Thomas v. Director, TDCJ-CID

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JEWELL LEE THOMAS,
#02350417,
§
§
Petitioner, §
§
v. § No. 3:24-cv-1757-N (BT)
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, §
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jewell Lee Thomas, a Texas prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 3), and two amended petitions (ECF Nos.
5, 8). For the reasons set forth below, the District Judge should dismiss Thomas’s
petition for lack of jurisdiction, or, alternatively, deny it for failure to state a claim.
Background
A. State Proceedings
Thomas pleaded guilty to felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) in two
separate cases before the 283rd Judicial District of Texas. Admin. ECF No. 21-1 at
98–101; ECF No. 22-5 at 6. The trial court assessed his punishment in each case at
ten years’ confinement and then probated the sentences for six years and assessed
a fine of $1,500. ECF No. 21-1 at 98, 103–05. One condition of Thomas’s
community supervision required him to participate in and to successfully complete
a Substance Abuse Felony Punishment (SAFP) treatment program. Id. at 123.
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But Thomas was discharged from the SAFP program for refusing to
participate, id. at 145–53, and the State moved to revoke his community
supervision in both cases. Id. at 139–40, 143–44. After an evidentiary hearing on
the motions, the trial court found that Thomas had violated the SAFP condition,
revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years’ (total)
confinement. Id. at 188.
On direct appeal, Thomas raised two issues: (1) the trial court erred by not
crediting him for time served before sentencing; and (2) the trial court abused its
discretion by revoking his community supervision because it was impossible for
him to complete the SAFP program due to his disability. ECF No. 21-3 at 16–21.
The Texas Fifth District Court of Appeals modified the judgments and sustained
the first issue. ECF No. 23-4 at 36–42; see also Thomas v. State, No. 05-21-00471-
CR, 2022 WL 3500007, at *1–2 (Tex. App. Aug. 18, 2022). But the Court overruled
the second issue. See Thomas, No. 05-21-00471-CR, 2022 WL 3500007, at *2.
Thomas petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) for
discretionary review, raising seven grounds that he had failed to raise on direct
appeal. See ECF No. 23-4 at 2–31; see also Thomas v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 3:23-
cv-468-X-BN, 2023 WL 10449089, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2023), rec. adopted,
2024 WL 1195796 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2024). The CCA refused Thomas’s request
for discretionary review. See ECF No. 23-5 at 2–7; see also Thomas, No. 3:23-cv-
468-X-BN, 2023 WL 10449089, at *1 (citing Thomas v. State, PD-0607-22 & PD-
0608-22 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2023)).
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Thomas filed six state habeas applications challenging his DWI
convictions—three for each of his two convictions. See ECF Nos. 23-6 at 32–40,
24-3, ECF No. 24-9, ECF No. 24-11, 24-17. The CCA dismissed the first four
because Thomas filed them before his convictions were final. See ECF Nos. 24-2,
24-7, 24-10, 24-13; see also Thomas, No. 3:23-cv-468-X-BN, 2023 WL 10449089,
at *2 (citing Ex parte Thomas, WR-93,153-01, -02, -03 & -04 (Tex. Crim. App.)).
The CCA then dismissed Thomas’s last two applications without written order. See
ECF Nos. 24-21, 24-25.
B. Federal Proceedings
Thomas also filed two other federal habeas petitions in this Court
challenging his DWI convictions. See Thomas v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 3:23-cv-468-
X-BN (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2023); Thomas v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 3:23-cv-469-X-
BN (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2023). The Court consolidated these actions before
ultimately dismissing them without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Thomas, No. 3:23-cv-468-X-BN, 2023 WL 10449089, at *1–2.
Thomas filed a third habeas application in this Court, Thomas v. Dir., TDCJ-
CID, No. 3:23-cv-1547-L-BN (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2023), arguing that the Texas
court of appeals “overlooked or misconstrued parts of the record where it found
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected his impossibility
defense.” Thomas v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, No. 3:23-cv-1547-L-BN, 2024 WL 945863,
at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2024), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 947459 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5,
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2024) (internal quotations omitted) (cleaned up). The court summarily dismissed
the application with prejudice under Habeas Rule 4. Id. at *4.
Here, Thomas again seeks to challenge his DWI convictions on four grounds:
(1) his conviction violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act because his disability prevented him from completing the SAFP
program; (2) Respondent violated Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
policies that exempt those with chronic conditions from SAFP programs; (3) staff
at the SAFP facility were deliberately indifferent to his medical conditions in
violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (4) he
was placed “in a situation of serious danger” in violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Am. Pet. at 6–8; Sec. Am. Pet. at 6–8.
In his Response (ECF No. 25), Respondent asks the Court to deny Thomas’s
habeas petition on two grounds: (i) Thomas’s claims related to inadequate medical
care or access to medical care do not sound in habeas; and (ii) Thomas’s claim
related to the violation of TDCJ policy fails to state a cognizable habeas issue. Resp.
at 7–11. Respondent notes that Thomas “did not properly raise Claims 1 and 4
before the CCA” and that it “cannot address whether Thomas’s claims related to
[Cause No. 18-10610] were raised before the CCA” because, at the time of filings,
Respondent was “still awaiting a complete set of records from Thomas’s most
recent state habeas action.”1 Id. at 7. Regardless, Respondent states that no
1 Respondent later filed an Amended Answer to incorporate information from
Thomas’s most recent state habeas proceedings. See Am. Answer at 1 (ECF No. 31).
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procedural defenses apply but reserves the exhaustion defense and procedural
default defense. Id.
Thomas responded by filing several motions, including: a motion to amend
his habeas petition (ECF No. 34), a motion to expand the record (ECF No. 38), a
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 39), and a motion purportedly brought
under Habeas Rule 7(c) (ECF No. 40).
Legal Standards and Analysis
I. To the extent that Thomas’s claims are successive, the District
Judge should dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice as an
unauthorized successive petition.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) limits
the circumstances in which a state prisoner may file a second or successive
application for habeas relief in federal court. Before a second or successive
application permitted by AEDPA may be filed in the district court, the applicant
must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district
court to consider the application. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). If a pending
petition qualifies as a successive writ application, this Court has no jurisdiction to
consider it absent prior authorization from the Fifth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(A) and (B).
A petition is considered successive when it raises a claim that was or could
have been raised in an earlier petition, or otherwise is an abuse of the writ.
But Respondent’s legal arguments and reservations otherwise remain the same.
See generally id.
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Hardemon v. Quarterman, 516 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2008). If a claim in a second
or successive petition was presented in a previous petition, it must be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If a claim in a second or successive petition was not
presented in a previous petition, it must be dismissed unless:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court that was previously unavailable;
or
(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;
and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
Although Respondent does not argue Thomas’s petition is successive under
§ 2244(b), see Am. Answer at 7, this is at least the fourth habeas application that
Thomas has filed in this District challenging his DWI convictions.
In his most recent application, Thomas raised a single ground: “that
the state court of appeals ‘overlooked or misconstrued parts of the record’ where it
‘found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected [his]
impossibility defense.’ ” Thomas, No. 3:23-CV-1547-L-BN, 2024 WL 945863, at *
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1. The Court summarily dismissed the habeas application for several reasons,
including:
• “[T]o the extent that Thomas merely raises a challenge
premised on the court of appeals’s finding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion [in affirming the trial court’s
revocation of Thomas’s community supervision], such a claim
is not cognizable under Section 2254.” Id. at *3;
• “[I]f Thomas’s habeas challenge may be read as a claim that the
state court denied his right to due process, such that the
proceeding itself was fundamentally unfair, his conclusory
support for this claim does not show a due process violation.”
Id.;
• “[I]f Thomas instead challenges the state court’s rejection of
his impossibility defense as not supported by sufficient
evidence, this claim should also be denied based on an
examination of the Dallas Court of Appeals’s reasoned opinion
decision . . . under the [AEDPA].” Id.
Thomas again attacks the Texas trial court’s revocation of his community
supervision. Because his prior theories failed, he now tries to cast the revocation
as the result of violations of his constitutional and statutory rights. But Thomas
could have brought such claims in his prior federal habeas application. Thomas is
also unable to show that this action falls within the carveout of § 2244(b)(2)
because (A) there is no new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously unavailable; (B)(i) the
factual predicate for the current claims were known to Thomas when he filed his
previous habeas applications; and (B)(ii) the facts underlying the claims do not
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establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no
reasonable factfinder would have revoked Thomas’s community supervision.
So, to the extent that Thomas’s claims are successive, the District Judge
should dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice as an unauthorized
successive petition. See Williams v. Fed. Dist. Ct., 2012 WL 1570768, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 16, 2012), rec. adopted, 2012 WL 1570407 (E.D. Tex. May 3, 2012)
(dismissing habeas application as successive where the petitioner filed three
previous petitions challenging the same underlying facts).
II. Alternatively, Thomas fails to state a cognizable claim.
a. Claims 1, 3, and 4 do not sound in habeas.
Thomas asserts that his conviction resulted from his inability to complete
the terms of his probation when the State deprived him of, or access to, adequate
health care in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Claim 1), the right
against cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment (Claim 3), and
the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to protection from “a situation of serious
danger”—a right he alleges that he is afforded due to the “special relationship”
between the State and an inmate (Claim 4). Am. Pet. at 6–8; Sec. Am. Pet. at 6–8.
But these claims fail because they do not sound in habeas.
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate means for a prisoner
to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 500 (1973); Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261, 263 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2007); Cook
v. TDCJ Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994). On the other
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hand, a civil rights action is an appropriate remedy for recovering damages
resulting from illegal administrative procedures or the conditions of
confinement. Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 1981). To
determine whether a prisoner must pursue habeas relief rather than a civil rights
action, the court must consider whether the prisoner challenges the fact or
duration of his confinement, or merely the rules, customs, and procedures
affecting conditions of confinement. Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir.
1987).
Thomas’s claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
ADA do not impact the fact or duration of his confinement. Thomas appears to
allege that he would not have been incarcerated but for the violation of these rights.
But he does not challenge the relevant law under which he is being held. Indeed,
the Texas trial court concluded, after an evidentiary hearing, that Thomas had
violated the terms of his community supervision and sentenced him to 10 years’
incarceration—a finding that was upheld on direct appeal. See ECF No. 21-1; see
also Thomas, No. 05-21-00471-CR, 2022 WL 3500007, at *3.
Accordingly, the District Judge should dismiss Claims 1, 3, and 4 as not
cognizable because they do not sound in habeas. See Schindler v. Warden, FCI
Beaumont, 2020 WL 5505441, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2020) (dismissing habeas
application because claims under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and ADA are not cognizable in habeas and did not impact the fact or
duration of the petitioner’s confinement).
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b. Claim 2 is not cognizable for federal habeas review.
Thomas also claims that the TDCJ violated its own policies by not exempting
him from participating in the SAFP program (Claim 2). Am. Pet. at 6; Sec. Am. Pet.
at 6. But federal habeas review is available only for the vindication of rights that
exist under federal law. Manning v. Blackburn, 786 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1986).
Thus, the District Judge should dismiss Claim 2 as not cognizable for federal
habeas review. See Newton v. Davis, 2018 WL 3559148 (N.D. Tex. June 20, 2018)
(Rutherford, J.), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 3549100 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018)
(denying habeas application that challenged, in part, purported violations of TDCJ
policy because such claims are not cognizable in habeas).
III. The District Judge should deny Thomas’s motion to amend as
futile.
Thomas moved for leave to file a third amended habeas application (ECF
No. 34). He argues that leave is necessary so he can bring another claim against
Respondent: that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Thomas
violated his probation. Mot. Amend at 1–3. But Thomas admits that this Court has
already disposed of this claim in a prior habeas application. Id. at 1; see also
Thomas, No. 3:23-cv-1547-L-BN, 2024 WL 945863, at *1. Thus, granting Thomas
leave to amend would be futile.
IV. The District Judge should deny Thomas’s motion for summary
judgment and related motions.
Thomas moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule 56 (ECF No. 39),
in which he replies to arguments in Respondent’s Response and Amended Answer
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and otherwise reiterates facts and evidence in support of his habeas petitions. See
generally id. He asks that the Court “reverse and remand” his underlying state
case. Id. at 74. But “a motion for summary judgment is not a proper method of
adjudicating a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” Gordon v. Dir., TDCJ-CID,
2018 WL 3060533, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2018), rec. accepted, 2018 WL
3046540 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2018) (citing Browder v. Director, Ill. Dept. of Corr.,
434 U.S. 257, 269, n.14 (1978); United States v. Hurley, 2005 WL 1473828 n.5
(N.D. Tex. 2005)). “The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts do not contemplate such a motion.” Brown v. Dir., TDCJ-CID,
2024 WL 5098507, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2024), rec. accepted, 2024 WL
5098050 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2024). While Habeas Rule 12 permits a court to apply
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when appropriate, dispositive motions are
not appropriate or necessary in the habeas context. Id. This is especially true
where, as here, the summary judgment motion essentially seeks the same relief as
that sought in the habeas application. See id.
So the District Judge should deny Thomas’s summary judgment motion
(ECF No. 39,).
Thomas also filed various summary judgment related motions, including (i)
a motion asking to expand the record in support of his summary judgment motion;
for leave to exceed the page limit for his summary judgment motion; and to
authenticate documents related to his summary judgment motion (ECF No. 38),
and (ii) a motion asking the Court to “admit or deny the authenticity and
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correctness of petitioner’s summary judgment evidence . . . pursuant to Habeas
Rule 7(c)” (ECF No. 40). The District Judge should deny these summary judgment
related motions as moot.
Recommendation
The District Judge should dismiss Thomas’s habeas petition for lack of
jurisdiction or deny it for failure to state a claim. The District Judge also should
deny Thomas’s motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 34), motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 39), and summary judgment related motions (ECF Nos. 38,
40).
SO RECOMMENDED.
February 6, 2026.
____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and
recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being
served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,
an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which
objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination
is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written
objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district
court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
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