BIELSTEIN, ET AL. v. SIGNATURE SOLAR LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
MARK A. BIELSTEIN, ET AL.
v.
SIGNATURE SOLAR LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.
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CIVIL NO. 4:24-CV-146-SDJ
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Opposed Motion to Modify Scheduling Order and
to Extend Deadline to Respond to Defendants’ Motion to Strike. (Dkt. #71). The
motion has been fully briefed. (Dkt. #75) (response); (Dkt. #79) (reply); (Dkt. #80)
(sur-reply). Having considered the motion, briefing by the parties, and applicable law,
the Court concludes that the motion should be denied.
I. B ACKGROUND
On January 16, 2026, Defendants Signature Solar Limited Liability Company,
James Showalter, and John Showalter (collectively, “Signature Solar”) filed a joint
motion to strike Plaintiffs Mark A. Bielstein and Rachelle R. Bielstein’s (the
“Bielsteins”) expert witness Richard J. Meier (“Meier”). See (Dkt. #70 at 1). In that
motion to strike, Signature Solar asserts, among other arguments, that Meier
conducted no testing to support his claim that the batteries from Signature Solar’s
off-grid solar kit caused the fire at issue in this case. (Dkt. #70 at 2–3, 8). Twelve days
later, the Bielsteins filed the present motion before the Court, wherein they indicate
that they have “endeavored to have the remnants of the battery system transported
to Mr. Meier’s laboratory in Florida for further analysis.” (Dkt. #71 ¶ 6).
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Signature Solar has objected to any further testing on the battery system.
(Dkt. #71 ¶ 8); (Dkt. #75 at 11). As a result, the Bielsteins now ask the Court to modify
the existing scheduling order and permit the Bielsteins to inspect the battery system.
(Dkt. #71 ¶ 9). For the scheduling deadlines, the Bielsteins specifically request the
following modifications: (1) a 14-day extension of the discovery deadline, from
February 25, 2026, to March 13, 2026; (2) a 34-day extension of the dispositive motion
deadline, from February 25, 2026, to March 31, 2026; (3) leave for the parties to serve
supplemental expert reports by March 13, 2026; and (4) leave for the parties to file
supplemental or amended motions to strike expert reports on or before March 20,
2026. (Dkt. #71 ¶ 16); (Dkt. #71-3). As for the testing itself, the Bielsteins request
that the Court compel Signature Solar to participate in “a joint forensic inspection
and analysis of the battery.” (Dkt. #71 ¶ 16).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) states that “[a] schedule may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Good cause requires the
party seeking to modify the scheduling order to show “that the deadlines cannot
reasonably 	be 	met 	despite 	the 	diligence 	of 	the 	party 	needing 	the 	extension.”
Squyres v. Heico Companies, L.L.C., 782 F.3d 224, 237 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation
omitted). Courts consider four relevant factors when determining whether there is
good cause under Rule 16(b)(4): “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely comply
with the scheduling order; (2) the importance of the modification; (3) potential
prejudice in allowing the modification; and (4) the availability of a continuance to
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cure such prejudice.” Id. (quoting Meaux Surface Prot., Inc. v. Fogleman, 607 F.3d
161, 167 (5th Cir. 2010)) (citation modified).
III. D ISCUSSION
The Bielsteins’ present motion seeks two categories 	of relief. 	First, the
Bielsteins request that the Court modify several deadlines in this case, so as to allow
the parties time to test the battery system and thereafter provide supplements for
their expert reports. (Dkt. #71-3). Second, the Bielsteins request that the Court order
the parties to conduct joint testing of the battery system. (Dkt. #71-3). For ease of
discussion, the Court will address each category in turn.
A. Good Cause to Modify
Addressing the first factor, the Court finds that the Bielsteins have not
provided 	a 	sufficient 	explanation 	for 	their 	failure 	to 	timely 	comply 	with 	the
scheduling order. See Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237. In explaining why there is good cause
for 	their 	requested 	modifications 	to 	the 	scheduling 	order 	and 	for 	permitting
supplemental briefing, the Bielsteins assert that the fact-discovery deadline remains
open until February 25, 2026, that their expert Meier did not deem testing necessary
to render his original opinions, and that they have promptly sought to conduct the
battery forensic analysis. (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 7–8, 11–12, 18). However, if the Bielsteins
intended to have their expert complete forensic testing on the battery system and
include the findings in his expert report, the deadline to do so was December 5, 2025.
See (Dkt. #67) (setting deadline to disclose expert testimony under Rule 26(a)(2) for
issues for which the party bears the burden of proof). The Bielsteins do not explain
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why the battery testing could not have been accomplished before the scheduling
order’s disclosure deadline, which is particularly concerning given that Meier’s expert
report from 2022 stated that the batteries “should be investigated as part of a
thorough forensic exam,” (Dkt. #75-1 at 17).
With the disclosure deadline and date of Meier’s report in mind, the Court
concludes that the Bielsteins have not provided a justification for why they waited to
schedule the battery testing until after the expert testimony disclosure deadline. The
only reason given for requesting the testing now is that “Defendants’ Motion to Strike
. . . 	asserts 	that 	the 	absence 	of 	such 	testing 	renders 	[Meier’s 	expert 	report]
inadmissible,” so “Plaintiffs promptly sought to conduct a targeted forensic analysis”
of the batteries. (Dkt. #71 ¶ 13). Under these circumstances, it appears that the
Bielsteins’ delay in testing is self-imposed. As a result, without an explanation for
their delay in testing the battery system, the first factor for the Rule 16(b)(4) good-
cause analysis weighs against the Bielsteins.
The second factor, “the importance of the modification,” also weighs against
the Bielsteins. See Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237 (citation modified). In their motion, the
Bielsteins assert that they “do not believe [the battery testing] is necessary,” instead
stating that the additional time for testing is being requested “to ensure the Court’s
Rule 702 analysis is informed by the fullest available record.” (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 13–14).
The Bielsteins make these assertions even though they acknowledge that Signature
Solar, in its motion to strike, “asserts that the absence of such testing renders [Meier’s
expert] opinions inadmissible.” (Dkt. #71 ¶ 13); see also (Dkt. #75 at 12). Hence,
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because the Bielsteins assert that the requested modifications to the scheduling order
to allow additional testing are not necessary, the second factor for the good cause
analysis weighs against the Bielsteins.
As for the question of whether there will be potential prejudice to the
nonmovant if the modifications are permitted, this third factor weighs against the
Bielsteins as well. See Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237. The Bielsteins claim that Signature
Solar will suffer no prejudice if the Court permits the requested modifications and
supplemental briefing. (Dkt. #71 ¶ 20–21). In response, Signature Solar asserts that
allowing the modifications will cause it to incur additional expenses and will harm
its developed litigation strategy. (Dkt. #75 at 9). Alongside these general assertions,
Signature Solar’s specific concern is that the “late-stage expert evidence” from the
battery testing may necessitate “additional expert analysis, supplemental opinions,
[and] renewed motion practice” to address the test results. (Dkt. #75 at 10).
Inherently, any modification to a scheduling order deadline has the potential
to cause a nonmovant to incur additional expenses and alter its litigation strategy.
Therefore, general assertions of additional expense or potential changes in strategy
may not be enough to show potential prejudice to the nonmovant. In this case,
however, Signature Solar’s specific concerns of potential prejudice are well taken. If
the additional testing is permitted, Signature Solar may need to conduct additional
expert analysis and thereafter supplement its own expert opinions, while also having
to amend its motion to strike Meier’s expert report once the battery system testing is
completed. See (Dkt. #75 at 10). This potential, additional burden on Signature Solar
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is sufficient to find that Signature Solar may be prejudiced by the Bielsteins’
requested relief. For this reason, the third good cause factor weighs slightly against
the Bielsteins.
Having established that Signature Solar will be prejudiced by the Bielsteins’
requests, the Court turns to the final good-cause factor: “the availability of a
continuance to cure such prejudice.” Squyres, 782 F.3d at 237. The Bielsteins do not
directly address a continuance in their motion because they assert that Signature
Solar will not be prejudiced by the requested modifications. See (Dkt. #71, #79).
Nevertheless, the Court finds that a continuance, if requested, would alleviate some
of Signature Solar’s concerns of potential prejudice because deadline extensions
would give Signature Solar additional time to modify its litigation strategy and
address the results of the battery forensic analysis. See, e.g., Sierra Club, Lone Star
Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 573 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that a
continuance would give the nonmovant more time to review late disclosures).
Therefore, because a continuance would cure some potential prejudice against
Signature Solar, the Court concludes that the fourth and final factor weighs neutrally
for the Bielsteins.
* 	* 	*
After reviewing the Rule 16(b)(4) good-cause factors, the Court concludes that
the Bielsteins have not sufficiently alleged good cause to warrant granting their
proposed 	modifications 	to 	the 	scheduling 	order 	and 	requests 	for 	leave 	for
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supplemental 	briefing. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Bielsteins’ 	requests 	for 	scheduling
modifications and for leave are denied.
B. Request to Compel Additional Testing
The Bielsteins’ second request for relief asks that the Court order “a joint
forensic inspection and analysis of the battery by the parties’ experts[.]” (Dkt. #71
¶ 16). As explained by the Bielsteins, they “offered Defendants a full opportunity to
inspect the battery and observe the testing”—“a targeted forensic analysis”—but
“Defendants declined.” (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 13, 18); see also (Dkt. #75 at 9–10) (opposing the
testing). Therefore, the Bielsteins now request a motion to compel testing.
As an initial matter, the exact manner of testing is not described by the
Bielsteins, nor does Meier provide clarity in his expert report, only noting that the
batteries “should be investigated as part of a thorough forensic exam,” (Dkt. #75-1
at 17) (Meier’s preliminary report). Nevertheless, Signature Solar asserts that the
requested 	testing 	“is 	inherently 	semi-destructive,” 	(Dkt. 	#75 	at 	9), 	while 	the
Bielsteins’ counsel, in correspondence with Signature Solar’s counsel, indicated that
“the analysis may be semi-destructive.” (Dkt. #71-1 at 5). Thus, for purposes of this
present motion to compel, the Court will assume that the requested testing is
destructive. See generally RevoLaze LLC v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. 2:19-CV-43-JRG,
2020 WL 1984322, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2020) (“destructive testing” is “testing
that destroys or irreversibly alters evidence”).
Generally, 	“if 	the 	parties 	differ 	as 	to 	whether 	an 	inspection 	or 	test 	is
appropriate, the court must balance the respective interests by weighing the degree
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to which the proposed inspection will aid in the search for truth against the burdens
and dangers created by the inspection.” Id. at *1 (citation modified). For destructive
testing, “[c]ourts approach [such] testing of evidence with greater caution than other
discovery requests, requiring the movant to show that the destructive testing is
necessary or integral to the case.” Anaya v. Tricam Indus., Inc., No. 5:18-CV-1045,
2019 WL 5850554, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2019). In determining whether
destructive testing is warranted, district courts, including courts in the Eastern
District of Texas, have applied a four-factor test. RevoLaze LLC, 2020 WL 1984322,
at *1.1 The factors are: “(1) whether the proposed testing is reasonable, necessary,
and relevant to proving the movant’s case; (2) whether the non-movant’s ability to
present evidence at trial will be hindered or prejudiced; (3) whether there are any
less prejudicial alternatives to obtaining the evidence sought; and (4) whether there
are adequate safeguards to minimize prejudice to the non-movant, particularly the
non-movant’s ability to present evidence at trial.” Id. (citing Mirchandani v. Home
Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 235 F.R.D. 611, 614 (D. Md. 2006)); see also Ramos v. Carter Exp.
Inc., 292 F.R.D. 406, 408–10 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (collecting cases on destructive testing).
The decision on whether to permit such testing “rests within the sound discretion of
the court.” RevoLaze LLC, 2020 WL 1984322, at *1 (citing Ostrander by Ostrander v.
Cone Mills, Inc., 119 F.R.D. 417, 419 (D. Minn. 1988)).
1 But see Krekstein v. McDonald’s Corp., 341 F.R.D. 575, 578 (E.D. Penn. 2022)
(“Where the testing at issue would not result in a situation where an object would be wholly
consumed or destroyed, some courts have elected to balance the parties’ competing interests
rather than apply the four-factor test” (citation modified)).
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On review, the Court finds that the Bielsteins have not explained why
destructive 	testing 	should 	be 	compelled 	in 	this 	instance. 	See 	(Dkt. 	#71). 	The
Bielsteins assert—as stated before—that “Plaintiffs do not believe [the testing] is
necessary,” (Dkt. #71 ¶ 13). And, the Bielsteins only generally state that Signature
Solar will not be prejudiced by the relief requested. See (Dkt. #71 ¶¶ 20–21). In
response, Signature Solar asserts that it will be prejudiced because the requested
testing involves, and will permanently alter, critical evidence in the case. (Dkt. #75
at 9–10). After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that the
Bielsteins’ reasons for destructive testing are insufficient. The Bielsteins provide no
rationale for why the testing is integral to or necessary for the case, nor do they
address whether there are adequate safeguards or less prejudicial alternatives to the
requested forensic testing. Accordingly, destructive testing of the batteries is not
warranted at this time. The Court will deny the request.
IV. C ONCLUSION
It 	is 	therefore 	ORDERED 	that 	Plaintiffs’ 	Opposed 	Motion 	to 	Modify
Scheduling Order and to Extend Deadline to Respond to Defendants’ Motion to
Strike, (Dkt. #71), is DENIED.
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