Hunter v. Boller et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TYLER DIVISION
JAMES ANTHONY HUNTER §
v.
OFFICER BOLLER, ET AL.
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:23cv154
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
The Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter, a former inmate of the Smith County Jail now confined
in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, filed this civil action
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 complaining of alleged violations of his civil rights during his confinement
in the Smith County Jail. The case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) and Local Rule CV-72 of the Local Rules of Court for the
Eastern District of Texas. As Defendants, Plaintiff named Officers Michael Boller, Dustin Taylor,
and Justin Mitchell, jail officers for Smith County.
Plaintiff complained of two separate alleged use of force incidents occurring in the Smith
County Jail. He claimed that on November 18, 2022, while he was being escorted from one part of
the jail to another, with his hands cuffed behind his back, Officers Mitchell and Taylor deliberately
pounded the crown of his head into the doors of an elevator and along its walls several times. He
says that as a result, he required medical intervention, which revealed that he had spinal injuries
ultimately requiring surgery.
On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff says that he was laying on his bed “fully demonstrating
compliance with my hands behind my back and my feet crossed at the ankles,” awaiting to be
escorted from his segregation cell. While he was in that position, Plaintiff states that Boller struck
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him in the neck with his fist and forearm more than once. According to Plaintiff, this incident
required immediate surgical intervention.
After defense motions for summary judgment were denied, counsel was appointed to
represent Plaintiff and the case was set for trial. Both parties waived a jury and requested a bench
trial. After the parties consented to allow the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to enter
final judgment in the proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c), the case was tried to the Court on
January 12 and 13, 2026.
Findings of Fact
In a trial before the bench, the Court must find the facts specially and make conclusions of
law. Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. This Rule recognizes and rests upon the unique opportunity
afforded the trial court judge to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and to weigh the evidence.
Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
In this case, the Court has examined the exhibits and considered the testimony of the parties
and witnesses in the cause. The Court has also noted the demeanor of the parties as they appeared
in the courtroom. After careful review of all the evidence presented, the Court has found the
following as facts:
Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter was confined in the Smith County Jail as a pre-trial detainee.
He had an extensive history of disruptive behavior, including damaging or destroying surveillance
cameras, smearing feces and urine on windows or throwing it at jail personnel, self-harm requiring
multiple trips to the hospital, inserting foreign objects into his penis or rectum, public masturbation,
refusing to comply with orders, and other such actions. Jail officers were well aware of this pattern
of behavior.
On November 18, 2022, Plaintiff was confined in cell 3F, a multi-inmate cell on the third
floor of the Smith County Jail. Directly outside the cell door was an area known as the security
vestibule or the “sallyport.” This area led into the main hallway on the third floor. There was a
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double door consisting of bars separating the cell from the sallyport, of which one of the doors slid
to open.
At around 10:30 p.m. on that date, Officer Powers was inside the cell dayroom conducting
count. Plaintiff approached the front of the cell to complain about his food and medication. He tried
to push his way out into the sallyport, but Officer Wideman blocked him from doing so. Defendant
Officer Mitchell arrived at the scene and ordered Plaintiff several times to go back into the cell, but
Plaintiff refused. As Plaintiff tried to push past Wideman, Mitchell put his hand on Plaintiff’s chest
and pushed him back into the cell dayroom, allowing Powers to squeeze past Plaintiff out into the
sallyport.
As Plaintiff continued to try to force his way out of the cell dayroom into the sallyport,
Defendant Officer Taylor arrived. Plaintiff grabbed hold of the bars on the cell door and wrapped
his leg around the gate in an effort to prevent being moved.
The officers were eventually able to pull Plaintiff off the door and place him on the floor.
Taylor and Mitchell secured him in hand restraints and Plaintiff was escorted to the infirmary by
Officers Mitchell, Velasquez, Cortez, and Sgt. Bradam. Officer Taylor did not assist in the escort
to the infirmary and neither Mitchell nor Taylor, nor any of the other officers present, rammed
Plaintiff’s head into the door or walls of the elevator.
These facts were testified to by Officer Taylor, Officer Wideman, and Officer Mitchell by
agreed deposition. These facts are also set out in the statements of Taylor, Wideman, Mitchell,
Bradam, and Powers contained in Defendants’ Exhibit 1, pp. 1-9. The Court found this testimony
and these statements to be credible.
Plaintiff testified that he approached the door to ask for food, but never entered the sallyport.
He said that while he was handcuffed behind his back, the officers lifted his arms up, causing him
to have to lean over, and that they rammed the crown of his head into the steel doors and then again
into the wall at the back of the elevator while escorting him. The Court did not find Plaintiff’s
testimony or written statements to be credible.
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On January 17, 2023, Plaintiff was confined in 206, an individual housing cell. A Code Blue
(medical emergency) was called because Plaintiff had showed an officer that he had a razor blade
in his mouth. Defendant Officer Boller went to Plaintiff’s cell and discovered that Plaintiff had
covered the cell window in feces. Plaintiff had also damaged the camera in his cell so that officers
could not see inside. Sgt. Rios and Officers Amador and Lindsay also came to the scene.
Plaintiff was ordered to give up the razor blade, but he refused. The officers decided to enter
his cell to retrieve it. Boller was aware of Plaintiff’s history of disruptive behavior and obtained a
riot shield prior to entering the cell. The riot shield serves to protect both officers and inmates from
direct contact resulting in hand to hand fighting and its use results in less injury to inmates.
Plaintiff was ordered multiple times by Boller and Amador to submit to hand restraints by
putting his hands out of the food slot in the door, but he refused. Amador sprayed pepper spray into
Plaintiff’s cell in an effort to gain compliance, but Plaintiff continued to refuse. Boller, Amador,
Rios, and Lindsay entered Plaintiff’s cell, with Boller in the lead holding the riot shield.
When the officers entered the cell, Plaintiff was standing in the middle of the cell with his
back toward the door, but with his head turned looking at the officers over his left shoulder. He
swung his right arm around and threw feces over the riot shield, striking Boller and Amador in the
face and head. He also struck the shield with his right arm. Boller continued to move forward with
the shield, pushing Plaintiff down onto the bed. The other officers were able to put Plaintiff in hand
restraints and he was taken out of the cell to the picket. Sgt. Rios took control of Plaintiff while
Boller went to the clinic to be cleaned up and examined for injuries.
These facts were testified to by Officers Boller, Amador, and Lindsay, and are recounted in
Officer Boller’s written statement (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 19). The Court found this testimony and
statement to be credible.
Plaintiff testified that the officers entered his cell, left, and then re-entered. The second time
they came in, he said that he was laying on his bunk in a compliant position and Officer Boller
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assaulted him by striking him repeatedly on the neck with his fist and forearm. The Court did not
find Plaintiff’s testimony to be credible.
Legal Standards and Analysis
Because Hunter is the plaintiff in this lawsuit, he has the burden of proving his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. Vogel v. American Warranty Home Service Corp., 695 F.2d 877,
882 (5th Cir. 1983). A “preponderance of the evidence” means the greater weight of the evidence;
it is that evidence which, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and is
more probably true and accurate. If, upon any issue in the case, the evidence appears to be equally
balanced, or if it cannot be said upon which side it weighs heavier, then the plaintiff has not met his
burden of proof. Smith v. United States, 726 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1984).
At the time of these incidents, Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee in the Smith County Jail. The
Fifth Circuit has explained that the claims of pre-trial detainees are classified based on whether they
concern “conditions of confinement” or an “episodic act or omission.” Olabisiomotosho v. City of
Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiff’s claims concern particular acts or
omissions of a jail officer, they fall into the category of an episodic act or omission. Id.
In analyzing a use of force claim as an episodic act or omission, the court determines (1)
whether the use of force was deliberate, and (2) if so, whether the use of force was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances of the case, taking into account what the defendant knew at that
time. Acosta v. Williamson County, Texas, slip op. no. 23-50777, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20677 at
*13-14, 2024 WL 3833303 (5th Cir. 2024), citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97
(2009). This determination of objective reasonableness is made “from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20
vision of hindsight.” Id.
Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of the force used: (1) the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force
used; (2) the extent of the plaintiff's injury; (3) any effort made by the officers to temper or to limit
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the amount of force; (4) the severity of the security problem at issue; (5) the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Wood v. Bexar County,
Texas, 147 F.4th 534, 550 (5th Cir. 2025), citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 and Austin v. City of
Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312, 322 (5th Cir. 2023). The list is not exclusive, but simply illustrative of the
types of objective circumstances potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force. Id.
In the November 18, 2022 incident, the preponderance of the credible evidence shows that
Plaintiff attempted to force his way out of a cell dayroom into a security vestibule, refused multiple
orders to stop doing so and return to the cell, and resisted forceful efforts by officers to gain
compliance. No excessive or unreasonable force was applied. This Court and others have stated
that where an inmate cannot be persuaded to obey an order, some means must be used to compel
compliance because discipline is essential for the institution to function. Amos v. Jefferson, civil
action no. 5:17cv195, 2019 WL 950367 (E.D.Tex., February 27, 2019), aff’d 861 F.App’x 596 (5th
Cir. 2021) (upholding use of pepper spray on belligerent inmate who repeatedly refused orders),
citing Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1984); Thomas v. Comstock, 222 F.App’x
439, 442 (5th Cir. 2007); Minix v. Blevins, civil action no. 6:06cv306, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30058,
2007 WL 1217883 (E.D. Tex., April 23, 2007) (inmates cannot pick and choose which rules to
obey), citing Meadows v. Gibson, 855 F.Supp. 223, 225 (W.D. Tenn. 1994); Sneed v. Lira, civil
action no. 09cv2583, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151230, 2011 WL 6998202 (S.D. Cal., November 3,
2011) (upholding use of force against inmate who was yelling obscenities and refusing direct orders,
and lunged at the guards). The preponderance of the credible evidence shows that in light of
Plaintiff’s behavior and the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth Kingsley factors, the Defendants’ actions
were objectively reasonable in light of what the officers knew at the time.
In the January 17, 2023 incident, the preponderance of the credible evidence shows that
Plaintiff refused orders to turn over a razor blade he had in his cell. When officers came to retrieve
it, he threw feces at them until being pushed onto the bed by an officer holding a riot shield. No
excessive or unreasonable force was applied. The preponderance of the credible evidence shows
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that the Defendant’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of what the officer knew at the
time.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense which shields public officials sued in their
individual capacities from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Joseph on Behalf of Estate of Joseph, 981 F.3d 319, 328 (5th Cir. 2020). The Fifth Circuit has
summarized the law as follows:
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability in their
individual capacity so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.’ Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Our qualified immunity inquiry is two-pronged. Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600
(5th Cir. 2020). First, we ask whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable
to the party asserting the injury, show that the official’s conduct violated a
constitutional right. Second, we ask whether the right was ‘clearly established.’ Id.
We can analyze the prongs in either order or resolve the case on a single prong. Id.
After explaining that a right is “clearly established” only if it is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that the defendant’s conduct violated that right, and that
there must be adequate authority at a sufficiently high level of specificity to put a reasonable official
on notice that the conduct is definitively unlawful, the Fifth Circuit went on to state:
When an official raises qualified immunity on summary judgment, as Sheriff Castloo
did here, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defense does not apply.
See Bryant v. Gillem, 965 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2020). To meet that burden, the
plaintiff must present evidence, viewed in her [i.e. the plaintiff’s] favor, satisfying
both qualified immunity prongs by showing that the defendant (1) violated a
constitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s
conduct. See id.
Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190-91 (5th Cir. 2020); Byrd v. Harrell, 48 F.4th 343, 346
(5th Cir. 2022) (when an official has asserted qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to rebut the defense by establishing that the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly
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established law and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the
official’s conduct). Conclusory allegations are insufficient to overcome the qualified immunity
defense. Williams-Boldware v. Denton County, Texas, 741 F.3d 635, 643-44 (5th Cir. 2014).
The right of a pre-trial detainee to be free from objectively unreasonable force was clearly
established at the time these incidents occurred. However, Plaintiff has wholly failed to meet his
burden of showing that the defense does not apply because the preponderance of the credible
evidence demonstrates that no constitutional violation occurred. Instead, the evidence shows that
the force used was a reasonable response under the circumstances and was proportionate to the need.
The Fifth Circuit has held that it is proper to submit the question of qualified immunity to
the finder of fact. See Presley v. City of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 409-10 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly,
the Court finds as a matter of law that the Defendants have established their entitlement to the
defense of qualified immunity.
Conclusions of Law
Based on the above factual findings, made by a preponderance of the credible evidence
pursuant to Rule 52(a), F. R. Civ. P., the Court makes the following conclusions of law:
1. The Defendants did not use excessive force upon the Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter on
November 18, 2022.
2. The Defendants did not violate any other clearly established constitutional rights of the
Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter on November 18, 2022.
3. The Defendants did not use excessive force upon the Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter on
January 17, 2023.
4. The Defendants did not violate any other clearly established constitutional rights of the
Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter on January 17, 2023.
5. The Defendants are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity from suit.
Plaintiff’s Previous Litigation History
Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter has filed at least five other lawsuits in the Eastern District
of Texas. None of these have been successful; on the contrary, evidence offered in these other cases
highlights his penchant for disruptive or aggressive behavior. See, e.g., Hunter v. Velasquez, et al.,
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civil action no. 6:23cv582 (E.D.Tex., dismissed July 3, 2025, currently on appeal) (evidence showed
that Hunter had his cell camera covered, concealed blades and sharp objects on his body, and had
to have gas used on him because he would not comply with orders); Hunter v. Anthony, et al., civil
action no. 6:24cv35 (E.D.Tex., September 3, 2025, appeal dismissed for want of prosecution)
(Hunter was taken to the emergency room after an episode of self-harm and then was pepper-sprayed
when he tried to rip off the bandages he had just received, before the transport van had even left the
hospital parking lot).
Plaintiff’s Behavior at Trial
On the second day of trial, Plaintiff was transported to the courthouse but refused to come
out of the holding area and appear in court. The Court dispatched his attorney to speak to him, and
various security personnel spoke to him, but Plaintiff resolutely refused to come to court. The Court
heard the final witness, Captain Martin, in Plaintiff’s absence, but has not considered his testimony
in determining the case.
After some time, the Court was informed that Plaintiff had cut himself or reopened an old
wound, and was asking to be allowed to come back to court to address the presiding judge
personally. The evidence was closed by this time, and given Plaintiff's behavior on day 2 in the
holding cell, after consultation with the U.S. Marshals, the court determined it would be a
security risk to allow Plaintiff to reenter the courtroom. However, in the interests of justice, the
court provided a live feed to Plaintiff so he could watch the closing arguments from his cell.
Once the proceedings had concluded, officials of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice had
to summon a special response team to extract Plaintiff from the holding cell, which was done
without further incident.
The Supreme Court has stated that while a court’s inherent powers must be exercised
with restraint and discretion, a primary aspect of these inherent powers is the ability to
fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. Chambers
v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991).
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As a general rule, this power is confined to instances of bad faith or willful abuse of the judicial
process. Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990).
A plaintiff’s refusal to appear in court for the trial of a lawsuit which he himself filed plainly
demonstrates bad faith and willful abuse of the judicial process. See, e.g., Tubby v. Allen, civil
action no. 6:16cv972, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99633, 2019 WL 2452308 (E.D.Tex., June 12, 2019)
(defendant’s actions including failure to answer counsel’s calls or emails, failure to appear at a
court-ordered deposition, refusal to accept court orders sent through the mail, and refusal to respond
to the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and entry of default amounted to willful conduct justifying the
imposition of sanctions); McDonald v. Bellsouth Telecommunications Inc,, 130 F.App’x 685 at *1
(“willful and intentional disregard of required appearances for depositions” justified imposition of
sanctions). It does not require prior notice for a litigant to be aware that refusal to appear for one’s
own trial manifests such bad faith and willful abuse. Ultimately, Plaintiff compelled multiple
defendants to conduct discovery and litigate his claims for a period of many months, caused the
Court to devote extensive resources to consider and rule on his motions and otherwise manage the
litigation of his claims, triggered the appointment of counsel to represent him, and demanded the
time and presence of the defendants, counsel, witnesses, security staff, and the Court’s own time and
resources for a multi-day trial in which he then willfully refused to participate. It is difficult to
imagine a course of action more abusive to the litigants or the judicial process.
In addition, Plaintiff’s conduct was aggravated by his actions in self-harm and refusing to
exit the holding cell, requiring the presence of both emergency medical technicians and a special
response team from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This appears to simply continue a
pattern of behavior amply documented in the evidence before the Court.
Such behavior has no place in a civilized society, much less in the halls of the courthouse.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has explained as follows:
Litigating a case in federal court is a privilege that requires conformance with the
rules, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (federal rules of procedure are “construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
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action and proceeding”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), and it also requires the pursuit of
litigation positions with the utmost good faith, even if those positions are self-
interested or zealously advocated. Hence, there is simply no place in any court for
the behavior that the plaintiff has engaged in throughout this litigation. In
determining what type of sanction is appropriate to both punish and deter the
plaintiff's conduct, the Court is mindful of the D.C. Circuit's admonition that “a
district court may not rely on its inherent power to impose a sanction of either default
or dismissal without explaining why lesser sanctions were likely to be ineffective.”
Slate v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 941 F.Supp.2d 27, 51-52 (D.C.C. 2013); cf. Taylor
v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (reversing a contempt conviction imposed upon a lawyer for
improper trial conduct, but observing that “behavior of this nature has no place in the courtroom,
which, in a free society, is a forum for the courteous and reasoned pursuit of truth and justice.”)
The Court has carefully considered the appropriate sanctions for Plaintiff’s demonstrated bad
faith and willful abuse of the judicial process. Dismissal of the action at this stage of the proceeding
is not appropriate because the case is ripe for decision on the merits. Monetary sanctions are of little
use in dealing with an indigent party proceeding pro se; however, as the Fifth Circuit has observed,
no one, rich or poor, is entitled to abuse the judicial process. Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798,
800 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Flores v. United States Department of Justice, civil action no. 5:20cv198, 2021 WL
1196268 (E.D.Tex., March 30, 2021, appeal dismissed), the Hon. Robert Schroeder, United States
District Judge, ordered as follows:
It is further ORDERED that the Court shall accept no further lawsuits from the
Plaintiff Eric Flores unless such lawsuit is filed by a licensed attorney enrolled to
practice in the Eastern District of Texas and upon payment of the full filing fee at the
initiation of the case. Any new lawsuit received from the Plaintiff which does not
meet both of these conditions shall be returned by the Clerk of Court or discarded,
at the sole discretion of the Clerk. It is further ORDERED that a copy of this Order
shall be sent to the Administrator of the Sanctions List for the Eastern District of
Texas.
See also Kohute v. National Rifle Association, civil action no. 6:24cv475 (E.D.Tex., January 29,
2025) (sanction order by the Hon. Jeremy Kernodle, United States District Judge, requiring further
filings to come from a licensed attorney); In re: Ola Mae Allen, civil action no. 6:82cv49 (E.D.Tex.,
February 9, 1993) (sanction order by the Hon. William Wayne Justice, United States District Judge,
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requiring further filings to come from a licensed attorney); Williams v. United States Court, civil
action no. 6:23cv355, 2023 WL 5944285 (E.D.Tex., September 12, 2023) (sanction order from the
Hon. J. Campbell Barker, United States District Judge, requiring further filings to come from a
licensed attorney). A similar sanction is appropriate in this case. It is accordingly
ORDERED that based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, made in
accordance with Rule 52, Fed. R. Civ. P., judgment is entered in favor of the Defendants in this
lawsuit and against the Plaintiff James Anthony Hunter. It is further
ORDERED that the Plaintiff shall take nothing on his lawsuit and that said lawsuit is
DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that the Court shall accept no further lawsuits from the Plaintiff James Anthony
Hunter, TDCJ-CID No. 02510100, unless such lawsuit is filed by a licensed attorney enrolled to
practice in the Eastern District of Texas and upon payment of the full filing fee at the initiation of
the case. Any new lawsuit received from the Plaintiff which does not meet both of these conditions
shall be returned by the Clerk of Court or discarded, at the sole discretion of the Clerk.
Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a new lawsuit only upon seeking and obtaining permission from
the Court to do so. Any new lawsuit Plaintiff submits without an attorney must be accompanied
by a motion setting out the claims in the lawsuit and demonstrating good cause to be allowed to
pursue it. Failure to comply with these requirements may result in the dismissal of the lawsuit
without further proceedings. It is further ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be sent to
the Administrator of the Sanctions List for the Eastern District of Texas. Finally, it is
ORDERED that all other motions which may be pending in this lawsuit be and hereby are
DENIED.
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