 507 U.S.at 396-97 (holding that clients are “to be held accountable for
the acts and omissions of their chosen counsel.”).
Appellant cites Pioneer in support of his conclusory argument that there is
excusable neglect here; but that case is easily distinguishable from this one. In Pioneer,
the Supreme Court gave “significant” weight to fact that the notice of the bar date (the
date by which the respondents had to file their proofs of claim) given by the bankruptcy
court “was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases.” Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 397.
Whereas the bar date is ordinarily “prominently announced and accompanied by an
explanation 	of 	its 	significance,” 	the 	bar 	date 	in 	Pioneer 	had 	a 	“peculiar 	and
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ORDER – PAGE 6
inconspicuous placement” with no explanation of its significance, which resulted in “a
dramatic ambiguity in the notification.” 	Id. 	Those “significant” factors lead the
Supreme Court to conclude that respondents’ counsel was neglectful in failing to catch
the notice but that it was excusable. Id. Here, however, the failure to observe the 14-
day deadline rests solely on Appellant (and/or his former counsel) in failing to follow
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and those clearly defined deadlines and/or
in calculating that deadline based on the obvious issuance date of the bankruptcy court
order that was being appealed. For these reasons, Appellant fails to establish that he is
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
Appellant also claims that this Court “violat[ed] basic procedural fairness”
because the undersigned dismissed the appeal without addressing Appellant’s motion
for extension of time. Doc. No. 7 at 3. This is a completely inaccurate representation
of the timeline of filings in this matter. 	As the Court previously identified in the
procedural background, Appellant did not file a motion to extend the deadline to file
his Notice of Appeal until November 22, 2024, more than 3 months after the Court
dismissed 	the 	appeal 	as 	untimely 	thereby 	depriving 	the 	Court 	of 	jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court did not dismiss the appeal to this Court “citing a frivolity of
merit” as Appellant asserts. 	Doc. No. 7 at 2. 	The Court denied Appellant leave to
proceed IFP in his appeal to the Fifth Circuit because the appeal to the Fifth Circuit
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ORDER – PAGE 7
“present[ed] no legal points of arguable merit and is therefore frivolous.” Doc. No. 6.
This argument does nothing to show Appellant is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1).
To be sure, it would be an abuse of discretion for this Court to relieve Appellant
under Rule 60(b)(1) from the order dismissing his appeal as untimely and to revive his
appeal. See Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 356-57. For these reasons, Appellant’s Motion for Relief
from Judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Signed February 3rd
, 2026.
______________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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