USA v. Whitaker, Jr

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SAMUEL DAVID WHITAKER, JR. (01)
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CASE NO. 4:25-CR-0086-SDJ-AGD
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the court is Defendant Samuel David Whitaker, Jr.’s Motion to Suppress
and Brief in Support (“Defendant’s Motion”) [Dkt. #229],1 this motion having been referred to the
undersigned by United States District Judge Sean D. Jordan for consideration and entry of
proposed findings and recommended disposition. The Government filed a response in opposition
thereto [Dkt. #252]. 	Having considered the Motion and response thereto, as well as all other
relevant filings,2 the court finds that Defendant’s Motion should be DENIED.
APPLICABLE BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are undisputed. See GOV ’T R ESP . TO M TN. TO S UPPRESS , p.2 [Dkt.
#252]. The agreed-upon facts are as follows:
In February 2025, Irving Police Department Investigator Foust secured a
search warrant for 4125 Easter Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Dkts. 227, 229, pg. 2. The
magistrate who signed the warrant is City of Irving Municipal Judge Michael
Acuna. Dkts. 227, 229, pg. 2. The City of Irving Municipal Court is a court of record
and Judge Michael Acuna is an attorney licensed in Texas. Dkts. 227, 229, pg. 8.
On February 10, 2025, the warrant was executed by Investigator Foust and other
members of the Irving Police Department at the location on Easter Avenue in the
City of Dallas. Dkts. 227, 229, pg. 2. During the execution of the search warrant on
1 Defendant’s original motion to suppress [Dkt. #227] was replaced by a successive motion to suppress [Dkt.
#229]. The motions are identical, except that Defendant attached a proposed order to the latter.
2 The court also considered substantive arguments raised in Defendant’s motion requesting oral argument
[Dkt. #254] and the Government’s response in opposition thereto [Dkt. #259].
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Easter Avenue, fentanyl, cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine were seized
by law enforcement, as well as multiple firearms. Dkts. 227, 229, pg. 2.
[Dkt. #252 at p.2].
On April 16, 2025, the grand jury returned a five-count Indictment charging Defendant, in
Count 1, with Conspiracy to Distribute or Possess with Intent to Distribute or Dispense Fentanyl,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and in Count 2, with
Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) [Dkt. #1, sealed]. Thereafter, on May 14, 2025, the grand jury returned a six-count First
Superseding Indictment, [Dkt. #93], charging Defendant with the same conduct alleged in the
Indictment. 	On July 9, 2025, the grand jury returned a seven-count Second Superseding
Indictment, [Dkt. #176], charging Defendant with the same conduct alleged in the Indictment and
First Superseding Indictment.
In his motion to suppress, Defendant argues all evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant should be suppressed because the municipal court judge who issued the warrant lacked
the authority to issue the same. 	For the reasons stated below, the court finds that Defendant’s
Motion lacks merit and should be denied.
ANALYSIS
1. 	Defendant’s Argument
Defendant argues that City of Irving Municipal Court Judge Michael Acuna did not have
the authority to issue the warrant in question. Defendant notes that the warrant was clear that the
premises to be searched was located in the City of Dallas, not the City of Irving. 	As such,
Defendant argues that “the issuing magistrate did not have the jurisdiction and authority to issue a
warrant for a place to be searched that was beyond the territorial limits of the municipality in which
the municipal judge served as a municipal judge.” [Dkt. #254, at p.3].
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Defendant relies primarily on Sanchez v. State, 365 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
In that case, Sanchez was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Harris County, Texas. 	Id. at
682. 	Sanchez admitted to consuming alcohol prior to the accident. 	Id. at 683. 	Additionally,
Sanchez “exhibited several clues of intoxication” while performing his field sobriety tests. 	Id.
After refusing to provide a breath sample, the officer applied for a blood warrant. 	The warrant
was ultimately issued by a statutory county court at law judge from County Court at Law Number
Five in Montgomery County, Texas. 	Id. 	On appeal, Sanchez argued that “the statutory county
court judge in Montgomery County lacked authority to issue a search warrant for [his] blood in
Harris County.” Id.
Ultimately, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the “Montgomery County judge
did not have jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for an individual ‘to be found in Harris County’
because such action reached beyond the Montgomery County line.” Id. at 686. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court reasoned that “[s]tatutory county court judges are magistrates, and the duty
of a magistrate is ‘to preserve the peace within his jurisdiction . . . .’” Id. at 684–85, quoting TEX.
C ODE C RIM. P ROC . art. 2.10 (emphasis added in the opinion). 	“Generally, ‘[a] statutory county
court has jurisdiction over all causes and proceedings, civil and criminal, original and appellate,
prescribed by law for county courts.’” Id. at 685, quoting TEX. GOV ’T C ODE § 25.0003(a).
Notably, however, “[i]n no statute has the Legislature expressly granted statutory county
courts the jurisdiction to issue a search warrant to be executed in another county.” Id. “Although
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly authorizes that any magistrate may issue an arrest
warrant, which can be executed statewide, the Legislature has declined to create such a provision
for search warrants.” Id.
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Further, “Article 1.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifically lists the
judicial positions that have statewide authority, including the judges of the Court of Criminal
Appeals, justices of the Texas Supreme Court, justices of the court of appeals, and judges of the
district courts.” Id. at 686, citing TEX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC . art. 1.23. Clearly, statutory county court
judges were omitted from this list. Id.
Considering the relevant statutory provisions, “a statutory county court judge is limited to
acting within the county of his court unless expressly authorized to act beyond that county.” Id.
“A statutory county court judge lacks jurisdiction to issue a search warrant to be executed outside
of his own county.” Id.
Accordingly, the Sanchez court determined that the “Montgomery County judge did not
have jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for an individual ‘to be found in Harris County’ because
such action reached beyond the Montgomery County line.” Id. Further, although the Montgomery
County judge was acting as a magistrate, his authority was defined by virtue of his office as a
statutory county court judge. Id. at 685, citing United States v. Conine, 33 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.
1994). And “[t]hat office has not been given statewide jurisdiction by the [Texas] Legislature for
search warrants.” Id.
Defendant herein now contends that like the statutory county court judge in Sanchez, the
City of Irving municipal judge exceeded his jurisdiction by issuing a search warrant for the
premises located in the City of Dallas. 	Defendant argues that “[s]ince Judge Acuna was a
municipal court Judge for Irving, Texas and since municipal court judges were not (and still are
not) included in the list of [ ] judicial positions designated in TEX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC . art. 1.23,
Judge Acuna’s jurisdiction to issue a search warrant as a magistrate was limited to the territorial
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jurisdiction of the City of Irving, Texas.” [Dkt. #254, at pp. 5–6]. As such, Defendant argues the
warrant was invalid.
2. 	The Government’s Argument
In contrast, the Government argues that Judge Acuna acted within his authority to issue the
search warrant. 	Citing Article 2A.151(14) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the
Government notes that a municipal court judge, like Judge Acuna, is a magistrate. [Dkt. #252, at
p. 2]; see also Gilbert v. State, 493 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (“Judges of city courts
of incorporated cities or towns are magistrates.”); TEX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC . ANN . art. 2.09. And,
the jurisdiction of a municipal court judge, “when acting as a magistrate, is coextensive with the
limits of his county.” See Gilbert, 493 S.W.2d at 784; see also Davidson v. State, 422 S.W.3d 750,
758 n.16 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d).
In Gilbert, a municipal court judge for the city of Hedwig Village, Texas in Harris County
issued a search warrant for property located in Houston, Texas in Harris County. 	Gilbert, 493
S.W.2d at 784. Because the municipal court judge was acting as a magistrate when he issued the
search warrant, the magistrate’s jurisdiction was “coextensive with the limits of his county.” Id.
Accordingly, the “issuance of the search warrant was within the authority of the magistrate of the
Hedwig Village municipal judge.” Id.
The Government argues that the decision in Gilbert resolves the issue presently before the
court. The Government further contends that Sanchez does not support Defendant’s position.
3. 	Harmonizing Gilbert and Sanchez
“The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant is a written order
issued by a magistrate.” United States v. Conine, 33 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Who may serve as a magistrate? 	According to Article 2A.151 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, a judge of a statutory county court and a judge of a municipal court, among
others, may serve as magistrates. TEX. C ODE C RIM. P ROC . ANN . art. 2A.151(11)(A) & (14).
Accordingly, when a municipal court judge issues a search warrant, he does so in his
capacity as a magistrate. See Gilbert, supra. And he may issue a search warrant within the limits
of his county. Id.
Likewise, when a statutory county court judge issues a search warrant, he does so in his
capacity as a magistrate. And he may issue a search warrant within the limits of his county because
his authority is defined by virtue of his office as a statutory county court judge. 	See Sanchez,
supra.3
Here, Judge Acuna, a municipal court judge for the City of Irving in Dallas County, Texas,
issued a search warrant for premises located in the City of Dallas in Dallas County, Texas. Because
Judge Acuna was acting as a magistrate when he issued the search warrant, he acted within his
authority to issue this search warrant within the limits of his county.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relies on both Sanchez and Gilbert. 	As noted in
Conine, when a judge issues a search warrant, “he is acting as a magistrate by virtue of his office”
“for [the judge’s] ‘authority to act in the capacity of magistrate is dependent upon his office.’”
Conine, 33 F.3d at 470. Following this reasoning, a municipal court judge acts as a magistrate by
virtue of his office and his authority to act as a magistrate is dependent upon his office. And as
3 Similarly, when a state district judge issues a search warrant, “he is acting as a magistrate by virtue of his
office as a district judge” because his “‘authority to act in the capacity of magistrate is dependent upon his office.’”
United States v. Conine, 33 F.3d at 470 (internal citations omitted). A state district judge’s jurisdiction “as a magistrate
will at least encompass that of a district judge.” Id. (finding that “[d]istrict judges are empowered, by the Texas
Constitution, to function judicially throughout the state.”)
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concluded by the Gilbert court, the authority of a municipal court judge acting as a magistrate falls
within the limits of his county.
Likewise, a statutory county court judge acts as a magistrate by virtue of his office and his
authority to act as a magistrate is dependent upon his office. And as concluded by the Sanchez
court, the authority of a statutory county court judge acting as a magistrate falls within the limits
of his county.
Defendant’s request to limit the authority of a municipal court judge acting as a magistrate
to his municipality based on Sanchez is misguided. In doing so, Defendant asks the court to ignore
the guiding premise of Sanchez – that is, the authority of a magistrate to act is dependent on his
office. 	Asking the court to apply the limitations of a statutory county court judge acting as a
magistrate to that of a municipal court judge acting as a magistrate ignores longstanding
jurisprudence. The court declines Defendant’s invitation to do so.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the court recommends that Defendant Samuel David Whitaker,
Jr.’s Motion to Suppress [Dkt. #229] be DENIED.
Within fourteen (14) days after service of the magistrate judge’s report, any party must
serve and file specific written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate
judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific
finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and
specify the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed
determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing
before the magistrate judge is not specific.
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Failure to file specific, 	written objections will bar the party 	from 	appealing the
uncontroverted factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted by
the district court, except on grounds of plain error, provided that the party has been served with
notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v United Servs.
Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).
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