Emmers v. Mitchener et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
KADEEM DWAYNE EMMERS, §
TDCJ-CID No. 01889448, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 2:25-CV-177-Z-BR
§
MICHAEL MITCHENER, et al., §
§
Defendants. §
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY SECOND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Before the Court is a second Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Plaintiff Kadeem
Dwayne Emmers (“Emmers”). (ECF 20). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Motion be
DENIED for the reasons set forth herein.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Emmers, a prisoner at the Clements Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, asks
the Court to issue a preliminary injunction to order the “Bill Clements administration” to stop “all
forms of retaliation” and to return personal property that has been confiscated by prison officials.
He also complains about the amount of food he receives, and asks the Court to enjoin the creation
of “policies that are not in compliance with the U.S. Constitution.” (ECF 20 at 2, 5). Emmers also
seeks monetary compensation for confiscated food items eaten by rats while the food was in
storage. (Id. at 4-5). His Complaint is currently undergoing preliminary screening.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Injunctive Relief.
An injunction is “an extraordinary remedy and should not issue except upon a clear
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showing of possible irreparable injury.” Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1976).
To obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail
on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not
granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the non-movant; and (4)
that the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Clark v.
Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). The plaintiff “must satisfy a cumulative burden of
proving each of the four elements enumerated before a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction can be granted.” Id. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy any one of the four factors, injunctive
relief will not issue. See, e.g., May v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 3:12-CV-4597-D, 2013 WL
2367769, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2013).
Whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief “is within the discretion of the court, but it
is an extraordinary remedy that should only be granted if the movant has clearly carried its burden.”
John Crane Prod. Sols., Inc. v. R2R & D, LLC, 861 F. Supp. 2d 792, 794 (N.D. Tex. 2012). The
decision to grant injunctive relief “is to be treated as the exception rather than the rule.” Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). If the moving
party fails to carry the “heavy burden” to satisfy each of these prerequisites, a preliminary
injunction is not warranted. Enterprise Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana,
762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985).
In the prison context, requests for a preliminary injunction are “viewed with great caution
because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable
problems of prison administration.” Wagner v. Campuzano, No. 1:12-CV-205-C, 2013 WL
12147778, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2013) (citing Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir.
1995)). “[E]xcept in extreme circumstances,” federal courts “are reluctant to interfere” with
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matters of prison administration and management. Young v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 338, 339 (5th
Cir. 1971); see also Humphrey v. Layton, 58 F.3d 636, 1995 WL 371021, at *1 n.5 (5th Cir. 1995).
Further, in assessing whether a preliminary injunction serves the public interest, prison
administrators must be afforded “wide-ranging deference” in their operation of the prison to
“preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
B. Emmers Shows No Substantial Likelihood of Irreparable Harm.
One of the elements that Emmers must show is a substantial likelihood of irreparable harm
if an injunction does not issue. Irreparable harm is defined as “harm for which there is no adequate
remedy at law.” Daniels Health Scis., L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585
(5th Cir. 2013). The movant seeking injunctive relief “must show a real and immediate threat of
future or continuing injury apart from any past injury.” Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641,
663-64 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing In re Stewart, 647 F.3d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 2011)).
Emmers seeks an order stopping “retaliation” as well as compensation for past harm—the loss of
his personal property. However, he does not specify the retaliatory behavior that he seeks to
prevent, or the specific person he seeks to enjoin.
The unsupported belief that Emmers might suffer retaliation from an unnamed person in
the future is merely speculative harm that will not support issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Further, a mere risk of harm does not constitute irreparable harm. Hunt, 646 F. Supp. at 65 (citing
Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3rd Cir. 1980)). “There
must be a present threat of substantial, noncompensable harm.” Hunt, 646 F. Supp. at 65. A movant
for injunctive relief must show “a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not
granted.” Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 1987). Emmers’ allegations of “retaliation”
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are vague and do not rise to the level of a substantial threat.
Further, the fact that Defendants purportedly confiscated his personal property and rats ate
his food does not constitute irreparable harm for which money damages would be inadequate. See
Humana, Inc. v. Avram A. Jacobson, M.D., P.A., 804 F.2d 1390, 1394 (5th Cir. 1986) (to show
irreparable injury, a plaintiff much show, inter alia, that “money damages would not fully repair
the harm”). In addition, a preliminary injunction “should not grant relief properly awarded only in
a final judgment.” Enterprise Intern., 762 F.2d at 476 (quoting Diversified Mortgage Investors v.
U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 571, 576 (2d Cir. 1976). Because Emmers fails to meet the second
requirement for injunctive relief, the Court need not consider the remaining elements.1 See May v.
Wells Fargo, 2013 WL at *1. Emmers’ request for injunctive relief should be DENIED.
III. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the United States Magistrate Judge recommends that
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF 20) be DENIED.
IV. INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE
The United States District Clerk is directed to send a copy of these Findings, Conclusions
and Recommendation to each party by the most efficient means available.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
ENTERED December 10, 2025.
1The Court notes, however, that Emmers fails to address the third and fourth elements. Further, because
Emmers has not met the requirements for injunctive relief, the Court does not address the propriety of the
nonmonetary relief requested.
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* NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT *
Any party may object to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation. In the
event parties wish to object, they are hereby NOTIFIED that the deadline for filing objections is
fourteen (14) days from the date of filing as indicated by the “entered” date directly above the
signature line. Service is complete upon mailing, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), or transmission by
electronic means, Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E). Any objections must be filed on or before the
fourteenth (14th) day after this recommendation is filed as indicated by the “entered” date. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Any such objections shall be made in a written pleading entitled “Objections to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.” Objecting parties shall file the written objections
with the United States District Clerk and serve a copy of such objections on all other parties. A
party’s failure to timely file written objections shall bar an aggrieved party, except upon grounds
of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings, legal
conclusions, and recommendation set forth by the Magistrate Judge and accepted by the district
court. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), as recognized in ACS
Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 676 F.3d 512, 521 n.5 (5th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857
F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988).
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