Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Crear et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST §
COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, IN TRUST 	§
FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF 	§
LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN 	§
TRUST 2005-WL2, ASSET-BACKED 	§
CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-WL2, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
V. 	§ 	No. 3:23-cv-745-L-BN
§
STEVEN CREAR, SR., ET AL., 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This chapter in the history of litigation related to Defendants Steven Crear,
Sr. (“Crear Sr.”) and Steven Crear, Jr. (“Crear Jr.”) (together, the “Crears”) and real
property located at 1617 Gillarel Springs Lane, in Dallas, Texas (the “Property”)
closed on February 19, 2026, when – after accepting the undersigned United States
magistrate judge’s recommendations as to the motion for summary judgment filed by
Plaintiff Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (“DB”) – United States District
Judge Sam A. Lindsay entered judgment for DB “with respect to its claims for
trespass to try title and quiet title, and related requests for declaratory and
permanent injunctive relief, and with respect to these claims” ordered, adjudged, and
decreed that, among other things, DB “is the owner of the [Property], free and clear
of any claims by Defendants.” Dkt. No. 103; Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Crear, No.
3:23-cv-745-L-BN, 2026 WL 404050 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2026), rec. accepted, 2026 WL
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402637 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2026); see also Crear v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 491
F. Supp. 3d 207, 219 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (“This is [Crear Sr.]’s sixth lawsuit challenging
foreclosure proceedings related to the Property. [Crear Sr.] voluntarily dismissed two
of his five previous lawsuits, see Crear, 3:10-cv-2149-K and Crear, 3:19-cv-1795-S-BT,
and the Court granted Chase or another defendant’s dispositive motion in the
remaining three, see Crear, 3:10-cv-00463-N, Crear, 3:11-cv-565-K, and Crear, 3:17-
cv-159-D. [Crear Sr.]’s claims lack merit, and the Court finds his lawsuits duplicative,
harassing, and burdensome to the Court and the parties who must defend against
them.”); Dkt. No. 17, ¶ 11 (adding related state lawsuits and appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
As DB put it in its motion for summary judgment, “[p]ractically speaking,
Crear Sr. and/or [Crear Jr.] have maintained possession of a house without making
a monthly payment for more than seventeen years.” Dkt. No. 83 at 10.
Then, four days after Judge Lindsay entered judgment, Crear Sr. filed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62 an Emergency Motion to Stay Execution and
Possession Pending Appeal [Dkt. No. 104] (the “Emergency Motion”), requesting that
the Court stay “execution and possession” of the Property “pending appeal and
resolution of post-judgment motions” and “[w]aive any bond requirement or set a
nominal bond amount in light of [his] financial circumstances and disability status,”
id. at 9.
“Rule 62 works in conjunction with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a),
which directs that a party seeking to stay the judgment or an order of a district court
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pending appeal ‘must ordinarily move first in the district court.’” U.S. Bank, N.A. as
Tr. for Registered Holders of AEGIS Asset Backed Sec. Tr. Mortg. Pass Through
Certificates, Series 2005-4 v. Richardson, No. 3:17-cv-2271-L, 2020 WL 10050786, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2020) (quoting FED . R. APP . P. 8(a)(1)(A); citing Hilton v.
Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (“Different Rules of Procedure govern the power
of district courts and courts of appeals to stay an order pending appeal.” (citing FED .
R. CIV. P. 62(c); F ED . R. APP. P. 8(a)))), rec. rejected on other grounds, 2020 WL
10050787 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2020).
Rule 62(a) “provides an automatic stay upon a judgment’s execution for thirty
days” but not “[f]or a final judgment that grants an injunction.” Firearms Policy
Coalition, Inc. v. McCraw, 623 F. Supp. 3d 740, 756-57 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (citing FED .
R. CIV. P. 62(a)).
But “[t]he Court may exercise its discretion to ‘suspend [or] modify’ an
injunction pending appeal if it provides ‘terms that secure the opposing party’s
rights.’” Id. at 757 (quoting F ED . R. C IV. P. 62(d)); see also Richardson, 2020 WL
10050786, at *2 (“Rule 62, amended effective December 1, 2018, eliminates the
reference in former Rule 62(d) to a ‘supersedeas bond.’ But the advisory-committee
notes make clear that amended Rule 62(b) ‘carries forward in modified form the
supersedeas bond provisions of former Rule 62(d).’ FED . R. CIV. P. 62 advisory
committee’s notes to 2018 amendment…. Thus, under amended Rule 62(b), [a
judgment debtor] may obtain a stay by providing ‘a bond or other security.’” (citations
omitted)).
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The relevant factors in determining if a court should stay an injunction
pending appeal are: (1) whether the party against whom the injunction
was granted made a strong showing of a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) whether the party against whom the injunction was granted
will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether a stay will
substantially injure the other parties’ interests; and (4) where the public
interest lies.
McCraw, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (citations omitted); accord Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 426 (2009); United States v. Texas, 97 F.4th 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2024).
“The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” Texas,
97 F.4th at 274 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434).
And, “[d]espite these clear-cut factors, the decision to issue a stay pending
appeal ‘contemplate[s] individualized judgments in each case,’ and it ‘cannot be
reduced to a set of rigid factors.’” McCraw, 623 F. Supp. 3d at 757 (quoting Hilton,
481 U.S. at 777).
But “[a] stay pending appeal ‘is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury
might otherwise result.’” Texas, 97 F.4th at 274 (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 427).
Here, while losing the Property may count as an irreparable injury to the
Crears, the balance of the factors does not weigh in favor of the Court suspending or
modifying the injunction pending appeal or otherwise entering a stay pending appeal.
Crear Sr. only offers unsupported conclusions to support the Emergency Motion,
consistent with how the Crears have defended this lawsuit. This lack of support –
especially 	considered 	against 	the 	background 	of 	the 	more 	than 	a 	decade 	of
proceedings leading to the judgment in this case – cannot sustain the extraordinary
relief that Crear Sr. currently seeks.
Similarly, in a case presenting a litigation odyssey like the Crears’ – but maybe
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not as extended as theirs has been – Judge Lindsay rejected an attempt to waive a
security requirement pending appeal, and his conclusions are equally applicable here:
[T]he record indicates that Defendants have exploited the judicial
process by initiating a handful of actions over the years to thwart U.S.
Bank’s 	foreclosure 	attempts 	that 	began 	in 	March 	2013, 	and 	they
persisted in their effort to delay the inevitable even after their claims
were dismissed with prejudice in a separate federal action. Defendants
have, therefore, had a “free ride” at the Bank’s expense long enough. It
would be patently unfair to delay foreclosure any longer while allowing
them to remain in possession of the property without posting a bond in
some amount pending their appeal. In other words, while allowing
Defendants to continue to remain in the possession of the property
without making any payments and not maintaining the property would
preserve the status quo as far as they are concerned, it would not
adequately 	protect 	U.S. 	Bank’s 	rights 	as 	the 	non-appealing 	party
pending appeal.
Richardson, 2020 WL 10050787, at *1; see id. at *2 (“This is simply another ‘Hail
Mary’ tactic to avoid and delay foreclosure and continue to remain in possession of
the property free and clear of their mortgage loan obligations.”).
The Court should therefore deny the Emergency Motion.
Recommendation
The Court should deny Defendant Steven Crear, Sr.’s Emergency Motion to
Stay Execution and Possession Pending Appeal [Dkt. No. 104].
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on
all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these
findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections
within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED . R. CIV.
P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
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specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation
where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by
reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure
to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the
factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or
adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: February 24, 2026
_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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