Spartan Composites LLC, et al., v. Signature Systems Group, LLC

United States District Court
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
SPARTAN COMPOSITES, LLC d/b/a
FODS, and SPARTAN MAT, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SIGNATURE SYSTEMS GROUP, LLC,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-609
Judge Mazzant
SEALED
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Spartan Composites, LLC’s d/b/a FODS and Spartan Mat
LLC’s (“Plaintiffs”) Emergency Motion for Interim Preliminary Injunctive Relief (the “Motion”)
(Dkt. #230). Having considered the Motion, the relevant pleadings, and the applicable law, the
Court finds that the Motion should be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The underlying facts are more thoroughly set forth in the Court’s October 21, 2025
Memorandum Opinion and Order and need no repeating here (Dkt. #154). Following a four-day
trial in which Defendant was found to have misappropriated three of Plaintiffs’ trade secrets,
Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion, asking the Court to enter a preliminary injunction preventing
Defendant from “marketing, selling, renting, leasing, or manufacturing its DiamondTrack mat
until final judgment is issued” (Dkt. #230 at p. 1). The Motion is opposed (Dkt. #233). Plaintiffs
have filed a reply (Dkt. #235).
LEGAL STANDARD
A preliminary injunction seeks to “prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s
ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
Line, 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 1985). Under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[e]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order must: (a) state the reasons why it
issued; (b) state its terms specifically; and describe in reasonable detail . . . the act or acts restrained
or required.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer
irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs any damage
that the injunction might cause the defendant; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public
interest. Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs urge the Court to restrain Defendant for two primary reasons: first, to prevent any
alleged erosion of the spirit behind the jury’s verdict, and second, to prevent Defendant from
“flooding the market” with its own line of “DiamondTrack” trackout mats (See Dkt. #230 at p. 1).
Defendant argues that the proposed injunction is unnecessary and improper in scope (See
Dkt. #233 at pp. 6–7). The Court must now determine whether Plaintiffs have requested a
sufficiently narrow injunctive order and have further offered sufficient proof to satisfy the four
elements necessary to support a preliminary injunction. As explained below, Plaintiffs have carried
their burden in both respects.
I. Scope
At the outset of its analysis, the Court notes again that Plaintiffs seek an injunctive order
against Defendant specifically covering its “marketing, selling, renting, leasing, or manufacturing
its DiamondTrack mat” (Dkt. #230 at p. 1). Defendant contests the scope of the proposed order,
stating that the “breadth of emergency injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek does not even comport with
the issues on which they succeeded at trial” (Dkt. #233 at p. 8). In structuring this argument,
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
Defendant places great emphasis on the jury’s rejection of a trade secret in the collective manner
in which Plaintiffs’ FODS mat was constructed (See Dkt. #211). Defendant argues that this Court
risks over-enjoining it, and that “such an injunction amounts to an attack on the jury’s finding that
no trade secret exists in the size, shape, structure, composition, and single-piece manufacture of a
trackout control mat” (Dkt. #233 at p. 9). As an alternative to Plaintiffs’ proposed relief, Defendant
asks that it be enjoined only from utilizing Plaintiffs’ customer lists, marketing, advertising, sales,
or pricing strategies to generate sales for its DiamondTrack mat (See Dkt. #233 at p. 9).
The Court remains ever mindful of the legal requirement that “an injunction must be
narrowly tailored to remedy the specific action which gives rise to the order.” OCA-Greater Houston
v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 616 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). Accordingly, it turns to the jury
charge to determine the proper scope of Plaintiffs’ requested relief. While the jury found that the
collective manner in which the FODS trackout mat was created did not constitute a trade secret, it
also found that the FODS trackout mat contained a trade secret in its proprietary molding process
(Dkt. #211 at p. 1). To be clear, the jury expressly found that the unique molding process of the
FODS trackout mat constituted a trade secret, and that Defendant misappropriated that trade
secret (Dkt #211 at p. 3). In light of the jury’s findings, the Court is satisfied that any proposed
injunction pertaining to the marketing, selling, renting, leasing, or manufacturing of the
DiamondTrack mat is sufficiently narrowly tailored to remedy any potential injustice associated
with “the action which gives rise to the order,” or the misappropriation of Plaintiffs’ alleged trade
secrets. Id.
II. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The first element to address in the context of an injunction is whether Plaintiffs can
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. In the context of this case, analysis
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 3 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
of this element appears deceptively simple. After all, Plaintiffs have already succeeded at trial on
the merits of many of their trade secret misappropriation claims. Most pertinent to the pending
motion, Plaintiffs have succeeded on their claim that the FODS trackout mat contained a
proprietary molding process that constituted a trade secret, and that the trade secret was
misappropriated by Defendant (See Dkt. #211). Plaintiffs’ success at trial, however, is not the end
of the story in the context of this initial element.
Plaintiffs cite a prior decision by this Court, Jostens, Inc. v. Hammons, and ask that the Court
find in their favor on this element. No. 4:20-CV-00225, 2022 WL 2392311, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 1,
2022). In Jostens, this Court determined that a party had effectively rendered moot any question
regarding a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” because it had “succeeded on the
merits for all of its claims.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have not succeeded on the merits of all of their
claims; rather, they have succeeded on a mere majority of them (See Dkt. #211). This is a
distinguishment without a difference, however, as the requested injunction directly relates to the
claims on which Plaintiffs have succeeded. The jury’s finding of the above-mentioned trade secret
is naturally implicated by Defendant’s continued marketing, selling, renting, leasing, or
manufacturing of a product that allegedly misappropriates it. As a result, the Court once again finds
that this element has been nullified by a party’s success at trial. Id. (noting further that “there is
support for a post-trial preliminary injunction in cases where one is necessary to protect the jury’s
verdict while briefing and argument continues on post-trial damage issues” (citation modified)).
While the Court is in active anticipation and receipt of post-trial motions, it declines to
preemptively uproot the findings of the jury, or to permit the potential subversion of such findings
on that basis alone.
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
III. Irreparable Harm
The second element asks whether Plaintiffs have put forth evidence showing a substantial
threat of irreparable harm in the absence of an injunctive order. See Nichols, 532 F.3d at 372. In
addressing this element, “[t]he Court looks not to the magnitude of the harm allegedly suffered by
[a party], but the irreparability of it.” Watchguard Techs., Inc. v. Valentine, 433 F. Supp. 2d 792, 794
(N.D. Tex. 2006). “[T]he central purpose of a preliminary injunction . . . is to prevent irreparable
harm. It is the threat of harm that cannot be undone which authorizes exercise of this equitable
power to enjoin . . . .” Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir. 1975). Paramount to the Court’s
discussion of this element is the consideration of whether: (a) Plaintiffs are entitled to a
presumption of irreparable harm in this instance; and (b) Plaintiffs have raised enough evidence to
support the presumption or an independent showing of irreparable harm.
The first issue under the Court’s consideration, whether Plaintiffs can claim a presumption
of irreparable harm, is not a straightforward matter. In fact, it was recently involved in a Fifth
Circuit opinion:
Though the parties did not provide a choice of law analysis, it is unclear whether
federal courts should apply a state-law ‘presumption of irreparable harm’ when
determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue in federal court. Compare
Heil Trailer Int’l. Co. v. Kula, 542 F. App’x 329, 336-38 (5th Cir. 2013) (vacating the
denial of a preliminary injunction in part on the basis that Texas courts presume
irreparable harm where trade secrets have been misappropriated) with Daniels
Health Sciences, L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Sciences, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing only federal authorities in finding no error in the district court’s
conclusion that irreparable harm was likely).
Direct Biologics, L.L.C. v. McQueen, 63 F.4th 1015, 1021 n.4 (5th Cir. 2023).
The Court does not endeavor, through this Memorandum Opinion and Order, to lay this
growing legal question to rest. However, as this Court claims jurisdiction exclusively under the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1836 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the application of the
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 5 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
presumption is less than clear. See Heil, 542 F. App’x at 335 (“Because both the availability and the
measure of damages are governed by state law in a diversity case, it follows that state law also
governs whether certain injuries qualify as irreparable for the purposes of granting a preliminary
injunction.”); see also NuPulseCV, Inc. v. DesignPlex Biomedical, LLC, No. 4:24-CV-00551-P, 2024
WL 4101786, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2024) (“To show irreparable harm for misappropriation of
trade secrets under Texas law, a movant need only show that ‘the defendant possesses the trade
secrets and is in a position to use them.’” (citation omitted)). Regardless of the ease at which this
Court may apply the relevant presumption to the case at hand, the fact remains that Plaintiffs have
sought recovery for trade secret misappropriation under both Texas and federal causes of action
(See Dkt. #1 at ¶¶ 31–40). Thus, this Court will consider the application, if any, of the presumption
of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Considerate Commerce Inc. v. ISP Elecs. LLC, No. 3:23-CV-2140-E-
BN, 2024 WL 3251722, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2024) (recognizing the application of the
presumption of irreparable harm in a case involving trade secret misappropriation where the federal
court claimed jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1454), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:23-CV-2140-E-BN, 2024 WL 3092443 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2024) .
Plaintiffs argue that they are owed a presumption of irreparable harm under Fifth Circuit
precedent as outlined in Heil. 542 F. App’x at 336. In that case, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
decision of a district court for its failure to apply or consider the notion that “Texas courts have
frequently found that irreparable harm is likely in cases where trade secrets have been
misappropriated.” Id. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly referenced a Texas court of appeals
decision that held the following: “[w]hen a defendant possesses trade secrets and is in a position to
use them, harm to the trade secret owner may be presumed.” Id. (quoting IAC, Ltd. v. Bell
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 6 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). However, in
that same decision, the Fifth Circuit also recognized that the presumption may be defeated or
otherwise inapplicable altogether, noting that “the facts and circumstances of a particular case
could perhaps show that certain injuries resulting from misappropriation of trade secrets are either
compensable by monetary damages or purely speculative, as Texas courts have occasionally
found.” Id. This sentiment was repeated in an employee non-compete context in Direct Biologics,
L.L.C. v. McQueen, wherein the Fifth Circuit found that a district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to presume the existence of an irreparable injury. 63 F.4th 1015, 1022 (5th Cir. 2023).
Defendant attacks any presumption of irreparable harm by citing Bianco v. Globus Med., Inc.,
a case decided in this district which openly questioned whether a presumption of harm is proper in
light of decisions by the Supreme Court and multiple circuit courts. No. 2:12-CV-00147-WCB,
2014 WL 1049067, at *8 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2014). However, because the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have carried their burden to support both a presumption and an independent showing of irreparable
harm, it need not address Defendant’s argument directly.
As noted above, under a presumption of irreparable harm analysis, Plaintiffs “need only
show that ‘the defendant possesses the trade secrets and is in a position to use them.’” NuPulseCV,
2024 WL 4101786, at *3 (citation omitted). Here, Defendant’s president has submitted a
declaration indicating that Defendant maintains a supply of DiamondTrack mats which it continues
to market and sell to various customers (Dkt. #233-1). Evidence at trial also revealed that Defendant
continues to possess FODS’s mold files on its shared drive, and that Defendant’s engineering team
has access to them, despite the jury’s finding that such information constituted a trade secret (See
Dkt. #235 at p. 7; see Dkt. #211). While Defendant contests the present use or accessibility of the
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 7 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
FODS files, the fact remains that Defendant’s DiamondTrack mats are the manufactured result of
a process found by the jury to constitute a trade secret (See Dkt. #211). Because Defendant remains
in continued possession of FODS’s proprietary information and the DiamondTrack mats, and
because Defendant actively argues that Plaintiffs do not possess any trade secrets while being
unbound by any restraint of use, the Court finds Plaintiffs entitled to the irreparable harm
presumption offered under Texas law. See NuPulseCV, Inc., 2024 WL 4101786, at *4 (noting that a
defendant’s “qualified promise not to ‘publish or make public’ [a plaintiff’s] confidential
information . . . is insufficient to defeat irreparable harm” because defendant simultaneously
argued that such information is not a trade secret); see, e.g., ScaleFactor, Inc. v. Process Pro
Consulting, LLC, No. 1:19-CV-229-RP, 2019 WL 2098086, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2019) (“The
Court further finds a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued. ‘When
a defendant possesses trade secrets and is in a position to use them, harm to the trade secret owner
may be presumed.’” (quoting IAC, 160 S.W.3d at 200)).
Even absent any presumption, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have offered sufficient proof
to support a finding of irreparable harm in this instance. Under the DTSA, “a court may grant an
injunction to prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation . . . on such terms as the court
deems reasonable.” 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i). The Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act likewise
provides that “[a]ctual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined if the order does not
prohibit a person from using general knowledge, skill, and experience that person acquired during
employment.” TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 134A.003(a). The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly
emphasized that a showing of some harm, without more, cannot support injunctive relief:
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however
substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 8 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other
corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation,
weigh[s] heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.
Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1975).
Importantly, “[a]n irreparable injury is one that cannot be undone by monetary damages or
one for which monetary damages would be especially difficult to calculate.” Heil, 542 F. App’x at
335 (citation modified). Thus, “the mere fact that economic damages may be available does not
always mean that a remedy at law is ‘adequate.’” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 600 (5th Cir.
2011).
Here, Plaintiffs predict that they will suffer a variety of harm if an injunction order does not
issue, including:
(a) Loss of customer base and sale opportunities due to Defendant’s
current practice of flooding the market with products that last “up
to ten years;”
(b) Loss of market position due to a forced response to Defendant’s
price gouging;
(c) Loss of goodwill with customers due to Defendant’s repeated
contact and advertisements with them; and
(d) Forced election of remedies because the jury charge did not
contemplate post-trial activity (Dkt. #230 at p. 7).
These hypothetical sources of harm, taken together, represent a threat of irreparable injury
that subverts both the word and spirit of the jury verdict. In consideration of the facts presented,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ proposed harm is sufficient to carry the second element necessary
to warrant a preliminary injunction order.
First, the proposed harm is not speculative. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to
support a finding of irreparable injury because they cannot point to a single lost sale, a single lost
customer, or any lost goodwill with customers because of Defendant’s purported increased sale of
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 9 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
DiamondTrack mats (Dkt. #233). While Defendant is correct in this respect, the law does not
require a showing of actual harm as a necessary prerequisite to a preliminary injunction. Indeed,
injunctive relief remains available to the plaintiff who can carry its burden of proving that the threat
of injury is substantial—meaning, “the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); see also Daniels Health Scis.,
L.L.C. v. Vascular Health Scis., L.L.C., 710 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[S]peculative injury is
not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the applicant.”). In support
of the substantial threat of injury, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that Defendant has reduced
its price of its DiamondTrack mat to unusual lows, is actively soliciting Plaintiffs’ customer base,
and has sold a greater number of DiamondTrack mats than its typical December average
(Dkt. #230-1). Defendant counters Plaintiffs’ offer of proof with evidence suggesting that it has
only sold 150 DiamondTrack mats to nine customers between the end of trial on November 20,
2025 and December 14, 2025 (Dkt. #237). Defendant further argues that its sales for December
2025 align with its average of 92 units/month for the year of 2024, and that any reduction in price
from an average of $1,559 from February to October 2024 and $1,515 from January to May 2025 to
an authorized price of $1,200 is reasonable under changing market circumstances (See Dkt. #235
at p. 2; Dkt. #233 at p. 6).
The Court is convinced that Plaintiffs have presented evidence sufficient to bring their
claim beyond the realm of “unfounded fear on the part of the applicant.” Holland Am. Ins. Co. v.
Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration indicating
that two of Plaintiffs’ customers have been directly contacted and offered a limited-time
“truckload” price of $1,200 per DiamondTrack mat (Dkt. #230-1 at p. 2). The declaration also
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 10 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

11
includes Plaintiffs’ understanding that Defendant’s solicitation included a discussion of the jury
verdict with at least one customer (Dkt. #230-1 at p. 2). Furthermore, Defendant has not contested
the fact that the discounted $1,200 price for the DiamondTrack mat constitutes a historic sale for
the company (Dkt. #233). While the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ characterization of Defendant’s
actions is exaggerated to an unnecessary degree, it also finds that Defendant’s intentional and
targeted solicitation of shared customers, combined with its unusual pricing strategy and higher-
than average sale figures following the jury verdict, constitutes an articulable and concrete threat
of continued misappropriation.1
Second, the proposed harm is not entirely compensable with monetary damages and
“would be especially difficult to calculate.” Heil, 542 F. App’x at 335 (citation modified). Courts in
this district have previously held that “a firm faces irreparable harm within its market when a
competitor can misappropriate its trade secrets and benefit from them ‘without first investing the
time, expense, and labor’ which the firm itself had to put in to create that trade secret.”
HealthTrackRX, Inc. v. Samaha, No. 4:24-CV-1100-SDJ, 2025 WL 1782559, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
3, 2025) (citing AHS Staffing, LLC v. Quest Staffing Group, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 3d 856, 873 (E.D.
Tex. 2018). Defendant’s persistent and discounted sale of a product found by a jury to be
manufactured as a result of trade secret misappropriation, together with Defendant’s express
solicitation of Plaintiffs’ customers, represents a harm that cannot be undone by money alone. See
Calsep A/S v. Intelligent Petroleum Software Sols., LLC, No. 4:19-CV-1118, 2022 WL 2813069, at *8
1 Plaintiffs repeatedly label Defendant’s actions as an attempt to “flood the market” with a product that uses
Plaintiffs’ trade secrets (Dkt. #230 at p. 1; Dkt. #235 at p. 1). The Court finds no evidence of any such “flood” under
the facts presented. As a result, the Court declines to speculate on the hypothetical harm presented by an
exaggerated “flood” of the market and instead centers the question of irreparable harm on the realistic ramifications
of Defendant’s particular marketing strategy.
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 11 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

12
(S.D. Tex. June 10, 2022) (emphasis added) (“[d]efendants attempted to bypass [the inventive]
process and produce a competing product at a lower price, essentially undercutting Plaintiffs and
driving them out of the market. If this occurred, Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm.”), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 4:19-CV-01118, 2022 WL 2806538 (S.D. Tex. July 18, 2022), aff’d
sub nom. Calsep A/S v. Dabral, 84 F.4th 304 (5th Cir. 2023).
Because Plaintiffs have offered evidence sufficient to either avail themselves of the
presumption of irreparable harm (if applicable) or to support a standalone finding of irreparable
harm, the Court finds that the second factor of the preliminary injunction analysis favors Plaintiffs.
IV. Balance of Hardships
Plaintiffs argue that the third element, the balance of hardships between the parties, is
skewed heavily in their favor. They emphasize that they stand to suffer price erosion, a loss of
market position, a loss of business opportunities and damage to their goodwill if Defendant is
permitted to continue selling its DiamondTrack mat into the fast-approaching trade show season
(See Dkt. #235 at p. 9; Dkt. #230 at p. 7). Defendant counters by claiming that an injunction aimed
at its DiamondTrack mat would prevent it “from being able to compete in the trackout control
market whatsoever” (Dkt. #233 at p. 14). The Court finds that Plaintiffs bear the greater weight of
hardship, as Defendant is no longer manufacturing or producing their DiamondTrack model, and
is actively selling four industrial matting products (Dkt. #237 at p. 2). The proposed injunction will
therefore not heavily damage or negatively influence Defendant’s continued operations, but rather
simply act to prevent any liquidation of the DiamondTrack model pending this Court’s final
judgment. See PSP Franchising, LLC v. SureFed Plus, LC, No. SA-25-CV-00544-XR, 2025 WL
3035112, at *11 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2025) (“Requiring Defendants to cease operations will impose
a substantial injury.”); see also Bennigan’s Franchising Co., L.P. v. Swigonski, No. CIVA
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 12 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

13
3:06CV2300G, 2007 WL 603370, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2007) (“If the plaintiffs’ motion for
injunctive relief is granted, the defendants will be forced to close the restaurant. This is a substantial
injury.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance of hardships ultimately favors Plaintiffs over
Defendant.
V. Public Interest
The final factor “invites consideration of the equities by the Court which ‘involves
weigh[ing] the public interest against the injury to the parties from the grant or denial of injunctive
relief.’” Walker v. Doe, No. 6:24-CV-00633-ADA, 2025 WL 1502634, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2025)
(quoting Int’l Paper Co. v. Harris Cnty., 445 S.W.3d 379, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
no pet.). The public interest favors protection of trade secrets to defend the proper operation of the
free market, protect legitimate competition, and to encourage investment in business and
innovation. Metallurgical Industries, Inc. v. Fourtek, 790 F.2d 1195, 1201 (5th Cir. 1986) (“If a
businessman has worked hard, has used his imagination, and has taken bold steps to gain an
advantage over his competitors, he should be able to profit from his efforts. Because a commercial
advantage can vanish once the competition learns of it, the law should protect the businessman’s
efforts to keep his achievements secret.”). The Court finds protecting Plaintiffs’ trade secrets from
open misappropriation does not disserve the public interest. Defendant describes Plaintiffs’
attempt at receiving an injunctive order as a thinly veiled request for an exclusionary right to sell
their FODS trackout mat without competition (See Dkt. #233 at p. 14). This is not so. Rather,
Plaintiffs seek the ability to compete in the market without suffering the negative consequences of
any misappropriation of their trade secrets, as defined by a jury upon the conclusion of a fair trial
on the merits. The Court finds this request reasonable and warranted under the circumstances. As
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 13 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

14
a result of the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiffs entitled to a preliminary injunction pending this
Court’s final judgment in the imminent future.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Spartan Composites, LLC’s d/b/a FODS and Spartan Mat
LLC’s Emergency Motion for Interim Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Dkt. #230) is hereby
GRANTED.
It is further ORDERED that Defendant Signature Systems Group, LLC and its officers,
employees, servants, agents, attorneys, successors, assigns, and all persons acting in concert or
participation with any of them, whether acting directly or through a parent company, affiliate, trust,
subsidiary, or division, who receive actual notice of this Order by personal service or otherwise, are
hereby RESTRAINED, ENJOINED, and PROHIBITED from:
(a) Manufacturing the DiamondTrack mat;
(b) Selling or offering to sell the DiamondTrack mat or supplying the
DiamondTrack mat for resale to any customer, whether direct,
distributor, reseller, private-label partner, affiliate, or other;
(c) Renting or leasing the DiamondTrack mat to any customer, whether
direct, distributor, reseller, private-label partner, affiliate, or other;
and
(d) Marketing or advertising the DiamondTrack mat in any manner,
whether for sale or otherwise, through any means, including social
media.
It is further ORDERED that within three (3) days of this Order, Signature must:
(a) Notify any distributors, resellers, rental houses/companies, private-
label partners, and affiliates that currently sell, resell, lease, or rent
out the DiamondTrack mat of this preliminary injunction and
provide them with a copy; and
(b) Remove any marketing and/or advertising for the DiamondTrack
mat from its website.
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 14 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>

15
It is further ORDERED that this preliminary injunction shall take effect
immediately and remain in effect until the date the Court enters final judgment. Plaintiffs
are not required to post a bond in connection with this preliminary injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Case 4:24-cv-00609-ALM Document 247 Filed 01/05/26 Page 15 of 15 PageID #:
<pageID>