Layton et al v. Smith County et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
NANCY LAYTON, JEREMY LAYTON,
and FREDDIE LAYTON, JR,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SMITH COUNTY, LARRY SMITH, and
BRAYLON J BARNES,
Defendants.
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CASE NO. 2:25-CV-00585-JRG
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Opposed Motion to Transfer Case to the Tyler Division (the
“Motion”) filed by Defendants Smith County, Larry Smith, and Braylon J Barnes (“Defendants”).
(Dkt. No. 25). In the Motion, Defendants move to transfer the above-captioned case to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division (the “Tyler Division”) under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Id. at 1). Having considered the Motion and its related briefing, and for
the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that it should be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 27, 2025, Plaintiffs Nancy Layton, Jeremey Layton, and Freddie Layton, Jr.
(“Plaintiffs”) filed suit against Defendants, alleging that Defendants “unlawful[ly] and unjust[ly]
kill[ed]” Jonathan Layton (the “Deceased”). (See Dkt. No. 1, at 1).
All of the facts giving rise to this case occurred in Smith County, Texas, which is within
the Tyler Division. The Deceased resided in Smith County, Texas. (Id. ¶ 1). The alleged killing
“occurred . . . in a rural part of northern Smith County.” (Dkt. No. 30, at 13). Also, each party
either resides or works in Smith County, Texas. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 9–10).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Change of venue is governed by 28 U.S.C § 1404(a). Under § 1404(a), “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district court or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). The plaintiff’s choice of venue is not a separate factor in this analysis. In re Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314-15 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Volkswagen II”). Rather, the plaintiff’s choice
of forum contributes to the defendant’s burden in showing good cause for the transfer. Id. at 315.
To show good cause, the moving party must demonstrate that the transferee venue is “clearly more
convenient” than the transferor venue. Id. Ultimately, it is within the Court’s “broad discretion”
whether to order a transfer. Id. at 311.
The first inquiry when analyzing a case’s eligibility for § 1404(a) transfer is “whether the
judicial district to which transfer is sought would have been a district in which the claim could
have been filed.” In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004) (“In re Volkswagen I”).
If the transferee district is a proper venue, then the court must weigh the relative conveniences of
the current district against the transferee district. Id. In making the convenience determination,
the Fifth Circuit considers several “private” and “public” interest factors, none of which are given
dispositive weight. Id. The private factors are: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. The public factors are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of
unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
The parties dispute each of the private and public interest factors. The Court discusses
each factor in turn.
(a) Private interest factors
(1) The relative ease of access to sources of proof
Defendants argue that the relative ease of access to sources of proof favors transfer because
“[t]he evidence is in the Tyler Division.” (Dkt. No. 25, at 5). As support, Defendants note that the
killing of the Deceased—which is the basis of this case—occurred in the Tyler Division. (Id. at
4). Defendants further assert that they all reside in the Tyler Division. (Id.). According to
Defendants, “[t]here is no legitimate reason to litigate this suit in Marshall.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs disagree. (Dkt. No. 30, at 6–7). While Plaintiffs concede that “none of the . . .
evidence [is] in Marshall,” Plaintiffs maintain that this Division still has a greater ease of access
to evidence than the Tyler Division. (Id.). Plaintiffs reason that the evidence is “essentially all
electronic” and it is easier to transport and deliver that evidence to this Division than the Tyler
Division. (Id.).
Ultimately, the Court agrees with Defendants. It is true that Defendants must have
“specifically identif[ied] the relevant sources of proof (and why they are relevant)” but failed to
do so. Seven Networks, LLC v. Google LLC, 2018 WL 4026760, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2018).
However, Defendants have “demonstrated a likelihood that some documentary evidence is likely
to be found in” the Tyler Division. Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). As the underlying facts establish,
all parties and witnesses reside in the Tyler Division. It follows that evidence will be found in that
division.
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On the other hand, the evidence is undisputedly electronic in nature. (See Dkt. No. 33, at
2; see also Dkt. No. 30, at 7). The Court therefore affords this factor less weight in the overall
transfer analysis. See In re Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc., 52 F.4th 625, 630 (5th Cir.
2023).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—the relative ease of access to sources of
proof—favors transfer but only slightly.
(2) The availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
The parties agree that this factor is neutral. (Dkt. No. 25, at 3, n. 1; see also Dkt. No. 30,
at 4, n. 1).
The Court agrees and finds that this factor—the availability of compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses—is neutral.
(3) The cost of attendance for willing witnesses
Defendants argue that this Division has a higher cost of attendance for willing witnesses
than the Tyler Division. (Dkt. No. 25, at 5). As support, Defendants assert that the law
enforcement professionals employed by Smith County would face a “substantial hardship” by
being forced to litigate this suit “60 miles away from where the . . . witnesses . . . live.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs respond that any difference in the cost of attendance between divisions “is not
significant.” (Dkt. No. 30, at 7 (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs reason that the witnesses live within
100 miles of both divisions. (Id. (citing In re Radmax, Ltd., 720 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2013)).
The Court agrees with Defendants. Witnesses incur costs when traveling, even when
travelling under 100 miles. Radmax, 720 F.3d at 288–89. Here, it is undisputed that all
witnesses are closer to the Tyler Division that this Division. The Tyler Division has, in this
case, an arguably lower attendance cost for willing witnesses than this Division. However,
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the Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that the mileage difference here is marginal. See id. (“this
factor has greater significance when the distance is greater than 100 miles”). This Court also
notes the recent analysis from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, where the Court in analogous circumstances noted:
“[T]he Court appreciates that convenience for the Parties and anticipated
witnesses is a relevant and important consideration; however, the parties are
not necessarily entitled to the most convenient forum for their travel
demands.”
Shenzhenshibairihongmaoyiyouxiangongsi v. Novoluto GmbH, 3:25-cv-00844-RCY, Dkt. No. 37,
at 2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20, 2026).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—the cost of attendance for willing witnesses—
weighs in favor of transfer but only slightly.
(4) All other practical problems
Defendants argue that other practical problems favor transfer. (Dkt. No. 25, at 5–6).
Specifically, Defendants contend that law enforcement personnel would be more able to attend to
their duties if trial is held in the Tyler Division, as compared to this Division. (Id.). Defendants
also argue that “this case does not present ‘rare and special circumstances’ in which ‘[t]he delay
associated with transfer may be relevant.’” (Dkt. No. 33, at 5).
Plaintiffs argue that “[t]here are no practical problems or administrative difficulties” in
trying this case in either division. (Dkt. No. 30, at 11). As support, Plaintiffs assert that “practical
problems” includes “problems such as . . . a court having to decide personal jurisdiction,” not the
cost of attendance identified by Defendants. (Id. at 11–12).
Defendants’ arguments are unpersuasive. First, the Court notes that the parties agree that
transfer would not result in delay. (See Dkt. No. 33, at 5; Dkt. No. 30, at 11). Second, Defendants
rely on the alleged inconvenience that law enforcement personnel would incur by trying this case
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in this Division under two (2) factors: this factor and the costs of attendance for willing witnesses.
(Dkt. No. 33, at 5–6). The Court refuses to double-count this alleged inconvenience. To find
otherwise would be inappropriate.
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—all other practical problems—is neutral.
(b) Public interest factors
(1) The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion
Neither party has addressed this factor. (See Dkt. Nos. 25, 30, 33, 34).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—the administrative difficulties flowing from
court congestion—is neutral.
(2) The local interest in having localized interests decided at home
Defendants argue that the Tyler Division has a stronger local interest in this case than this
Division. (Dkt. No. 25, at 6). Defendants, who perform their law enforcement duties in the Tyler
Division, reason that “[r]esidents of the Tyler Division should have an opportunity to . . . judge the
propriety of the conduct of local law enforcement.” (Id.).
Plaintiffs argue that “everyone in East Texas” has a “strong local interest” in deciding this
case, rendering this factor neutral. (Dkt. No. 30, at 15). According to Plaintiffs, this is not a case
where one division is not in “any relevant way connected to the events that gave rise to this suit.”
(Id. at 12–13 (citing Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318)).
While Plaintiffs correctly note that this Division has an interest in deciding this case, the
Tyler Division has a stronger one. See In re Clarke, 94 F.4th 502, 510 (5th Cir. 2024) (“the transfer
factors are relative”) (emphasis in original). After all, “the events that gave rise to [this] suit”
occurred in the Tyler Division. See id. at 511 (quoting In re TikTok, Inc., 85 F.4th 352, 364 (5th
Cir. 2023). Plaintiffs have not persuaded the Court otherwise.
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Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—the local interest in having localized interests
decided at home—favors transfer.
(3) The familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case
Defendants argues that this factor is neutral. (Dkt. No. 25, at 4, n. 2). Plaintiffs have not
contested otherwise. (See Dkt. No. 30).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—the familiarity of the forum with the law that
will govern the case—is neutral.
(4) The avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws
Defendant argues that this factor is neutral. (Dkt. No. 25, at 4, n. 3). Plaintiffs have not
disputed this. (See Dkt. No. 30).
Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor—the avoidance of unnecessary problems of
conflict of laws—is neutral.
(c) The “interest of justice”
In its response, Plaintiffs argue that the “interest of justice” disfavors transfer. (Dkt. No.
30, at 16 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964))). Specifically, Plaintiffs assert
that, as Defendants are or are associated with a county that has a “culture” of police improprieties,
intimidation, coercion, and corruption, “[w]itnesses have expressed fear or reluctance to testify in
a Tyler courtroom.” (Id. at 16–17).
First, the Court has already considered the interest of justice in its discussion of the private
and public interest factors. Indeed, these factors bear on both “convenience . . . and the interest of
justice.” Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 315 (5th Cir. 2008). Second, and assuming arguendo that
Plaintiffs’ arguments are true, keeping the case in this Division does not guarantee no one might
attempt to harass potential fact witnesses, who may otherwise reside in Smith County. Plaintiff’s
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criticism of Smith County as having a “culture” of improprieties is nothing more than opinion and
argument.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ arguments should be rejected.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing factors, the Court must determine whether the Tyler Division is
“clearly more convenient” than this Division. The Fifth Circuit has been careful to emphasize that
district courts should not merely engage in a “raw counting” exercise which tallies up the factors
favoring transfer and the factors weighing against transfer. Radmax, 720 F.3d at 290, n.8 (“We do
not suggest—nor has this court held—that a raw counting of the factors in each side, weighing
each the same and deciding transfer only on the resulting ‘score,’ is the proper methodology.”).
Instead, the Court must make factual determinations to ascertain the degree of actual convenience
to be achieved, if any, and whether such rises to the level of “clearly more convenient.” See id.
Where the present and proposed forums are both roughly similar in terms of convenience, courts
should not conclude that the proposed transferee forum is “clearly more convenient.” Volkswagen
II, 545 F.3d at 315. While this Court does not hold that “clearly more convenient” is equal to
“clear and convincing,” a movant must show materially more than a mere preponderance of
convenience, lest the standard have no real or practical meaning. See id. When carefully applying
the convenience factors and the related factual arguments in each unique case, courts should be
careful not to lose sight of the plaintiff’s choice of forum and its historical significance in our
jurisprudence. Id. (“[W]hen the transferee venue is not clearly more convenient than the venue
chosen by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's choice should be respected.”).
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Having found that one factor favors transfer, two factors slightly favor transfer, and five
factors are neutral, the Court concludes that, on balance, this case should be transferred to the Tyler
Division.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED. The
Court therefore ORDERS the Clerk of Court to TRANSFER the above-captioned case to the
Tyler Division. The Court further ORDERS that all pending deadlines in the above-captioned
case are STAYED, to be rescheduled by the newly assigned District Judge in the Tyler Division.
.
____________________________________
RODNEY GILSTRAP
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 6th day of March, 2026.
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