Leonard v. Thomas et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
GENTRY LEONARD, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
V. § No. 3:24-cv-1780-D-BN
§
NIKEVA THOMAS, ET AL., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Gentry Leonard, a Texas prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to an alleged unlawful imprisonment due to a
purported false parole violation in retaliation for complaints filed against his parole
officer. See Dkt. Nos. 3, 5-7, 9. Senior United States District Judge Sidney A.
Fitzwater referred Leonard’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate
judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
The Court granted Leonard leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 10. And, after screening his
claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters these findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this lawsuit
without prejudice subject to the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
Applicable Background
In 1993, Leonard was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and aggravated
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robbery and sentenced by the jury to 99 years and 45 years imprisonment,
respectively. See State of Texas v. Leonard, No. F92-45533 (204th Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall.
Cnty. June 25, 1993); State of Texas v. Leonard, No. F92-45534 (204th Jud. Dist. Ct.,
Dall. Cnty. June 25, 1993).1 While on parole for those crimes, Leonard asserts that
he was arrested for five parole violations on January 18, 2022 and that, on January
22, 2022, the parole division decided not to pursue parole revocation. See Dkt. No. 3
at 7. But he alleges that “this was unknown to the plaintiff until July 3, 2022 when
Director of [P]arole Rene Hinojosa[] informed the plaintiff that his parole had been
continue[d] and released the plaintiff.” Id.
A review of Dallas County criminal records reflects that Leonard was arrested
on January 18, 2022 for indecent exposure. See State of Texas v. Leonard, No. M22-
44749 (Dall. Cnty. Crim. Ct. No. 2). The indecent exposure was alleged to have
occurred on the date of the arrest. See id. (Complaint-Information dated Jan. 25,
2022). At the time, Leonard was on bond for a felony charge of indecency with a minor.
See State of Texas v. Leonard, No. F20-50342 (292nd Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall. Cnty.). Bond
was set in the indecent exposure case on January 20, 2022, and the State moved to
increase the bond in the felony case on January 28, 2022, which was granted on
February 1, 2022. Bond was posted for his pending charges on July 1, 2022.
Leonard was then arrested again in March 2023 for indecent exposure. See
State of Texas v. Leonard, No. M23-16874 (Dall. Cnty. Crim. Ct. No. 2). Leonard was
1 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a “district court may properly take judicial
notice of public state court records.” Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816
F. App’x 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
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found guilty by a jury for the March 2023 incident on July 12, 2023. See id. (Judgment
dated July 12, 2023). He then pled nolo contendere to the January 2022 indecent
exposure on August 4, 2023. See Leonard, No. M22-44749 (Judgment dated Aug. 4,
2023). Misdemeanor charges from 2020 for resisting and evading arrest and failure
to identify himself were then dismissed. See State of Texas v. Leonard, No. M20-16996
(Dall. Cnty. Crim. Ct. No. 2); State of Texas v. Leonard, No. M20-17005 (Dall. Cnty.
Crim. Ct. No. 2); State of Texas v. Leonard, No. M20-50342 (Dall. Cnty. Crim. Ct. No.
2); State of Texas v. Leonard, No. M20-50343 (Dall. Cnty. Crim. Ct. No. 2). On
September 27, 2023, Leonard pled guilty to attempt to commit indecency with a child.
See Leonard, No. F20-50342 (Judgment dated Sept. 27, 2023).
Leonard’s parole was revoked, and he is currently in prison. Leonard filed this
action on July 10, 2024. A sworn certification states that it was placed in the mail on
June 30, 2024. See Dkt. No. 3 at 11.
Legal Standards
Under the PLRA, where prisoners (whether incarcerated or detained pending
trial) seek relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on
initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require
that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678.
So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C.,
No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs
cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences
using speculation.”).
“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.
Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements,
including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).
So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”
that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,
and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,
Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));
see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899
(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’
is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).
Analysis
Leonard asserts that he was arrested on false parole violations in January
2022 and that his continued detention beyond the alleged January 22, 2022
determination to continue parole supervision without sanction violated his due
process rights under Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and constituted
unlawful detention. These claims, however, rely on an assertion contradicted by state
court records subject to judicial notice that he was arrested and held in January 2022
solely due to parole violations.
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Because Leonard has not shown that the convictions related to his arrest on
January 18, 2022 and subsequent detention have been reserved, expunged,
invalidated or otherwise called into question, the claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir.
1996) (A Section 1983 claim that “falls under the rule in Heck is legally frivolous
unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated,
or otherwise called into question.” (citation omitted)).
As to whether a particular civil claim is subject to the rule in Heck,
[i]t is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of
a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his
constitutional rights if that “violation arose from the same facts
attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves
‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’”
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d
391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting, in turn, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)); accord Magee v.
Reed, 912 F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court
held that if a plaintiff’s civil rights claim for damages challenges the validity of his
criminal conviction or sentence, and the plaintiff cannot show that such conviction or
sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside, the claim is not
cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)).
Heck applies to parole revocations. See Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177
(5th Cir. 1995) (Heck requires showing that “any revocation proceeding has been
reverse, expunged, set aside by a state court, or called into question by a federal
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court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”). But in this case, Leonard’s claims more
directly attack his arrest and conviction for the January 18, 2022 indecent exposure
because they assert that he was arrested that day on false and retaliatory charges
and held in unlawful detention until July 2022. See Kastner v. Texas, 332 F. App’x
980, 981 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (applying Heck bar to conviction after plea of
nolo contendere). And they also attack the validity of his conviction for attempted
indecency with a child given that he was also being held on this charge during his
alleged unlawful detention.
Because Leonard fails to show that the criminal convictions that underlie his
civil claims relating to his January 2022 arrest and his subsequent detention have
been reversed, invalidated, set aside, or otherwise resolved in his favor, the claims
asserted – calling that conviction into question – are currently subject to the rule in
Heck and thus not cognizable.
And, where this is the case, the Court should dismiss the lawsuit without
prejudice, as a Heck “dismissal ‘does not preclude a later claim meeting the
preconditions for suit.’ That is, a Heck dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice.”
Cook v. City of Tyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (cleaned up;
quoting Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996); citing Clarke v.
Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss Gentry Leonard’s claims without prejudice subject
to the rule announced in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: March 30, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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