Jones v. Director, TDCJ-CID

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
HENDRICK DARNELL JONES, §
TDCJ No. 02404694, §
§
Petitioner, §
§
V. § No. 3:24-cv-1443-K-BN
§
DIRECTOR, TDCJ-CID, §
§
Respondent. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Through a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
[Dkt. No. 1], Petitioner Hendrick Darnell Jones, a Texas state prisoner, challenges
his 2022 Dallas County conviction for murder. See State v. Hendrick Darnell Jones,
No. F-2200303-S (282nd Jud. Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., 2022).
The Court has reviewed the petition, the state court record, and the parties’
submissions. The relevant procedural history is set out below.
On July 14, 2022, Jones pleaded guilty to the offense of murder in the 282nd
District Court of Dallas County, Texas and was sentenced to sixty years in prison.
See Dkt. Nos. 11-3, 11-4. As part of the plea agreement, Jones waived his rights to
appeal. See Dkt. No. 11-2.
Jones then sought collateral relief in state court. He filed a state application
for writ of habeas corpus on March 6, 2023, challenging the conviction at issue here.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief without written order on May 24,
2023. See Dkt. No. 11-9.
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Jones had previously filed an earlier state habeas application on August 9,
2022, but that application challenged a different cause number (F-21-00381) that had
been dismissed before Jones was reindicted in this case. See Dkt. No. 11-8 at 240-55.
The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed that first application without written order
on March 8, 2023. See Dkt. No. 11-6.
Jones next sought federal habeas relief. In July 2023, he filed a Section 2254
petition in the Southern District of Texas. That petition was transferred to the
Northern District, and Jones filed an amended petition on July 29, 2023. See Darnell
Hendricks a/k/a Hendrick Darnell Jones v. Director, No. 3:23-cv-1606-B (N.D. Tex.
2023). The Court dismissed that petition without prejudice on September 5, 2023.
Jones then filed the petition in this case on May 16, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
In his pending petition, Jones asserts four grounds for relief. He alleges that
(1) the original indictment was defective; (2) the reindictment was defective; (3) trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in multiple respects, including failing to
adequately explain the charges, file motions, seek discovery, or advise him regarding
plea options; and (4) his due process rights were violated when law enforcement
allegedly continued custodial interrogation after he requested counsel.
For the reasons explained below, Jones has not demonstrated that the State’s
adjudication of his claims was contrary to or involved unreasonable application of
established federal law, nor that it was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts, and the Court should deny federal habeas relief.
Legal Standard
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“Federal habeas features an intricate procedural blend of statutory and case
law authority.” Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019). In the district
court, this process begins with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), under which “state prisoners face strict procedural requirements and
a high standard of review.” Adekeye, 938 F.3d at 682 (citation omitted). Under the
AEDPA, a state prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This standard “restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas
corpus” and ensures that “state courts play the leading role in assessing challenges
to state sentences based on federal law.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 124 (2020). A
state court decision is “contrary” to clearly established federal law only if “it relies on
legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it
reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially
indistinguishable facts.” Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); see also
Lopez v. Smith, 574 U.S. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) (“We have emphasized, time and
time again, that the [AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on
their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly
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established.’” (citation omitted)). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of
federal law when the state court “identifies the correct governing principle” but
“unreasonably applies that principle to the facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
412-13 (2000).
The question is not whether the state court was incorrect, but whether its
decision was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet,
that is because it was meant to be.” Id. at 102. Federal courts must “determine what
arguments or theories supported ... or could have supported the state court’s decision”
and then ask whether fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments are
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id.
Under this highly deferential standard, a petitioner must do more than show
the state court’s factual or legal conclusions were incorrect, he must show that they
were “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-10.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “a state-court factual determination is
not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a
different conclusion in the first instance” and that federal habeas relief is precluded
even where the state court’s factual determination is debatable. Wood v. Allen, 558
U.S. 290, 301, 303 (2010). State court factual findings are “presumed to be correct”
unless the petitioner can rebut this presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.”
Id. at 293.
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This presumption applies not only to explicit findings of fact but also “to those
unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court’s conclusions of mixed
law and fact.” Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Ford
v. Davis, 910 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “As long as there is ‘some
indication of the legal basis for the state court’s denial of relief,’ the district court may
infer the state court’s factual findings even if they were not expressly made.”
(footnotes omitted)).
Analysis
I. Jones’s Petition Is Time-Barred
A state prisoner ordinarily has one year to file a federal habeas petition,
starting from the date upon which the judgment of conviction became final by “the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Under Texas law, notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after
sentencing. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). The record reflects Jones pleaded guilty to
murder and was sentenced on July 14, 2022. Dkt. No. 11-4. He did not pursue a direct
appeal, and so his conviction became final on August 15, 2022, when the time for
seeking direct review expired.
That date triggered the one-year AEDPA limitations period. See Roberts v.
Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 2003).
Absent tolling, Jones’s limitations period expired on August 15, 2023.
A. Statutory Tolling Is Insufficient to Overcome Untimeliness
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AEDPA provides that the limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Jones filed two state habeas applications, but only one tolled the limitations
period.
Jones’s first application, filed August 9, 2022, challenged a cause number (F-
21-00381) that had been dismissed before he was reindicted and convicted in the
present case. See Dkt. 11-8 at 240-255. Because that application did not attack “the
pertinent judgment or claim,” it did not toll the federal limitations period. See Ex
parte Harrington, 310 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Jones’s second state habeas application, filed March 6, 2023, properly
challenged the conviction at issue here. See Dkt. No. 11-10 at 89 (Second Petition).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied that application on May 24, 2023. See
Dkt. No. 11-9 (Denial). This second application properly tolled the limitations period
for 80 days, extending Jones’s filing deadline from August 15, 2023, to November 3,
2023.
Although Jones filed a previous federal habeas petition that was dismissed
without prejudice, a federal habeas petition does not toll the AEDPA limitations
period. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001).
Jones filed this latest petition on May 16, 2024, more than six months after the
November 3, 2023, deadline.
The petition is therefore untimely, and no alternative triggering date applies
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under Section 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).
B. Equitable Tolling Does Not Apply
Jones has not demonstrated entitlement to equitable tolling.
To qualify, a petitioner must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and
prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (cleaned up). A
petitioner must pursue the habeas process with “diligence and alacrity.” Phillips v.
Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000). Unexplained delays do not evince due
diligence or rare and extraordinary circumstances. See Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d
710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999).
Jones attributes his untimely filing to his lack of legal knowledge, difficulty
obtaining assistance sooner, and reliance on other inmates and a writ writer for help.
Dkt. No. 1 at 14.
These circumstances do not constitute the type of rare and “extraordinary
circumstances” to justify equitable tolling. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171-73
(5th Cir. 2000).
Jones also asserts that trial counsel refused to file a direct appeal. Dkt. No. 1
at 14.
Even accepting this allegation as true, it does not warrant equitable tolling
because Jones does not contend that counsel affirmatively misinformed him about
filing deadlines or otherwise prevented him from timely filing this petition. See
Vineyard v. Dretke, 125 F. App’x 551, 553 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (equitable
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tolling applicable when an attorney affirmatively misinforms his client and causes
him to miss the limitations period).
Because the petition was filed after the expiration of the limitations period and
no basis exists for additional statutory or equitable tolling, the petition is time-barred
and should be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Alternatively, Jones is Not Entitled to Relief on Any Ground
Even if the petition were timely, Jones is not entitled to relief on any of the
asserted grounds.
His first two grounds – challenging the original indictment and reindictment
– are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. These claims are also foreclosed by
his guilty plea and do not present a cognizable federal claim.
His remaining grounds – ineffective assistance of counsel and violation of his
due process – fail on the merits under the applicable federal standards.
A. Grounds One and Two (Defective Indictment/Reindictment)
Jones challenges both his original indictment and the subsequent
reindictment, asserting that they were “defective” because they allegedly lacked
statutory citations, did not “bar” subsequent prosecution, and violated double
jeopardy principles. Dkt. No. 1 at 5-8.
Federal habeas review of alleged indictment defects is narrow. Relief does not
lie for claimed errors in a state indictment “unless it can be shown that the indictment
is so defective that it deprives the state court of jurisdiction.” McKay v. Collins, 12
F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1994); Morlett v. Lynaugh, 851 F.2d 1521, 1523 (5th Cir. 1988).
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Jones’s claims do not meet this threshold and do not warrant relief for at least
three independent reasons.
First, Jones did not fairly present these indictment challenges to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals in a procedurally proper manner. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)(1)(A); see also Wilder v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2001) (petitioner
must present to the state courts not only the same facts but also the same legal theory
upon which the federal claim is based). Jones’s state habeas proceedings challenged
other issues – ineffective assistance / due process – while the defective-indictment
theory appears only in his prior federal filing history. See Dkt. No. 11-10 at 74-90.
Because Texas would treat a new attempt to litigate these unraised claims as
an abuse of the writ under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07 § 4, the claims are
procedurally defaulted absent cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of
justice, neither of which Jones establishes. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
735 n.1 (1991); see also Smith v. Director, TDCJ-CID, No. 3:20-CV-2947-G (BT), 2022
WL 18359120, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 2022) (neither a petitioner’s “pro se status”
nor his “lack of legal training and knowledge” constitutes cause to excuse default),
rec. adopted, 2023 WL 289721 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2023).
Second, Jones’s guilty plea independently forecloses these claims. A guilty plea
waives collateral review of non-jurisdictional defects occurring before the plea,
including alleged defects in the charging instrument. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
The Supreme Court has explained that a guilty plea “represents a break in the
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chain of events” preceding the conviction and operates as an admission of all elements
of the charged offense. Id. at 267.
Jones’s allegations go to form and notice, not to any jurisdictional defect that
would render the trial court without authority to accept the plea and enter judgment.
Third, even if the Court could reach the merits, the claims fail.
The re-indictment charged Jones with murder – a valid statutory offense under
Tex. Penal Code Section 19.02(b) – and alleged that he “intentionally cause[d] the
death of [the victim] . . . by SHOOTING DECEASED WITH A FIREARM.” Dkt. No.
11-5. This language tracks the statute, alleges all essential elements of the offense,
provides notice of the specific conduct forming the basis of the charge, and confers
jurisdiction. The indictment specifies the date of the offense, the identity of the victim,
the culpable mental state (intentionally or knowingly), the prohibited conduct
(causing death), and the manner and means (shooting with a firearm).
And the absence of a specific code citation does not invalidate an indictment
that otherwise alleges all essential elements. See Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 180
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Nor does the re-indictment violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Jeopardy
attaches only once a “jury is empaneled” or a guilty plea accepted. Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
The record reflects that the original charge was dismissed before any plea was
entered or jury empaneled. Because jeopardy had never attached, the State was free
to re-indict. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1973); see also Ex parte
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Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
Jones’s double jeopardy claim therefore lacks any legal basis.
In sum, Grounds One and Two are procedurally barred and, in the alternative,
fail on the merits.
B. Ground Three – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Jones also alleges trial counsel provided ineffective counsel because he failed
to explain the charge, failed to file motions or seek discovery, failed to “object to
baseless” accusations, failed to investigate or communicate adequately, and failed to
discuss plea options. Dkt. No. 1 at 8-9.
Even assuming trial counsel committed the errors that Jones alleges, Jones
cannot show that counsel’s representation resulted in prejudice.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must satisfy the two-
prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
First, the petitioner must show “counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness,” with reasonableness judged under professional norms
prevailing at the time counsel rendered assistance. Id. at 688. The reviewing court
must give great deference to counsel’s performance and strongly presume counsel
exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 689. The right to counsel does not
require errorless counsel. A criminal defendant is only entitled to reasonably effective
assistance. See Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 281-82 (5th Cir. 1984); Boyd v.
Estelle, 661 F.2d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 1981).
Second, the petitioner must show prejudice. He must demonstrate “a
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. When the state
court has denied ineffective assistance claims, federal review is “doubly deferential.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). The Court must apply both
Strickland’s presumption of reasonable performance and AEDPA’s requirement that
the state court’s decision be not merely wrong but objectively unreasonable. Id.
Jones’s allegations do not meet that standard.
Many of his complaints concern generalized pre-plea matters (investigation,
discovery, motion practice) and are stated at a high level of abstraction. Jones does
not identify what specific motions counsel should have filed, what particular
discovery counsel should have sought, or what evidence would have been uncovered.
He does not explain what additional information he needed about the charges or how
counsel’s explanation was deficient. Conclusory assertions like these are insufficient
to show deficient performance. See, e.g., Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 530 (5th Cir.
1990).
Even if counsel’s performance were deficient, Jones fails to satisfy Strickland’s
prejudice requirement. In the guilty plea context, a petitioner must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Jones does not allege facts showing he would have rejected the plea agreement
and proceeded to trial if counsel had conducted additional discovery, filed unspecified
motions, or communicated differently. He does not identify a viable defense,
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exculpatory evidence, or a plausible trial strategy that would have made going to trial
rational in light of the murder charge and potential punishment exposure.
Jones was facing a murder charge with a potential sentence range of five to
ninety-nine years or life in prison. Under the plea agreement, he received sixty years.
Jones does not explain what different outcome he could reasonably have expected at
trial or how counsel’s alleged errors affected his decision to accept the plea.
Absent such a showing, the Court cannot find a reasonable probability that
counsel's alleged errors affected the plea decision.
Ground Three should be denied.
C. Ground Four – Due Process Violation
Jones’s final claim alleges that he was deprived of due process when law
enforcement continued custodial interrogation after he requested counsel and that
his statements were involuntary because he was intoxicated. Dkt. No. 1 at 10. He
appears to argue that these alleged interrogation improprieties rendered his
subsequent guilty plea involuntary.
This claim fails because Jones provides no factual basis connecting the
interrogation to his plea, and the record independently refutes any suggestion of
coercion.
As a threshold matter, Jones’s voluntary guilty plea forecloses collateral review
of alleged constitutional violations that occurred before the plea was entered. “When
a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of
the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims
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relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of
the guilty plea.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267.
To overcome this waiver, Jones must allege facts showing that the alleged
interrogation misconduct rendered his guilty plea itself unknowing or involuntary.
See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (valid plea must be knowing
and voluntary); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970) (a guilty plea
generally forecloses later collateral attacks based on alleged defects in prior
constitutional litigation choices).
Jones does no such thing. He challenges only the conduct of law enforcement
during interrogation and seeks relief from his conviction on that pre-plea conduct. See
Dkt. No. 1 at 10. He does not allege that any statements obtained during questioning
were used to induce his plea, that he pled guilty to avoid the admission of those
statements at trial, or that the alleged interrogation conditions affected his ability to
make a voluntary and informed decision at the plea hearing. Such claims are not
cognizable after a valid guilty plea.
Jones’s assertion that he was tired, intoxicated, or exasperated during
custodial questioning does not alter this analysis. See Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d
530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that a guilty plea is not involuntary absent
proof of an improper inducement beyond that inherent in the plea-bargaining
process); see also Ex parte Altobji, No. 01-14-01008-CR, 2015 WL 505202, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 5, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (rejecting a claim of plea involuntariness based solely on a defendant’s
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placement in a “high-stress” custodial setting).
Even assuming those conditions affected Jones’s willingness to speak at the
time of interrogation, they do not establish that his later guilty plea, entered with the
assistance of counsel, was involuntary.
A guilty plea is constitutionally invalid only if it was not “a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). Jones does not allege that he was
impaired at the plea hearing, that he failed to understand the proceedings, or that
exhaustion or intoxication carried over to his plea decision. Absent allegations linking
the interrogation conditions to the plea itself, his claim remains foreclosed.
Even if the Court construes Ground Four as an indirect challenge to the
voluntariness of the plea, the record affirmatively refutes Jones’s allegations.
Jones signed a “Judicial Confession” and “Plea Agreement” in which he
acknowledged his rights, stated that he is mentally competent, and affirmed he
understood the nature of the accusation against him. Dkt. No. 11-1 at 4. He
acknowledged the applicable punishment range and stated:
I admit and judicially confess that I committed the offense of [Murder]
... exactly as alleged in the charging instrument. I affirm that my plea
and judicial confession are freely and voluntarily made, and not
influenced by any consideration of fear, persuasion, or delusive hope of
pardon or parole.
Id. at 2. Jones also confirmed that defense counsel explained his rights and the
consequences of his plea, and that his “statements and waivers are knowingly, freely,
and voluntarily made.” Id at 2-4.
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A plea is constitutionally valid when the defendant has “real notice of the true
nature of the charge against him.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Written plea documents and judicial confessions
are “‘entitled to a presumption of regularity and are accorded great evidentiary
weight.’” United States v. McDaniel, 907 F.3d 366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hobbs
v. Blackburn, 752 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985). Jones offers no evidence sufficient
to overcome that presumption.
Finally, Jones’s allegations are conclusory and lack factual detail. He does not
identify when he allegedly invoked counsel, what questioning occurred thereafter,
what specific statements were obtained, or how those statements influenced his
decision to plead guilty. Nor does he allege facts showing a reasonable probability
that, but for the alleged interrogation conduct, he would have rejected the plea
agreement and insisted on proceeding to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59.
Jones provides no specific factual support for his claims.
Because Jones has neither alleged nor demonstrated that any purported
custodial interrogation violations rendered his guilty plea involuntary, Ground Four
does not warrant federal habeas relief.
Recommendation
The Court should deny the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person
in State Custody [Dkt. No. 1] with prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
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findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: January 16, 2026
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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