Abbruzzese v. Stephen F. Austin State University et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
ISABELLA RAE ABBRUZZESE,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHEN F. AUSTIN STATE
UNIVERSITY and UT SYSTEMS,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:25-CV-00018-
MJT-CLS
ORDER ADOPTING, IN PART, THE REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES
MAGISTRATE JUDGE; GRANTING, IN PART, DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
STAY DISCOVERY; AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff Isabella Rae Abbruzzese, proceeding pro se, alleges that Defendants Stephen F.
Austin State University (SFA) and UT System1 violated her state and federal rights by exposing
her to mold, manifoldly mishandling her Title IX complaint, and initiating procedurally deficient
student-conduct hearings in retaliation for filing a Title IX complaint. [Dkt. 9]. The District Court
referred this proceeding to the Honorable Christine L. Stetson, United States Magistrate Judge, to
conduct all pre-trial proceedings, to enter findings of fact and recommend disposition on case-
dispositive matters, and to determine non-dispositive matters. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); E.D.
TEX. LOC . R. CV-72.
Now before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Preliminary Injunction (PI) [Dkt. 32] and Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss [Dkt. 81] and to Stay
Discovery [Dkt. 82]. On November 26, 2025, Judge Stetson issued a Report and Recommendation
[Dkt. 113] advising the Court to: (1) grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (2) deny Plaintiff’s
1 Defendants correctly note that “UT System” is misidentified as “UT Systems.” [Dkt. 81 at 10 n.1].
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Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and (3) deny as moot
Defendant’s Motion to Stay Discovery. On December 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed Objections [Dkt.
116] to the Report and Recommendation, having first filed a Motion for Extension of Time to file
said Objections four days prior [Dkt. 115]. The motion for extension was granted by Judge Stetson
on February 2, 2026 [Dkt. 117].
I. 	The Report and Recommendation is Adopted to the Extent No Objections Have
Been Raised
A party who timely files specific, written objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is entitled to a de novo determination of findings or recommendations to which
the party specifically objects. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. C IV. P. 72(b)(2)–(3). 	To be
specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is
made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates
by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. 	“Frivolous,
conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” 	Nettles v.
Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). If a party fails to
object to recommendations contained within a report and recommendation, the party waives de
novo review, and the district court need only review the report for clear error.
In her Report and Recommendation, Judge Stetson explained that most claims against
Defendants SFA and UT System should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
because of Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, including the following:
Count 7—claims under Occupational Safety and Health Act;
Counts 4 and 18—claims under Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act;
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Counts 1 and 16—negligence and premises liability;
Counts 8 and 17—intentional infliction of emotional distress;
Count 9—stalking and harassment; and
Count 10—claims under Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.
Plaintiff did not address the recommended dismissal of these claims in her Objections. [Dkt. 116].
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation on these claims for clear error and found
none; therefore, each of the above claims are dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation are Overruled
Moving to Plaintiff’s specific objections, the Court first dispenses with the complaint that
the Magistrate Judge failed to properly construe Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings, allegedly evidenced
by Judge Stetson’s harsh treatment of Plaintiff following the death of her mother. 	The District
Court notes first that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss has been pending since June 19, 2025. [Dkt.
81]. A response was due from Plaintiff on July 3, 2025, but no response was filed at that time.
Throughout the early part of July, Plaintiff filed multiple motions seeking extensions of her
deadlines to submit additional evidence from the July 2, 2025 evidentiary hearing, but at no point
during that flurry of activity did Plaintiff file a response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Only
on July 23, 2025, more than 20 days after her response to the motion was due, did Plaintiff advise
the court of the loss of her mother. Judge Stetson immediately entered a 90-day stay. [Dkt. 103].
On October 20, 2025, upon Plaintiff’s October 8 motion [Dkt. 105], the stay was lifted
[Dkt. 106]. Yet, at no point did Plaintiff request more time to respond to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. As a result, Judge Stetson issued her Report and Recommendation [Dkt. 107]. See E.D.
TEX. LOC . R. CV-7(d). Plaintiff objected and requested additional time to respond to the dismissal
motion [Dkt. 108], which by then had been pending for over four months. Judge Stetson withdrew
her Report and Recommendation and gave Plaintiff 14 more days to respond to Defendants’
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Motion to Dismiss. See [Dkt. 109]. Plaintiff finally filed her response on November 17, 2025.
[Dkt. 111]. Plaintiff’s suggestion that she has been treated unkindly or harshly by the Magistrate
Judge in connection with her requests to stay the case and respond late to Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is not well-taken. 	Moreover, Judge Stetson’s assessment of Plaintiff’s pro se pleading
does not suggest that an inappropriately rigid standard was applied. See [Dkt. 115 at 2]. While
the nonmovant is entitled to reasonable inferences from the well-pleaded facts in deciding a motion
to dismiss, the Court may not insert facts where none are alleged.
III. 	Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Plaintiff raises three specific objections to the Report and Recommendation. 	First, she
complains that it unfairly determines that Plaintiff failed to allege that she suffered from a
qualifying disability as needed to plead her failure-to-accommodate and discrimination claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) contained in Counts
Three and 15 of her Second Amended Complaint (SAC). 	Without citation to any caselaw or
authority, Plaintiff claims that her allegations of acute health symptoms requiring hospitalization
on June 1, 2024, and the resultant emotional distress as set forth on pages two and three of her
SAC are sufficient to meet the pleading standard for elaborating on the severity, duration or
permanence of her alleged impairments [Dkt. 116 at 3–4]. 	See, e.g., Allder v. Arcosa Telecom
Structures, 	LLC, 	No. 	24-CV-145, 	2025 	WL 	1363093, 	at 	*5 	(E.D. 	Tex. 	Apr. 	3, 	2025)
(recommending dismissal of Title II ADA claim because plaintiff “has not alleged any facts
identifying his disability or how it substantially limits one of his major life activities and thus has
not sufficiently alleged that he has a qualifying disability”), R. & R. adopted, 2025 WL 1219025
(E.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2025). They are not. See [Dkt. 113 at 34–37]. Given the opportunity, Plaintiff
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now claims that she could allege sufficient facts. 	[Dkt. 116 at 6]. 	Whether Plaintiff should be
afforded yet another opportunity to amend her complaint is addressed later.
Judge Stetson also recommended dismissal of Plaintiff’s RA retaliation claim contained in
Count Three because Plaintiff failed to allege that “the challenged decision occurred solely by
reason of her disability.” [Dkt. 113 at 37–38.] Plaintiff’s Objections fail to address this pleading
deficiency or point out how the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation is incorrect. As such, Plaintiff
is only entitled to clear-error review. 	Having reviewed Plaintiff’s SAC, the Court finds the
recommendation to dismiss this claim well-founded and dismisses Plaintiff’s RA retaliation claim.
IV. 	Title IX Claims
Plaintiff’s second specific objection is to the dismissal of her Title IX claim. See [Dkt. 116
at 4]. She complains that it is based on an unduly narrow assessment of her pleadings. Plaintiff
points first to page 29 of the Report and Recommendation and claims that the Magistrate Judge
was over-rigid in concluding that Plaintiff failed to plead the necessary temporality to connect a
protected activity to the time of the alleged retaliation. 	[Id. at 4–5]. 	Plaintiff claims this to be
unfair, but much like her pleading, her Objections simply state that she reported a sexual assault
on a given day and “thereafter” experienced retaliation. 	[Id. at 4]. 	While courts afford pro se
plaintiffs some leeway in construing their pleadings and drawing inferences in their favor, the
Court cannot make inferences where there is a complete lack of factual detail. 	Similarly, the
Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff’s allegation of deliberate indifference under Title IX was
factually insufficient. 	[Dkt. 113 at 25–29]. 	Other than disagreeing with the Magistrate Judge,
Plaintiff points to no part of her SAC where the Court could locate the facts needed to show the
“high bar” of deliberate indifference. Doe v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 351, 356 (5th
Cir. 2020). Whether Plaintiff should be allowed yet another attempt to replead is addressed later.
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V. 	§ 1983 Claims
Finally, Plaintiff objects to dismissal of her § 1983 claims. She acknowledges that SFA
and UT System, as pled, are entitled to sovereign immunity on all such claims, but Plaintiff, in her
Objections, asserts that she can establish waiver of that immunity under Ex parte Young because
she alleges claims against specific “university officials and employees” as “individually named
defendants.” See [Dkt. 116 at 5]. Plaintiff points to pages two, three, seven, and eight of her SAC
to support this contention, saying that while the SAC does not use “the precise capacity language,”
she should be allowed to “clarify the capacity in which these officials are sued” to save her claims.
[Id.]. 	However, the “precise capacity language” is critical here. 	See Block v. Tex. Bd. of L.
Exam’rs, 952 F.3d 613, 619 & n.24 (5th Cir. 2020). 	Moreover, capacity is not Plaintiff’s only
problem. See id. (emphasis added) (For Ex parte Young to apply, a “plaintiff must name individual
state officials as defendants in their official capacities.”). As pointed out by the Magistrate Judge,
Plaintiff lists no university official as a defendant. 	See [Dkt. 113 at 20 (noting how Plaintiff
“falsely claims that certain people . . . were sued in their individual capacities” even though “the
only defendants named as parties” are SFA and UT System)]. While the SAC includes facts about
actions taken by certain people, it never advises Defendants or the Court that Plaintiff is alleging
claims against them (in any capacity). As a result, the recommendation to dismiss these claims for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is correct.
VI. 	Whether to Allow Plaintiff a Final Attempt at Pleading Viable Causes of Action
The Magistrate Judge did not address, as Plaintiff did not raise the issue as part of her
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the question of whether Plaintiff should be allowed
to replead through a Third Amended Complaint. 	In her Objections, however, Plaintiff requests
leave to do so. See [Dkt. 116 at 6]. The Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff could plead facts
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sufficient to state failure-to-accommodate and/or discrimination claims under the ADA and RA,
and a retaliation claim under the ADA (her claim for retaliation under the RA is dismissed as set
forth above). The Court is also of the opinion that Plaintiff could, if pleaded correctly, assert facts
to support a Title IX retaliation claim.
Regarding her ability to assert § 1983 claims sufficient to survive Eleventh Amendment
immunity against a university official, the Court is not so convinced. 	In determining dismissal
under subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the basis for the Defendants’ Motion and the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation, the Court may make factual determinations necessary to resolve the
issue of jurisdiction. E.g., Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Based
upon the Court’s de novo review of the record; Plaintiff cannot assert a procedural due process
claim. According to the documents referred to in her SAC and appended to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss, Plaintiff was advised of the charges against her. See [Dkts. 81-6 to 81-9]. She was
provided with an opportunity to participate in the process. [Id.] That is all the process she was
due in this context. See Willis v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 394 F. App’x 86, 87 (5th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting Esfeller v. O’Keefe, 391 F. App’x 337, 342–43 (5th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 581, 583 (1975))) (“A student subject to
school disciplinary proceedings is entitled to some procedural due process,” including “notice of
the charges,” “an explanation of what evidence exists against” the student, and “an opportunity to
present [the student’s] side of the story.”); see also Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 85–86 (1978) (“All that Goss required was an ‘informal give-and-take’ between the
student and the administrative body dismissing him that would, at least, give the student ‘the
opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context.’”). As a
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result, the Court finds that it would be futile to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to assert a procedural
due process claim under § 1983 against a school official.
The Court also finds, based upon Plaintiff’s factual allegations, that it would be futile to
allow her an opportunity to amend her Fourth Amendment claim as there is not even a suggestion
that a law enforcement officer seized her or restrained her in any way. Indeed, this argument—
that she cannot raise a Fourth Amendment challenge because she alleges no facts to support a
search or a seizure—was specifically addressed in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. 	[Dkt. 81 at
32]. In response, Plaintiff points to the actions of unnamed SFA police officers [Dkt. 111 at 9]
whom her SAC alleges “engaged in conduct that constituted an unreasonable seizure of Plaintiff’s
person and property through intimidation, surveillance, and presence of law enforcement without
cause.” 	[Dkt. 76 at 17]. 	This is not a well-pleaded Fourth Amendment violation, and Plaintiff
does not indicate in her Objections that she would be capable of factually asserting a valid Fourth
Amendment claim. Plaintiff had more than adequate time to prepare a response, her Objections,
and to provide legal authority for her position. She has not done so. The Court finds it is futile to
allow further amendments on this claim.
Finally, Plaintiff does not address the dismissal of her equal protection claim in her
Objections other than by generally claiming that, if given the opportunity, she could “address any
deficiencies identified” in the Report and Recommendation by repleading her allegations against
university officials. [Dkt. 116 at 5]. Similarly, in her response to Defendants’ assertion that her
equal-protection claim should be dismissed for failure to plead, Plaintiff merely claims that her
pleading was sufficient, or that she could properly plead if allowed discovery. See [Dkt. 111 at 8,
11–12]. Again, Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to make her best case for a claim under the
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Equal Protection clause, but neither her response nor her Objections suggest that Plaintiff is aware
of facts to support such a claim. The Court finds it futile to allow further amendments.
VII. 	Motion for TRO and PI
Upon review of the record in this case, including the hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO
and PI [Dkt. 97], Plaintiff’s motion is moot. In the motion, Plaintiff requests relief to prevent her
suspension from SFA and to remain enrolled until she completes her degree. See [Dkt. 32 at 1].
At the time she filed her request for injunctive relief on April 3, 2025, Plaintiff’s disciplinary
appeals were not complete, so the case was stayed in the interim. See [Dkts. 26, 31, 39]. According
to the record, the Court was advised that Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings, including all appeals,
would resolve by April 24, 2025. 	See [Dkts. 37, 39]. 	The Magistrate Judge immediately set a
hearing for May 1, 2025 [Dkt. 39], but because of filings by Plaintiff (as detailed in the Report and
Recommendation [Dkt. 113 at 7–8]), the hearing ultimately took place on July 2, 2025.
At the hearing, Plaintiff repeatedly stated that she did not wish to return as a student to SFA
and that she was already enrolled at the University of North Texas (UNT) in Denton, Texas. In
her December 10, 2025 filing requesting additional time to respond to the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, Plaintiff noted that she was set to graduate from UNT “th[at] week.” 	[Dkt. 115 at 2].
Accepting Plaintiff’s statements as true, granting her an injunction that would cause her to remain
enrolled at SFA to complete her bachelor’s degree would be futile. As a result, the court finds that
Plaintiff’s Motion for TRO and PI is moot.
VIII. 	Order
Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief [Dkt. 32] is DENIED as moot.
The Report and Recommendation [Dkt. 113] is ADOPTED in part.
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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 81] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The
Motion is granted to the following extent:
• 	Counts 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18 and 19 are dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; and
• 	Plaintiff’s Title IX sexual harassment and discrimination claims under Counts 2
and 14 and her Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim under Count 3 are dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
The Motion is denied to the extent that Plaintiff shall be allowed 14 days from entry of this Order
to file a Third Amended Complaint on the following, and only the following, claims:
• 	Title IX Retaliation,
• 	Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodations under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, and
• 	Retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is advised she must clearly articulate against whom
each of her claims is alleged, in what capacity they are sued if appropriate, and provide facts that
support the elements of said claims. 	Once Plaintiff repleads, if she does, Defendants may file
whatever responsive pleading they deem necessary within the timeframe provided by the Federal
and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Last,
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery [Dkt. 82] is GRANTED until such time as Plaintiff
files her Third Amended Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
Michael J. Truncale
United States District Judge
SIGNED this 27th day of February, 2026.
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