Guardian Garage Midwest LLC v. Polyguard Garage of Texas LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
GUARDIAN GARAGE MIDWEST LLC, §
PLAINTIFF, §
§
V. § CASE NO. 3:23-CV-1581-N-BK
§
POLYGUARD GARAGE OF TEXAS LLC, §
ET AL., §
DEFENDANTS. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the district judge’s Order of Reference, Doc. 23,
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 56, is before the undersigned magistrate judge
for the issuance of findings and a recommended disposition. Upon review, the motion should be
GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff Guardian Garage Midwest LLC (“Guardian”), initiated this
civil action against individuals Dallas Glenn, Jordan Glenn, and Cressa Brooke Glenn
(collectively, the “Individual Defendants”), and business entity Polyguard Garage of Texas, LLC
(“Polyguard”). Doc. 1 at 1-2. This suit arises out of Defendants’ alleged conspiracy to
misappropriate Guardian’s confidential business information for use in the formation and
operation of Polyguard, an LLC in which the Individual Defendants are members or otherwise
closely involved. Doc. 1 at 4-5.
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 1 of 14 PageID <pageID>

2
The Complaint alleges that Dallas Glenn was formerly a member and employee of
Guardian and was authorized to access Guardian’s confidential business information. Doc. 1 at
2-3. In September 2022, Guardian and Dallas Glenn allegedly executed a “Redemption
Agreement,” which terminated Dallas’ employment and extinguished his membership interest in
Guardian. Doc. 1 at 2-3. Under the Agreement, Dallas allegedly acknowledged his prior access
to Guardian’s confidential information and agreed not to disclose it, make it available to others,
or exploit it for any purpose without Guardian’s express authorization. Doc. 1 at 2-3.
Guardian alleges that, after the Agreement’s execution, Dallas disclosed Guardian’s
“confidential business information” to co-defendants Jordan and Cressa Glenn, who
subsequently formed Polyguard in January 2023. Doc. 1 at 4-5. Guardian further asserts that
since Polyguard’s formation, Defendants have “acted in concert to misappropriate” Guardian’s
confidential information and intellectual property for the operation and marketing of Polyguard’s
services. Doc. 1 at 5. According to Guardian, “such intellectual property includes, but is not
limited to, certain photographs” belonging to Guardian that were posted on Polyguard’s website.
Doc. 1 at 5.
Based on these allegations, Guardian asserts claims against the Defendants for copyright
infringement, breach of contract, unfair competition by misappropriation, and civil conspiracy.
Doc. 1 at 5-9.
B. Procedural History
In December 2023, all Defendants, then represented by the same counsel, filed separate
Answers to Guardian’s Complaint. Doc. 8; Doc. 9; Doc. 10; Doc. 11. Guardian subsequently
served its First Set of Interrogatories, First Requests for Production, and First Requests for
Admission on all Defendants. Doc. 56 at 4. Thereafter, Defendants’ counsel was permitted to
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 2 of 14 PageID <pageID>

3
withdraw. Doc. 17; Doc. 20. When Defendants failed to respond to Guardian’s discovery
requests, Guardian moved to compel responses and requested that its 10 requests for admission
be deemed admitted. Doc. 31 at 2-3. Because no Defendant filed a response, the Court granted
the motion as unopposed and deemed the requests admitted. Doc. 33.
Guardian subsequently moved for summary judgment against all Defendants. Doc. 56.
However, after the Court later struck Defendant Polyguard’s Answer due to its failure to comply
with the Court’s Orders requiring it to retain replacement counsel, Guardian additionally filed a
separate motion seeking default judgment against Polyguard. Doc. 65.
In a separate report and recommendation, the undersigned has recommended that
Guardian’s Motion for Default Judgment against Polyguard be granted in part. See Doc. 68.
Accordingly, although Guardian’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeks relief against all
Defendants, see Doc. 56 at 11, the Court considers the motion only as it pertains to the Individual
Defendants: Dallas Glenn, Jordan Glenn, and Cressa Glenn.
Only Cressa Glenn, proceeding pro se, filed a response to Guardian’s motion within the
time allotted to do so.1 See Doc. 62. Dallas Glenn and Jordan Glenn have neither responded to
the motion nor otherwise participated in this action since their counsel was permitted to
withdraw in December 2024. See Doc. 20.
1 Although Cressa’s response appears to oppose Guardian’s motion on behalf of herself and the
other individual defendants, see Doc. 62, she is not a licensed attorney and therefore may only
appear on her own behalf in federal court. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021-1022 (5th
Cir. 1998) (“in federal court a party can represent himself or be represented by an attorney, but
cannot be represented by a nonlawyer.”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654 (permitting only two types of
representation-by an attorney admitted to practice law or by a person representing himself).
Accordingly, the Court considers Cressa’s response only as it pertains to her individually.
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 3 of 14 PageID <pageID>

4
II. APPLICABLE LAW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting a since-amended
version of FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment
has the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of [the summary judgment record] . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
If the moving party makes the requisite initial showing, the nonmoving party must come
forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). “To meet this
burden, the nonmovant must ‘identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the ‘precise
manner’ in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s].’” Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651,
656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
871 (1994)). When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact has been established,
courts “must view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth.,
827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). “Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
A motion for summary judgment cannot be granted merely because there is no opposition
to it. Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Administracion Cent. Sociedad Anonima, 776 F.2d 1277, 1279 (5th
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 4 of 14 PageID <pageID>

5
Cir. 1985). Rather, “[t]he movant has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact and, unless he has done so, the court may not grant the motion, regardless of
whether any response was filed.” Id. Nevertheless, the court may accept as undisputed any facts
listed in support of the motion for summary judgment. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172,
174 (5th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, if the movant’s uncontested submissions establish a prima
facie entitlement to summary judgment, the court may properly grant the motion.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Copyright Infringement (17 U.S.C. § 501)
1. Guardian is Entitled to Summary Judgment on its Copyright Infringement
Claim.
Guardian moves for summary judgment on its copyright infringement claim against
Defendants, contending that there is no genuine dispute that the Defendants copied and displayed
at least one of Guardian’s photographs without attribution or compensation. Doc. 56 at 13. To
prevail on a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish (1) “ownership of a valid
copyright,” and (2) “‘copying’ by the defendant.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 501 (5th Cir.
2020) (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
In support of its motion, Guardian produces the following uncontroverted evidence: (1)
copies of the copyrighted photographs at issue (Doc. 56-4 at 7-8); (2) a screenshot showing the
photographs as they appeared on Guardian’s social media page (Doc. 56-4 at 9); (3) a certificate
of copyright registration (Doc. 56-9), which Stephen Anderson attests covers the photographs at
issue; and (4) Defendants’ deemed admission that they used “Plaintiff’s confidential information,
including photographs, which were posted on Defendant Polyguard[‘s] website,” (Doc. 31-1 at
14, Pl’s Req. for Admission No. 6); (5) a certificate of formation for Polyguard LLC listing
Cressa Glenn and Jordan Glenn as managing members (Doc. 56-6 at 1-2); and (6) a screenshot
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 5 of 14 PageID <pageID>

6
purportedly showing the infringing use of at least one copyrighted photographs on the
polyguardgarage.com website (Doc. 56-4 at 6).
Taken together, this evidence sufficiently establishes each element of Guardian’s
copyright infringement claim. The certificate of registration is prima facie evidence of both the
copyright’s validity and the registrant’s ownership. Batiste, 976 F.3d at 501. Defendants have
offered no evidence rebutting Guardian’s ownership and, thus, the first element is satisfied. Id.
The second element—copying—is likewise satisfied through evidence of Defendant’s
access to the original work and probative similarities between the original work and the allegedly
infringing work. Peel & Co. v. The Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2001). In an Affidavit
submitted in support of their motion, Guardian’s corporate representative Stephen Andersen
attests that Dallas Glenn was authorized to access Guardian’s confidential business information,
including the photographs at issue, during his employment with Guardian. Doc. 56-4 at 2.
Andersen further attests that Dallas Glenn retained these photographs and later disseminated
them to co-defendants Jordan Glenn, Cressa Glenn, and Polyguard. Doc. 56-4 at 2-3. This
evidence establishes a “reasonable possibility” that Defendants had access to the copyrighted
works. See Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Access . . .
include[s] an opportunity to view the copyrighted work.”).
Finally, although the question of similarity should normally be left to the factfinder,
summary judgment is appropriate “when the similarities between plaintiff’s and defendant’s
works are so overwhelming as to preclude the possibility of independent creation” and the court
concludes that no reasonable juror could make a contrary finding. Fed’n of State Massage
Therapy Boards v. Mendez Master Training Ctr., Inc., 393 F.Supp.3d 557, 569 (S.D. Tex. 2019);
Biggs v. Cabela’s, Inc., No. 4:03-CV-205, 2004 WL 530167, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2004)
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 6 of 14 PageID <pageID>

7
(McBryde, J.) (citing Peel, 238 F.3d at 395). In the instant case, after conducting a side-by-side
comparison of Guardian’s photographs with the images appearing on Polyguard’s website, the
Court concludes that at least one image posted on Polyguard’s website is either identical or
strikingly similar to Guardian’s copyrighted work. Compare Doc. 56-4 at 8, with Doc. 56-4 at 6.
Indeed, the similarities between the photographs are so striking that no reasonable juror could
conclude that the images were the result of independent creation. Mendez, 393 F.Supp.3d at 569.
Because the undisputed evidence establishes Guardian’s ownership of a valid copyright
and Defendants’ copying of the work, Guardian has demonstrated entitlement to summary
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted in favor of
Guardian as to the Individual Defendants’ liability for copyright infringement.
2. Guardian is Not Entitled to Statutory Damages or Attorneys’ Fees on its
Copyright Infringement Claim.
The Copyright Act provides that a prevailing plaintiff may elect to recover either actual
damages plus “any additional profits of the infringer,” or statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-
(c). Statutory damages, however, are subject to the limitations imposed by Section 412 of the
Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 412. Section 412 provides that “no award for statutory damages
or attorneys’ fees, as provided by sections 504 and 505, shall be made for . . . any infringement
of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and before the effective date of its
registration, unless such registration is made within three months after the first publication of the
work.” Id. § 412(2).
Guardian seeks $30,000 in statutory damages, representing the maximum award allowed
for the single infringed photograph. Doc. 56 at 14, 16; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)
(authorizing statutory damages of $750 to $30,000 per infringed work). However, Guardian is
precluded from recovering statutory damages because the photograph was neither registered
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 7 of 14 PageID <pageID>

8
before Defendants’ infringement nor within three months of its initial publication on Guardian’s
Facebook page. See Doc. 1 at 5 (stating that photographs were first published “no later than
December 1, 2021”); Doc. 56-4 at 3 (noting that infringing photograph appeared on Polyguard’s
website from March 29, 2023, to July 14, 2023); Doc. 56-9 (certificate of registration reflecting
an effective registration date of May 5, 2023).
Accordingly, notwithstanding Defendants’ liability for copyright infringement, Guardian
is not entitled to statutory damages or attorneys’ fees on this claim. See 17 U.S.C. § 412(2).
Guardian’s request for $30,000 in statutory damages and attorneys’ fees as provided under the
Copyright Act should therefore be denied.
B. Breach of Contract
Although the Complaint appears to assert a breach of contract claim only against
Defendant Dallas Glenn, Guardian moves for summary judgment on this claim against all
“Defendants” for breach of the Redemption Agreement. Compare Doc. 1 at 6-7, with Doc. 56 at
13. To prevail on a breach of contract claim under Texas law, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) the
existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3)
breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of
the breach.” Conn Credit I, L.P. v. TF LoanCo III, L.L.C., 903 F.3d 493, 499–500 (5th Cir.
2018) (internal quotations omitted). “The existence of a contract between the parties is essential
to a breach of contract action.” Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Maya, No. 2005 WL 1017814, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2005) (Boyle, J.) (citing Frazin v. Hanley, 130 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)).
Here, Guardian’s requests for admission, which have been deemed admitted,
conclusively establish that “Defendant Dallas Glenn signed and entered into a Redemption
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 8 of 14 PageID <pageID>

9
Agreement with Plaintiff.” See Doc. 31-1 at 14 (Pl’s Req. for Admission No. 3); Doc. 33.
However, Guardian does not allege, and the summary judgment record contains no evidence of,
a contractual relationship between Guardian and Defendants Jordan Glenn or Cressa Glenn. See
Doc. 1 at 6-7. Although Guardian now seeks to hold the Defendants “jointly and severally
liable” under the Agreement, the Complaint does not assert this theory, nor does Guardian
provide any basis for imposing liability on Cressa Glenn or Jordan Glenn as non-parties to the
Agreement. Because the evidence shows that the only parties to the Agreement were Guardian
and Dallas Glenn, Guardian is not entitled to summary judgment against Jordan Glenn and
Cressa Glenn, and any breach of contract claims asserted against them should be dismissed.
With respect to Defendant Dallas Glenn, however, the summary judgment record
establishes that he was a party to the Agreement. Doc. 31-1 at 14 (Pl’s Req. for Admission No.
3). Dallas Glenn does not dispute that Guardian performed its obligations under the Agreement,
and the second element of Guardian’s breach of contract claim is therefore satisfied. Doc. 8 at 3;
Doc. 56-4 at 3. Guardian further alleges that Dallas Glenn breached the Agreement by “using
Plaintiff’s copyrighted works in violation of the agreement.” Doc. 56 at 13. The Agreement
expressly prohibited Dallas Glenn from “exploit[ing] or attempt[ing] to exploit, commercially or
otherwise, appropriate for [his] use or reproduce in any form, all or any part of [Guardian’s]
Confidential Information unless specifically authorized” to do so. Doc. 56-3 at 3.
In support, Guardian provides the affidavit of Stephen Anderson, who attests that Dallas
Glenn disseminated confidential information, including at least one photograph, to the other co-
defendants. Doc. 56-4 at 2-3. However, the photograph2 that Guardian indicates was first
2 Although Guardian repeatedly refers to “photographs,” it offered evidence of a single
photograph that was published to Polyguard’s website.
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 9 of 14 PageID <pageID>

10
published on its own website, see Doc. 1 at 5, is specifically excluded from the definition of
“Confidential Information” in the Agreement. See Doc. 56-3 at 3 (excepting from the definition
of Confidential Information “any information voluntarily disclosed to the public as authorized by
the Company,”). On this record, Guardian has not demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to Dallas Glenn’s breach of the Agreement. Consequently, Guardian’s motion
for summary judgment as to this claim should be denied as to all Defendants.
C. Misappropriation
Guardian next seeks summary judgment against Defendants on its common law
misappropriation claim. Doc. 56 at 14-15. Under Texas law, a misappropriation claim requires
Guardian to establish that: (1) Guardian created a “product through extensive time, labor, skill
and money”; (2) Defendants’ used that product in competition with plaintiff, thereby gaining a
competitive advantage; and (3) Guardian suffered commercial damage as a result. Jim S. Adler,
P.C. v. Angel L. Reyes & Associates PC, No. 3:19-cv-2027, 2020 WL 5099596, at *13 (N.D.
Tex. Aug. 7, 2020) (Horan, J.), rep & rec. adopted, 2020 WL 5094678 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29,
2020) (citing U.S. Sporting Products, Inc. v. Johnny Stewart Game Calls, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 214,
218 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied).
Here, the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to establish any of the elements of a
misappropriation claim, and nothing in the summary judgment record cures this defect. As in the
Complaint, Guardian’s motion alleges only that it “created and maintained confidential
information through extensive time, labor, skill, and money,” without specifying what
information was misappropriated or how its creation required substantial effort. See Doc. 56 at
15. These conclusory allegations, unsupported by any factual detail, are insufficient to meet
even the minimal pleading standards. See, e.g., Ferring B.V. v. Allergan, Inc., 4 F. Supp.3d 612,
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 10 of 14 PageID <pageID>

11
630 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (pleadings were insufficient to state a claim where plaintiff alleged only
misappropriation of “confidential, trade secret, proprietary and privileged information” without
specifying what information was misappropriated).
Because Guardian has failed to provide any factual support for its claim, it cannot meet
its burden for summary judgment. Accordingly, Guardian is not entitled to summary judgment
on the misappropriation claim, and the claim should be dismissed, sua sponte, for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Miller v. Sam Houston State Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 888
(authorizing sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, so long as “the plaintiff has alleged
[its] best case.”).
D. Civil Conspiracy
Finally, Guardian seeks summary judgment on its claim that the Individual Defendants
engaged in a civil conspiracy to misappropriate Guardian’s copyrighted works and publish them
on Polyguard’s website. Doc. 56 at 15. To establish a claim for civil conspiracy under Texas
law, a plaintiff must show: “(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a
meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and (5)
damages as the proximate result.” Agar Corporation, Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580
S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. 2019) (quoting Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.
1983)). Civil conspiracy is a “derivative tort,” meaning that a “defendant’s liability for
conspiracy depends on participation in some underlying tort[.]” Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d
672, 681 (Tex. 1996).
In the case sub judice, Guardian submits that the Individual Defendants conspired to
infringe upon Guardian’s copyright and to misappropriate Guardian’s confidential information.
Doc. 1 at 8-9, ¶¶ 41-43. However, because Guardian’s misappropriation claim fails, Guardian
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 11 of 14 PageID <pageID>

12
cannot maintain a conspiracy claim predicated on that alleged tort. See Wickfire, LLC v.
Woodruff, 989 F.3d 343, 358 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that, under Texas law, “a civil conspiracy
claim is connected to the underlying tort and survives or falls alongside it.”).
Moreover, although Guardian prevails on its copyright infringement claims, as explained
supra, Guardian is not entitled to statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 412(2), and the record
contains no evidence of actual damages resulting from Defendants’ infringement. Under Texas
law, “[c]ivil conspiracy depends entirely on the injury caused by the underlying tort; the injury is
the damage from the underlying wrong, not the conspiracy itself.” Agar, 580 S.W.3d at 141.
Because Guardian has not demonstrated any injury proximately caused by Defendants’
infringement, there is no factual basis to conclude that it suffered damages as a result of the
alleged conspiracy. See, e.g., First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 520
S.W.3d 53, 52 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015), aff’d in relevant part, 514 S.W.3d 214, 224 (Tex.
2017) (affirming denial of summary judgment on civil conspiracy claim where the plaintiff failed
to produce any evidence that its damages were caused by the underlying wrongful conduct).
Accordingly, Guardian is not entitled to summary judgment on its civil conspiracy claim.3
3 The Court notes that several courts have held that civil conspiracy claims predicated solely on
copyright infringement may be preempted by the federal Copyright Act. See, e.g., M-I LLC v.
Stelly, 733 F.Supp.2d 759, 791 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding that civil conspiracy claim was
preempted by the Copyright act because “the intent element” of the conspiracy claim “does not
constitute qualitatively different conduct” than that underlying a federal copyright claim); Ultraflo
Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc., 823 F.Supp.2d 578, 588 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (same); Raj v. Murphy,
No. 3:17-CV-357, 2019 WL 982863, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 28, 2019) (Reeves, J.) (same).
Nevertheless, because the Court concludes that Guardian is not entitled to summary judgment on
its civil conspiracy claim and preemption is an affirmative defense, the Court declines to address
the issue of preemption sua sponte.
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 12 of 14 PageID <pageID>

13
E. Entitlement to Injunctive Relief
Guardian seeks a permanent injunction barring Defendants from further use of both its
copyrighted material and confidential information. Doc. 1. Because Guardian has prevailed on
its copyright infringement claim, it may be entitled to an injunction barring further infringement
if it satisfies the applicable prerequisites. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Tex. Border Mgmt., Inc., 11
F.Supp. 3d 689, 696 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (Ramirez, J.) (citation omitted).
To obtain a permanent injunction in copyright cases, the plaintiff must show: “(1) actual
success on the merits; (2) no adequate remedy at law; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs
any damage to the defendant; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Arista
Records, Inc. v. Kabani, No. 3:03-CV-1191, 2004 WL 884445, at *4. (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2004)
(Sanders, J.) (citing DSC Comm’ns Corp. v. DGI Tech. Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1996)).
All four requirements are satisfied here. First, Guardian is entitled to summary judgment
in its favor on the copyright infringement claim; thus, it has prevailed on the merits. Second,
given the unavailability of statutory damages in this case, no adequate remedy at law exists.
Third, there has been no showing that Defendants would suffer any harm from a permanent
injunction which merely prevents continued unlawful infringement. Finally, considering the
need for fair competition, the Court concludes that a permanent injunction is abundantly in the
public interest. Accordingly, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s request for a permanent
injunction as to the unauthorized use of its copyrighted photographs.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 56, should be
GRANTED only as to Dallas Glenn’s, Jordan Glenn’s, and Cressa Glenn’s liability for
Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, and Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 13 of 14 PageID <pageID>

14
prohibiting Polyguard’s further infringement of its copyrighted works. In all other respects, the
motion should be DENIED.
SO RECOMMENDED on March 10, 2026.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by
law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific
written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.
R. CIV. P. 72(B). An objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate where in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific
written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon
grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir.
1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file
objections to 14 days).
Case 3:23-cv-01581-N-BK Document 69 Filed 03/10/26 Page 14 of 14 PageID <pageID>