Energy Alchemy Inc v. Sagrero Nambo et al

ORDER – PAGE 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ENERGY ALCHEMY, INC., 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 3:23-CV-0815-K
§
MARY CRUZ d/b/a MI DIA CAFÉ, 	§
JESUS SAGRERO d/b/a MI DIA CAFÉ, 	§
MARTA SAGRERO d/b/a MI DIA 	§
CAFÉ, and JUAN SAGRERO NAMBO, 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Energy Alchemy, Inc.’s Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs (Doc. No. 81). 	Having carefully considered the Motion, the record in this
matter, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
Motion.
I. 	Background
The detailed procedural and factual background of this matter is included in the
Court’s previous Memorandum Opinion and Order (Doc. No. 79) granting in part and
denying in part Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and Memorandum Opinion and
Order (Doc. No. 78) (together, the “Opinions”) granting part and denying in part
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 	In the Opinions partially granting Plaintiff’s
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 1 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 2
requested relief, Plaintiff succeeded on its claims for the “MI DIA” mark under the Lanham
Act and Texas common law and the Court permanently enjoined Defendants Maricruz
Sagrero Nambo, Jesus Sagrero Nambo, Marta Sagrero, and Juan Sagrero Nambo (together,
“Defendants”) from using Plaintiff’s “MI DIA” mark or any confusingly similar variant in
connection with its restaurant. Doc. No. 78 at 1-2; Doc. No. 79 at 1-2. The Court denied
Plaintiff’s requested relief as to its claims for the “FROM SCRATCH” mark under the
Lanham Act and the Texas common law and for trademark infringement under Texas
statutory law. 	See generally id. 	The Court also found the case is exceptional and ordered
Defendants to pay Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs. Doc. No. 78 at 25-27; Doc. No. 79
at 23-25. Plaintiff, thereafter, filed this Motion.
II. 	Applicable Law
Courts in the Fifth Circuit use the lodestar method for calculating reasonable
attorneys' fees. See La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995).
The court first “determine[s] the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation
and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.” Id. The court then calculates
the “lodestar” amount by “multiply[ing] the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly
rates.” Id. There is a strong presumption of the reasonableness of the lodestar amount. See
Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010); Smith & Fuller, P.A. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber
Co., 685 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 2012). 	However, the court may consider whether the
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 2 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 3
lodestar amount should be adjusted in light of certain additional factors. See Kellstrom, 50
F.3d at 324.
“[T[he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 437 (1983). To that end, “courts customarily require the applicant to produce
contemporaneous billing records or other sufficient documentation so that the district
court can fulfill its duty to examine the application for noncompensable hours.” Kellstrom,
50 F.3d at 324 (quoting Bode v. United States, 919 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990)). An
affidavit from a participating attorney may be sufficient to establish the fees being sought.
Smith & Fuller, 685 F.3d at 490.
III. 	Analysis
The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, the supporting declarations and
detailed time records, the record of this matter, and the applicable law. 	The Court turns
first to Plaintiff’s request to recover fees incurred by certain timekeepers other than lead
counsel Amy LaValle and John Arnott—James R. Ennis, research attorney; Angela Ortiz,
legal practice assistant/paralegal; M. Elena Benavente, paralegal; Sonya L. Rose, paralegal;
and Sheryl Haywood, paralegal. The requested fees for these individuals total $2,688.00.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for these fees because the request is not supported by
evidence before the Court.
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 3 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 4
First, there is no documentation from which the Court can determine that the
hourly rates of those timekeepers are reasonable, such as their experience and comparable
rates in this legal market. Further, the time sheets reflect work done by these individuals,
but it appears that certain work, particularly that done by Ms. Haywood, was merely
clerical. 	See Velo v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 681 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Paralegal work
can only be recovered as attorney's fees if the work is legal rather than clerical.”).
Accordingly, the Court finds there is insufficient proof of the reasonableness of the hours
expended by and the hourly rates of James R. Ennis, Angela Ortiz, M. Elena Benavente,
Sonya L. Rose, and Sheryl Haywood. 	See Hensley, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (“[T[he fee
applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the
appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”); Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 324 (“[C]ourts
customarily require the applicant to produce contemporaneous billing records or other
sufficient documentation so that the district court can fulfill its duty to examine the
application 	for 	noncompensable 	hours.”). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	denies 	Plaintiff
attorneys’ fees of $2,688.00 for these timekeepers.
The Court now addresses the attorneys’ fees incurred by Amy LaValle and John
Arnott. First, the Court finds that rates charged by Ms. LaValle and Mr. Arnott are
reasonable. 	The declarations of Ms. LaValle and Mr. Arnott, both partners, sufficiently
document their hourly rates in this market. Ms. LaValle billed at a reduced hourly rate of
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 4 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 5
$450 and Mr. Arnott’s reduced hourly rate was $485 (in 2023) and $495 (in 2024). Based
on this Court’s own experience, these hourly rates are reasonable. Further, Ms. LaValle’s
and Mr. Arnott’s hourly rates are inline with those previously found to be reasonable by
this Court and other courts in the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas. See,
e.g., ICM US Operating, LLC v. Industrias Costa Mesa, S.A. de C.V., Civ. Action No. 20-CV-
1712-K, 2025 WL 1646592, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 2025)(Kinkeade, J.) (finding $544
to $1065/hour for partners to be reasonable); Plunkett v. FirstKey Homes LLC, Civ. Action
No. 3:23-CV-2684-L-BN, 2024 WL 5315330, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2024)(Horan,
M.J.)(finding $775/hour for lead counsel to be reasonable), adopted by, 2024 WL 5075065,
(N.D. Tex., Dec. 11, 2024)(Lindsay, J.); Hill v. Schilling, Civ. Action No. 3:07-CV-2020-L,
2022 WL 1321548, at *6 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2022)(Lindsay, J.) (finding $730-$830/hour
for partners to be reasonable); Adv. Physicians, S.C. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., Civ.
Action No. 3:16-CV-02355-G-BT, 2021 WL 6428370 at * 6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17,
2021)(Rutherford, M.J.)(finding $537 to $862/hour to be reasonable).
The Court further finds that hours expended by Ms. LaValle and Mr. Arnott are
reasonable. See Doc. Nos. 81-1 (LaValle Declaration) & 81-2 (Arnott Declaration). 	The
hours expended in this matter were substantial, but this is understandable in light of the
amount of necessary activity pre-litigation and then once suit was filed as well as the subject
matter of this litigation. Based on the documentation, the hours expended by Ms. LaValle
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 5 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 6
(201.1 hours) and Mr. Arnott (42.1 hours), totaling 243.2 hours, are reasonable. 	The
Court does, however, find that this time should be reduced because appropriate billing
judgment is lacking.
“[P]laintiffs seeking attorney's fees are charged with the burden of showing the
reasonableness of the hours billed and, therefore, are also charged with proving that they
exercised billing judgment.” 	Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. 	“Billing judgment requires
documentation of the hours charged and of the hours written off as unproductive,
excessive, or redundant.” 	Id.; see Walker v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 99 F.3d 761,
769 (5th Cir. 1996). 	Here, there is no evidence that any time was written off by Ms.
LaValle or Mr. Arnott, and, therefore, no demonstration that appropriate billing judgment
was exercised. 	“The proper remedy for omitting evidence of billing judgment does not
include a denial of fees but, rather, a reduction of the award by a percentage intended to
substitute for the exercise of billing judgment.” 	Saizan, 448 F.3d at 799. 	An attorney’s
reduction of their fees by 10% has been found to be sufficient evidence of billing judgment.
ICM US Operating, 2025 WL 1646592, at *8. Therefore, the Court finds a reduction of
10% of the hours expended to be appropriate here. Reducing the hours expended by 10%
results in 181.0 hours for Ms. LaValle and 37.9 hours for Mr. Arnott.
Based on the Motion and supporting documentation, the Court finds the lodestar
amount to be calculated as follows—181 hours for Ms. LaValle at $450 an hour and for
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 6 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 7
Mr. Arnott 21.2 hours (in 2023) at $485 an hour and 16.7 hours (in 2024) at $495 an
hour, for a total of $100,448.50. This lodestar amount is presumptively reasonable. The
Court has also considered the Johnson factors and concludes that none warrant adjusting
the lodestar. 	Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 800 n. 18(5th Cir.
2006) (citing Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974)); see also Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565
(1986) (“[M]any of the Johnson factors ‘are subsumed within the initial calculation’ of the
lodestar” amount, therefore “such modifications are proper only in certain ‘rare’ and
‘exceptional’ cases, supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record and detailed
findings by the lower courts.”) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-901 (1984)).
For these reasons, the Court awards Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$100,448.50.
Plaintiff also seeks to recover its costs of suit totaling $2,998.93. A prevailing party
in a civil action is entitled to recover its costs unless the court otherwise directs. See Rule
54(d)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (identifying recoverable costs). 	Plaintiff established
through record evidence that it has incurred these fees. See Doc. No. 81-1 at 2, ¶ 10 & Ex.
A; Doc. No. 81-2 at 2, ¶¶ 8-9 & Exs. A & B. The Court finds these costs are recoverable
and, therefore, awards Plaintiff its costs of $2,998.93.
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 7 of 8 PageID <pageID>

ORDER – PAGE 8
Finally, Plaintiff requests that Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the
award of attorneys’ fees and costs. “A court may impose joint and several liability in setting
fees.” Walker, 99 F.3d at 772. 	Plaintiff suffered a “single indivisible injury” and, on this
record, it does not appear that the imposition of joint and several liability will result in
inequitable results. 	Id. at 772-73. 	In its discretion, the Court imposes joint and several
liability on Defendants for this award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
IV. 	Conclusion
The Court GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Fix Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
(Doc. No. 81). 	For the foregoing reasons, the Court awards Plaintiff $100,448.50 in
attorneys’ fees against Defendants jointly and severally. 	The Court awards Plaintiff
costs of $2,998.93 taxed against Defendants jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED.
Signed January 8th , 2026.
______________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:23-cv-00815-K Document 82 Filed 01/08/26 Page 8 of 8 PageID <pageID>