Trustees of the IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health and Benefit Fund et al v. Rockey Electric Inc

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
TRUSTEES OF THE IBEW-NECA
SOUTHWESTERN HEALTH AND
BENEFIT FUND, et al.,
§
§
§
§
Plaintiffs, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-0224-B
§
ROCKEY ELECTRIC, INC., 	§
§
Defendant. 	§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 22) by Trustees of the IBEW-
NECA Southwestern Health and Benefit Fund (“Health Benefits Plan”), Trustees of the NECA-
IBEW Local Union No. 584 Pension Plan (“Pension Plan”), Trustees of the NECA-IBEW Local
Union No. 584 Profit Sharing Plan (“Profit Sharing Plan”), Trustees of the Tulsa Electrical Joint
Apprenticeship and Training Committee (“Training Committee Plan”), and Trustees of the
National Electrical Benefit Fund (“NEBF Plan”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”). For the following reasons,
Plaintiffs’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
This is an employee benefits case. Plaintiffs, as representatives of certain employee benefits
plans, are suing Rockey Electric, Inc. (“Rockey”) because Rockey failed to make contributions to
those plans under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
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Plaintiffs are administrators and fiduciaries of multiemployer pension and employee benefit
plans. Doc. 14, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-8, 11. Defendant Rockey Electric, Inc. (“Rockey”) is an electrical
contracting company that employs individuals who receive benefits under those plans. See id. ¶¶ 9-
10. In July 2020, Rockey executed a “Letter of Assent,” which bound Rockey to the terms of a CBA
between the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 584 (“Local Union 584”)
and the Eastern Oklahoma Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association (the
“Chapter”). Id. ¶ 10. By assenting to the CBA’s terms, Rockey agreed to pay contributions to specific
benefits plans (including those administered by Plaintiffs) in accordance with each plan’s respective
trust agreement. Id. Those plans would utilize Rockey’s contributions to supply various employee
benefits to Rockey’s employees. Id. Along with benefit plan contributions, Rockey agreed to pay
union dues to Local Union 584 and contribute to an additional administrative fund run by the
Chapter, known as the “RAM Fund.” Id. ¶ 22-23; see Doc. 14-1, Am. Compl. Ex. 1, at 39. For
administrative convenience, the CBA required participating employers like Rockey to pay all
contributions in a lump sum directly to the RAM Fund, which would then distribute those
contributions to participating plans. Doc. 14-1, Am. Compl. Ex. 1, at 39. However, if an employer
defaulted on any of its contribution obligations, “[r]esponsibility for the enforcement . . . and the
collection [of such contributions] remain[ed] with each individual Fund respectively.” Id. at 39-40.
Plaintiffs originally filed this action on January 30, 2023, alleging Rockey “breached its
agreements with Plaintiffs by failing and refusing to submit to an exit audit” and—depending on the
outcome of the audit—may owe certain withheld contributions, along with liquidated damages and
interest, to Plaintiffs. Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 13-14. However, in May 2023, Plaintiffs, through a third-
party auditor, were able to audit Rockey’s wage and payroll records without court intervention. See
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generally Doc. 14-7, Am. Compl. Ex. 7. The audit uncovered various deficiencies in Rockey’s
contributions between August 2020 and May 2021. Id. at 1-2. Specifically, the auditors found that
Rockey owed $12,098.13 in CBA-mandated plan contributions and union dues, along with
liquidated damages and interest. See id. at 2.
In April 2024, based on Rockey’s now-exposed deficiencies, Plaintiffs filed an amended
complaint. See generally Doc. 14, Am. Compl. Plaintiffs allege that, by failing to make the requisite
contributions, Rockey violated the CBA, Plaintiffs’ respective trust agreements, and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. ¶ 1. In June 2024, Plaintiffs served Rockey with the
Amended Complaint. See Doc. 17, Aff. Service, 1. Rockey failed to file an answer or otherwise
respond. In October 2024, the Clerk of Court entered default. See Doc. 20, Entry Default, 1. Then,
in August 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Default Judgment. See generally Doc. 22, Mot.
Plaintiffs seek unpaid employer contributions, interest, liquidated damages, audit fees, attorney’s
fees, and costs. Id. at 2.
The Court considers the Motion below.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, upon motion of the plaintiff, federal
courts have the authority to enter a default judgment against a defendant who has failed to plead or
otherwise defend against the relief sought. F ED . R. CIV. P. 55(a), (b)(2). That being said, “[d]efault
judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in
extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989) (footnotes and citations omitted). A party is not entitled to a default judgment merely because
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the defendant is technically in default. Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). Instead, “default judgment is committed to the discretion of the district court.”
Chevron Intell. Prop., L.L.C. v. Allen, No. 7:08-CV-98-O, 2009 WL 2596610, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24,
2009) (O’Connor, J.) (citing Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977)).
In determining whether a default judgment should be entered against a defendant, courts
have developed a three-part analysis. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Morelia Mexican Rest., Inc., 126 F. Supp.
3d 809, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (Boyle, J.) (citation omitted). First, courts consider whether the entry
of a default judgment is procedurally warranted. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th
Cir. 1998). Second, courts assess the substantive merits of the plaintiff’s claims and determine
whether there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co., v.
Hou. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[A] default is not treated as an absolute
confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right to recover.” (citations omitted)).
“Third, courts determine what form of relief, if any, the plaintiff should receive.” Morelia Mexican,
126 F. Supp. 3d at 813 (citation omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Court concludes that a default judgment is procedurally warranted and that there is
sufficient basis for judgment in the pleadings. The Court awards $9,822.50 in unpaid contributions
and $3,400 in audit fees. The Court does not award interest on unpaid contributions, liquidated
damages, attorney’s fees, or court costs at this time.
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A. 	An Entry of Default Judgment Is Procedurally Warranted.
To determine whether default judgment is procedurally warranted, the Court considers a list
of factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit, known as the Lindsey factors:
[1] whether material issues of fact are at issue; [2] whether there has been substantial
prejudice; [3] whether the grounds for default are clearly established; [4] whether the
default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable neglect; [5] the harshness of
a default judgment; and [6] whether the court would think itself obliged to set aside
the default on the defendant’s motion.
Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893 (citation omitted).
After applying the six Lindsey factors to Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court determines that default
judgment is procedurally warranted. First, Rockey has not filed any responsive pleading, so there are
no material facts in dispute. See id.; Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206 (“The defendant, by his
default, admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact . . . .”). Second, Rockey’s “failure to
respond threatens to bring the adversary process to a halt, effectively prejudicing [Plaintiffs’]
interests.” Ins. Co. of the W. v. H & G Contractors, Inc., No. C-10-390, 2011 WL 4738197, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Oct. 5, 2011) (citing Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893) (other citation omitted). Third, the grounds for
default are clearly established because Rockey has had nearly two years to respond to the Amended
Complaint and five months to respond to the present Motion or provide an explanation for its
delay. Cf. Ann Best Elite Temporaries, Inc. v. KNR Grp., Inc., 216 F.3d 1080 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(holding default judgment to be inappropriate where defendant sent letter to court explaining his
failure to appear was due to financial privation). Fourth, there is no evidence before the Court to
indicate that Rockey’s silence is the result of a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.” Lindsey,
161 F.3d at 893. Fifth, Plaintiffs seek only the relief the law provides them, and “the Court is aware
of no applicable defense.” See John Perez Graphics & Design, LLC v. Green Tree Inv. Grp., Inc., No. 3:12-
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CV-4194-M, 2013 WL 1828671, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2013) (Lynn, J.) (citation omitted). Sixth,
and finally, the Court is not aware of any facts that would give rise to “good cause” to set aside the
default if challenged by Rockey. Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893 (quoting F ED . R. CIV. P. 55(c)). Therefore,
the Court concludes that default judgment is procedurally warranted.
B. 	There is a Sufficient Basis for Judgment in the Pleadings.
Next, the Court reviews the pleadings to determine whether Plaintiffs established a viable
claim for relief. See id.; Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206. In doing this, the Court assumes that,
due to its default, Rockey admits all well-pleaded facts in the Amended Complaint. Nishimatsu
Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206. But a “defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to
admit conclusions of law.” Id.
In conducting this portion of the analysis, “the Fifth Circuit looks to the [Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8] case law for guidance.” Morales v. Rausch Grp. & Assocs., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-2850-
B, 2020 WL 6583023, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2020) (Boyle, J.). “Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading
to contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015). “The factual allegations
in the complaint need only be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). But “the pleading must present ‘more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009)).
ERISA mandates that “[e]very employer who is obligated to make contributions to a
multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained
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agreement shall . . . make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such
plan or such agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 1145. If an employer defaults on its contribution obligations,
the multiemployer plan is permitted to bring a civil action under ERISA to enforce it. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3). Because Congress intended § 1132 to allow plan trustees to expeditiously recover
delinquent contributions, the law recognizes very few circumstances justifying an employer’s
noncompliance. See La. Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Pension Fund & Welfare Fund v. Alfred Miller Gen.
Masonry Contracting Co., 157 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the “only three defenses to
a delinquency action” as being illegality, fraud, or dissolution of the union). None of those
circumstances are present here.
Plaintiffs allege Rockey failed to pay various contributions and dues required by the CBA
between August 2020 and May 2021, totaling $12,098.13. See Doc. 14, Am. Compl. ¶ 14; Doc. 22,
Mot., 2. Viewing these assertions as admitted, Plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action under
ERISA.1
C. 	Plaintiffs are Entitled to Unpaid Contributions and Audit Fees But Are Not Entitled to Prejudgment
Interest, Liquidated Damages, Attorney Fees, or Court Costs At This Time.
Having found sufficient basis for default judgment, the Court must consider any damages to
which Plaintiffs are entitled. Normally, courts should not award damages without a hearing, unless
detailed affidavits establish the necessary facts. Morelia Mexican, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 814 (citing United
Artists Corp. v. Freeman, 605 F.2d 854, 857 (5th Cir. 1979)). But a hearing is unnecessary if the court
1 While Plaintiffs allege both an ERISA violation and breach of contract, the Court does not consider
Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim separately because the factual basis and recovery is the same under either
cause of action.
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can determine the amount of damages with mathematical calculation, by referencing the pleadings
and supporting documents. James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs seek unpaid employer contributions totaling $12,098.13, interest on unpaid
contributions compounded monthly at a rate of 1.5%, liquidated damages at a rate of 15% of total
unpaid contributions, audit fees totaling $3,400, attorney’s fees totaling $18,091.54, and costs
totaling $644.16. Doc. 22, Mot., 2. Section 1132(g)(2) applies to actions involving delinquent
contributions and allows plans to recover (1) unpaid contributions, (2) interest on those unpaid
contributions, (3) the greater of liquidated damages as provided under the plan itself (not to exceed
a 20% rate) or an amount equal to the interest on the unpaid contributions, (4) reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs, and (5) other relief the court deems appropriate. “[I]nterest on unpaid contributions
shall be determined by using the rate provided under the plan” if the plan specifies an interest rate.
§ 1132(g)(2). The Court reviews each damages component separately.
1. 	Unpaid Contributions
Plaintiffs seek unpaid employer contributions and dues totaling $12,098.13. Doc. 22, Mot.,
2. As determined by the audit, those unpaid contributions and dues are owed to ten separate entities
in the following respective amounts:
• 	Pension Plan: $3,146.85
• 	Profit Sharing Plan (annuity plan): $808.94
• 	Training Committee Plan: $340.20
• 	NEBF Plan: $606.71
• 	Health Benefits Plan: $4,919.80
• 	National Labor Cooperative Council: $8.51
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• 	Labor Management Compliance Council: $42.53
• 	RAM Fund: $1,011.17
• 	National Electrical Contractor Association: $606.71
• 	Local Union 548 Dues: $606.71
Doc. 14-7, Am. Compl. Ex. 7, at 2; Doc. 22-2, Aff. LaFave ¶ 6.
As the Court noted in a prior order, only five of the above entities are before the Court as
named plaintiffs. See Doc. 23, Order, 1. However, Plaintiffs seek unpaid contributions withheld
from several other plans and parties not before the Court: (1) $8.51 for the National Labor
Cooperative Council, (2) $42.73 for the Labor Management Compliance Council, (3) $1,011.17 for
the RAM Fund, (4) $606.71 for the National Electrical Contractors Association, and (5) $606.71 in
union dues to Local Union 584. Plaintiffs allege that the CBA authorizes them to collect all
contributions and overdue contributions, including those owed to the non-party plans and entities.
See Doc. 14, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-23. But because the Court does not take conclusions of law as
admitted, see Nishimatsu Constr., 515 F.2d at 1206, the Court requested supplemental briefing to
identify Plaintiffs’ authority, contractual or otherwise, to collect funds due to non-party entities. See
Doc. 23, Order, 2.
In response, Plaintiffs filed supplemental briefing, in which they maintained their position
that they can collect unpaid employer contributions on their own behalf, as well as on behalf of the
non-party entities named above. Doc. 24, Suppl. Br. ¶ 10. As contractual support for their position,
Plaintiffs refer to Section 6 of the CBA, which sets forth various employer-contribution requirements
to designated employee benefit funds and describes the RAM Fund’s role in distributing
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contributions. See id. ¶¶ 6-9. In particular, Plaintiffs cite Section 6.07, claiming that this provision
“authoriz[es] Plaintiffs to pursue collection on behalf of each fund and [local unions].” Id. ¶ 9.
Section 6.07 does not contain such authority. In its entirety, Section 6.07(a) reads as follows:
The failure of an individual Employer to comply with the provisions of Sections 6.01
through 6.06 shall also constitute a breach of this Labor Agreement. As a remedy for
such a violation, the Labor-Management Committee and/or the Council on Industrial
Relations for the Electrical Contracting Industry, as the case may be, are empowered, at
the request of the Union, to require an Employer to pay into the affected Joint Trust
Funds established under this Agreement any delinquent contribution to such funds
which have resulted from the violation.
Doc. 14-1, Am. Compl. Ex. 1, at 41 (emphasis added). Neither the 	“Labor-Management
Committee,” nor the “Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Contracting Industry” is a
party to this case. And the Amended Complaint does not allege the involvement of either entity in
these proceedings. Accordingly, the Court fails to see how this provision provides Plaintiffs’ assumed
authority.
Section 6.07(b) is likewise unhelpful and reads as follows:
If, as a result of violations of this Section, it is necessary for the Union and/or the
Trustees of the Joint Trust Funds to institute court action to enforce an award rendered
in accordance with Subsection (a) above, or to defend an action which seeks to vacate
such award, the Employer shall pay any accountants’ and attorneys’ fees incurred by
the Union and/or Fund Trustees, plus cost of the litigation which have resulted from
the bringing of such court action.
Id. (emphasis added). While Section 6.07(b) mentions the “Trustees of the Joint Trust Funds,” it
does so only to note that those trustees can obtain fees and costs in certain circumstances. See id. It
does not implicitly or explicitly permit any particular fund to recover unpaid contributions owed to
another. See id. Moreover, it applies solely to actions taken to enforce or defend “an award rendered
in accordance with Subsection (a) above”—a reference to actions taken by the Labor-Management
Committee or Council on Industrial Relations for the Electrical Contracting Industry. See id.
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Plaintiffs do not allege they are enforcing an award rendered through such action, and, in any event,
enforcing an award does not give each respective plan authority to collect for another. Thus, Section
6.07 of the CBA does not provide Plaintiffs’ assumed authority to collect unpaid contributions owed
to non-party entities.
Plaintiffs appear to also contend that because Rockey and other participating employers pay
plan contributions in one “lump-sum” payment to the RAM Fund, Plaintiffs are correspondingly
authorized to recover those unpaid distributions in a lump sum—including those earmarked for non-
party entities. See Doc. 24, Suppl. Br. ¶¶ 4-8. However, the CBA contains no language providing
such authority. In fact, the CBA explicitly notes in Section 6.05(c) that, while the RAM Fund receives
payments meant for all benefit plans in the CBA, the RAM Fund “shall not be responsible for the
enforcement and collection of payments required by the collective bargaining agreement.” Doc. 14-
1, Am. Compl. Ex. 1, at 39-40. Instead, “[r]esponsibility for the enforcement of these payments and
the collection of all moneys due . . . shall remain with each individual Fund respectively.” Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, this argument is similarly unavailing.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have a clear basis to recover unpaid contributions owed to the named-
plaintiff plans but not to non-parties. Per a third-party audit of Rockey’s employer contributions in
the relevant period, Plaintiffs identified $9,822.50 in unpaid contributions owed to named-plaintiff
plans: $3,146.85 owed to the Pension Plan, $808.94 owed to the Profit Sharing Plan (annuity plan),
$340.20 owed to the Training Committee Plan, $606.71 owed to the NEBF Plan, and $4,919.80
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owed to the Health Benefits Plan. See Doc. 14-7, Am. Compl. Ex. 7, at 2. The Court thus awards
each Plaintiff its respective unpaid contributions.
2. 	Interest
ERISA allows plans to recover interest on unpaid contributions, “determined by using the
rate provided under the plan” if it provides a rate. § 1132(g)(2). If the relevant plan does not provide
a rate, Courts must generally apply a rate prescribed under 26 U.S.C. § 6621. Id. Plaintiffs ask the
Court to apply an interest rate of 1.5%, compounded monthly (resulting in an effective annual rate
of 19.56%). See Doc. 22, Mot., 2. But Plaintiffs do not identify any support for that rate in the CBA
or in any plan’s respective trust agreement.2 In fact, Plaintiffs’ supporting documentation adds
further confusion because the audit report—attached to the Motion as Exhibit 1—reflects an entirely
different interest rate in its calculations. See Doc. 22-1, Mot. Ex. 1, at 7 (reflecting a nominal annual
rate of 18%).
Accordingly, the Court declines to award interest at this time. If Plaintiffs seek interest on
the $9,822.50 in unpaid contribution damages awarded above, they must, within 7 days of this
Order, file a supplemental brief indicating the proper rate of interest to be applied and final amount
of interest owed. Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief must identify the particular contractual basis for their
proposed rate. If there is no contractual basis for that rate, Plaintiffs must determine the proper rate
under § 6621. Finally, Plaintiffs must propose a final calculation of interest due, taking into account
2 The Court pointed out these same deficiencies in its prior Order denying Plaintiffs’ first Motion for default
judgment. See Doc. 12, Mem. Op. & Order, 10. While Plaintiffs now attach the CBA and each Plaintiff’s
respective benefit plan to the Amended Complaint, they again fail to identify any provision providing the
interest rate sought.
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the proper interest rate and the Court’s determination to award $9,822.50 (not $12,098.13) in
unpaid contributions.
3. 	Liquidated Damages
Under ERISA, a plaintiff can obtain liquidated damages in an amount provided by the plan
itself (but not exceeding 20%) or equal to the interest on the unpaid contributions. § 1132(g)(2)(C).
Courts are to award the greater of the two figures. Id. Plaintiffs seek liquidated damages at a rate of
15%. Doc. 22, Mot., 2. As with interest, Plaintiffs again do not provide the contractual basis for
their 15% figure. And even with a contractual basis, the Court cannot determine “the greater of”
contractual liquidated damages and interest because it does not know the correct amount of interest
on the unpaid contributions. Accordingly, the Court declines to award liquidated damages at this
time. If Plaintiffs continue to seek liquidated damages in this action, they are directed to file
supplemental briefing within 7 days of this Order both identifying a contractual basis for a 15% rate
of liquidated damages (or another proper rate) and providing a final rate of interest on unpaid
contributions per the Court’s above specifications.
4. 	Audit Fees
Plaintiffs also seek an award of “audit fees”—costs incurred by Plaintiffs to audit Rockey’s
payroll records—totaling $3,400. Id. As a contractual basis for this request, Plaintiffs cite generally to
their respective trust agreements. See Doc. 14, Am. Compl. ¶ 21. For instance, the Health Benefit
Plan’s trust agreement expressly provides for audit fees in the event of delinquent contributions. See
Doc. 14-2, Am. Compl. Ex. 2, at 21. ERISA provides further support for an audit fee award,
permitting the Court to award “other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”
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§ 1132(g)(2)(E). As Rockey only submitted to an audit after Plaintiffs instituted this action, the Court
finds the award appropriate. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiffs $3,400 in audit fees.
5. 	Attorney’s Fees and Costs
ERISA also allows successful plaintiffs to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See
§ 1132(g)(2)(D). “In determining the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees, a district court first must
calculate the ‘lodestar’ by ‘multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended on the case by the
reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers.’” Rodney v. Elliott Sec. Sols., L.L.C., 853 F. App’x
922, 924 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998)).
“The calculation of reasonable hours requires a determination of whether the total number of hours
claimed were reasonable and whether specific hours claimed were reasonably expended.” Cardinal
Servs., Inc. v. Omega Protein, Inc., No. 00-1909, 2007 WL 1343266, at *1 (W.D. La. May 7, 2007)
(citation omitted). “Courts may exclude hours that are insufficiently documented and should not
award attorney’s fees unless the prevailing party presents sufficiently detailed records that the time
expended and the need for services are clearly established.” Id. (citing Bode v. United States, 919 F.2d
1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiffs seek $18,091.54 in attorney’s fees and $644.16 in costs. See Doc. 22, Mot., 2. In
support, Plaintiffs submit the affidavit of their lead counsel, Douglas M. Selwyn. See generally Doc.
22-3, Selwyn Aff. Mr. Selwyn has 40 years of experience in his employee benefits law practice and
has a billable rate of $443 per hour. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiffs’ other attorney seeking fees, Ashley L. Selwyn,
has 12 years of experience in employee benefits law and has a billable rate of $343 per hour. Id.
While Plaintiffs demonstrate the reasonableness of their counsel’s rates, they do not properly address
the reasonableness of the hours spent or even state how many hours they worked on this case. The
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Court cannot properly evaluate “whether specific hours claimed were reasonably expended” without
any indication of how many hours each attorney worked and what they accomplished during those
hours. See Cardinal Servs., 2007 WL 1343266, at *1.
Plaintiffs also fail to specify the source of the $644.16 in “costs of court” that they claim. See
Doc. 22, Mot., 2. “A district court has discretion to deny all costs and expenses when the party
seeking the costs has not provided an itemized breakdown of the costs incurred and reasons for their
necessity.” Guity v. Lawton Env’t Serv., LLC, 50 F. Supp. 3d 760, 772 (E.D. La. 2014) (citing Fogleman
v. ARAMCO (Arabian Am. Oil Co.), 920 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorney’s fees and costs at this time. If Plaintiffs
continue to seek attorney’s fees and costs, they must file supplemental briefing within 7 days of this
Order, addressing the deficiencies identified above.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 22). The Court:
• GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for unpaid employee benefit contributions in the amount of
$3,146.85 to the Pension Plan, $808.94 to the Profit Sharing Plan (annuity plan), $340.20
to the Training Committee Plan, $606.71 to the NEBF Plan, and $4,919.80 to the Health
Benefits Plan, totaling $9,822.50;
• GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for audit fees in the amount of $3,400;
• DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for interest on unpaid contributions;
• DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for liquidated damages; and
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• DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs.
Plaintiffs have 7 days from the date of this order to file supplemental briefing to address
deficiencies in their requests for interest, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs. A final
judgment will follow, but not before 8 days after the entry of this order.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: March 12, 2026.
_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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