Dunn v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
JOHN JOSEPH DUNN,
Petitioner,
v. No. 1:25-CV-00244-H
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner John Joseph Dunn, a self-represented state prisoner, filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After reviewing the petition, the Court
notified Petitioner that his claims were not cognizable in a habeas context and advised him
that it intended to redesignate his pleading as a civil-rights complaint. Dkt. No. 4.
Petitioner objected to the Court’s intended construction, insisting that his claims sound in
habeas. Dkt. No. 5. He asserts that he does “not wish to file any other petition than th[is]
one.” Jd. He also filed a motion for a Spears’ hearing on the matter. Dkt. No. 6. Because
Petitioner objects to the redesignation of his case, the Court will not construe his pleadings
as civil-rights complaint. But the Court concludes that he fails to show that he is eligible for
federal habeas relief. Thus, the petition is denied and dismissed with prejudice for failure to
state an actionable claim. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts.
1 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (Sth Cir. 1985).
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1. Background and Petitioner’s claims
Petitioner admits that “this petition has nothing to do with [his] July 2022
conviction;” instead, he challenges the Board of Pardons and Paroles’ (BPP) denial of his
request to participate in a drug treatment program. Dkt. No. | at 14, 17. He clarifies that
he is not “arguing for parole, [his petition] is about rehabilitation.” Jd. at 17-18. Asa
result, he seeks an order compelling the BPP to grant him “IPTC”? drug treatment. Id.
at 16. He asserts that his claims sound in habeas because the BPP’s refusal to place him in
drug treatment renders his imprisonment unlawful. Dkt. No. 5.
os Legal Standards
Federal habeas relief is unavailable “absent the allegation by a [petitioner] that he or
she has been deprived of some right secured to him or her by the United States Constitution
or the laws of the United States.” Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995). “The law
is well settled that a prisoner has no constitutional right to participate in an educational or
rehabilitative program.” Rivera v. Fox, No. A-06-CA-609 SS, 2006 WL 3245740, at *3
(W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2006) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976)); See also
Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 49 (Sth Cir. 1995) (explaining that
“[p]risoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitation programs . . . are not directly
subject to ‘due process’ protections”).
IPTC refers to TDCJ’s “In-Prison Therapeutic Community” program, which “provide[s] services to
qualified inmates identified as needing substance use treatment.”
https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/rrd/substance_abuse.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2025).
2
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Likewise, the United States Constitution does not create a liberty interest in parole.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (explaining that
“{t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”) Moreover, “it is entirely up to each
State whether it chooses to create a parole system and the amount of discretion with which
it entrusts its parole decisionmakers.” Brasfield v. Owens, No. A-05-CA-1009-SS, 2007 WL
9701123, at *9 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2007). And Texas has elected not to create a liberty
interest in parole. See Orellana, 65 F.3d at 31-32; Allison v. Kyle, 66 F.3d 71, 73-74 (5th Cir.
1995).
In fact, it is well established that “[a] Texas prisoner does not necessarily have a
constitutional expectancy of release on a particular date.” Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953,
958 (5th Cir. 2000). Rather, in Texas, “[a]s a general rule, only sanctions which result in
loss of good conduct time for inmates who are eligible for release on mandatory supervision
or which otherwise directly or adversely affect release on mandatory supervision will
impose upon a liberty interest.” Spicer v. Collins, 9 F. Supp. 2d 673, 685 (E.D. Tex. 1998)
(citing Orellana, 65 F.3d at 31-33).
3. Discussion
The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary to resolve this petition.
See Young v. Herring, 938 F.2d 543, 560 n.12 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that “‘a petitioner
need not receive an evidentiary hearing if it would not develop material facts relevant to the
constitutionality of his conviction”). Thus, Petitioner’s motion for a Spears hearing is
denied. Dkt. No. 6.
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Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to federal habeas relief. His claims
fail to implicate any federally protected liberty interest. Contrary to his unsupported
conclusions, Petitioner has no constitutional right to placement in a drug treatment
program. Moreover, he has no constitutional expectancy in parole or parole eligibility.
And because placement in IPTC would not automatically accelerate Petitioner’s release, his
claim is not cognizable under the habeas statutes. Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21
(5th Cir. 1997). Thus, his petition fails to state a claim that entitles him to federal habeas
review.
4. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be denied and dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Also, pursuant to Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c), Petitioner has failed to show that reasonable jurists would (1) find this Court’s
“assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong” or (2) find “it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and
“debatable whether [this Court] was correct in its procedural ruling.” Thus, any request for
a certificate of appealability should be denied. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
All relief not expressly granted, and any remaining pending motions are denied.
So ordered.
Dated Aprit_¥, 2026.
Loy.JAMES WESLEY HENDRIX
United States District Judge
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